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*Is a Non-metaphysical Religious Thought Possible?*  
– Possibility of Religious Thought within the Scope of Heidegger's  
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– A Methodological Approach –

Ebrahim Khodadady & Ehsan Golparvar





## **IS A NON-METAPHYSICAL RELIGIOUS THOUGHT POSSIBLE?**

### **– Possibility of Religious Thought within the Scope of Heidegger’s Onto-theology Criticism –**

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#### **Abstract**

This article aims to treat the uniqueness of religious thought as a subject of reflection by reference to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy since his views incorporate such a deeply rooted analysis. In pursuing the subject the article inquiries into the possibility of a non-metaphysical religious mode of thought in considering Heidegger’s critique of traditional Western metaphysics, his assessments on the onto-theological and humanistic character of metaphysics, and his evaluations on the meaning of true thinking pursuant to the mode of thought he calls ontological. With regard to our assessments of religious thought, we take Heidegger’s onto-theological criticisms as a point of departure. However, considering his philosophy and manner of thinking, we try to reveal what kind of possibilities the Heideggerian view can provide us in terms of religious thinking. Therefore, it is important that our assessments of religious thought not be interpreted as identical to Heidegger’s philosophy but rather as ideas that he might have potentially incorporated into his own philosophy.

*Key Words:* Religious thought, Heidegger, onto-theology, metaphysical thinking, religion, calculative thinking, meditative thinking

## **Introduction**

Since the beginnings of modern thought, numerous philosophers and scientists have critiqued metaphysics and the notions of metaphysical truth in various forms and conceptualizations. Modern thought often embraces a scientific and rational worldview that goes against many conventional philosophies and concepts of truth, including religious and mythological thinking. On the one hand, religious morals and laws can be incorporated into an entirely rational worldview within the scope of “nature” identified with “ratio.” On the other hand, in the wake of modern scientific and Cartesian influences, a subject who is isolated from all historicity, contingency, desire, life and the entire realm of being is construed to be the master of universe. According to this perspective, which reached full maturity during the Enlightenment, a man who claims to have attained intellectual maturity by displaying the “courage to make use of your own mind” needs to reference nothing except science and his own intellect. Such an attitude evidently made everything, including God, man, things, the universe and being, an epistemic object of human thought. Therefore, it has become almost impossible to establish a truly ontological relationship with the abovementioned realms of being.

The most apparent influence of this view on religious thought involved substituting the experience of religion with a scientific worldview, imposing a conceptual and rational framework that was designed by humans onto religion, and encouraging an individual pietism that was isolated from all institutionalization and consistent with the atomistic concept of the subject. Limiting the relationship between the individual and God, therefore, upheld a religious way of thinking that had been degraded to a mere function as a result of these issues. In our opinion, when it comes to modes of thought – particularly religious thought – a deeply rooted inquiry is generally needed in order to comprehend such transformations. In the present study, which aims to treat the uniqueness of religious thought as a subject of reflection, we have chosen the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, since his views incorporate such a deeply rooted analysis. Obviously, our intention is not to associate Heidegger, who spent his entire lifetime addressing the “meaning of Being,” with religious thinking or to introduce him as a kind of religious or mystic figure. Our objective is rather to investigate the possibility of a non-

metaphysical religious mode of thought in considering Heidegger's critique of traditional Western metaphysics (which he addresses in order to obtain an authentic experience of Being), his assessments on the onto-theological and humanistic character of metaphysics, as well as his evaluations on the meaning of true thinking pursuant to the mode of thought he calls ontological. At this point, it is worth noting that with regard to our assessments of religious thought, we take Heidegger's onto-theological criticisms as a point of departure. Nevertheless, considering his philosophy and manner of thinking, we try to reveal what kind of possibilities the Heideggerian view can provide us in terms of religious thinking. Therefore, it is important that our assessments of religious thought not be interpreted as identical to Heidegger's philosophy but rather as ideas that he might have potentially incorporated into his own philosophy.

In order to understand Heidegger's criticism of onto-theological thought, we must first understand how he evaluates and criticizes traditional Western metaphysics, which in a sense he identifies with the oblivion of Being. According to Heidegger, Western metaphysical thinking involves forgetting the ontological difference between Being and beings. All beings find their meaning during historical periods of exposure in which the Being that is not a being is reduced to a mere being. Identifying Socratic rationalism as the source of such an approach, Heidegger affirms that metaphysical thought paved the way for the destruction of the truth – and therefore the meaning – of Being, since it is inclined towards reducing everything to the rational, pursuant to its humanistic character.

According to Heidegger, throughout the Western metaphysical tradition, the meaning of Being goes unconsidered because it is instead designed as being, whereas the possibility of a true reflection towards Being depends on the possibility of a non-metaphysical reflection found in pre-Socratic thinkers. We think that the interpretation of such an approach in religious thought can be possible only through a method of thinking that enables a transition “from a conception of God that is made an object of imagination to a conception in which God is considered as one to shape imagination.” This method of thinking means that the thing which is made the object of reflection (such as Being, God, man, etc.) should be reflected in terms of its Being. In other words, “ontologically” as Heidegger puts it, it necessitates the true experience of its Being – and therefore, an es-

sential change in terms of its manner of thinking – rather than being designed in certain epistemic practices. Without a doubt, this method of thinking requires reflecting on the meaning of a metaphysical thought that essentially possesses a calculative nature.

### 1. Metaphysical Thinking in the Heideggerian Sense

In general terms, metaphysics can be described as the search for an unchanging substance behind any change. When considered within the context of such a definition, the common issue of the Western metaphysical tradition has been establishing Being (*Sein*) as presence.<sup>1</sup> This characteristic of the Western metaphysical tradition, which is criticized by Heidegger for reducing the Being to a being, involves searching for a constant and permanent source by means of binary oppositions. By reducing the Being to a being and defining it ahistorically, this definition defines the truth as something that can be obtained via certain epistemological tools.

In the Heideggerian view, “Metaphysics is inquiry beyond or over beings that aims to recover them as such and as a whole for our grasp.”<sup>2</sup> According to Heidegger, Western metaphysical thought, starting with Platonic philosophy, positions the Being outside of us as a being. By defining philosophy as striving for the *Sophon*,<sup>3</sup> it has forgotten the true distinction between *Being* and *beings*.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it has grown away from reflecting on Being, and this fact reached its radical peak in terms of the complete oblivion of Being through modern technology, in which metaphysics is, in a sense, embodied.

<sup>1</sup> John Sallis, “Heidegger/Derrida and Presence,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 81/10 (1984: Eighty-First Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division), 597.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?* (translated into Turkish by Yusuf Örnek; Ankara: Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu, 1991), 38; cf. id., “What is Metaphysics?” (trans. David Farrell Krell), in his *Pathmarks* (ed. William McNeill; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 93.

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger, *Nedir Bu Felsefe?* (translated into Turkish by Dürrin Tunç; Istanbul: Logos Yayıncılık, 1990), 23; cf. id., *What is Philosophy?* (translated with an introduction by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde; Albany: New College and University Press, 1956), 51.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” (trans. Frank A. Capuzzi), in his *Pathmarks*, 246.

According to Heidegger, for pre-Socratic thinkers, such as Heraclitus, the word *philosophos* meant to speak, like Logos, in harmony with *sophon*,<sup>5</sup> and therefore, to correspond with logos.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, *theoria* meant to contemplate the truth beyond any utility.<sup>7</sup> However, along with the conceptualization of philosophy as striving for *sophon* (due to metaphysics, for instance), Aristotle defines philosophy as the knowledge of first causes. The concept of theory experienced its greatest semantic shift in modern philosophy, as observation (*Betrachtung*) began to signify the entrapment of reality within the scope of certain epistemological setups.<sup>8</sup> Beyond any doubt, the essentialist character of traditional Western metaphysics provides the underlying reason for a manner of thinking that determines the Being as such and reduces it to being by means of making Being an epistemic object rather than reflecting as it is. Pursuant to this essentialist character, philosophy prefers to establish a concept of truth that exists independently of life, existence and historicity by defining its object of reflection in terms of its essence and its most basic characteristics due to a rationalistic conception of being. In Heidegger's view, Aristotle constitutes the most apparent example of this determination since he clearly distinguishes essence from existence, and the philosophy as treated by Aristotle "is a kind of aptness which makes it possible to see being in respect to what it is in so far as it is being."<sup>9</sup>

Because of this, Heidegger believes that metaphysical research comes across beings everywhere, but it can never find the Being that is not a being. Since Being is not an attribute present in being, it can neither be objectively designed nor embodied like being. Indeed, Being, which is completely different from all beings, is essentially

<sup>5</sup> *Sophon* signifies that all beings are collected and present in Being. The Being is being; where "is" is transitive and refers to being collected. In other words, Being collects beings by existence, Being is collection. Heidegger, *What is Philosophy?*, 46-48.

<sup>6</sup> Heidegger, *Nedir Bu Felsefe?*, 21; cf. id., *What is Philosophy?*, 47.

<sup>7</sup> Heidegger, "Bilim ve Düşünüm [Science and Reflection]," in his *Bilim Üzerine İki Ders [Two Essays by Heidegger on Science]* (translated into Turkish by Hakkı Hünler; Istanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 1998), 23.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Nedir Bu Felsefe?*, 27; cf. id., *What is Philosophy?*, 59.

Non-being.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the ontological distinction between the Being and beings, which is crucial in the Heideggerian view, is forgotten within the scope of metaphysical thought since the Being is reduced to a being. The history of metaphysics corresponds with the history of forgetting this distinction. The comprehension of Being reduced to being as a fundamental cause and principle for everything involves adopting a perspective that perceives everything as identical and therefore indistinguishable. This perspective explains everything via the same logical principles that eliminate the difference between Being and beings within sameness. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, the difference between beings reaches significance only with regard to the distinction between Being and beings. As a non-being, Being is diversely revealed in beings. However, to associate this entire process of revealing with a single logic means ruling out the difference, namely the ontological distinction, between the Being and beings within such a logic of identity.

From a Heideggerian perspective, the origin of this dominant manner of thinking in traditional Western metaphysics lies in its humanistic nature. There is a strict relationship between humanism, which bestows a privileged place to the human subject in epistemology and reduces everything to the intellect of the human subject, and metaphysical thought. The possibility of humanism is ensured through metaphysics granting a central and exclusionist role to man.<sup>11</sup> In other words, metaphysics can subsist only if its humanistic nature, which reduces everything to the human subject in rationalistic terms, remains concealed. As Gianni Vattimo points out, the humanistic character within Western metaphysics is reflected in modern philosophy through the Cartesian *cogito*, which makes man the master of the universe by positioning him in the center of the universe.<sup>12</sup> This perspective reached its peak with the Enlightenment. As many Enlightenment thinkers would agree, the Enlightenment principally addresses the salvation of man by maturing him in the sense of reason, and it

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<sup>10</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 45-46.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 245.

<sup>12</sup> Gianni Vattimo, *Modernliğin Sonu: Postmodern Kültürde Nihilizm ve Hermenötik* [*The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modern Culture*] (translated into Turkish by Şehabettin Yalçın; İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1999), 86.

emphasizes that both religion and metaphysics\* – along with progressive historicism and rational maturation – should be abandoned.<sup>13</sup> Especially when considered in terms of modern epistemology, which asserts the right method as the prerequisite of obtaining true knowledge, humanism, which can in a sense be interpreted as leaving everything to the human subject's will, assigns a privileged place to the representative and the theorizing on the one hand, in the sense of prioritizing theory over reality. On the other hand, it detaches man from life and the entire Being, as a necessary consequence of detachment between theory and practice.<sup>14</sup> In order to describe this manner, which Heidegger deems dominant in the entire tradition of Western metaphysics, he uses the expression "calculative thinking"\*\*\* as separate from meditative thinking.

Pursuant to his general criticisms of metaphysics, Heidegger affirms that calculative thinking corresponds to philosophical and scientific thinking, and it can be considered an act of computing. In line with its epistemological and humanistic character, this manner of thinking treats its object of reflection in terms of its essence and main characteristics, making it an object of rational reflection. In one sense, this is nothing but the construction of a metaphysical, and thus fictional, being that is reduced to the intellect of the human subject via

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\* At this point, we have to say that metaphysics are not addressed in the same way by Enlightenment thought in the Heideggerian sense. In Enlightenment thought, metaphysics tends to describe and exclude everything outside of human experience, particularly religion and myth, as metaphysical, whereas Heidegger argues the matter in terms of the meaning of Being. He also describes metaphysics as a mode of thinking that treats Being only by reducing it to being, and he considers the Enlightenment to be a continuation of this metaphysical tradition.

<sup>13</sup> Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" in Lawrence E. Cahoon (ed.), *From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 51.

<sup>14</sup> Hans Bertens, *The Idea of the Postmodern: A History* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), 166.

\*\*\* Here, it is crucially important to address the concept of time conception in metaphysical thought. The creation of a calculable world within an eternal present has become possible through the mathematical conception of time. This approach transforms it so that the truth becomes an object which is outside us staying-there and which can be obtained through the usage of necessary epistemological instruments.

epistemological methods in such a manner that the Being of the thing, which is made the object of reflection, is forgotten. Along with this argument, Heidegger underlines that the dominant way of thinking in Western metaphysics is not the type of meditative thinking that is found in the pre-Socratic Being experience. Western metaphysics allows the true thing to be reflected upon to remain unthought, and it realizes its reflection is pursuant to human interests since it contains humanistic content. Accordingly, calculative thinking can be considered an activity of computing based on interests rather than on meaning:

Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is.<sup>15</sup>

Calculative thinking – which became prevalent in the scientific manner of thought, as is reflected in modern technology – considers the world to be a source standing out there. In the modern period, referred to as *Gestell* (framing) by Heidegger, Being is seen only as a source that stands for industry and technology.

And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of *poiesis*. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.<sup>16</sup>

Just as a windmill surrenders to a blowing wind, the modern technique concentrates on storing and locking up energy in an entirely unnatural way.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, Heidegger uses the hydroelectric power

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking* (trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund; New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966), 46.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in his *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (trans. William Lovitt; New York: Garland Publishing, 1977), 14.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, *Tekniğe İlişkin Soruşturma [The Question Concerning Technology]* (translated into Turkish by Doğan Özlem; Istanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 1998), 55.

plant built on the Rhine as an example.<sup>18</sup> Modern science, dominated by calculative thinking, entraps and securely refines the real by means of theory as observation. Therefore, according to Heidegger, “modern science as theory in the sense of an observing that strives after is a refining of the real that does encroach uncannily upon it.”<sup>19</sup>

For Heidegger, modern science, which intends to control “the real” and render it predictable by making it an object of calculative thinking rather than steering for its being, should be considered an entrapping representation that corresponds with reality: “Science sets upon the real. It orders it into place to the end that at any given time the real will exhibit itself as an interacting network, i.e. a surveyable series of related causes. The real thus becomes surveyable and capable of being followed out in its sequences. The real becomes secured in its objectness. From this there result spheres or areas of objects that scientific observation can entrap after its fashion.”<sup>20</sup> From this perspective, either everything is objectified in a calculative manner that prioritizes epistemology or it is excluded for being irrational when such objectifying is impossible. Especially with the Cartesian metaphysics of subjectivity, the language leaves itself to our will and control, as an instrument for establishing dominance over beings. Thereupon, the beings themselves begin to be seen as realities that interact with cause and effect.<sup>21</sup>

In the Heideggerian view, even modern scientific concern with control and predictability is similar to metaphysical thought. Therefore, the language of metaphysical thought makes not only Being, but also God, religion and man the object of a calculative logic. Thus, the language does not reflect them either. In fact, regarding the possibilities of the language of religion, criticisms of rational theology are essentially about the fact that religion and God are treated within the scope of logic, which reduces them to rational. Nietzsche considered Pascal to be a Christian of single logic because he said “God of Abra-

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, “Bilim ve Düşünüm,” 27; cf. id., “Science and Reflection,” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 166-167.

<sup>20</sup> Heidegger, “Bilim ve Düşünüm,” 28; cf. id., “Science and Reflection,” 167-168.

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, “‘Hümanizm’ Üzerine Mektup,” in Ahmet Aydoğan (ed. and trans.), *Hümanizmin Özü: Heidegger, Sartre, Eliot, Babbitt* (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2002), 43-44.

ham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and the scholars,” which means that man is not only a being of reason, but also one with feelings and instincts, and religion and God resists being reduced to the rational level<sup>22</sup> in his onto-theological criticisms. Similarly, Heidegger is a significant inspiration for criticisms of rational theology, even though his philosophy is not assigned to religion and God. This is why Heideggerian onto-theological criticism is relevant to our study, particularly in comprehending the content of so-called religious thought.

## **2. The Relationship between Logic, Metaphysics and Onto-theology**

Heidegger’s criticisms of onto-theology is important to the way thought, particularly religious thought, has been understood throughout the history of metaphysics, and to the kind of a metamorphosis it underwent. This process of metamorphosis that Heidegger called the “onto-theo-logical construction of metaphysics” in fact means the subjection of the object of reflection to a humanistic reduction that is related to a rational epistemology by means of fortification of an epistemological way of thinking rather than an ontological one. In other words, the way of thinking that has claimed to attain this essence throughout the history of metaphysics has chosen to fictionalize the object of reflection rather than reflecting on it. That is why this tradition has become alienated from both reflection and the meaning of Being. The metaphysical manner of thinking, which Heidegger criticizes as onto-theology, is nothing but this fiction realized, based on a way of thinking that prioritizes epistemology. A healthier assessment of how this fiction came to be can be possibly pursuant to the following evaluations by Heidegger on metaphysics:

Metaphysics thinks of beings as such, that is, in general. Metaphysics thinks of beings as such, as a whole. Metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the ground-giving unity of what is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that accounts for the ground, that is, of the All-Highest. The Being of beings is thus thought of in advance as the grounding ground. Therefore, all metaphysics is at bottom, and from the ground up, what

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<sup>22</sup> Hans Küng, *Does God Exist? An Answer for Today* (trans. Edward Quinn; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 382.

grounds, what gives account of the ground, what is called to account by the ground, and finally what calls the ground to account.<sup>23</sup>

Heidegger carries out these analyses on the content of metaphysics in order to experience the concepts of ontology, theology and onto-theology through their own centers of gravity. As a matter of fact, the suffix 'logy' (*logos*) refers to an entire relation of foundation according to which the objects of sciences are designed and therefore comprehended.

Ontology, however, and theology are "Logies" inasmuch as they provide a foundation for beings and account for them within the whole. They account for Being as the ground of beings. They account for the *Logos* and are in an essential sense in accord with the *Logos*-, that is they are the logic of the *Logos*.<sup>24</sup>

This is why, for Heidegger, their common name should be onto-theo-logic. From this point of view, logic "is the name of thinking that gets to the root of being as such in the sense of being as *logos* in everywhere and that grounds it."<sup>25</sup> And when the being of being is designed as the cause of itself, one arrives at the concept of God in metaphysics.<sup>26</sup>

This is why Heidegger calls this tradition of thinking onto-theo-logy. For him,

Metaphysics is ontology in that it thinks of Being as the first and most universal ground common to all beings. Metaphysics is a kind of theology because it thinks of Being as the highest ground above all beings, ultimately as the ground of itself, *causa sui*, which is the metaphysical concept of God. Metaphysics is thus in its very nature onto-theo-logic.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, *Özdeşlik ve Ayrım* (translated into Turkish by Necati Aça; Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Yayınları, 1997), 42; cf. id., *Identity and Difference* (translated with an introduction by Joan Stambaugh; New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), 58.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 59.

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *Özdeşlik ve Ayrım*, 43; cf. id., *Identity and Difference*, 59.

<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, *Özdeşlik ve Ayrım*, 44; cf. id., *Identity and Difference*, 60.

<sup>27</sup> Heidegger, "Metafizikğin Onto-teo-lojik İnşası [The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics]," in Ahmet Demirhan (ed. and trans. into Turkish), *Heidegger ve*

In other words, the onto-theological quality of metaphysics arises from the very nature of metaphysics, and since the comprehension of beings (*logos*) leads to asking questions about the origin of Being, and this origin is called God (*Theos*), it is possible to claim that according to Heidegger, every philosophy is also a theology.<sup>28</sup>

When considered within the context of these assessments, since the Western tradition of metaphysics treats Being reduced to a being in terms of its essence and characteristics, it is an ontology (Onto: Being), and as it treats Being in terms of source and ground for beings as the highest and most principal selfdom, it is an onto-theology (Theo: God). Accordingly, for Heidegger, throughout the tradition of metaphysical thinking, the effort to understand the transcendent ground of all beings in terms of a transcendent Being has brought along hazardous effects in both philosophy (thinking) and theology (religious thought). This onto-theological approach constrains philosophy from considering Being as a non-being, whereas it hinders the true relation with the divine by misinterpreting the nature of God.<sup>29</sup> In fact, because theology accepts God as an exterior source in the chain of creation, Heidegger contends that it reduces the divine or the true God to the God of philosophers, and this reveals the onto-theological approach in the very essence of the entire Western metaphysics tradition. In Heidegger's opinion, this tradition of metaphysics establishes our fundamental and final conceptual parameters by ontologically grounding and theologically legitimizing our historical comprehension of 'what is.'<sup>30</sup> As Wayne Hankey points out, considering theological history in terms of onto-theology will reveal that God has been considered a being encircled by horizons given through a chain of the notions of being. Such a confinement is not only in question for God, but also for man. In this respect, one can even claim

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*Teoloji [Heidegger and Theology]* (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2002), 65; Joan Stambaugh, "Introduction," in *Identity and Difference*, 15.

<sup>28</sup> John Reynold Williams, *Heidegger'in Din Felsefesi [Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of Religion]* (translated into Turkish by Mehmet Türkeri; Izmir: İzmir İlahiyat Vakfı Yayınları, 2005), 124.

<sup>29</sup> Mark A. Wrathall, "Introduction: Metaphysics and Onto-Theology," in Mark A. Wrathall (ed.), *Religion After Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.

<sup>30</sup> Iain D. Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.

that in the Western tradition of metaphysics, the relationship man has with himself and the world is formed within certain theologies that are determined ontologically.<sup>31</sup>

This very process of formation reveals the epistemologically\* privileged character of philosophy and thus of metaphysics. Because epistemology searches for the nature of the knowledge behind things, the question is always, “what is this?” Responses to this question also assume a representative relationship between the interrogative and the defined. For example, when we ask “What is man?,” we choose to define man in terms of what makes him what he is, namely, his essence, and we also reduce man to a definition that excludes all situations except for the form by means of determining man in a form that cannot be otherwise. This philosophical approach, which Levinas called ontological imperialism, singles out a dominant way of thinking that obstructs, excludes or agrees with the prescribed epistemic context of many things in general about Being, and specifically in the current example, man. Yet, to define a thing by its characteristics implies an inherent assertion about how it should be. This, in a sense, is similar to the way the dog in a picture does not bark or Foucault’s famous “this is not a pipe” premise signifies how epistemological fictions based on a representative relationship are detached from existence.

According to Heidegger, and in keeping with a way of thinking that is primarily based on epistemology, the method of metaphysics

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<sup>31</sup> Wayne Hankey, “Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas, John Milbank, Jean-Luc Marion and John Zizioulas,” *Modern Theology* 15/4 (1999), 387.

\* Even though the most absolute form of an epistemological way of thinking consists of a modern-age epistemology that “searches for possibility and limits of knowledge, determines the content of knowledge and then advances to analyze our faith, values, judgments and views in consideration of such determination” (Doğan Özlem, *Kültür Bilimleri ve Kültür Felsefesi [The Sciences of Culture and Philosophy of Culture]* [Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1986], 68), as Heidegger emphasizes, the dominant philosophical way of thinking in Western metaphysics can be described as an entirely theoretical activity of thinking that is primarily based on epistemology, which prefers to comprehend Being in terms of the abovementioned theoretical activity, apart from ignoring historicity, existence and life within the scope of the contrast between theory and history.

that reduces Being to a being and entraps everything into certain categories with respect to ontology signifies an unawareness of the most crucial question about the meaning of Being for man. Ontological categories developed under this tradition are seen as manifest, and they are perceived as the eternal and effective salvation of the intellect. However, Heidegger thinks that philosophical categories, which he considers to be apparently obvious, possess historical contingency.<sup>32</sup> That is, ontological categories designed by attributing them to absoluteness, ahistoricity and universality are in fact historically constructed within the humanistic approach, rather than an ontological reflection, and they are epistemological categories that claim to theorize or represent the truth.

Through a Heideggerian perspective, the main problem within the content of the humanistic approach that claims to theorize or represent the truth is that it is not open to the meaning of the thing that it turns into an object of reflection. As a matter of fact, the most important prerequisite for thinking about the meaning of Being in general and of any being in particular is to be ontologically open to the being of the reflected thing. However, due to the abovementioned epistemology-based attitude of humanistic thinking, it is out of the question to move beyond the construction of meaning. In our opinion, the most apparent example of this problem can be seen in metaphysical attitudes regarding the relationship man establishes with God.

### 3. Metaphysical Thought and Religion

Based on the continuity of Western metaphysics, Heidegger emphasizes that metaphysics established its most concrete form via modern technology, and the control and dominance of reality eventually transformed into a dominance that also included man. Modern man, as Nietzsche stresses, lives in an age of nihilism, where the high values, the ideas of substance and finally onto-theological comprehensions of God established by the metaphysical tradition, trivialize themselves over the course of time under the dominance of a scientific worldview. Even worse, the madman of Nietzsche is aware of the greatness of the absence of God, whereas modern man, called 'last

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<sup>32</sup> Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger ve Varlık ve Zaman [Heidegger and Being and Time]* (translated into Turkish by Kaan Ökten; Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1998), 39.

man' by Nietzsche and 'das-Man', namely, *the They* by Heidegger, is even unaware of the situation. Moreover, according to Heidegger, people in the marketplace who make fun of Nietzsche's madman have lost their faith in God not because they think God is not worthy of belief, but because they have abandoned the possibility of believing. "Because," says Heidegger, "they are incompetent in reflection, they have left reflecting and instead, have filled the marketplace with empty talk."<sup>33</sup>

This evidently does not signify a desire by Heidegger for reanimating the metaphysical imaginings of God. Modern man has to live in a godless world following the collapse of the onto-theo-logical imaginings of God. Nevertheless, Heidegger claims that man bears the possibility of being closer to the divine God, even if he gives up empty talking and lends an ear to the voice of Being. "*Causa sui*," adds Heidegger, "This is the proper name for God in [metaphysics] philosophy. To this God man can neither pray nor offer sacrifice. Before the *causa sui* man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god... Therefore, thinking which must abandon the God of philosophy, God *causa sui*, is perhaps closer to the divine God." In other words, the god-less thinking "is freer for Him than onto-theo-logy would like to admit."<sup>34</sup> Evidently, however, such a reflection cannot be realized by man, who, according to Heidegger, forgets that even the question of the meaning of Being is forgotten, or as Nietzsche's last man, does nothing but pursue his own desires.

It is possible to affirm that with capitalist lifestyles and consumer culture, man lives a life that adheres to Nietzsche and Heidegger's descriptions of modern man. Modern man, who worries about nothing but the pursuit of human desires, enjoying a more comfortable life and continuously consuming without making any distinctions among his desires regarding value or quality, is clearly incompetent when it comes to reflection and comprehension. Modern life is full of such thoughtlessness and lack of meaning. For example, in terms of modern intellectual culture, the parallelisms established almost reluctantly between religion and science via interpretations of religion

<sup>33</sup> John Peacocke, "Heidegger ve Onto-teoloji Sorunu [Heidegger and the Problem of Onto-theology]," in *Heidegger ve Teoloji*, 165.

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, "Metafizik'in Onto-teolojik İnşası," 66; id., *Identity and Difference*, 72.

from a modernist perspective put religious texts and traditional religious lifestyles to a historical reading which will eventually make them compatible with the modern world. Their concern about maintaining the harmony of modern lifestyles constitutes only a few examples of the epistemological perspective that is essentially detached from any religious thought. Again, many people in the modern world who consider themselves connected to a certain religion are nonetheless within a consumption logic that snubs the relationship styles and moral hierarchies prescribed by their religion regarding God, man and the universe. Evidently, this is a consequence of the abovementioned incompetence when it comes to reflection.\* Such inaptitude arises from the fact that the world in which modern man lives is essentially constructed with a humanistic logic, and both God and religion participate in this process of construction.

Both God and religion serve important functions in the eyes of modern man.<sup>35</sup> It is impossible to talk about God and religion having any sanctioning power on man, except for meeting his psychological needs. It should be noted that in the modern world, the phenomenon of returning to religion and the divine is entirely deceptive. Religious thinking pays attention to man's ontological connection with God, whereas man in the modern world has a more logical relationship with God, whom he makes an object of imagination that exists only to fulfill his religious need, or whom he seeks out from a sense of abandonment. It is evidently doubtful that a God who has no choice but to forgive and is pacified by the human imagination is really a

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\* Numerous examples can be given in this respect. Since the desires of modern people of faith are, just like those of other men within consumer culture, encoded towards capitalist consumer products, the modern faithful man takes comfort in either integrating into such life practice without giving importance to values of religion he belongs to, or through a relief that arises via reconciliation of his own values with modern values. The phenomena of such fashion shows, resorts for the faithful, the efforts for a more luxurious and comfortable life, indifference to famine, poverty and ecological balance are typical features that demonstrate how, in fact, religious thought and practices arising from such thinking are unimportant in the eyes of modern man.

<sup>35</sup> Regarding reduction of religion to a functional and instrumental function in terms of moral and social control, see İbrahim Kalın, "Dinî ve Bilimsel Enstrümentalizm: Çıkılmazlar, Çözüm Arayışları [Religious and Scientific Instrumentalism: Deadlocks, Seeking Solutions]," *Dîvân* 1/1 (1996), 107-118.

God. Humanist theologians especially encourage modern man to transform his conception of God, who is traditionally an object of fear, in favor of viewing God as an object of love. In other words, they convince man that God does not contact him from some unknown world, and man's ability to reach this other world does not depend on his deeds in this world. Afraid of man's potential for evil, such a tame God is a flexible being that is adaptable to human psychology. It is possible to avoid making God an object of design, I reckon, through establishing an understanding that arises from a determination of being in the true sense by resolutely responding to rooted questions about the meaning of existence.

### **Instead of a Conclusion: Pure or Meditative Thinking (Religious Thinking) as a Possibility of a Non-Metaphysical Religious Thought**

Heidegger defines meditative thinking as non-calculative thinking that is determined through the otherness of Being and considers the ontological difference between Being and beings. The basic characteristic of this mode of thought is that the being sacrifices itself within Being for the sake of the truth of Being.<sup>36</sup> Such a thought does not impose a fictional perspective onto things, but rather it accepts them as they are and respectfully lets them exist in silence. Therefore, reflection refers to an unconstrained and altruistic (or non-selfish) activity. Moreover, such reflection is pious, accepting and respectful. It "is a truly accepting response to the call or voice of Being."<sup>37</sup> In this context, comprehension is not a theoretical or epistemological activity. Instead, its content is entirely related to practice, and it corresponds to the active part of the encounter between man and his own existential-Being possibilities.<sup>38</sup>

Heideggerian meditative thinking contends that auditory metaphors are more important than visual ones, and it views Speech as the essence of language. The privilege given to sound enables an explanation of the etymological affinity between the words "to hear" (*hören*), "to be all ears" (*hörchen*), "to belong" (*gehören*) and finally "to obey" (*gehorchen*) in German. Therefore, "to hear" refers to "to be

<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, *Metafizik Nedir?*, 49.

<sup>37</sup> Peacocke, "Heidegger ve Onto-teoloji Sorunu," 160.

<sup>38</sup> Mulhall, *Heidegger ve Varlık ve Zaman*, 116-117.

all ears,” “to belong” and “to obey.” In the same context, a thought that hears the call of Being is one that expresses gratitude for being the object of such a call and therefore becomes obedient to it. A pious hearer who participates in the call abandons the request to tyrannize the true nature of beings by means of the narcissistic approach of the visual.<sup>39</sup> Without a doubt, leaving beings as they are necessitates freeing them from ontological categories that are built via the epistemological character of metaphysical tradition, as well as considering man not as a being of intellect, but as a Being that humbly consents to its fate and enters into an existential relationship with Being and beings, rather than a theoretical-fictional relationship.

This is why Heidegger thinks that the realization of meditative thinking can be possible only through comprehending that the intellect, which has reigned for centuries, is the most “stiff-necked adversary of thought.”<sup>40</sup> For this manner of thought, reality, Being and truth are all understood through actively participating in temporality and existence, which are the meaning of Being and can be comprehended by surrendering, instead of entering into an ahistorical realm of being that remains outside of us and can be theorized through various epistemological methods. At this point, Heidegger uses an etymological analysis to explain the true meaning of reflection. In German, the words *sinnan* and *sinen* (to sense) mean “to follow a direction that is the way that something has, of itself, already taken.” The source of *Besinnen* (reflecting), which is derived from the same stem, is “to venture courageously after sense or meaning (*Sinn*).” Therefore, it involves more than simply comprehension. Consequently, “we do not yet have reflection when we have only consciousness. Reflection is more. It is a calm, self-possessed surrender to that which is worthy of questioning.”<sup>41</sup> Therefore, reflection in the Heideggerian view possesses an essence that is different from consciousness, scientific knowledge, and the intellectual cultivation that is unarguably essential to a modern lifestyle.

<sup>39</sup> Peacocke, “Heidegger ve Onto-teoloji Sorunu,” 160-161.

<sup>40</sup> Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche ‘God Is Dead,’” in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, 112; cf. id., “Nietzsche’nin ‘Tanrı Öldü’ Sözü,” in his *Nietzsche’nin ‘Tanrı Öldü’ Sözü ve Dünya Resimleri Çağı* (translated into Turkish by Levent Özşar; Bursa: Asa Kitabevi, 2001), 61.

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” 180.

Heidegger's criticisms of intellectual cultivation are especially remarkable in this respect.

Intellectual cultivation brings before man a model in the light of which he shapes and improves all that he does. Cultivating the intellect requires a guiding image rendered secure in advance, as well as a standing-ground fortified on all sides. The putting forward of a common ideal of culture and the rule of that ideal presupposes a situation and bearing of man that is not in question and that is secured in every direction. This presupposition, for its part, must be based on a belief in the invincible power of an immutable reason and its principles.<sup>42</sup>

On the other hand, reflection, which is a historical dwelling, incorporates us into our dwelling for the first time. This is why reflection is more cautious, provident and poor compared to intellectual cultivation. As a matter of fact, "the ways of reflection constantly change, ever according to the place on the way at which a path begins, ever according to the portion of the way that it traverses, ever according to the distant view that opens along the way into that which is worthy of questioning."<sup>43</sup> Obviously, the possibility for true reflection requires giving up the search for rational knowledge in modern thinking and philosophy. Relieving the problem from being methodical allows man to escape from the theoretical and fictional objections that he puts between truth and his own Being and which obstruct him from contemplating the truth. In doing so, he assumes responsibility for his own existence.

Indeed, Heidegger identifies meditative thinking as a non-metaphysical way of thinking on the one hand, and on the other hand, when considered along with onto-theology criticisms, a non-metaphysical religious thought. First of all, as with the Heideggerian view, religious thought, which prioritizes ontology, maintains an ontological openness towards the Being that is made the object of reflection. In religious thought that is interpretative rather than explanatory, man is invited to find the answers to certain fundamental questions about the meaning of an entire realm of Being in general and his own existence in particular. This reigning interpretative logic operates so that the person who accepts the invitation opens himself to truths that he personally finds in the midst of questions and which

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<sup>42</sup> Heidegger, "Bilim ve Düşünüm," 42; cf. id., "Science and Reflection," 180.

<sup>43</sup> Heidegger, "Bilim ve Düşünüm," 43; cf. id., "Science and Reflection," 181.

give meaning to existence by means of abandoning his search for explanatory responses. As a result, an entire realm of Being attains the possibility of being experienced within its ontological connection with God.

As for thinking about man and other Beings in terms of their ontological connections with God, this presupposes escaping from the theoretical (humanistic) obstacles placed by man between himself and truth. Thus, man is no longer an obstacle to that which he has made an object of reflection, and he begins to contemplate the ontological connection that all Beings have with God by letting things be. Levinas, who was deeply influenced by Heideggerian philosophy, associates the face of the other with the trace of God.<sup>44</sup> In religious thought, man is invited to see the divine trace carried by an entire realm of being and to realize all his relationships with beings in light of this. Religious thought does not choose to design either God or man, or even other created Beings by means of making them objects of knowledge belonging to a thought that prioritizes epistemology. The point here is to get out of the way of Being, which is made the object of reflection, and allow it to reveal itself to us as it is. This question, corresponding with the Heideggerian concept of letting be and releasement,<sup>45</sup> is actualized in religious thought through concepts such as fate, consent and faith.

Consequently, when it comes to religious thought, it is impossible for man to test God, man or the world in which he is created as an object of imagination. As referred to above in saying, “from God shaped by imagination, to God who shapes imagination,” a man who adheres to religious thought does not have a rational foundation of thought, and he does not strive to reduce his knowledge about God, religion, man and Being to the limits of human rationality. Here, man realizes his reflection via existence, and he also contemplates the truths that God reveals to him by means of existence. The pious man knows he will be entrapped within the limitations of the human intellect, and he will reduce everything to this intellect if there is no exist-

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<sup>44</sup> For association established by Levinas' philosophy between God and the other, see Jeffrey Bloechl (ed.), *The Face of the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).

<sup>45</sup> For a more detailed analysis on these concepts, see Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 116-118.

ence. Accordingly, he knows that the possibility of attaining the truth depends on obedience and surrender. That same way that Heidegger describes man as “being-towards-death,” in religious thought, man is first invited to understand his own mortality. In such a mode of thought in which Being is almost synonymous with nothing, man transitions from the illusory to true existence. Continuously underlining the mortality and limitedness of man, this invitation invokes the fact that man possesses nothing, and God controls everything. Therefore, man makes a vital preference between an illusory existence based on the idea of property and a true existence that can be attained only by abandoning the concept of property. Indeed, the beginning point of the way of thinking we call religious thought corresponds exactly to this very moment of choice.

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# **DĀR AL-HIJRA IN KHĀRIJĪ AND ISMĀ‘İLĪ THOUGHT**

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## **Abstract**

The understanding of *dār al-bijra*, whose roots lie in the emigration of the Prophet Muḥammad from Mecca to Medina, has found a significant place in the history of Islamic sects. By making this notion a part of their creeds, the Khārijīs and the Ismā‘īlīs have endeavored to legitimize some of their views. In this article, we try to bring to light how these sects understand the notion of *dār al-bijra* and what elements regarding the creed were later added to this concept.

*Key Words:* Khawārij, Ismā‘īliyya, Qarmaṭiyya, *dār al-bijra*, *taqiyya*

## **Introduction**

Because the Prophet Muḥammad was not able to put an end to polytheistic domination in Mecca, he was forced to immigrate to Medina, where became known as the land of emigration (*dār al-bijra*). With the Prophet, Muslims immigrated to Medina in large numbers and founded a state for themselves from which they had the opportunity to spread Islam. The political triumph the Prophet achieved through emigration later caused some Islamic sects to develop an emigration-based theology to fulfill their own political aspirations. Although these sects initially formed emigration-based theologies inspired by the Prophet’s emigration, they later attached their own distinct connotations to the notions of *bijra* (emigration) and *dār al-bijra*, which deviate substantially from the meanings they had in the time of the Prophet; these notions with added meanings eventually became central elements of their own beliefs.

In this article, we will employ a scientific approach to determine what kind of theological perspective the Khārijīs, the first in the Islamic tradition to make the notion of *dār al-hijra* a part of their creed, developed and what new approaches and contributions the Ismāʿīlīs advanced following the Khārijī understanding of this belief.

### ***Dār al-hijra* in Khārijī Thought**

Khārijīs or Khawārij was the first Islamic sect to make the notion of *dār al-hijra* an essential part of its creed. The first appearance of this notion dates back to a dispute between Nāfiʿ ibn al-Azraq (d. 65/684), the leader of the Azāriqa branch, and Najda ibn al-ʿĀmir (d. 69/688), the leader of the Najadāt branch. Nāfiʿ ibn al-Azraq was willing to form a religious society, and to that end, he benefited from the idea of the Prophet’s emigration to Medina.<sup>1</sup> In Nāfiʿ’s view, all Muslims should emigrate to him,<sup>2</sup> because he himself had emigrated from Muslim society, which he had declared to be unbelieving, just as all Muslims had followed the Prophet to Medina. He declared that emigration towards him in order to fight the polytheists is the chief distinction between belief and unbelief. Acting on this proclamation, he branded all of those who chose not to emigrate as unbelievers, although some held the same opinion as he did.<sup>3</sup> He perceived emigration as an obligation so that he could fight against those who opposed him, and he employed the notion of *taqiyya* (precautionary dissimulation) as the opposite of emigration. However, the meaning he attached to *taqiyya* is quite different from how the Shīʿī tradition understands it. According to Nāfiʿ, *taqiyya*, rather than suggesting a concealment of one’s faith in the case of imminent danger to one’s life and property, expresses sitting still (*quʿūd*) or abstaining from emigration, which is obligated by Allah for *jihād*, and from commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong. According to Nāfiʿ’s understanding, *taqiyya* was unlawful, and he accused the

<sup>1</sup> W. Montgomery Watt, “Khārijite Thought in the Umayyad Period,” *Der Islam* 36/3 (1961), 220.

<sup>2</sup> Abū I-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa-kbtilāf al-muṣallīn* (ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1950), I, 162.

<sup>3</sup> Al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, I, 158-162.

*qaʿada*, those who failed to emigrate and thus abstained from *jibād*, of unbelief.<sup>4</sup>

The first harsh reaction to Nāfiʿs intolerant understanding that viewed those who did not join him as unbelievers came from Najda ibn al-ʿĀmir, who was also a Khārijī. Although Najda emphasized that it was better for those who could to participate in *jibād*, he also ruled that *quʿūd* was permissible. He utilized the following Qurʾānic verse (Q 4:95) to legitimize his view: “Allah has exalted those who strive above those who sit still by a tremendous reward.” In this verse, sitting still and not participating in *jibād* is not seen as unbelief, but it is emphasized that *jibād* is more virtuous. Nonetheless, Nāfiʿ insisted on the validity of his own view and restricted the scope of this verse by suggesting that its meaning was limited to those who accompanied the Prophet during the conquest of Mecca.<sup>5</sup>

Considering the above-mentioned view of the Najadāt, one cannot say that all branches of Khawārij accuse the *qaʿada* of being unbelievers.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, the Azāriqa’s stipulation of emigration for

<sup>4</sup> Abū l-ʿAbbās ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Nāshīʿ al-Akbar, *Masāʾil al-imāma wa-muqtaṭafāt min al-Kitāb al-awsaṭ fi l-maqālāt* (ed. Josef van Ess; Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1971), 69; Abū Ḥātim Aḥmad ibn Ḥamdān al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-zīna fi l-kalimāt al-Islāmiyya al-ʿArabiyya* (part III, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Sallūm al-Sāmarrāʾī), in al-Sāmarrāʾī, *al-Ghuluww wa-l-firaq al-ghāliya fi l-ḥaḍāra al-Islāmiyya* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Baghdād: Dār Wāsiṭ li-l-Nashr, 1982), 285. Al-Baghdādī and al-Isfarāyīnī took it further to state that Nāfiʿ saw them as polytheists. See Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir ibn Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq* (ed. Muḥammad ʿUthmān al-Khusht; Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Sīnā, 1988), 79; Abū l-Muzaḥfar Shaḥfūr ibn Ṭāhir ibn Muḥammad al-Isfarāyīnī, *al-Tabṣīr fi l-dīn wa-tamyīz al-firqa al-nājiya ʿan al-firaq al-bālikin* (ed. Kamāl Yūsuf al-Ḥūt; Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1983), 50.

<sup>5</sup> Al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-zīna*, 285.

<sup>6</sup> For example see Sālim ibn Dhakwān, *The Epistle of Sālim ibn Dhakwān* (= *Sīra*) (ed. Patricia Crone and Fritz W. Zimmermann; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 96-98; al-Rabīʿ ibn Ḥabīb ibn ʿAmr al-Ibāḍī, *al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ* (= *Musnad al-Imām al-Rabīʿ ibn Ḥabīb*) (ed. Muḥammad Idrīs and ʿĀshūr ibn Yūsuf; Beirut: Dār al-Ḥikma, 1995), 297-299; Abū l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahraṣṭānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal* (ed. Aḥmad Fahmī Muḥammad; Fustāṭ: n.p., 1948), I, 194-196; al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq*, 90. For a contemporary assessment, see Patricia Crone, “A Statement by the Najdiyya Khārijites on the Dispensability of the Imamate,” *Studia Islamica* 88 (1998), 75-76.

*jibād* and their accusation the *qaʿada* of unbelief became central points around which the main topics of controversy amongst the branches of Khawārij intensified. The Azāriqa's evaluation of *quʿūd* as *taqiyya* caused the lands where the *qaʿada* resided to be named *dār al-taqiyya*.<sup>7</sup> Regarding the lands named *dār al-taqiyya*, the Azāriqa preferred to use the term *dār al-shirk* (land of polytheism) and *dār al-kufr* (land of infidelity).<sup>8</sup> However, because most of the sub-branches of the Khawārij did not accept this view, the term *dār al-taqiyya* was more commonly used to refer to the lands where the *qaʿada*, both Khārijīs and non-Khārijīs, lived.

The Ibāḍiyya, one of the moderate branches of Khawārij, conceptualized the status of such lands differently. According to them, lands where non-emigrating Muslim opponents lived were defined as *dār al-tawḥīd* (land of unity), while the headquarters of the sultan was *dār al-baghy* (land of usurpation). Muslims who live in *dār al-tawḥīd* were considered monotheists (*muwawḥhīds*) though not believers (*muʾmins*).<sup>9</sup> They befriended the *qaʿada* of their own sect who lived in *dār al-tawḥīd* but clearly maintained that those who emigrated and fought were superior to the *qaʿada*.<sup>10</sup>

The disputes regarding the status of the lands where the *qaʿada* lived naturally incited judicial controversies amongst the Khārijīs about *dār al-taqiyya*. A lengthy discussion of the judicial status of those living in *dār al-taqiyya* goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, touching upon the fundamental judicial issues regarding *dār al-taqiyya* is necessary to better comprehend the matter at hand.

The Azāriqa held the opinion that everybody living in *dār al-kufr* was an unbeliever regardless of whether they belonged to the

<sup>7</sup> For more examples of this definition, see al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq*, 94, 100.

<sup>8</sup> See Abū Tammām, *Bāb al-shaytān min Kitāb al-shajara*, in Wilferd Madelung and Paul Walker, *An Ismāʿīlī Heresiography: The 'Bāb al-shaytān' from Abū Tammām's Kitāb al-shajara* (Leiden, Boston & Köln: Brill, 1998), 21 (Arabic text); al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq*, 79; al-Isfarāyīnī, *al-Tabṣīr*, 50.

<sup>9</sup> It is seen that the Ibāḍīs clearly make a distinction between *muʾmin* and *muslim*. See al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, I, 171-172; Abū Tammām, *Bāb al-shaytān*, 28; al-Shahraṣṭānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, I, 213; also see Watt, "Khārijite Thought ...," 225.

<sup>10</sup> Sālim ibn Dhakwān, *Sīra*, 96-98.

Azāriqa or any other sect. Those who lived in such lands had two options: either to emigrate to them or to be executed.<sup>11</sup> According to the Azāriqa, all forms of worship performed in *dār al-kufr* were simply unacceptable and fruitless because the performers were unbelievers.<sup>12</sup> This opinion allowed for no further discussion amongst the Azāriqa of judicial matters related to *dār al-kufr*. However, all other Khārijī branches tended to view members of their own sects living in *dār al-taqiyya* as Muslims and consequently found themselves considering more intricate judicial matters. More important than these matters was the question of whether or not to befriend and feel love for the Khārijīs living in these lands. According to the Najadāt, killing *abl al-ʿabd* (Jews and Christians) and *abl al-dhimma* (tax-paying non-Muslims) who live there was lawful, furthermore, they cannot be befriended. As for the ʿAjārida, it was not permissible to kill the *qaʿada* living in *dār al-hijra* or to confiscate their property, because emigration was not obligatory, but just virtuous.<sup>13</sup> The Ibāḍiyya, on the other hand, declared the blood and property of who live in *dār al-taqiyya* to be unlawful because they considered them as *abl al-tawḥīd*, except for those who live in the headquarters of the sultan.<sup>14</sup>

One of the important judicial issues discussed about *dār al-taqiyya* was whether the execution of one's parents living in *dār al-taqiyya* would be lawful. Contrary to the opinion of the Azāriqa, who accepted that the execution of anyone in *dār al-taqiyya* to be lawful, the Shimrākhiyya suggested that it would be unlawful to kill one's parents living in *dār al-taqiyya* even if they were opponents.<sup>15</sup> Another prevalent judicial issue among the Khārijīs was concerned marriage to those living in *dār al-taqiyya*. The Ḍaḥḥākhiyya and the Ṣufriyya held that a Muslim woman from either sect living in *dār al-taqiyya* could marry an infidel<sup>16</sup> man living there who was not from

<sup>11</sup> Abū Ḥātim, *Kitāb al-zīna*, III, 284.

<sup>12</sup> Al-Nāshiʿ al-Akbar, *Masāʾil al-imāma*, 69.

<sup>13</sup> Abū Tammām, *Bāb al-shayṭān*, 22; al-Isfarāyīnī, *al-Tabṣīr*, 57; al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, I, 191, 201-202.

<sup>14</sup> Al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, I, 171; al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, I, 213. For criticism of the Azāriqa's views by an Ibāḍī, see al-Rabīʿ ibn Ḥabīb, *al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ*, 289-301.

<sup>15</sup> See al-Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt*, I, 184; Abū Tammām, *Bāb al-shayṭān*, 32-33.

<sup>16</sup> Here, "infidel" means Muslims opposed to their sect.

her sect. It was just as permissible for a man to marry an unbelieving or opposing woman outside of his sect who also lived in *dār al-taqiyya*.<sup>17</sup>

One may conclude that the Khārijīs took the path of legitimizing their views through their opponents. The Khārijīs, who primarily indulged in *dār al-taqiyya*-centered arguments and disputes about its judicial status, did not engage in any serious discussion about their own regions. Nonetheless, the existence of a land (*dār*) they claimed as their own in opposition to *dār al-taqiyya* is certain. To define their land, they, as opposed to the term *taqiyya*, coined the term *‘alāniya*, meaning “a place where there is no *taqiyya* and where everything is open and visible.” The name of these land of Khārijī adherents was *dār al-‘alāniya*.<sup>18</sup>

The Khārijīs also utilized the term *dār al-bijra* in addition to *dār al-‘alāniya* to refer to their own land to demonstrate that emigration (*bijra*) was the opposite of *qu‘ūd*, suggesting that it was necessary to immigrate to this land.<sup>19</sup> We also see the term *dār al-islām* used for this land as opposed to *dār al-kufr*.<sup>20</sup>

Clearly, it was impossible for opponents to reside in *dār al-bijra* that the Khārijīs viewed as places that belonged only to them. Indeed, while the Azāriqa did not allow anyone from outside of their sect to live in *dār al-bijra*,<sup>21</sup> even the more moderate Ibāḍiyya ruled that the execution of opponents living in *dār al-bijra* was permissible.<sup>22</sup> Places called *dār al-bijra* are, in a way, saved lands for the Khārijīs in which their religious and legal principles are upheld.<sup>23</sup> They believed that, after emigrating from *dār al-taqiyya*, it was impossible to pledge oneself to an imām and practice Islam without building a *dār al-bijra*.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, a *dār al-bijra* was required so that canonical

<sup>17</sup> Abū Tammām, *Bāb al-shayṭān*, 33; al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, I, 217.

<sup>18</sup> See al-Ash‘arī, *Maqālāt*, I, 168.

<sup>19</sup> Abū Tammām, *Bāb al-shayṭān*, 22; al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, I, 198.

<sup>20</sup> See al-Nāshī‘ al-Akbar, *Masā‘il al-imāma*, 69.

<sup>21</sup> Abū Ḥātim, *Kitāb al-zīna*, III, 284.

<sup>22</sup> Al-Isfarāyīnī, *al-Tabṣīr*, 58.

<sup>23</sup> Al-Ash‘arī, *Maqālāt*, I, 168.

<sup>24</sup> Abū Ḥātim, *Kitāb al-zīna*, III, 282.

worship practices could be performed.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, according to the Khārijīs, if somebody were to live as a Muslim, he was obliged to live in *dār al-hijra*; more moderate branches held that it was possible to remain Muslim in *dār al-taqiyya*, although many maintained that it was better to live in a *dār al-hijra* and participate in *jibād*.<sup>26</sup> Because the notion of *dār al-hijra* assumed such a pivotal place in Khārijī thought, emigrating from *dār al-hijra* was not well received, and such people were accused of being either apostates or hypocrites.<sup>27</sup>

As is required by their creed, the Khārijīs immediately found themselves a new *dār al-hijra* when they were forced to leave their land as a result of a defeat in war. After having to retreat during the war against al-Muhallab, the Azāriqa made the city of Sābūr their new *dār al-hijra*.<sup>28</sup> In cases when they were unable to maintain a foothold in central locations, they built castles on steep, precipitous and hard-to-reach places, considering them their new *dār al-hijra*. The *dār al-hijra* they built on Mount Nafūsa in Maghrib (the present Libya) is one of the most important examples of this.<sup>29</sup> This kind of *dār al-hijra* in particular presented a beneficial example for the Ismāʿīlī *dār al-hijras*.

### ***Dār al-hijra* in Ismāʿīlī Thought**

The term *dār al-hijra* moved by the Khārijīs to theological ground for the advantage of their teachings and political aspirations, was re-interpreted and further developed by the Ismāʿīlīs. The term, for the most part, retained the initial meaning attached to it by the Khārijīs, and played a central role in Ismāʿīlī belief, too, despite eventually succumbing to different interpretations and an expansion of its meaning.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>25</sup> For example, Hāzimiyya saw pilgrimage as obligatory only for those living in *dār al-Islām*. See al-Nāshīʿ al-Akbar, *Masāʿil al-imāma*, 69.

<sup>26</sup> For example see al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, I, 195-196.

<sup>27</sup> For example see Abū Tammām, *Bāb al-sbaytān*, 22; al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, I, 198.

<sup>28</sup> Al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq*, 81; al-Isfārāyīnī, *al-Tabṣīr*, 51.

<sup>29</sup> Abū l-Qāsim Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Ibn Ḥawqal al-Naṣībī, *Kitāb ṣūrat al-arḍ* (ed. Johannes Heindrik Kramers; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1939), 27.

<sup>30</sup> The most important Ismāʿīlī source in which we can find the most detailed theoretical information about *dār al-hijra* is *Sarāʾir wa-asrār al-nuṭaqāʾ*, which

For the Ismāʿīlīs like the Khārijīs, *dār al-bijra* generally meant a freed land in which the sect's adherents lived. For this reason, *ahl al-dhimma*, non-Muslims who can live in Muslim lands through an agreement with the Muslims, were not allowed to live in Ismāʿīlī *dār al-bijras*. According to al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān (d. 363/974), *ahl al-dhimma* could not enter the *ḥaram* (the holy site, Mecca) or a *dār al-bijra*, and if they did, they were evicted according to the practice of the Prophet.<sup>31</sup>

Similar to the Khārijīs, the Ismāʿīlīs saw the existence of a *dār al-bijra* as an obligation. However, unlike Azāriqa, they did not proclaim emigration as a condition of being Muslim or as a marker of piety. According to the Ismāʿīlīs, the obligation for a *dār al-bijra* stemmed from the need to establish their own jurisprudence. Likely acting on the fact that the Prophet Muḥammad did not fight during the Meccan period, but only in the Medinan period, they ruled that unless a land was adopted as a *dār al-bijra* by a prophet or his executor (*waṣī*), it was impossible to gird oneself with a sword and wage war on anyone.<sup>32</sup>

Significantly, the Ismāʿīlīs, contrary to the Khārijīs, did not consider *jibād* (and thus *dār al-bijra*) as an indispensable condition of being Muslim. The chief aim of the Ismāʿīlīs was to acquire for themselves a *dār al-bijra* where their own sect and its legal system would be dominant. Nonetheless, a Muslim did not cease to be considered as such in the event of the failure to find oneself a *dār al-bijra*. A fine example of this would be the case of the Prophet Jesus. In the view of the Ismāʿīlīs, the Prophet Jesus did not have a *dār al-bijra*, and so could not establish a mission.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, this in no way harmed or tainted his status as messenger (*nātiq*). For a *nātiq*, what matters is to work toward establishing a *dār al-bijra*. The journeys that Jesus made accompanied by his apostles were aimed at forming a *dār al-bijra* in which to reside and take refuge. If he had managed

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is attributed to Jaʿfar ibn Maṣṣūr (d. ca. 350-360/960-970) See Jaʿfar ibn Maṣṣūr al-Yemen, *Sarāʾir wa-asrār al-nuṭaqaʾ* (ed. Muṣṭafā Ghālīb; Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1984).

<sup>31</sup> Al-Qāḍī Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nuʿmān ibn Muḥammad al-Tamīmī al-Maghribī, *Taʾwīl al-daʿāʾim* (ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Aʿzamī; Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1982), III, 312.

<sup>32</sup> Jaʿfar ibn Maṣṣūr, *Sarāʾir*, 239.

<sup>33</sup> Jaʿfar ibn Maṣṣūr, *Sarāʾir*, 23.

to do this, he would have established Allah’s governance and *sharī‘a*. However, he failed to establish a *dār al-hijra*.<sup>34</sup>

At this point, another important quality of an *Ismā‘īlī dār al-hijra* comes to light. According to this injunction, for a *nāṭiq* to enforce his *sharī‘a*, he must have a *dār al-hijra* without fail. Therefore, if those who believed in a particular messenger failed to establish a *dār al-hijra*, it would be impossible for the *sharī‘a* of the *nāṭiq* of the time to be practiced because the entire legal system and all legal practices would be based on the influence of the ruling group or person who was not from them.

The *Ismā‘īlīs* re-interpreted history by developing a mythological historical understanding in parallel with their definitions of *dār al-hijra*. In one such interpretation, they claimed that the Prophet Ādam, after descending into the world, was victorious in his fight with Satan and built the Ka‘ba, adopting it as his *dār al-hijra*.<sup>35</sup> The Ka‘ba was also the *dār al-hijra* of the Prophet Ibrāhīm in Mecca where he had taken his son *Ismā‘īl*.<sup>36</sup> The *dār al-hijra* of the Prophet Muḥammad, in contrast, was Medina because he established Allah’s governance and *sharī‘a* there and transformed his followers into a congregation that fought against his enemies.<sup>37</sup>

The *Ismā‘īlīs* believed that ‘Alī and his followers resorted to *taqiyya* because the “proponents of darkness (*ẓulmat*)” came to power following the passing of the Prophet. After the Prophet’s death, ‘Alī hid in Medina, the Prophet’s *dār al-hijra*, and later left there for al-Kūfa, which he adopted as his *dār al-hijra*. His son and successor, al-Ḥasan, resumed the period of *taqiyya* in order to establish a new *dār al-hijra*, seeing that “proponents of darkness” were gaining ever more strength.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, during the time of the seven imāms who came after the passing of the Prophet, no *dār al-*

<sup>34</sup> Ja‘far ibn Manṣūr, *Sarā‘ir*, 205.

<sup>35</sup> Ja‘far ibn Manṣūr, *Sarā‘ir*, 38-41. Ja‘far ibn Manṣūr’s evaluation of Ādam as a divine savior against Satan, the representative of evil, causes us to conclude that he sees Ādam as Demiurg, the sublime existence that fights against evil in the Gnostic understanding. For more information on the depiction of Ādam as seen by Ja‘far ibn Manṣūr as a divine being, see Ja‘far ibn Manṣūr, *Sarā‘ir*, 38-46.

<sup>36</sup> Ja‘far ibn Manṣūr, *Sarā‘ir*, 131.

<sup>37</sup> Ja‘far ibn Manṣūr, *Sarā‘ir*, 236.

<sup>38</sup> Ja‘far ibn Manṣūr, *Sarā‘ir*, 38-39.

*bijra* was established except for that of ‘Alī. However, the seventh imām and the initiator of the seventh circle, Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl,<sup>39</sup> took action by taking leave from ‘Irāq,<sup>40</sup> his ancestral home, in order to establish a *dār al-bijra*. The hidden imāms who succeeded him carried out the mission secretly, trying to adopt a *dār al-bijra* all the while.<sup>41</sup> For this reason, they too had no *dār al-bijra*.

The Ismā‘īlīs failed to establish a *dār al-bijra* from the middle of the 2<sup>nd</sup>/8<sup>th</sup> century, when they first appeared, to the 3<sup>rd</sup>/9<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>42</sup> However, it is reported that the Ismā‘īlī missionaries from the city of al-Kūfa succeeded in establishing a *dār al-bijra* in the year 277/889 or 279/891. According to this report, the Ismā‘īlī missionaries in this region decided to build a *dār al-bijra* as a homeland to which to emigrate, reside within and be together. As their building site, they chose the Mahtamābādih village that belonged to the Caliph’s lands named al-Qāsimiyyāt in the city of al-Kūfa. They carried huge chunks of rock to the village and built a very strong fortress surrounded by a deep moat. Upon completion of the fortress in a short time, the Ismā‘īlī men and women living in nearby lands immigrated to this new homeland. They called this place their *dār al-bijra*.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>39</sup> For the Ismā‘īlīs’ views on the seven imāms, their theory of cyclical history and other views, see Ali Avcu, *Karmatīler’in Doğu ve Gelişim Süreci* [The Formation and Development of Qarmatizm] (PhD dissertation; Ankara: Ankara University, 2009), 172-183.

<sup>40</sup> Ja‘far ibn Maṣṣūr, *Sarā‘ir*, 39.

<sup>41</sup> Ja‘far ibn Maṣṣūr, *Sarā‘ir*, 254.

<sup>42</sup> In fact, Muṣṭafā Ghālīb sees Salamiyya where the imāms live during a time of hidden invitation as a *dār al-bijra*; see Muṣṭafā Ghālīb, *Tārīkh al-da‘wa al-Ismā‘īliyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1965), 162. However, the narration we cited above as part of *Sarā‘ir* proves this wrong because Salamiyya has never been a place dominated solely by the Ismā‘īlīs at any time of hidden invitation. If Salamiyya had been considered a *dār al-bijra* by the Ismā‘īlīs, the places where the Prophet Jesus lived would have necessarily been accepted as *dār al-bijras*.

<sup>43</sup> Abū Bakr ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Aybak Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmi‘ al-ghurar: al-Durra al-muḍiyya fī akbbār al-Dawla al-Fāṭimiyya* (vol. VI: ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid; Cairo: al-Ma‘had al-‘Almānī li-l-Āthār, 1961), 53; Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Maqrīzī, *Itti‘āz al-ḥunafā’ bi-dbīkr a’immat al-khulafā’* (ed. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl; Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1948), 113; id., *Kitāb al-muqaffā al-kabīr* (ed. Muḥammad al-Ya‘lāwī; Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1991), III, 291-292; Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī,

The *dār al-bijra* firstly established by the Ismāʿīlīs in Yemen, or al-Kūfa, was, according to the report, an actual homeland that would keep the adherents of this belief together. These places could be seen as the first steps the Ismāʿīlīs took towards establishing their own state. An important disparity between the Ismāʿīlī *dār al-bijra* and the Khārījī one is that the Ismāʿīlīs saw their *dār al-bijra* as the place where al-Mahdī Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl would appear.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, the adherents of the Ismāʿīlī faith were to build a *dār al-bijra* as fast as possible to expedite the coming of al-Mahdī and to have the most appropriate place for his arrival. The Ismāʿīlīs therefore built a *dār al-bijra* for this purpose in every place where they mustered enough strength. Because it is unknown in which *dār al-bijra* al-Mahdī would appear. However, the Qarmaṭī Ismāʿīlīs, who gained a powerful position, particularly in Baḥrain, heightened the expectation that al-Mahdī would most likely appear in the *dār al-bijra* there. In fact, Nāṣir Khusraw (d. 481/1088), who visited the *dār al-bijra* of al-Aḥsāʾ, the Baḥrain Qarmaṭī State's capital, stated that a saddled horse was kept ready for al-Mahdī.<sup>45</sup> The Qarmaṭīs of ʿIrāq at the time must have believed that al-Mahdī would appear in Baḥrain because they emigrated to al-Aḥsāʾ with Abū Ṭāhir, the leader of the Baḥrain Qarmaṭīs, after his Baghdād siege of 316/928.<sup>46</sup> Significant to the Ismāʿīlī faith, unlike Khārījism, is that they didn't consider emigration to *dār al-bijra* as an indispensable condition of living an Islamic life. To the contrary, every adherent of the Ismāʿīlī faith was responsible for doing their utmost to establish more *dār al-bijras* in order to facilitate the coming of al-Mahdī.

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*Nibāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab* (ed. Muḥammad Jābir ʿAbd al-ʿĀl al-Ḥinī; Cairo: al-Maktaba al-ʿArabiyya, 1948), XXV, 228-229.

<sup>44</sup> Farhad Daftary, *A Short History of the Ismailis: Traditions of a Muslim Community* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 41-42; Heinz Halm, *Sbiʿism* (translated from German by Janet Watson; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), 116.

<sup>45</sup> Abū Muʿīn Nāṣir-i Khusraw ibn Ḥārith al-Qubādiyānī, *Safarnāma-i Ḥakīm Nāṣir-i Khusraw: bi-inzīmām-i Rausbanāʾināma wa-Saʿādatnāma* (ed. Maḥmūd Ghanīzāda; Berlin: Kaviani Press, 1922), 125.

<sup>46</sup> Abū I-Ḥasan al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad al-Hamadānī, *Tatbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwa* (ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān; Beirut: Dār al-ʿArabiyya, 1966), II, 381, 388.

*Dār al-bijras*, as places in which al-Mahdī could appear, became attractive places to the adherents of Ismā‘īliyya, and they began to immigrate to these lands. Administrators collected taxes and donations in the name of al-Mahdī, and in fact, all of the resident’s property was collected in the *dār al-bijra* in Baḥrain in preparation for the appearance of al-Mahdī. The adherents gave away their earnings, whereas the administration provided them with only their most essential needs. However, at the time of the crisis of the “Pseudo Mahdī,”<sup>47</sup> alongside the adherent’s fading hope of al-Mahdī’s immediate appearance, this practice was forcibly stopped. People’s hope that al-Mahdī would soon return gradually eroded, especially because al-Mahdī failed to appear at the expected time, and it quickly became clear that the person purported to be al-Mahdī was actually an impostor. When this anticipation dwindled, adherents generally ceased to give away their property in the name of al-Mahdī for use in the event of his appearance.<sup>48</sup>

One of the most important Ismā‘īlī *dār al-bijras* was founded in Baḥrain. When Abū Sa‘īd al-Jannābī (d. 300/912), who was reportedly sent to Baḥrain by Ḥamdān Qarmaṭ (d. 286/899) of ‘Irāq, started gaining considerable strength in the region, he decided to build a *dār al-bijra* where al-Mahdī would appear and where adherents of the sect could securely reside and practice their own jurisprudence and prepare for *jibād*. For this purpose, he founded al-

<sup>47</sup> The “Pseudo Mahdī” incident proved to be the most important event that preceded the downfall of the Baḥrain Qarmaṭī State. According to a narration, Abū Ṭāhir al-Jannābī, the leader of the Baḥrain Qarmaṭī State, installed Zakariyyā al-Iṣfahānī as head of the state, thinking that he was al-Mahdī they had long awaited. However, it soon turned out that he was not al-Mahdī, and he was put to death by Abū Ṭāhir. This event seriously shook the faith of the Baḥrain Qarmaṭīs in the leaders of the movement, and they eventually lost their power, never to regain it. Some researchers see the declaration of Zakariyyā al-Iṣfahānī to be al-Mahdī by Abū Ṭāhir as a scheme, but we think that this suggestion is not true; Abū Ṭāhir did indeed believe that Zakariyyā al-Iṣfahānī was al-Mahdī whose coming they had been craving to witness, and that is why Abū Ṭāhir installed Zakariyyā al-Iṣfahānī. But when Abū Ṭāhir realized that Zakariyyā al-Iṣfahānī was not al-Mahdī, he got rid of Zakariyyā al-Iṣfahānī. For proofs and sources for this view, see Avcu, *Karmatîler’in Doğuş ve Gelişim Süreci*, 222-228.

<sup>48</sup> Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *Tatbîṭ dalā’il al-nubuwwa*, II, 381, 388-389. For more information on the Qarmaṭīs of Baḥrain and al-Mahdī crisis, see Avcu, *Karmatîler’in Doğuş ve Gelişim Süreci*, 207-245.

Aḥsāʾ, two miles from Hajar, as an appropriate place. Unlike so many other *dār al-bijras*, it was not steep and rocky. However, the big deserts surrounding the area made the journey to it a very grueling one. Abū Saʿīd launched his project by building a strong fortress in al-Aḥsāʾ and also engaged in agriculture. He started dispatching small military expeditions to nearby places and gained booty, which were sent to al-Aḥsāʾ. He returned the portion of this booty taken from those who later joined him to them, but for those who did not, he returned only their wives and children under age of four. He isolated the children he took as booty from his own children, keeping them in another house and grouping them according to their talents. Some were trained in the military, some in the religious sciences and some in other occupations. These children absorbed the Ismāʿilī mission and became the most important element of the Ismāʿilī military. Al-Aḥsāʾ, on the other hand, became the center of the Baḥrain Qarmaṭī State, and their *dār al-bijra* was where al-Mahdī was expected to appear.<sup>49</sup>

Established almost concurrently with the *dār al-bijra* in ʿIrāq was another Ismāʿilī *dār al-bijra* built in Yemen. The first aim of Maṣṣūr al-Yemen (d. 302/914) and ʿAlī ibn Faḍl (d. 303/915), who came as missionaries, was to build a *dār al-bijra* similar to those in other Ismāʿilī territories. Arriving in Yemen in 268/881, Maṣṣūr and ʿAlī spread the Ismāʿilī message in different regions. Beginning with his mission in ʿAden-Abyan and after gaining a powerful status in his mission, Maṣṣūr al-Yemen built his first *dār al-bijra* in a very steep place called ʿAbr Mahrem, situated at the foot of Mount Maswar. After building houses for people in this *dār al-bijra*, he had food and various items brought into the castle in amounts that would last for a long time. Upon the completion of this *dār al-bijra*, his followers migrated to the castle with their families. After gaining enough strength in this *dār al-bijra*, Maṣṣūr then went up Mount Maswar and built a second *dār al-bijra* in the castle on top of the mountain. He had all of the booty they obtained carried to the castle, making it a place of residence for the Ismāʿilīs in the region.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Al-Nuwayrī, *Nibāyat al-arab*, XXV, 235-238; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, VI, 55-57.

<sup>50</sup> Al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān, *Risālat iftītāḥ al-daʿwa* (= *Risāla fī ḡubūr al-daʿwa al-ʿUbaydiyya al-Fāṭimiyya*) (ed. Wadād al-Qāḍī, Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1970), 46-47; Abū Muḥammad al-Yemenī, *ʿAqāʾid al-thalāth wa-sabʿin firqa* (ed.

After leaving Manşūr, ‘Alī ibn Faḍl travelled to the place called Jayshān, built a *dār al-bijra* on the Sarw Yāfi‘ Mountain and launched his mission from there.<sup>51</sup> As stated above, one of the most important functions of a *dār al-bijra* is that it is the place of al-Mahdī’s appearance. ‘Alī ibn Faḍl became the first Ismā‘īlī missionary who put this thought into practice; he proclaimed himself to be the Mahdī whose coming had long been awaited by the followers of the sect and who would declare the beginning of the day of judgment. He ‘appeared’ in his *dār al-bijra*, declared the day of judgment and abrogated the validity of the Islamic *sharī‘a*.<sup>52</sup>

One of the first *dār al-bijras* of the Ismā‘īlis was Ikdjan (Īkajān) in Africa. Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Shī‘ī, who had been sent there as a missionary, captured Ikdjan after gaining strength and built a *dār al-bijra* there. Abū ‘Abd Allāh and his Ismā‘īlī followers settled in this *dār al-bijra*, and it became the place where the foundations of the Fāṭimid State were laid.<sup>53</sup>

The term *dār al-bijra* gained a very central position in the primary Ismā‘īlī sources before the foundation of the Fāṭimid State but started losing its former importance after the Fāṭimids came to power, finally ending up as a symbolical term. This must be a result of the founder of the Fāṭimid State, ‘Ubayd Allāh (‘Abd Allāh)<sup>54</sup> al-Mahdī’s rejection

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Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Ghāmīdī; Medina: Maktabat al-‘Ulūm wa-l-Ḥikam, 1993), II, 704; Idrīs ibn ‘Imād al-Dīn ibn Ḥasan ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Idrīsī, *Uyūn al-akbbār* (ed. Muṣṭafā Ghālīb; Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1986), V, 38-39.

<sup>51</sup> Al-Yemenī, ‘*Aqā‘id al-tbalāth wa-sab‘in firqa*, II, 704.

<sup>52</sup> ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Ubayd Allāh al-‘Alawī, *Sīrat al-Hādī ilā l-Ḥaqq Yahyā ibn al-Ḥusayn* (ed. Suhayl Zakkār; n.p., 1972), 394; Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Yemenī, *Sīrat Ja‘far al-Hājib* (trans. Wladimir Ivanow) in Wladimir Ivanow (ed.), *Ismaili Tradition concerning the Rise of the Fatimids* (= *al-Muntakhab min ba‘d kutub al-Ismā‘īliyya*) (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1942), 198; al-Qādī al-Nu‘mān, *Risālat iftitāḥ al-da‘wa*, 150.

<sup>53</sup> See al-Qādī al-Nu‘mān, *Risālat iftitāḥ al-da‘wa*, 140, 246-247; Abū Zayd ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘Ibar wa-dīwān al-mubtada’ wa-l-kbabar fī ayyām al-‘Arab wa-l-‘Ajam wa-l-Barbar* (Bulaq: al-Maṭba‘a al-Miṣriyya, 1867), III, 362.

<sup>54</sup> The real name of the founder of the Fāṭimid State is ‘Abd Allāh. However, the opposing sources, under the influence of the Shī‘ī-Sunnī or Fāṭimid-Abbāsīd clash, changed his name to ‘Ubayd Allāh to lessen his prestige. Opposing authors begrudged him the name “‘Abd Allāh” meaning “Servant of Allah” and instead

of the belief that Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl would soon appear as al-Mahdī, his declaring of himself and his hereditary successors as imāms and his defense of the imāmate as an interminable institution.<sup>55</sup> In fact, the proclamation that imāmate was still a living institution through the family lineage of 'Ubayd Allāh al-Mahdī delivered a severe blow to the belief that Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl would soon appear as al-Mahdī, a thought that had played a central role in the initial Ismā'īlī teachings. This also meant that *dār al-bijras*, where the long-awaited al-Mahdī was anticipated to appear, lost their significance in the Fāṭimid lands. On the other hand, the rapid rise of the Fāṭimids as a powerful state brought about the natural consequence that many non-Ismā'īlīs, even non-Muslims were living within the borders of the state. They took a step further and employed many non-Muslims in state positions, and some of these people eventually became favored aides of the caliph. For these reasons, the creed that only al-Mahdī and his companions could live in *dār al-bijras* lost its importance.

Consequently, the concept of *dār al-bijra* for the Ismā'īlīs was of cardinal importance during the phase of state building, but after the official foundation of a state, it lost its functionality and importance in the face of the social realities. Additionally, Qarmaṭī Ismā'īlīs, who failed to found a functioning state that could confront that of the Fāṭimids, adhered to their creed formed around *dār al-bijra* for a longer time, based on their expectation regarding al-Mahdī's arrival. Nonetheless, this concept lost its essential functionality in Qarmaṭī thought as well, particularly regarding the expectation of al-Mahdī's coming disappearing altogether. The group of the Ismā'īlīs who made this concept popular again, starting from the beginning of the 6<sup>th</sup>/12<sup>th</sup> centuries, was al-Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāḥ and his followers in Alamūt. They settled their followers in castles that they had either built or captured,

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used the *ism taṣgbīr* version of this name, 'Ubayd Allāh, which means "little servant of Allah" or "poor servant of Allah." This use by opposing authors gained widespread recognition, and in almost all opposing works, the name used was 'Ubayd Allāh instead of 'Abd Allāh because the works written and published by the Ismā'īlīs were in circulation in very limited number of places. In contemporary scientific works, his real name is sometimes used, but the more well-known 'Ubayd Allāh is still the most frequently used name.

<sup>55</sup> For the changes made in the Ismā'īlī teaching by 'Ubayd Allāh al-Mahdī, see Avcu, *Karmatiler'in Doğuşu ve Gelişim Süreci*, 163-171.

and for a certain period of time, they abrogated Islamic *shari‘a* and, declaring the judgment day, actually perpetuated the fundamental meanings attached to the *dār al-bijra* concept within Ismā‘īlī terminology.

### Conclusion

Among the Islamic sects, the understanding of *dār al-bijra*, which has roots in the Prophet Muḥammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina, was first developed by the Khārijīs. An extremist branch of the Khawārij, the Azāriqa, saw the emigration of their fellow sectarians living amongst opposing communities whom they did not considered Muslims, as mandatory by basing this belief on the Prophet Muḥammad’s emigration. They also based the obligatory nature of emigration on the likewise obligatory condition that a *dār al-bijra*, where only ‘Muslims’ live, must be established. In this land of emigration, only their fellow sectarians can live, and it is obligatory to wage war on those from opposing sects. For this reason, they concurred that the *qa‘ada*, who were fellow sectarians but did not emigrate, were unbelievers, maintaining that one could live as Muslim only in a *dār al-bijra*.

More moderate branches of the Khawārij, such as the Najadāt and the Ibāḍiyya, despite emphasizing that it is necessary to emigrate to a *dār al-bijra*, maintained that their fellow sectarians who lived in a *dār al-taqiyya* and did not emigrate to a *dār al-bijra* could not be declared unbelievers. The Ibāḍiyya branch also held that of all of the places in *dār al-taqiyya*, only the sultan’s headquarters is *dār al-baghy* (land of tyranny) and that everywhere else is *dār al-tawḥīd* (land of unity), thereby forbidding the killing of unarmed civilians, women and children, with the exception of the sultan’s soldiers.

The concept of *dār al-bijra*, as it was understood by the Ismā‘īlīs, could be said to be borrowed from the Khārijī belief that a *dār al-bijra* was a place where only fellow sectarians could live and where the first step toward establishing their beliefs and state was with the power of the sword. However, the Ismā‘īlīs have tried to legitimize their thought by basing their understanding of *dār al-bijra* on the Prophet’s emigration from Mecca to Medina. However, they developed a different understanding regarding this concept, originally derived from the Khārijī interpretation, with respect to their own teachings. First and foremost, they did not consider living in a *dār al-bijra* as the sole condition for being Muslim. A believer could

live as a Muslim outside of a *dār al-bijra*. However, the foundation of a *dār al-bijra*, where only their opponents could settle, was necessary to spread their sect’s power, practice their religious beliefs and ‘gird themselves with the sword’ and fight.

The second important matter that separates the Ismā‘īlī *dār al-bijras* from the Khārijī ones is that al-Mahdī, whose appearance was expected to take place in the near future, would only appear in one of the *dār al-bijras* established by their adherents. This situation forced the Ismā‘īlīs to build a *dār al-bijra* in every region to which they sent a missionary. As a result of the founding and strengthening of the Fātimid State, the viability of the obligatory Ismā‘īlī precept that *dār al-bijras* can house only their fellow sectarians came to an end, and with the erosion of the hope that al-Mahdī would soon appear, the centrality of the belief that it is indispensable to have *dār al-bijras* for the appearance of al-Mahdī dwindled over time.

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**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABŪ ḤANĪFA AND ZAYD IBN  
‘ALĪ  
– An Assessment in the Context of an Account in  
*al-Majmū‘ al-fiqhī*–**

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**Abstract**

This article analyzes various claims made by modern-day scholars about the educational connection between Zayd ibn ‘Alī and Abū Ḥanīfa. In light of historical data, these claims are evaluated here on the basis of an account in *al-Majmū‘ al-ḥadīthī wa-l-fiqhī*, attributed to Zayd. The main findings of the article are as follows: 1. Apart from the account in *al-Majmū‘*, there is no narration in early Islamic sources that is concerned with their educational relationship. 2. Abū Ḥanīfa saw Zayd, listened to his speeches, and recognized his superior qualities, but never served him as a disciple. 3. Before meeting in al-Kūfa, they did not recognize or interact with one another. Before meeting Zayd, Abū Ḥanīfa was a renowned *faqīh* in al-Kūfa, appreciated by friends of Zayd for his scientific authority. There was, however, no period of association between the two. Therefore, the argument that Abū Ḥanīfa served as a disciple of Zayd ibn ‘Alī for two years in al-Ḥijāz or al-Kūfa is rejected.

*Key Words:* Zayd ibn ‘Alī, *al-Majmū‘ al-fiqhī*, *Majmū‘ al-fiqh*, Abū Ḥanīfa

## Introduction

Several modern-day studies have presented various claims about the educational relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) and Zayd ibn ʿAlī (d. 122/740).<sup>1</sup> Certain researchers have claimed that Abū Ḥanīfa gained knowledge (ʿilm) from Zayd ibn ʿAlī, whereas others have gone one step further, arguing that Abū Ḥanīfa was Zayd’s disciple. Another group of studies refers to the accounts that list Zayd ibn ʿAlī among the masters (*sheikhs*) of Abū Ḥanīfa, although no such account exist. All of these assertions require close scrutiny.

Did Abū Ḥanīfa study with Zayd ibn ʿAlī? What references are used by those who defend this argument? Was this a master-apprentice relationship or a meeting of colleagues? Did the education of Abū Ḥanīfa by Zayd ibn ʿAlī occur in a two-year period of discipleship? What are the grounds for such an assertion? What is the main basis of claims which argue that an educational relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī existed?

In this article, we will determine how the various claims about this relationship have emerged, and explain the source of the ambiguity.

<sup>1</sup> See Muḥammad Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa: Ḥayātub<sup>ā</sup> wa-ʿaşrub<sup>ā</sup> - ārāʿub<sup>ā</sup> wa-fiqhub<sup>ā</sup>* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1947), 30, 79; Muḥammad Ḥamidullah, *İmam-ı Azam ve Eseri [al-İmām al-Aʿzam and His Heritage]* (translated into Turkish by Kemal Kuşçu; Istanbul: Çağaloğlu Yayınevi, 1963), 17; Muştafā al-Shakʿa, *al-İmām al-Aʿzam Abū Ḥanīfa* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Lubnāniyya, 1983), 54; Şālih Aḥmad al-Khatīb, *al-İmām Zayd al-muftarā ʿalayb* (Beirut: Dār al-Nadwa al-Jadida, 1984), 65; Ahmet Özel, *Hanevî Fıkıh Âlimleri [Ḥanaḫî Jurisprudents]* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1990), 14; Ali Bakkal, *İslâm Fıkıh Mezbepleri [Islamic Legal Schools]* (Istanbul: Rağbet Yayınevi, 2004), 62; Ekrem Sağıroğlu, *İmam-ı Azam Ebû Hanîfe: Hayatı, Siyaseti, Eseri [al-İmām al-Aʿzam Abū Ḥanīfa: His Life, Political Ideas and His Heritage]* (Istanbul: Yasin Yayınevi, 2002), 43; İsmet Demir, *İmâm-ı Âzam Ebû Hanîfe: Hayatı, İslâm Hukuku ve Hanevî Mezbebi'ni Tedvindeki Metodu [al-İmām al-Aʿzam Abū Ḥanīfa: His Life and His Place in the Formation of Islamic Law and Ḥanaḫism]* (Istanbul: Seçil Ofset, 2005), 105; Mehmet Erdoğan, “İbn Mesʿūd’dan Ebû Hanîfe’ye Rey Mektebi [The School of Raʿy from Ibn Masʿūd to Abū Ḥanīfa],” in İbrahim Hatiboğlu (ed.), *İmâm-ı Âzam Ebû Hanîfe ve Düşünce Sistemi – Sempozyum Tebliğ ve Müzakereleri – [al-İmām al-Aʿzam Abū Ḥanīfa and His Thought – Symposium Proceedings –]* (Bursa: Kurav Yayınları, 2005), I, 332; İsa Doğan, *İmam Zeyd b. Ali [al-İmām Zayd ibn ʿAlī]* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2009), 129.

Subsequently, we will analyze an account we consider to be highly important in the context of this study.

### **The Educational Relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī as Described in Several Contemporary Studies**

The researcher who focused on the relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī the most was Muḥammad Abū Zahra (d. 1974). His works, *Abū Ḥanīfa: Ḥayātub<sup>ā</sup> wa-ʿaṣrub<sup>ā</sup> - ārāʾub<sup>ā</sup> wa-fiḡhub<sup>ā</sup>*, *al-Imām Zayd* and *Tāriḡb al-madhābīb al-Islāmiyya*, have served as a reference for subsequent studies. Thus, it is appropriate to begin by concentrating on Abū Zahra's works.

Based on the works of Abū Zahra, we can conclude that Abū Ḥanīfa knew of Zayd ibn ʿAlī. Nevertheless, this knowledge was limited to information exchanged during their meetings and was not a relationship of master-apprentice. Abū Zahra writes:

We do not suspect that Abū Ḥanīfa met Zayd ibn ʿAlī; but we do not believe that he was affiliated with him. On the contrary, he received knowledge from Zayd during their meetings, without any affiliation.<sup>2</sup>

Abū Zahra bases his argument that Abū Ḥanīfa received ʿilm from Zayd ibn ʿAlī on the following account, cited from *al-Rawḡ al-naḡīr Sharḡ Majmūʿ al-fiḡb al-kabīr* by al-Ḥusayn ibn Aḡmad al-Sayyāghī al-Ḥaymī al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 1221/1806):

Abū Ḥanīfa said: I have seen Zayd ibn ʿAlī and his friends (*ablab<sup>ā</sup>*), but I have never seen a man more *faḡīb*, wise, witty, or honest than him in his day. He was a peerless personality.<sup>3</sup>

Abū Zahra also mentions this account in his *al-Imām Zayd*.<sup>4</sup> The source records statements made by Abū Ḥanīfa about Zayd, as well as references to the scientific discussions between the two. This is the source of Abū Zahra's claim that Abū Ḥanīfa considered Zayd ibn ʿAlī

<sup>2</sup> Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 79.

<sup>3</sup> Sharaf al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn ibn Aḡmad al-Sayyāghī al-Ḥaymī al-Ṣanʿānī, *al-Rawḡ al-naḡīr Sharḡ Majmūʿ al-fiḡb al-kabīr li-l-Imām Zayd* (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, n.d.), I, 50; cf. Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 79; id., *al-Imām Zayd* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1959), 70.

<sup>4</sup> Abū Zahra, *al-Imām Zayd*, 70.

to be the wisest scholar of his day.<sup>5</sup> Contrary to our expectations, there is no record of an actual discussion or scientific debate between Zayd and Abū Ḥanīfa. Did Abū Zahra find this account sufficient to claim that Abū Ḥanīfa received *‘ilm* from Zayd? We do not know. It is striking, however, that in the aforementioned works, despite the existence of quotations from such works as *Tārīkh Baghdād* by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071), *Manāqib Abī Ḥanīfa* by Muwaffaq ibn Aḥmad al-Makkī (d. 568/1173), *Manāqib Abī Ḥanīfa* by Ibn al-Bazzāzī (d. 827/1424), and *al-Kāmil fī l-tārīkh* by Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1232)<sup>6</sup>, Abū Zahra only refers to al-Sayyāghī in this matter; this probably signifies that Abu Zahra does not have sufficient information, and prefers to leave the issue rather ambiguous. Was there any other information in *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr* or other works that convinced Abū Zahra of such a view, even though he did not cite them? An examination of other works on the subject reveals even more ambiguity. For example, in his *al-Imām al-A‘zam Abū Ḥanīfa*, Muṣṭafā al-Shak‘a argues, “... But whatever the view on the issue is, Abū Ḥanīfa was a student of Zayd.”<sup>7</sup> Shak‘a does not, however, refer to any source. In addition, just as in Abū Zahra’s works, even though al-Shak‘a cites accounts of meetings between Abū Ḥanīfa and Muḥammad al-Bāqir, Ja‘far al-Šādiq and ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan,<sup>8</sup> we see that there is no evidence of his meeting with Zayd or having any association with him. The situation is almost identical in other studies on the subject.<sup>9</sup>

Aside from the data in *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, some works mention Zayd ibn ‘Alī as being one of the masters of Abū Ḥanīfa,<sup>10</sup> while others do not.<sup>11</sup> What is common in all of these studies is the lack of any

<sup>5</sup> Abū Zahra, *al-Imām Zayd*, 179.

<sup>6</sup> For several examples, see Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 37, 38, 49, 73, 74; id., *al-Imām Zayd*, 44, 47, 51, 57, 58, 64, 71 et seq.; id., *Tārīkh al madhābīb al-Islāmīyya* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, n.d.), 348, 349, 351.

<sup>7</sup> Al-Shak‘a, *al-Imām al-A‘zam*, 54.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, 49-58; Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 80-81.

<sup>9</sup> For other examples see al-Khaṭīb, *al-Imām Zayd*, 65; Özel, *Haneḫī Fıkıb Âlimleri*, 14; Ḥamīdullah, *İmam-ı Azam ve Eseri*, 17.

<sup>10</sup> See Muwaffaq ibn Aḥmad al-Makkī, *Manāqib Abī Ḥanīfa* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1981), 41.

<sup>11</sup> See Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn ‘Uthmān al-Dhahabī, *Manāqib al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfa ve sāhibayb’ Abī Yūsuf wa-Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan* (Cai-

information that clearly defines the relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī. Maybe this is why Abū Zahra only relies on *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr* in this matter. Can this work lead us to the source of the views on this subject? In our analysis, we found two points of reference for al-Sayyāghī. One of these is *al-Mawāʿiẓ wa-l-iʿtibār bi-dbikr al-kbiṭaṭ wa-l-āthbār* by Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442). The words, which are quoted by Abū Zahra from *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr* and attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa, are cited by al-Sayyāghī from this author.<sup>12</sup> Other writers referred to by al-Sayyāghī are Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf (d. 1191/1777) and Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥusayn (ibn al-Muʿayyad billāh Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim) (d. 1090/1679), both of whom are Zaydī. Because these authors lived in a later era, they can be disregarded. The last two, however, have led us to examine the relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī in a different light. Thus far, theories about this connection have been based on general historical and biographical works on these figures, including works from the Zaydī world. Identifying the approach to the subject in these works enables an appropriate assessment of their theories.<sup>13</sup>

Our second question, “Did the education of Abū Ḥanīfa by Zayd ibn ʿAlī consist of a two-year period of discipleship?” is not explicitly addressed by Abū Zahra. His statement, “We do not believe he was affiliated to Zayd ibn ʿAlī. On the contrary, he received knowledge from Zayd during their meetings, without any affiliation,”<sup>14</sup> affirms that Abū Ḥanīfa was not a regular student of Zayd. However, Abū Zahra does not describe when these meetings took place or at what intervals they occurred. Similarly, Abū Zahra apparently quotes from *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr* once again: “It is rumored that Abū Ḥanīfa was his student for two years (*tatalmadha lab<sup>u</sup> sanatayn*)”;<sup>15</sup> however, what is being commented on here is whether Abū Ḥanīfa was a bound

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ro: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 11; Ḥāfiẓ al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Shihāb al-Bazzāzī al-Kardārī, *Manāqib al-Imām al-ʿAzam Abī Ḥanīfa* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1981), 85.

<sup>12</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, I, 50; cf. Taqī al-Dīn Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maqrīzī, *al-Mawāʿiẓ wa-l-iʿtibār bi-dbikr al-kbiṭaṭ wa-l-āthbār* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.), II, 436.

<sup>13</sup> As it would be more appropriate to handle the approaches of these people in later chapters of our study, they will not be discussed here.

<sup>14</sup> Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 79.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 79; al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, I, 66.

disciple to Zayd. After writing, “It is rumored that he was his student for two years” without giving any references, Abū Zahra quotes from al-Sayyāghī: “I saw Zayd ibn ‘Alī and his friends ...”<sup>16</sup> He writes, “We do not suspect that Abū Ḥanīfa met him; but we do not believe he was affiliated with Zayd ibn ‘Alī.”<sup>17</sup> As Abū Zahra accepts that Abū Ḥanīfa met with Zayd ibn ‘Alī, even though it was not a form of regular discipleship, the question remains, when and where could these meetings have occurred, in al-Ḥijāz or in al-Kūfa? According to Abū Zahra, the answer is al-Kūfa.

In his work, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, Abū Zahra relates the accounts that Abū Ḥanīfa met Muḥammad al-Bāqir when he was still a disciple to Ḥammād, and met Ja‘far al-Šādiq in al-Ḥira in the presence of al-Manšūr, the second ‘Abbāsīd Caliph.<sup>18</sup> Abū Zahra does not provide any information about the time or place of Abū Ḥanīfa’s meeting with Zayd ibn ‘Alī. In his *al-Imām Zayd*, however, Abū Zahra claims that Abū Ḥanīfa met Zayd in al-Kūfa and, providing quotations about Zayd, heralds the intellectual discussions that would occur between them.<sup>19</sup> This evidently does not contradict the fact that Abū Ḥanīfa may have met Zayd ibn ‘Alī during his sojourns in al-Ḥijāz; nonetheless, it is most likely that the two-year period of meetings mentioned happened when both were residing in the same region. These meetings must have occurred during Abū Ḥanīfa’s residence in al-Ḥijāz or Zayd’s sojourn in al-Kūfa. Abū Zahra does not relate anything else about Zayd’s time in al-Kūfa or his intellectual connections with Abū Ḥanīfa. As for Abū Ḥanīfa’s residing in al-Ḥijāz, Abū Zahra relates that this occurred long after the death of Zayd ibn ‘Alī. According to Abū Zahra, in 130/747-748, Abū Ḥanīfa escaped the torture of the Umayyad governor, ‘Umar ibn Hubayra, and sought refuge in Mecca, where he continued to live for two years. When the Umayyad Caliphate ended in 132/750, he returned to al-Kūfa and paid homage to al-Šaffāḥ, the first ‘Abbāsīd Caliph, while continuing to live in Mecca until 136/753-54 due to unrest in ‘Irāq.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, according to Abū Zahra, Abū Ḥanīfa resided in al-Ḥijāz only after Zayd’s death. As Abū

<sup>16</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, I, 50; cf. Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 79; id., *al-Imām Zayd*, 70.

<sup>17</sup> Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 79.

<sup>18</sup> Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 79-81.

<sup>19</sup> Abū Zahra, *al-Imām Zayd*, 179.

<sup>20</sup> Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 41-42.

Zahra gives no details about the sojourn of Zayd ibn ʿAlī in al-Kūfa, apart from relating their meeting in this city, he cannot claim that Abū Ḥanīfa was Zayd's disciple for two years. Thus, it cannot be accurately claimed that Abū Zahra affirms Abū Ḥanīfa as a disciple of Zayd ibn ʿAlī for a period of two years.<sup>21</sup> The emergence of such a claim, however, is not totally unrelated to the fact that Abū Zahra left the subject ambiguous. We will return to the sources of Abū Zahra that serve as the grounds for this assertion during our investigation of the third question. At this point, however, we must investigate whether this assertion originated in the works of Abū Zahra.

In his *al-Imām al-ʿAzam Abū Ḥanīfa*, Muṣṭafā al-Shakʿa argues that Abū Ḥanīfa studied with Zayd ibn ʿAlī, but he offers no support for this assertion. Moreover, this suggestion, given without reference, contradicts the above-given findings of Abū Zahra. Then again, despite Abū Zahra's assertion that Abū Ḥanīfa lived in al-Ḥijāz after 130/747-748, according to al-Shakʿa, the interaction between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī happened during Abū Ḥanīfa's stay in al-Ḥijāz.<sup>22</sup> In other relevant studies, the same assertion is found without any references. In certain works, however, writers refer to *al-Kashshāf* by al-Zamakhsharī. İsmet Demir, for example, refers to him, stating: "Even though Abū Ḥanīfa was one year younger than Zayd ibn ʿAlī, he was the latter's disciple for two years, and in a sense, made up for his deficiency in ḥadīth thanks to Zayd ibn ʿAlī, who was a master of ḥadīth from the school of *raʿy*".<sup>23</sup> However, upon a closer analysis of *al-Kashshāf*, we see that al-Zamakhsharī says nothing about the educational relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd. The description in this work refers to the reaction of Abū Ḥanīfa to Zayd ibn ʿAlī's rebellion.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Erdoğan, "İbn Mesʿūd'dan Ebū Hanīfe'ye Rey Mektebi," 332.

<sup>22</sup> Al-Shakʿa, *al-Imām al-ʿAzam*, 54.

<sup>23</sup> Demir, *İmām-ı Âzam*, 105; cf. Abū l-Qāsim Jār Allāh Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʿiq ḡhawāmiḍ al-tanzīl wa-uyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujūh al-taʿwīl* (ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwid; Riyāḍ: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1998), I, 318.

<sup>24</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī says the following: "Abū Ḥanīfa secretly placed a *fatwā* on Zayd ibn ʿAlī to help and provide him with financial assistance and concerned with the necessity of rebelling together." See al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, I, 318.

As explained above, one of the main sources in contemporary studies suggesting an educational connection between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī is the following quote, attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa:

I have seen Zayd ibn ʿAlī and his friends, but have never seen a man more *faqīh*, wise, witty, or honest than him in his day. He was a peerless personality.<sup>25</sup>

Abū Zahra takes this quote from al-Sayyāghī, who, in turn, took it from al-Maqrīzī. Other contemporary works clarify that this quotation cannot be found in any source earlier than al-Maqrīzī.<sup>26</sup> Another support for the claim that Abū Ḥanīfa was a disciple of Zayd for two years is the statement by Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Muʿayyad bi-llāh ibn al-Qāsim, a Zaydī scholar, to whom al-Sayyāghī refers.

Al-Sayyāghī writes:

In the marginal notes (*taʿlīq*) of *al-Majmūʿ* transmitted by Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥusayn, I saw that Abū Ḥanīfa was among the disciples of Zayd ibn ʿAlī, and that he took lessons from him for two years.<sup>27</sup>

There is no other valid support for a period of two years in Zaydī literature. As a matter of fact, despite al-Sayyāghī being willing to collect all the material in favor of Zayd ibn ʿAlī and his *al-Majmūʿ*, and to examine all claims about them in his voluminous work, which is a commentary on *al-Majmūʿ*, he never cites Zaydī or Sunnī sources of the early period in support of this claim. Although carrying out a thorough analysis of several early Zaydī and Imāmī sources, we have been unable to find any evidence to support this assertion.<sup>28</sup> Never-

<sup>25</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, I, 50; cf. Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 79; id., *al-Imām Zayd*, 76.

<sup>26</sup> At this stage, we would like to mention two works and their references that describe the words attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa, with respect to the connection between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī: Aḥmad Shawqī Ibrāhīm ʿAmarrājī, *al-Ḥayāt al-siyāsiyya wa-l-fikriyya li-l-Zaydiyya fī l-mashriq al-Islāmī* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūlī, 2000), 37 (referring to *al-Mawāʿiẓ* by al-Maqrīzī); Faḍīla ʿAbd al-Amīr al-Shāmī, *Tārīkh al-firqa al-Zaydiyya bayna l-qarnayn al-thānī wa-l-tbālith li-l-bijra* (Baghdād: Wizārat Turāth, 1974), 83 (referring to *al-Aʿlām* by Ziriklī).

<sup>27</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, I, 66.

<sup>28</sup> In this matter, the following works can be referred to: *al-Kutub al-arbaʿa*; *al-Rijāl* by al-Najāshī; *Maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn* by Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī; *Amālī* by Aḥmad ibn ʿĪsā ibn Zayd; *al-Aḥkām fī l-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām* by Yaḥyā ibn Ḥusayn

theless, even though there is an account in *al-Majmūʿ*, narrating that Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions went to a house in al-Kūfa where Zayd secretly lived and they met, the commentator does not cite this account when discussing whether or not Abū Ḥanīfa was a disciple of Zayd ibn ʿAlī, and gives no detail or interpretation of the significance of this encounter.<sup>29</sup> For this reason, this account must be carefully evaluated.

### Evidence for the Relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī

The principal source for the basis of our article is the following account found in *al-Majmūʿ*,<sup>30</sup> attributed to Zayd ibn ʿAlī:

قال أبو خالد رضي الله عنه لما دخل زيد بن علي عليهم السلام الكوفة استخفى في دار عبدالله بن الزبير [الاسدي] فبلغ ذلك أبا حنيفة فكلم معاوية بن إسحاق السلمي ونصر بن خزيمه العبسي وسعيد بن خثيم حتى دخلوا على زيد بن علي عليهم السلام فقالوا هذا رجل من فقهاء الكوفة، فقال زيد بن علي عليه السلام ما مفتاح الصلاة وما افتتاحها وما استفتاحها وما تحريمها وما تحليلها، قال: فقال ابوحنيفة مفتاح الصلاة الطهور وتحريمها التكبير وتحليلها التسليم وافتتاح الصلاة التكبير لان النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم كان اذا افتتح الصلاة كبر ورفع يديه والاستفتاح هو سبحانك اللهم وبحمدك وتبارك اسمك وتعالى جدك ولا إله غيرك لانه روي عن النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم انه كان اذا استفتح الصلاة قال ذلك فأعجب زيدا عليه السلام ذلك منه.

Abū Khālid said the following: When Zayd ibn ʿAlī came to al-Kūfa, he hid in the house of ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr [al-Asadī]. When Abū

Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq; *Nuṣrat madhbāb al-Zaydiyya* by Ṣāhib ibn ʿAbbād; *al-Ifāda fī tārikh al-aʿimma al-sāda* by Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq bi-l-ḥaqq al-Hārūnī; and *al-Ḥadāʾiq al-wardiyya fī manāqib aʿimmat al-Zaydiyya* by al-Maḥallī.

<sup>29</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍir*, II, 5-6.

<sup>30</sup> The editions of the book: Zayd ibn ʿAlī, “*Corpus Iuris*” di Zaid Ibn ʿAlī (= *Majmūʿ al-fiqh*) (ed. Eugenio Griffini; Milano: Ulrico Hoepli, 1919); id., *Musnad al-Imām Zayd* (ed. ʿAbd al-Wāsiʿ ibn Yaḥyā; Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1983); id., *al-Majmūʿ al-ḥadīthi wa-l-fiqhī* (ed. ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥammūd al-ʿIzzī; ʿAmmān: Muʿassasat al-Imām Zayd ibn ʿAlī al-Thaqāfiyya, 2002); for more about this book see Eren Gündüz, *Zeyd bin Ali: Hayatı, Eserleri ve İslam Hukuk Düşüncesindeki Yeri* [*Zayd ibn ʿAlī: His Life, Works, and Place in Islamic Legal Thought*] (Istanbul: Düşünce Kitabevi Yayınları, 2008).

Ḥanīfa learned about this, he spoke to Mu‘āwiya ibn Ishāq al-Sulamī, Naṣr ibn Khuzayma al-‘Absī and Sa‘īd ibn Khuthaym. When they finally met with Zayd ibn ‘Alī, they said about Abū Ḥanīfa: “This is one of the *faqīhs* of al-Kūfa.” Thereupon, Zayd ibn ‘Alī asked: “What is the key (*miftāḥ*), the initial words (*iftitāḥ*), the initial prayer (*istiftāḥ*), the beginning (*taḥrīm*) and the end (*taḥlīl*) of the *ṣalāt*?” Abū Ḥanīfa responded: “The key of the *ṣalāt* is purification (*al-ṭubūr*); its beginning is *takbīr*; and its end is *salām* (*al-taslīm*). The *ṣalāt* begins with *takbīr* because the Prophet (pbuh) recited *takbīr* and raised his hands at the beginning of the *ṣalāt*. Here is the opening prayer: Glory be to You, O Allah, and all praises are due unto You, and blessed is Your name and high is Your majesty and there is no god but You. It is related from the Prophet (pbuh) that he recited this prayer when he wanted to begin the *ṣalāt*.” The answer pleased Zayd ibn ‘Alī.<sup>31</sup>

First, we have to stress the authenticity of the prayer at the end of this account, as it is attributed to the Prophet in both Sunnī and Shī‘ī ḥadīth sources.<sup>32</sup> As for *al-Majmū‘* which includes the account, there are varying opinions about its status.

According to Zaydīs, due to its content and its attribution to Imām Zayd, this is a reliable book of ḥadīth and fiqh.<sup>33</sup> Sunnī ḥadīth and fiqh literature, however, does not attribute any value to the book. This is because Abū Khālid ‘Amr ibn Khālid, the first narrator of the book, said that he was the only one who narrated it from Zayd. Abū Khālid is a weak narrator who is heavily criticized by Sunnī scholars

<sup>31</sup> Zayd ibn ‘Alī, *al-Majmū‘ al-ḥadīthī wa-l-fiqhī*, 85.

<sup>32</sup> For the account related as *مفتاح الصلاة الطهور وتحريمها التكبير وتحليلها التسليم* by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī, see al-Tirmidhī, “Ṣalāt,” 176. The ḥadīth has also been transmitted from ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Ibn Mas‘ūd and Ibn ‘Abbās through various chains of narrators. See Ibn Māja, “Ṭahāra,” 3; al-Tirmidhī, “Ṭahāra,” 3; “Ṣalāt,” 176. Some parts of this account are directly attributed to ‘Alī, related in four credible ḥadīth sources of the Imāmiyya; see Ja‘far Subḥānī, *Buḥūth fī l-mīlāl wa-l-niḥāl* (Qum: Mu‘assasat al-Imām al-Ṣādiq, 1995), VII, 137-154.

<sup>33</sup> See Ibrāhīm ibn Qāsim ibn al-Imām al-Mu‘ayyad billāh, *Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya* (ed. ‘Abd al-Salām ibn ‘Abbās al-Wajīh; ‘Ammān: Mu‘assasat al-Imām Zayd ibn ‘Alī al-Thaqāfiyya, 2001), I, 49-51; al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, I, 11, 68-69; ‘Abd Allāh ibn Ḥammūd al-‘Izzī, *Ulūm al-ḥadīth ‘inda l-Zaydiyya wa-l-muḥaddithīn* (‘Ammān: Mu‘assasat al-Imām Zayd ibn ‘Alī al-Thaqāfiyya, 2001), 17, 144, 275; Zayd ibn ‘Alī, *Musnad*, 17.

of *ʿilm al-rijāl*, and is not considered to be a competent scholar in ḥadīth narration.<sup>34</sup>

Many accounts in the work can be found in both Shīʿī and Sunnī ḥadīth sources. Nevertheless, it cannot be expected that any value be assigned by Imāmī Shīʿīs to this work due to their approach to the ḥadīth.<sup>35</sup>

The first modern study of the subject is found in *Corpus Iuris di Zaid Ibn ʿAlī* (= *Majmūʿ al-fiqh*) edited by Griffini (d. 1925). The work was well received by certain experts from both the Western and Islamic worlds.<sup>36</sup>

As for the content of the account, it is accepted that Abū Ḥanīfa's response to Zayd ibn ʿAlī is accurate given its appearance in related sources. One of the versions appears in *Musnad al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfa* as follows:<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Al-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-iʿtidāl* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifā, n.d.), III, 257.

<sup>35</sup> See Subḥānī, *Buḥūth*, VII, 137-139; cf. Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī al-Ṭūsī, *Tabḍīb al-aḥkām* (ed. al-Sayyid Ḥasan al-Khursān; Beirut: Dār Ṣaʿb, 1981), VII, 251; id., *al-Istibṣār fī-mā ukbtulifa min al-akbbār* (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1970), I, 66. For Shīʿī views of ḥadīth and the support for the above-given belief, see Etan Kohlberg, "Shīʿī Ḥadīth," in A. F. L. Beeston et al. (eds.), *Arabic Literature to the End of the Umayyad Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 299-307; Saffet Köse, "Fıkıh Literatürünün Tartışmalı İki Eseri: *el-Mecmūʿu'l-kebir* ve *el-Mebâric fî'l-hiyel* [Two Discussed Works of the Fiqh Literature: *Al-Majmūʿ al-kabîr* and *al-Makbârij fî l-hiyal*]," *İslâm Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi* [Journal of Islamic Law Studies] 3 (2004), 289-311, particularly pp. 296-297.

<sup>36</sup> Al-ʿAbbās ibn Aḥmad ibn İbrâhîm ibn Aḥmad al-Yemenî, *Tatimmat al-Rawḍ al-naḍîr* (Beirut: Dār al-Jil, n.d.), 331-344; Fuat Sezgin, *Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967), I, 552-555; id., *Târikh al-turâth al-ʿArabî* (translated into Arabic by Maḥmūd Fahmî Hîjâzî; Riyâḍ: Jâmiʿat al-Imâm Muḥammad ibn Suʿūd al-Islâmiyya, 1991), I (part: III), 315; Muḥammad ʿAjjâj al-Khatîb, *al-Sunna qabla l-tadwîn* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1963), 371; id., *al-Mukhtaṣar al-wajîz fî ʿulûm al-ḥadîth* (Beirut: Muʿassasat al-Risâla, 1987), 83; id., *Uṣûl al-ḥadîth: ʿUlûmub<sup>â</sup> wa-muṣṣalahaub<sup>â</sup>* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1989), 216; Köse, "Fıkıh Literatürünün Tartışmalı İki Eseri," 291-301.

<sup>37</sup> Abū Nuʿaym Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd Allâh al-Iṣfahânî, *Musnad al-Imâm Abī Ḥanīfa* (Riyâḍ: Maktabat al-Kawthar, 1994), 130; Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybânî, *al-Āḥbâr* (ed. Abū l-Wafâʾ al-Afghânî; Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1993), I, 1.

عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، قال الوضوء مفتاح الصلاة، والتكبير تحريمها، والتحليل تسليم وفي كل ركعتين تسليم، ولا تجزئ صلاة إلا بفاتحة الكتاب، ومعها غيرها.

The Prophet (pbuh) said: *Wuḍūʿ* is the key of the *ṣalāt*. *Takbīr* ends its connection with the world and *salām* restores its connection. The *salām* takes place in every two *rakʿas*. The *ṣalāt* may be valid only if the Fātiḥa of the Book is recited, along with another [sūra].

This account, narrated by Abū Saīd al-Khudrī, is found in *al-Sunan* by al-Bayhaqī with the same wording and chain of narrators (‘an Abī Ḥanīfa ‘an Abī Sufyān ‘an Abī Naḍra ‘an Abī Sa‘īd al-Khudrī).<sup>38</sup>

Upon Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s question, “What is the key of the *ṣalāt*?” Abū Ḥanīfa answers: “The key of the *ṣalāt* is purification (*ṭubūr*).” In his response, he uses the word *ṭubūr*, whereas these narrations use the term *wuḍūʿ*. The word *ṭubūr* means the action of eliminating the condition of impurity and absence of *wuḍūʿ*, a state that hinders the performance of the *ṣalāt* in fiqh literature. It is synonymous with the word *wuḍūʿ*, which signifies purity from the condition that requires *wuḍūʿ*.<sup>39</sup> Other subtle changes in the narrations are found in the translocation of the subject and verb. Considering that the expressions *wuḍūʿ* and *ṭubūr* are synonymous, there is no inconsistency between the beginning of these narrations and the one found in *al-Majmūʿ*. The remainder of the narration is not found in *Musnad al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfa*. Nevertheless, Abū Ḥanīfa refers to this hadith by stating: “Here is the opening prayer: *Subḥānaka-llāhumma wa-bi-ḥamdik wa-tabāraka-smuk wa-ta‘ālā jadduk wa-lā ilāha ghayruk*. As is related from the Prophet (pbuh), he said this prayer when he wanted to begin the *ṣalāt*.” This, despite being slightly modified, was narrated by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī in other credible ḥadīth sources.<sup>40</sup>

The inaugural prayer of the *ṣalāt*, which is found in this account within Ḥanafī tradition, is replaced by other Qur’ānic-based wordings in Zaydī fiqh. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the narration is contrary to Zaydī fiqh. Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥusayn Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq

<sup>38</sup> Aḥmad ibn Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī, *al-Sunan al-kubrā* (Hyderabad: Dā‘irat al-Ma‘ārif al-Uthmāniyya, 1927), II, 380.

<sup>39</sup> Sa‘dī Abū Jayb, *al-Qāmūs al-fiqhī* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1982), 234.

<sup>40</sup> Al-Nasā‘ī, “Ifitāḥ,” 19; al-Tirmidhī, “Ṣalāt,” 179.

(d. 298/911), the founder of the Hādawī branch of Zaydiyya, after mentioning an inaugural prayer attributed to ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib – which is also found in *al-Majmūʿ*<sup>41</sup> – writes: “This is the most beautiful prayer we ever heard among the ones said during inauguration.” Thus, he sees other inaugural prayers as valid in terms of fiqh.<sup>42</sup> Al-Sayyāghī also says “This inauguration is one that is rumored to belong to the Prophet, and it is known as ‘the inauguration of Ibn Masʿūd’ (*istiftāḥ Ibn Masʿūd*) by ḥadīth scholars [*abl al-ḥadīth*.]”<sup>43</sup>

Before commenting on the aforementioned account, it is necessary to evaluate it from a historical point of view. Have historical sources ever recorded such an event? In other words, can we historically verify that Zayd ibn ʿAlī came to al-Kūfa, hid in this city, and met Abū Ḥanīfa there?

The account in *al-Majmūʿ* is found neither in historical works nor in biographies. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain some clues as to the probability of the encounter. Al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/922) and Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1232), who recorded historical events, give the date of the rebellion of Zayd ibn ʿAlī as 121/738-739 and his murder as 122/739-740.<sup>44</sup> In spite of conflicting opinions about the residence of Zayd ibn ʿAlī in al-Kūfa, it is certain that he stayed there during the reign of Yūsuf ibn ʿUmar, who became governor of ʿIrāq following the dismissal of Khālīd ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Qasrī. Al-Qasrī’s governorship of ʿIrāq took place between 105/723-724 and 120/737-738. The assignment of Yūsuf ibn ʿUmar as governor was in 121/738-739.<sup>45</sup> In

<sup>41</sup> Zayd ibn ʿAlī, *al-Majmūʿ al-ḥadīthī wa-l-fiqhī*, 85.

<sup>42</sup> Yahyā ibn al-Ḥusayn Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq, *al-Aḥkām fī l-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Yemen: Maktabat al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 2003), I, 91.

<sup>43</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, II, 6.

<sup>44</sup> Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk* (ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm; Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, n.d.), VII, 160, 180; ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Ibn al-Athīr al-Shaybānī, *al-Kāmil fī l-tārīkh* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1987), IV, 443, 452.

<sup>45</sup> Abdulkерim Özyaydın, “Hālīd ibn Abdullah el-Kasrī [Khālīd ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Qasrī],” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslām Ansiklopedisi (DİA)* [*Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam*], XV, 281-282; Mustafa Demirci, “Emevîlerin Irak Valisi Hālīd ibn Abdullah el-Kasrī’nin Hayatı ve Faaliyetleri [The Life and Activities of Khālīd ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Qasrī, the ʿIrāq Governor of the Umayyads],” *Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi* [*Journal of Academic Research in Religious Studies*] 4/3 (2004), 61-74; Melek Yılmaz Gömbeyaz, “Bir Emevî Valisi:

light of the accounts in *Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī*, Zayd ibn ‘Alī was sent by Caliph al-Hishām ibn ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 105-125/724-743) to Yūsuf ibn ‘Umar to confront Khālid al-Qasrī, the previous governor, regarding a past case.<sup>46</sup> Zayd ibn ‘Alī did not, however, leave al-Kūfa immediately, rather staying there for another four or five months.<sup>47</sup> Meanwhile, certain residents of al-Kūfa visited him and incited a rebellion.<sup>48</sup> Thereafter, the governor, who had been warned by Caliph al-Hishām, made continuous inquiries about Zayd and forced him to leave the city.<sup>49</sup> Zayd ibn ‘Alī left the city, but returned upon promises of support by the al-Kūfa Shī‘īs who had followed him to al-Qādisiyya.<sup>50</sup> It was at this time that Zayd ibn ‘Alī hid in al-Kūfa.<sup>51</sup> He spent two months of his secret eleven-month preparations for rebellion<sup>52</sup> in Baṣra.<sup>53</sup> According to an account in *al-Majmū‘*, upon his arrival in al-Kūfa Zayd hid. Therefore, Abū Ḥanīfa’s meeting with Zayd ibn ‘Alī during the latter’s secret residence in al-Kūfa could have been possible only a few months before Zayd’s death.<sup>54</sup>

The Sunnī sources provide no reference to a meeting or dialogue between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd as related in *al-Majmū‘*, and there is no evidence to show that he was taught by Zayd.

Apart from this account on the educational relationship between Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ‘Alī, some historical and biographical sources give several accounts of Abū Ḥanīfa’s opposition to the revolt of Zayd. Although they are not directly related to our subject, we would like to mention such accounts here in the hope of providing

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Hālid b. Abdullah al-Kasrī [An Umayyad Governor: Khālid ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Qasrī],” *ISTEM* 8 (2006), 237-254, particularly 250.

<sup>46</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 161.

<sup>47</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 167.

<sup>48</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 166.

<sup>49</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 169-171.

<sup>50</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 166; Abū Ṭālib al-Nāṭiq bi-l-ḥaqq al-Hārūnī, *al-Ifāda fī tārīkh al-a’imma al-sāda* (Yemen: Manshūrāt Markaz Ahl al-Bayt, 2001), 45.

<sup>51</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 171.

<sup>52</sup> al-Hārūnī, *al-Ifāda*, 47.

<sup>53</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 171.

<sup>54</sup> According to many accounts, Zayd ibn ‘Alī passed away in 122/739-740, at the age of 42. See al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 180; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, IV, 443; al-Dhahabī, *Siyar a’lām al-nubalā’* (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1992), V, 390.

some clues. As related in *al-Ḥadāʾiq al-wardiyya fī manāqib aʾimmat al-Zaydiyya* by al-Maḥallī (d. 652/1254), when Zayd ibn ʿAlī began to invite people in al-Kūfa to pay homage to him, he sent al-Fuḍayl ibn al-Zubayr to Abū Ḥanīfa. When Fuḍayl came to Abū Ḥanīfa and delivered the letter from Zayd ibn ʿAlī, Abū Ḥanīfa was speechless. Then, he cried, “Shame on you; what are you talking about?” Fuḍayl responded: “Why do you not help him? It is just to make *jibād* alongside him.” Abū Ḥanīfa asked, “Which *faqīhs* have joined him?” Fuḍayl responded, “Salama ibn Kuhayl, Yazīd ibn Abī Ziyād, Hāshim Hārūn ibn Ṣaʿd, Abū Hāshim al-Rummānī, Ḥajjāj ibn Dīnār and others.” Abū Ḥanīfa did not give his final answer that day. The following day, when he secretly met with the envoy, he declared: “Send him my regards. As for rebellion with you (*al-kburūj maʿak*), this I cannot do. However, I have assistance and power to help you in your *jibād* against your enemy; you and your companions may use this for mounts and weapons.” Thus, he subsidized Zayd ibn ʿAlī. The amount was rumored to be thirty thousand dirham or dīnār.<sup>55</sup>

Abū Ḥanīfa said the following regarding the revolt of Zayd ibn ʿAlī: “This rebellion seems to be like the rising of the Prophet on the day of Badr.”<sup>56</sup> When asked why he had not joined in the war alongside Zayd ibn ʿAlī, he answered: “If I knew people would not desert him, contrary to what they did to his grandfather, I would certainly join him in *jibād*, since he is the just imām. It is for this reason that I provided him with financial support.”<sup>57</sup>

### Assessment & Conclusion

1. At the beginning of the account in *al-Majmūʿ*, it is said that Zayd ibn ʿAlī kept himself out of sight in a house when he arrived in

<sup>55</sup> Ḥamīd al-Shahīd ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Maḥallī, *al-Ḥadāʾiq al-wardiyya fī manāqib aʾimmat al-Zaydiyya* (ed. al-Murtaḍā ibn Zayd al-Maḥṭūrī; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Yemen: Maktabat Markaz Badr li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 2002), I, 254; cf. Aḥmad ibn Yahyā ibn Jābir al-Balādhurī, *Kitāb jumal min Ansāb al-asbrāf* (eds. Suhayl Zakkār and Riyāḍ Zirīklī; Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1996), III, 1361; Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī, *Maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn*, (ed. Sayyid Aḥmad Ṣaqr; Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, n.d.), 147; al-Hārūnī, *al-Ifāda*, 46; Ibn al-Bazzāzī, *Manāqib*, 267.

<sup>56</sup> Ibn al-Bazzāzī, *Manāqib*, 267; Abū Zahra, *Tārīkh al-madbāhib*, 348; id., *al-Imām Zayd*, 71.

<sup>57</sup> Al-Makkī, *Manāqib*, I, 342; Ibn al-Bazzāzī, *Manāqib*, 267, Abū Zahra, *Tārīkh al-madbāhib*, 348; id., *al-Imām Zayd*, 71.

al-Kūfa. When Abū Ḥanīfa was informed of the situation, and after discussing it with colleagues, he visited Zayd. Therefore, Abū Ḥanīfa acknowledged Zayd ibn ‘Alī. His decision may also indicate that Abū Ḥanīfa knew Zayd ibn ‘Alī beforehand. Their acquaintance may date back to the visits of Abū Ḥanīfa in al-Ḥijāz, or perhaps to Zayd’s sojourn in the city four to five months prior to his secret residence in al-Kūfa. Zayd ibn ‘Alī was in al-Kūfa due to a lawsuit, and he was confronted by the former governor in the mosque at the behest of Caliph al-Hishām. It is improbable that Abū Ḥanīfa, known for his love of the Ahl al-bayt, was unaware of or indifferent to the meeting. Therefore, it is clear that Abū Ḥanīfa already knew Zayd at the time. As to the question of whether Abū Ḥanīfa had known Zayd before the latter came to al-Kūfa, we have no credible information. It is known, however, that Abū Ḥanīfa met with Muḥammad al-Bāqir, Zayd’s older brother, in Medina. It is possible that Abū Ḥanīfa met him either during this period or after the demise of al-Bāqir in Medina, where Zayd lived, or in Mecca during ḥajj. The words attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa about Zayd ibn ‘Alī can be understood in this context. That is, Abū Ḥanīfa met Zayd, listened to his speeches and recognized his superior intellect. However, did Zayd ibn ‘Alī know Abū Ḥanīfa? Was it a one-sided recognition, or a mutual acquaintance? The account of *al-Majmū‘* relates that during the meeting, Abū Ḥanīfa was introduced to Zayd ibn ‘Alī as “a man among the *faqīhs* of al-Kūfa,” not as his student. Furthermore, the narrator Abū Khālid reports that he had been with Zayd ibn ‘Alī for five years in Medina before the latter came to al-Kūfa. He claims that he lived with Zayd for months and followed him, even during ḥajj. He sat at Zayd’s feet while in al-Kūfa, up until the time of his assassination.<sup>58</sup> As even this narrator, who reports that he was always with Zayd, describes Abū Ḥanīfa’s introduction to Zayd in such a manner, it is clear that there was no mutual interaction between the two before this event.

Again, based on the statements of the narrator, we can conclude that this meeting occurred during Zayd’s secret sojourn in al-Kūfa. As a matter of fact, because Zayd hid in the house of ‘Abd Allāh ibn Zubayr al-Asadī, it is likely that this meeting happened during Zayd’s secret residence, which began after his return from al-Qādisiyya and

<sup>58</sup> See Zayd ibn ‘Alī, *Musnad al-Imām Zayd*, 340-341.

which lasted eleven months.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, we can reach the following conclusions:

First, prior to the meeting, Abū Ḥanīfa was a well-known *faqīh* in al-Kūfa, whose scientific authority is highly regarded by friends of Zayd. Accordingly, Zayd's friends introduced him as one among the *faqīhs* of al-Kūfa. During the meeting, Abū Ḥanīfa did not open the conversation with Zayd. Instead, he caught Zayd's attention with his reference to the ḥadīth in response to Zayd's test.

Second, there is no source to confirm that Abū Ḥanīfa studied from Zayd for two years following the meeting. Therefore, it is impossible to suggest his dwelling in al-Kūfa was for this purpose. Additionally, at the time, Zayd ibn ʿAlī was too busy with preparations for the rebellion, making such a relationship unlikely.

2. As described above, the main source for the two-year discipleship of Abū Ḥanīfa under Zayd ibn ʿAlī is Yaḥyā ibn al-Ḥusayn, who is a Zaydī. This assertion, however, based on this narrator of *al-Majmūʿ*, contradicts the account in *al-Majmūʿ*. Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf (d. 1191/1777), another narrator and commentator of *al-Majmūʿ*, claims the due to the Umayyad government, Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd could meet only in secret.<sup>60</sup> Again, according to the account in *al-Majmūʿ*, their meeting was a secret one. It has been demonstrated, however, that Zayd ibn ʿAlī did not know Abū Ḥanīfa prior to this meeting. Moreover, this meeting is not proof that Abū Ḥanīfa studied with Zayd. Even if we accept that the beginning of his sojourn in al-Kūfa coincided with the meeting, it is well known that this period did not exceed one year.<sup>61</sup> In addition, this period was during a time when Zayd ibn ʿAlī was constantly pursued by the governor's men and thus was continuously on the move. It is improbable he continued teaching during such a period. There is no satisfactory information which supports the assertion that Abū Ḥanīfa was a disciple of Zayd for two years while in al-Ḥijāz. In fact, what is certain about Abū Ḥanīfa's time in al-Ḥijāz is that it occurred between 130/747-748 and 132/749-750, long after Zayd ibn ʿAlī's death.

<sup>59</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 172, 173; al-Hārūnī, *al-Ifāda*, 47.

<sup>60</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, I, 66.

<sup>61</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, 172-173; al-Hārūnī, *al-Ifāda*, 47.

3. According to the account in *al-Majmūʿ*, the dialogue between Zayd ibn ʿAlī and Abū Ḥanīfa reveals that Abū Ḥanīfa’s answers are based on a ḥadīth. Zayd did not ask him for its source. In *Musnad al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfa*, however, which compiles the ḥadīths narrated by Abū Ḥanīfa, it is explicitly stated that he attributed this account to the Prophet via narrators who were not among the Ahl al-bayt. Therefore, his response in the presence of a great scholar and *faqīh* like Zayd ibn ʿAlī, and Zayd’s satisfaction with this response, indicate that Abū Ḥanīfa possessed a high-level of knowledge. The ignorance of Zaydī narrators and writers, who claim that Abū Ḥanīfa was a student of Zayd, based on the abovementioned meanings derived from Abū Khālīd’s narration, indicate that their assessment is inaccurate. This conclusion is supported by the fact that al-Sayyāghī, while evaluating the argument that Abū Ḥanīfa studied with Zayd ibn ʿAlī for two years in *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, does not go beyond referring to this belief in the introduction to the book,<sup>62</sup> and provides no further information about the connection between the two.<sup>63</sup>

4. The most important support for those who support the claim that Abū Ḥanīfa was a disciple of Zayd ibn ʿAlī is the following quote: “I have seen Zayd ibn ʿAlī and his friends, but never have I seen a man more *faqīh*, wise, witty, or honest than him in his day. He was a peerless personality.” There is, however, no source for these statements prior to the one related by al-Maqrīzī.<sup>64</sup>

5. Aside from Zayd’s father ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn, his elder brother Muḥammad al-Bāqir, Jaʿfar al-Şādiq and ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan, Zayd ibn ʿAlī is also mentioned as one of the teachers of Abū Ḥanīfa; there is an impression that the last one was added on to the former names. There are historical sources for Abū Ḥanīfa’s meeting with Muḥammad al-Bāqir and Jaʿfar al-Şādiq and studying with them.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, I, 66.

<sup>63</sup> Al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr*, II, 5.

<sup>64</sup> Here, it should be noted that Abū Ḥanīfa also uttered similar words about Jaʿfar al-Şādiq, however, the interpretation of this as if Abū Ḥanīfa was a student of Jaʿfar has been reasonably criticized. See İsmail Hakkı Ünal, “Ebû Hanife Üzerine Bir Sohbet [A Conversation on Abū Ḥanīfa],” *İslâmî Araştırmalar (Ebû Hanife Özel Sayısı) [Islamic Researches (Special Issue: Abū Ḥanīfa)]* 15/1-2 (2002), 327. Mehmet Atalan, “Ebû Hanife ve Ali Oğulları [Abū Ḥanīfa and the ʿAlids],” *Dimî Araştırmalar [Religious Studies]* 8/24 (2006), 165-167.

<sup>65</sup> Al-Makkī, *Manāqib*, I, 143, 148.

However, the only source for his meeting and having a dialogue with Zayd is the dubious account found in *al-Majmūʿ*.

6. Abū Ḥanīfa and Zayd ibn ʿAlī are contemporaries. Abū Ḥanīfa was born in 80/699-700.<sup>66</sup> The earliest birth date given for Zayd ibn ʿAlī is 75/694-695. Other dates given are 76/695-696, 78/697-698, and even 80/699-700 as Zayd's year of birth.<sup>67</sup> Even if 75/694-695 is accurate, the age difference is insignificant, as there was no shame in studying from someone who was the same age or a few years older. It is striking, however, that Zayd is not considered to be among the *ṣaḥāba* and older *tābiʿūn*. It is unlikely that Abū Ḥanīfa would have studied from a peer when many *tābiʿūn* scholars and other prominent figures of Ahl al-bayt, such as ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn (d. 94/713) and his son Muḥammad al-Bāqir (d. 114/732), were available. Although in *Musnad al-Imām Abī Ḥanīfa*, there are reports which Abū Ḥanīfa transmitted from Muḥammad al-Bāqir,<sup>68</sup> a man respected in both Sunnī and Shīʿī circles due to his scientific authority, and also from ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan<sup>69</sup> and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq,<sup>70</sup> who were alive after al-Bāqir's death, there is no narration from Zayd ibn ʿAlī.<sup>71</sup>

The educational and jurisprudential methodology of Abū Ḥanīfa also casts doubt upon the belief that he was a disciple of Zayd. It has been documented that Abū Ḥanīfa hashed out problems in a circle of experts from various backgrounds.<sup>72</sup> Abū Ḥanīfa once stated that he always accepted the words of the *ṣaḥāba* in controversial matters, but as for the opinions of the *tābiʿūn*, such as Ibrāhīm, al-Shaʿbī, Ibn Sīrīn, ʿAṭāʾ, and Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab, he added, "I can judge as they

<sup>66</sup> Abū ʿUmar Yūsuf ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, *al-Intiqāʾ fi faḍāʾil al-aʿimma al-thalātha al-fuqabāʾ* (ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda; Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya, 1997), 188.

<sup>67</sup> Al-Sayyāghī preferred 75/694-695 as the date of his birth, while Muḥsin al-Amīn and Abū Zahra preferred 78/697-69 and 880/699-700 respectively. See al-Sayyāghī, *al-Rawḍ al-naḍir*, I, 52; Muḥsin al-Amīn, *Aʿyān al-Sbiʿa* (Beirut: Dār al-Taʿāruf li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1986), II, 107; Abū Zahra, *al-Imām Zayd*, 33. For further discussion see Gündüz, *Zeyd bin Ali*, 30-31.

<sup>68</sup> Abū Nuʿaym, *Musnad*, 27.

<sup>69</sup> Abū Nuʿaym, *Musnad*, 172.

<sup>70</sup> Abū Nuʿaym, *Musnad*, 66.

<sup>71</sup> Abū Nuʿaym, *Musnad*, 105.

<sup>72</sup> Abū Zahra, *Tārikh al-madhāhib*, 337.

do.”<sup>73</sup> Zayd ibn ‘Alī could be regarded to be one of the younger *tābi‘ūn*.

7. Abū Ḥanīfa lists some of his teachers and talks extensively about Ḥammād while making no mention of Zayd ibn ‘Alī.<sup>74</sup> When he was asked about the source of his knowledge, he stated, “I was in the spring of knowledge and affiliated with one of the *faqībs* there.” The *faqīb* mentioned is Ḥammād ibn Abī Sulaymān (d. 120/738).<sup>75</sup> During Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s lifetime Abū Ḥanīfa was a prominent disciple of the educational circle of Ḥammād in al-Kūfa, where there was a strong intellectual tradition from the time of ‘Umar. After Ḥammād’s death, Abū Ḥanīfa was assigned to be the head of this group, which was comprised of many *faqībs*. Ḥammād passed away one or two years before the death of Zayd ibn ‘Alī.<sup>76</sup> Subsequently, Abū Ḥanīfa was placed in charge of the education in his master’s group, while Zayd ibn ‘Alī secretly prepared for revolt.<sup>77</sup>

8. According to accounts of Abū Ḥanīfa’s involvement in Zayd’s revolt, it is reported that he provided financial support for Zayd ibn ‘Alī, but did not pay homage to him. Abū Ḥanīfa had already reached the necessary intellectual maturity to construct his own attitude and behavior. These accounts, however, are considered unilaterally, in favor of the assertion that he was a disciple of Zayd.

In conclusion, according to the sources at our disposal, there is no credible evidence that Abū Ḥanīfa studied with Zayd ibn ‘Alī, particularly in respect to the account in *al-Majmū‘*. This account considers Abū Ḥanīfa to be a renowned *faqīb* even before meeting Zayd. Abū

<sup>73</sup> Al-Makkī, *Manāqib*, 80; Abū l-Faḍl Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr al-Suyūṭī, *Tabyīḍ al-ṣaḥīfa fī manāqib Abī Ḥanīfa* (ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Maḥmūd Naṣṣār; Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1990), 108, 112.

<sup>74</sup> In his own words, he followed his lessons for 18 years. When the Caliph al-Manṣūr asked him from whom he had received knowledge, he answered, “From Ḥammād, from ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd and ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās through Ibrāhīm.” For this and similar quotes, see Abū Bakr al-Khaṭīb Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Baghdādī, *Tāriḫ Baghdād aw Madīnat al-salām* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, n.d.), XIII, 334; Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 30.

<sup>75</sup> See Abū Zahra, *Abū Ḥanīfa*, 71; id., *Tāriḫ al-madbābīb*, 333, 335.

<sup>76</sup> Al-Dhahabī, *Manāqib*, 11.

<sup>77</sup> Al-Makkī, *Manāqib*, 61.

Ḥanīfa was perhaps mistakenly considered to be one of the disciples of Zayd ibn ‘Alī because of his explicit sympathy toward the Ahl al-bayt, his support for Zayd ibn ‘Alī’s revolt, and his words of praise for Zayd’s scholarship. Later, this belief became a common conviction that has been disseminated through recent works on the subject.

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## **FACTORS UNDERLYING RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION SCALE – A Methodological Approach –**

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### **Abstract**

This study translated the 21-item Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) into Persian and explored its factorial validity in Iran by administering it to 329 undergraduate university students and employing three methods of factor extraction, i.e., Maximum Likelihood (ML), Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Among the three methods, ML seems to be favored in the literature recently because it forms the basis of the structural equation modeling (SEM) upon which studies such as Brewczynski and MacDonald's (2006) are developed. The ML, PAF and PCA all extracted four latent variables (LVs) when they were applied to the participants' responses and the LVs were rotated via Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. When the highest loading of a cross loading item was kept and its loadings on other LVs were removed, it was found that the three methods had the same items loading on factors three and four. The one-way ANOVA analysis of the mean of loadings and post hoc tests, however, showed that the PCA differed significantly from the ML and PAF. It was also found that the first factor extracted by the PAF is the same as the second factor of the ML and vice versa. Based on the items loading on the first two factors it is suggested that the PAF be adopted as the best

method of factor extraction in both exploratory and confirmatory studies.

*Key Words:* Latent variables, maximum likelihood, principal axis factoring, principal component analysis, SEM

## **1. Introduction**

While exploring abilities such as foreign language proficiency is achieved through tests whose validity is established by employing a number of approaches such as content analysis (Khodadady, 1999), what underlies learners' attitudes, beliefs and opinions as regards language learning is identified logically and then changed into psychological scales as "the most widely used survey data collection techniques" (de Vau, 1985: 70). As a distinct example of a psychological measure, the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) conceived by Allport (1950; 1954) and developed originally by Allport and Ross (1967) has attracted the attention of scholars in many fields to explore the relationship between religious orientation and a host of variables such as mental health (e.g., Ghorbani et al., 2000), stress (Almeida, 2006), and child-parent attachment (Miner, 2009), to mention few.

Religious orientation is logically approached as a construct consisting of two components, i.e., intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, which are assumed to help human beings pursue a religious life as an end in itself and as a means to achieve certain goals, respectively (Allport and Ross, 1967). Almeida (2006), for example, administered the ROS revised by Genia (1993) to 76 undergraduate engineering students at the University of the Witwatersrand and treated it as a measure consisting of intrinsic and extrinsic subscales. However, Almeida could not find any significant relationships between the religious orientation and stress as measured by the Pressure Inventory designed by Weiten (1988; 1992; 1998).

Similarly, Ghorbani et al. (2000) administered the ROS developed by Allport and Ross (1967) and scored it by employing the instructions provided by Robinson and Shaver (1973) as a measure consisting of intrinsic and extrinsic subscales. Ghorbani et al also utilized the 14-item Muslim Attitudes Towards Religion Scale (MARS) developed by Wilde and Joseph (1997) and tried to find out whether they bear any significant relationship with anxiety, depression, somatization, obsessive compulsion and interpersonal sensitivity scales measured

by the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (Derogatis et al., 1974). When they administered the measures to 178 university students in Iran, they found significant relationships among the subscales of the measures utilized.

In spite of contributing to human understanding of religiosity, the study of Almeida (2006) and Ghorbani et al. (2000) both suffer from treating the ROS as a measure consisting of two subscales without indicating whether it had any psychometric/factorial validity in the society in which they were conducted. As Brewczynski and MacDonald (2006) [henceforth BM06] convincingly argued, “virtually all of the empirical research done in the psychology of religion in general, and with the ROS in particular, have been done with English-speaking participants” (p. 64). Therefore, they administered the ROS to 385 undergraduate students in Poland and employed the structural equation modeling (SEM) to study its underlying factors.

The present study has an objective similar to BM06 in that it embarks on exploring the factorial structure of the ROS within a Persian-speaking society where Islam is practiced as its official religion. However, it differs from their study in two ways. First, the SEM is *not* considered as an appropriate measure of factorial validity in this study because its results are not compatible with those found in experimental designs.

Khodadady, Pishghadam and Fakhari (2010) [henceforth KPF10], for example, designed an experimental study to explore the relationship among reading comprehension ability, grammar and vocabulary knowledge because based on an SEM design Shiotsu and Weir (2007) [henceforth SW07] claimed that syntactic knowledge is relatively more significant than “vocabulary breadth in predicting text reading comprehension test performance” (pp. 123-124). The claim was based on the regression and correlation summary of their study 3 in which the three measures of syntax, reading comprehension and vocabulary were administered to 591 participants as shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the correlation coefficient obtained between syntax and reading (.85) is higher than that of vocabulary and reading (.79).

**Table 1**

Regression and correlation coefficients obtained in two studies

		Reading (Traditional MCIT) ×		Reading (Schema-Based Cloze MCIT) ×	
		Syntax	Vocabulary	Syntax	Vocabulary
SW07	Beta	.64	.25	-	-
	r	.85	.79	-	-
	% explained	72%	62%	-	-
KPF10	r	.77	.82	.43	.57
	% explained	59%	67%	18%	32%

KPF10 designed and employed two types of reading comprehension tests, i.e., traditional multiple choice item test (MCIT) and schema-based cloze MCIT, and administered them along with syntax and vocabulary MCITs to 82 female learners of English as a foreign language (TEFL) after they divided the participants into control and experimental groups and taught them syntax and vocabulary explicitly for one semester. Their results showed that the explicit teaching of syntax does bring about significantly higher performance on the part of experimental group. However, the performance of both groups showed that syntactic knowledge does not show higher correlations with the reading comprehension ability than the vocabulary knowledge and thus challenged the findings obtained via SEM.

As can be seen in Table 1, the correlation coefficients obtained among the traditional MCIT (.77), schema-based cloze MCIT (.43) measuring the reading comprehension ability and the syntax test is noticeably lower than those obtained among the vocabulary test and the traditional MCIT (.82), and schema-based cloze MCIT (.57). Although as measures of reading comprehension ability traditional MCITs and schema-based cloze MCITs are developed on two different theories (see Khodadady, 1999), they both show higher correlations with the vocabulary than with the syntactic knowledge and thus challenge SW07's findings. As can be seen in Table 1, while syntactic knowledge explains only 18% of variance in the schema-based cloze

MCIT, the amount of variance explained by vocabulary knowledge is almost twice, i.e., 32%.

The second way in which the present study differs from that of BM06 is its utilization of three methods of factor extraction, i.e., the Maximum Likelihood (ML), Principal Axis Factoring (PAF), and the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for the extraction of latent variables (LVs) in the ROS. This study is therefore developed to find out whether the items comprising the ROS will load on two factors as accepted by Ghorbani et al (2000) or three factors as the SEM results obtained by BM06 show. It also attempts to find out whether the ML, PAF and PCA yield the same number of items having similar magnitudes of loading on the same LVs when they are rotated.

## **2. Methodology**

### **2.1 Participants**

Three hundred twenty nine, 251 female (76.3%) and 78 male (23.7), undergraduate university students majoring in agriculture,  $n = 123$  (37.4%), English language and literature,  $n = 95$  (28.9%), theology,  $n = 95$  (28.9%), and architecture,  $n = 16$  (4.9%) at Ferdowsi University of Mashhad voluntarily took part in the present study. Their age ranged from 18 to 38 (Mean = 20.78, SD = 2.335) and they all spoke Persian as their mother language and practiced Islam as their religion.

### **2.2 Instrument**

Following BM06 the original English version of 21-item ROS was translated into Persian and employed in the present study. (The English back translation version has been given in appendix to reach an international audience. Interested readers may, however, contact the corresponding author for the Persian version of the ROS.) It contains the 20 items developed by Allport and Ross (1967) and one more item, E21, added by Feagin (1964). They were all presented on a Likert scale having five points, i.e., completely disagree, disagree, no idea, agree and completely agree to which the values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were assigned, respectively.

In translating the items comprising the ROS schema theory was followed (see Khodadady, 2001; 2008; Seif and Khodadady, 2003). Based on this theory, all the words/phrases constituting the items were translated by employing their semantic, syntactic and discorsal

relationships with each other and their best Persian equivalents were chosen by employing the same relationships governing their Persian equivalents. The translated items were then submitted to two specialists in the Persian Language and Literature Department of Ferdowsi University of Mashhad to be checked and approved in terms of their Persian academic style.

Schema theory solves the unresolved problem faced by BM06 when they tried to translate the intrinsic item, "If I were to join a church group, I would prefer to join (1) a Bible Study group, or (2) a social fellowship." According to them, "Difficulty in translating this item related to the essential inadequacy of its content in the Polish context (i.e., American Bible study groups have no easily understood equivalent in Poland)." The schema *church* used in the item does not need to be related to America so that its Bible study groups become alien to the target readers. The best equivalent for the *church* in Iran is *mosque* if the item in which it occurs is to be read and responded by the majority Muslim Iranians. This means that the equivalents for (1) a Bible Study group and (2) a social fellowship ought to be chosen within a target context/discourse, i.e., Iranian mosque, hence (1) the Qur'ān study group and (2) religious boards.

### 2.3 Procedure

After translating the ROS into Persian and ensuring that its items were compatible with Islam and the Iranian culture, most instructors in agriculture, literature, theology and science faculties of Ferdowsi University of Mashhad were contacted and their cooperation was sought. Upon getting the approval of some, one of the researchers attended their classes and administered the ROS in person on a single occasion.

### 2.4 Data Analysis

The descriptive as well as inferential statistical analyses were carried out by utilizing the SPSS version 19.0. The reliability of the ROS was estimated via Cronbach Alpha. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Principal Axis Factoring (PAF), and Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods were employed to extract rotated LVs. Similar to Khodadady (2009), Kaiser criterion, i.e., eigenvalues higher than 1, was used to determine the number of LVs. Since Khodadady's study (2010) shows that having acceptably cross loading item is a common feature in social studies, it was decided that if an item cross

loaded acceptably, i.e., .30 and higher, on more than one factor, its highest loading on one single factor be adopted as its main contribution to the construct under investigation and its cross loadings on other factors be ignored. Following Khodadady and Hashemi (2010), the unrotated factor matrix was skipped and all correlation coefficients with their frequency and magnitudes were obtained and reported to answer the following four research questions.

Q1. How do the 21 items comprising the ROS correlate among themselves?

Q2. How many LVs will be extracted if the ML, PAF, and PCA are utilized?

Q3. How reliable will the ROS and extracted LVs be?

Q4. Will the number of items as well as loadings on the extracted LVs differ significantly from each other when the ML, PAF and PCA are utilized?

### **3. Results and Discussion**

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of 21 ROS items correlating with each other. As can be seen, out of 210 correlation coefficients (CCs) only 67 (32%) correlate acceptably with each other. These results answer *the first research question* and show that the ROS consists of heterogenous items. Had it consisted of only two factors, most of its constituting items would have shown highly acceptable correlations with each other. The 47-item Characteristics of Effective English Language Teachers (CEELT), for example, consists of homogeneous items because out of 1080 CCs, 916 (84.8%) correlated acceptably with each other when Khodadady (2010) administered it to 1469 high school students in Iran.

**Table 2**

Frequency (F), percent (P) and cumulative percent (CP) of 210 ordered correlation coefficients (CC) obtained among the 21 items comprising the ROS

CC	F	P	CP	CC	F	P	CP	CC	F	P	CP	CC	F	P	CP
-.30	3	1.4	1.4	-.06	2	1.0	21.4	.17	4	1.9	50.0	.41	3	1.4	85.7
-.28	1	.5	1.9	-.05	3	1.4	22.9	.18	5	2.4	52.4	.42	2	1.0	86.7
-.27	1	.5	2.4	-.04	1	.5	23.3	.19	4	1.9	54.3	.43	1	.5	87.1
-.26	3	1.4	3.8	-.03	1	.5	23.8	.21	2	1.0	55.2	.44	2	1.0	88.1
-.25	2	1.0	4.8	-.02	1	.5	24.3	.22	4	1.9	57.1	.45	4	1.9	90.0
-.24	1	.5	5.2	-.01	5	2.4	26.7	.23	6	2.9	60.0	.47	3	1.4	91.4
-.22	1	.5	5.7	.00	3	1.4	28.1	.24	7	3.3	63.3	.48	5	2.4	93.8
-.21	1	.5	6.2	.01	2	1.0	29.0	.25	3	1.4	64.8	.49	1	.5	94.3
-.20	2	1.0	7.1	.02	1	.5	29.5	.27	2	1.0	65.7	.50	1	.5	94.8
-.19	1	.5	7.6	.03	4	1.9	31.4	.28	5	2.4	68.1	.51	2	1.0	95.7
-.18	3	1.4	9.0	.04	2	1.0	32.4	.29	3	1.4	69.5	.52	1	.5	96.2
-.17	1	.5	9.5	.05	1	.5	32.9	.30	4	1.9	71.4	.54	1	.5	96.7
-.16	3	1.4	11.0	.06	5	2.4	35.2	.31	1	.5	71.9	.55	1	.5	97.1
-.15	3	1.4	12.4	.07	4	1.9	37.1	.32	2	1.0	72.9	.57	1	.5	97.6
-.14	4	1.9	14.3	.08	2	1.0	38.1	.33	3	1.4	74.3	.58	2	1.0	98.6
-.13	1	.5	14.8	.09	5	2.4	40.5	.34	5	2.4	76.7	.68	1	.5	99.0
-.12	2	1.0	15.7	.11	3	1.4	41.9	.35	2	1.0	77.6	.71	1	.5	99.5
-.11	3	1.4	17.1	.12	2	1.0	42.9	.36	3	1.4	79.0	.72	1	.5	100
-.10	2	1.0	18.1	.13	1	.5	43.3	.37	1	.5	79.5	Total	210	100	
-.09	2	1.0	19.0	.14	6	2.9	46.2	.38	4	1.9	81.4				
-.08	1	.5	19.5	.15	2	1.0	47.1	.39	2	1.0	82.4				
-.07	2	1.0	20.5	.16	2	1.0	48.1	.40	4	1.9	84.3				

Upon estimating the magnitude of correlational relationships among the ROS items, the KMO and Bartlett's Test was run to find out whether applying factor analysis to the data was appropriate. It yielded .88 as the obtained value of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. According to Kaiser (1974), KMOs in the .80s are "meritorious," (cited in DiLalla and Dollinger, 2006: 250) and the LVs extracted can thus be accepted as underlying factors of ROS. Furthermore, the significant Bartlett's Test of Sphericity, i.e.,  $X^2 = 2561.210$ ,  $df = 210$ ,  $p < .001$ , indicated that the correlation matrix was not an identity matrix.

Table 3 presents the LVs extracted via ML, PAF and PCA, respectively. As can be seen, all the three methods extracted four variables and thus provided the answer to the second question dealing with the number of LVs underlying the Persian version of ROS. These results provide empirical evidence to challenge the logical classification of the items into two subscales, i.e., intrinsic (I) and extrinsic (E). They also challenge the three LVs extracted via SEM by BM06 and show that religious orientation is multifactorial within an Iranian context. (The LVs will be discussed shortly.)

**Table 3**

LVs extracted from the Persian version of ROS via ML, PAF and PCA

BM06	ML				PAF				PCA			
	LV1	LV2	LV3	LV4	LV1	LV2	LV3	LV4	LV1	LV2	LV3	LV4
I1	*	.64	.31	-.37	.63	*	.31	-.37	.72	*	*	-.32
I2	.52	.41	*	*	.44	.51	*	*	.56	.51	*	*
I3	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*
I4	*	.60	*	*	.62	*	*	*	.75	*	*	*
I5	*	.73	*	-.32	.72	*	*	-.32	.78	*	*	*
I6	.37	.64	.32	-.31	.65	.35	.33	-.30	.72	*	*	*
I7	*	.39	.55	*	.39	*	.55	*	.48	*	.56	*
I8	*	*	.59	*	*	*	.58	*	*	*	.60	*
I9	*	*	.66	*	*	*	.66	*	*	*	.69	*
Es1	*	*	.58	*	*	*	.58	*	*	*	.64	*
Ep2	.68	*	*	*	*	.68	*	*	*	.74	*	*
Ep3	.73	*	*	*	*	.72	*	*	*	.76	*	*
E4	*	*	*	.52	*	*	*	.51	*	*	*	.58
E5	*	*	*	.58	*	*	*	.58	*	*	*	.66
E6	*	*	*	.51	*	*	*	.51	*	*	*	.67
Ep7	*	*	.40	.33	*	*	.42	.33	*	*	.57	.32
E8	*	*	*	.53	*	*	*	.55	*	*	*	.62
Ep9	.54	*	*	*	*	.54	*	*	*	.70	*	*
E10	*	*	*	.63	*	*	*	.63	*	*	*	.73
Ep11	.59	*	*	*	*	.60	*	*	.34	.65	*	*
Es12	*	*	.55	*	*	*	.55	*	*	*	.70	*

\* Loadings less than .30

The results presented in Table 3 are compatible with Khodadady and Hashemi's (2010) findings. They administered the 34 items comprising the Beliefs about Language Learning Inventory (BALLI) developed by Horwitz (1985; 1988) to 418 undergraduate and graduate students of English to find out whether the 34 beliefs held by undergraduate and graduate learners would load on five LVs corresponding to the five major logical areas of language learning established by the designer of the BALLI, i.e., 1) Difficulty of language learning, 2) Foreign language aptitude, 3) the nature of language learning, 4) Learning and communication strategies, and 5) Motivations and expectations. The application of the PCA and PAF and rotating the loadings resulted in the extraction of 14 LVs, indicating that the BALLI was addressing issues far more diverse than the five logically established areas of foreign language learning.

The results presented in Table 3 also challenge the number of LVs extracted by SEM which is based on an extraction method other than PAF and PCA. Since BM06 extracted three factors, i.e., Revised Intrinsic, Social Extrinsic (Es), and Personal Extrinsic (Ep), after they revised some ROS items and ran *six* confirmatory **Maximum Likelihood** (ML) factor analyses by using SEM, the same method, i.e., ML, was used in the present study by utilizing the SPSS to find out whether the extraction method upon which the SEM rests yields the same number of LVs having the same loading items as extracted by the PAF and PCA.

Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients of the rotated LVs extracted by ML, PAF, and PCA in the present study. Since the reliability coefficient obtained for the ROS was .80 and those of its LVs ranged from .87 to .70 they answer *the third question* and establish the ROS as a reliable measure of religious orientation in Iran. As it can also be seen in Table 4, the ROS is neither two dimensional as assumed by Allport and Ross (1967) and taken for granted by Ghorbani et al (2000). Nor is it three dimensional as found by BW06. The constituting items of factor three, i.e., Ep7, Es1, Es12, I7, I8, and I9, for example, reject the identification of two distinct extrinsic LVs, i.e., Ep and Es motivations, by BM06 because they load with three intrinsic items, i.e., I7, I8, and I9, on the third factor extracted by three methods in this study.

**Table 4**

Factors extracted by ML, PAF and PCA and their loading items

LVs	Method	# of items	No cross loading	Eigenvalue	Variance explained	Alpha
1	ML	5	Ep11, Ep2, Ep3, Ep9, I2	2.486	11.838	.79
	PAF	4	I1, I4, I5, I6	2.442	11.629	.87
	PCA	5	I1, I2, I4, I5, I6	3.390	16.141	.86
2	ML	4	I1, I4, I5, I6	2.391	11.388	.87
	PAF	5	Ep11, Ep2, Ep3, Ep9, I2	2.440	11.619	.79
	PCA	4	Ep11, Ep2, Ep3, Ep9	2.774	13.211	.76
3	ML	6	Ep7, Es1, Es12, I7, I8, I9	2.344	11.162	.77
	PAF	6	Ep7, Es1, Es12, I7, I8, I9	2.343	11.157	.77
	PCA	6	Ep7, Es1, Es12, I7, I8, I9	2.718	12.941	.77
4	ML	5	E10, E4, E5, E6, E8	2.170	10.333	.70
	PAF	5	E10, E4, E5, E6, E8	2.176	10.364	.70
	PCA	5	E10, E4, E5, E6, E8	2.665	12.690	.70

It seems that SEM provides researchers with a statistical test through which they can justify their personal positions. After running six ML via SEM, BM06, for example, extracted their third factor upon which extrinsic items, i.e., Ep2, Ep3, Ep7, Ep9, and Ep11, loaded acceptably. The same extraction method, i.e., ML, however, resulted in having the same five items load on the *first* factor along with I9 in the present study as shown in Table 4. This very difference might explain why BM06 ran six MLs instead of one before they could come up with a three factorial solution to their problem. The PAF and PCA, nonetheless, show that the constituting items of the first factor are totally different from those extracted via ML, i.e., they are intrinsic in nature. This difference can be explained by focusing on mean loadings and the nature of values upon which the extraction methods rest.

Table 5 presents the mean loading of items comprising the four factors extracted by ML, PAF and PCA. As can be seen, the mean of the PCA, i.e., .67, is different from that of the ML (.5885) and PAF (.5895). The one-way ANOVA analysis showed that the difference in the means obtained is significant ( $F = 7.688$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The Scheffe post hoc test, however, showed that while the mean of the

ML and PAF differ significantly from the PCA, they do not differ from each other because they yield the same rounded mean loadings, i.e., .59, indicating that the two methods extract the same LVs with one single difference, i.e., the order of the first two LVs.

**Table 5**

Descriptive statistics of the mean loadings obtained by the ML, PAF and PCA

Method	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
ML	20	.5885	.07969	.01782	.5512	.6258	.40	.73
PAF	20	.5895	.07619	.01704	.5538	.6252	.42	.72
PCA	20	.6700	.07011	.01568	.6372	.7028	.56	.78
Total	60	.6160	.08355	.01079	.5944	.6376	.40	.78

The unaddressed problem with employing the SEM as a confirmatory factorial method is first revealed when the extraction method, i.e., the ML, through which its LVs are extracted is compared with the PAF and PCA. As shown in Table 4, the number and nature of items loading on the first LVs extracted by the PAF and ML are, for example, logically different, which may somehow explain why six MLs are run in SEM designs such as the one conducted by BM06. The very simplicity of the PAF in terms of being run once shows its superiority over the SEM. The superiority is further emphasized when the LVs extracted by the PAF and ML are compared with each other.

Although the PAF rests on original correlation matrix whereas the ML rests on parameter estimates that are most likely to have produced the observed correlation matrix, they both explain almost the same amount of variance in the rotated LVs extracted as shown in Table 6. As can be seen, the ML, PAF and PCA extracted the same number of LVs which explain the same amount of variance, i.e., 54.984, when the initial Eigenvalues are taken into account. However, when Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings are adopted as the criteria, the amount of variance explained by the PAF and ML drops to 44.768 and 44.721, respectively, while that of the PCA remains the same, i.e., 54.984, indicating that rotating the loadings does not affect the variances explained by the PCA and thus renders it questionable as a method of factorial analysis.

**Table 6**

Total Variance Explained by Components (Cs) and Factors (Fs) extracted by PCA and PAF

LVs	#	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
		Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
ME	1	6.044	28.783	28.783	5.558	26.467	26.467	2.486	11.838	11.838
	2	2.780	13.239	42.022	2.142	10.202	36.669	2.391	11.388	23.226
	3	1.616	7.693	49.715	1.050	5.002	41.670	2.344	11.162	34.388
	4	1.107	5.269	54.984	.641	3.051	44.721	2.170	10.333	44.721
PAF	1	6.044	28.783	28.783	5.591	26.623	26.623	2.442	11.629	11.629
	2	2.780	13.239	42.022	2.167	10.319	36.943	2.440	11.619	23.247
	3	1.616	7.693	49.715	1.050	5.000	41.943	2.343	11.157	34.405
	4	1.107	5.269	54.984	.593	2.825	44.768	2.176	10.364	44.768
PCA	1	6.044	28.783	28.783	6.044	28.783	28.783	3.390	16.141	16.141
	2	2.780	13.239	42.022	2.780	13.239	42.022	2.774	13.211	29.353
	3	1.616	7.693	49.715	1.616	7.693	49.715	2.718	12.941	42.293
	4	1.107	5.269	54.984	1.107	5.269	54.984	2.665	12.690	54.984

It is argued that the very insensitivity of the PCA to the amount of variance when the loadings are rotated distorts the LVs it extracts and thus does not provide empirically sound variables explaining what underlies psychological measures as it must. This argument is further supported when the number of acceptably loading items (ALIs), i.e., .30 and higher, on the LVs are taken into account. As can be seen in Table 3, the number of ALIs on the four LVs extracted by the ML and PAF, i.e., 29, is more than the PCA, i.e., 25. It is therefore suggested that the PCA is treated cautiously in establishing the factorial validity of psychological measures.

Table 7 presents the correlation coefficients obtained among the four LVs extracted via ML, PAF, PCA. As can be seen, the four LVs extracted by the three methods all show significant relationships with the ROS and thus establish it as an internally valid measure of religious orientation. The three methods also show the same degree of relationship between the ROS and its third and fourth LVs. They do, however, differ noticeably from each other in terms of their first and second LVs' relationships with the ROS and thus necessitate scrutinizing the correlation coefficients obtained among its items.

**Table 7**

Correlations among the four LVs extracted via ML, PAF, PCA.

LVs	ROS			LV1			LV2			LV3		
	ML	PAF	PCA	ML	PAF	PCA	ML	PAF	PCA	ML	PAF	PCA
1	.79*	.70*	.74*									
2	.70*	.79*	.76*	.51*	.51*	.51*						
3	.77*	.77*	.77*	.42*	.56*	.56*	.56*	.42*	.40*			
4	.16*	.16*	.16*	.02	-.37*	-.34*	-.37*	.02	.04	-.15*	-.15*	-.15*

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 8 presents the CCs among the 21 items of ROS. As it can be seen, among the 210 CCs, items six and five show the highest correlations with I1, i.e., .72 and .71, respectively. Similarly, these two items show the highest loadings on the first rotated LV extracted by the PAF and PCA (see Table 3), indicating that these two methods are empirically superior to the ML because they are based on the highest *observed* relationships among items rather than their parameter estimates. Between the two methods, the PAF is, however, empirically and logically superior to the PCA because it excludes item I2 from acceptably loading on the first factor because it has the *highest* CC with Ep11, i.e., .50, and thus loads the third, i.e., .60, on the second LV extracted by the PAF.

**Table 8**

Correlation coefficients obtained among the items comprising the ROS

	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I6	I7	I8	I9	Es1	Ep2	Ep3	E4	E5	E6	Ep7	E8	Ep9	E10	Ep11
I2	.42																			
I3	.24	.23																		
I4	.48	.48	.11																	
I5	.71	.41	.17	.57																
I6	.72	.48	.21	.58	.68															
I7	.54	.23	.12	.44	.47	.51														
I8	.47	.30	.18	.33	.38	.55	.52													
I9	.45	.30	.19	.40	.35	.40	.49	.51												
Es1	.39	.24	.17	.33	.31	.47	.42	.45	.48											
Ep2	.33	.39	.25	.29	.30	.38	.27	.38	.28	.29										
Ep3	.34	.48	.18	.34	.30	.44	.24	.32	.24	.22	.58									
E4	-.30	-.04	.01	-.11	-.19	-.25	-.17	-.14	-.12	-.16	.03	.06								
E5	-.28	.04	.02	-.03	-.27	-.24	-.16	-.11	-.10	-.05	.04	.06	.41							
E6	-.18	-.05	-.01	-.07	-.20	-.15	-.14	-.20	-.14	.06	-.11	-.05	.23	.23						
Ep7	-.01	.09	.11	.05	-.07	.00	.14	.14	.22	.21	.15	.18	.14	.15	.22					
E8	-.26	-.15	.06	-.15	-.30	-.26	-.09	-.13	-.16	-.14	-.01	-.02	.28	.38	.28	.25				
Ep9	.08	.23	.09	.16	.07	.19	.03	.09	.07	.14	.36	.40	.19	.17	.08	.25	.07			
E10	-.30	-.06	.03	-.09	-.26	-.25	-.21	-.22	-.18	-.18	-.08	-.06	.34	.37	.34	.11	.36	.12		
Ep11	.35	.50	.19	.36	.28	.43	.24	.28	.22	.24	.45	.45	.00	.07	-.01	.17	-.12	.40	.01	
Es12	.16	.13	.09	.23	.14	.24	.29	.34	.41	.32	.18	.14	-.01	-.10	.06	.27	.00	.09	.03	.18

In sharp contrast to the PAF, the ML extracts items Ep3, Ep2, Ep11, Ep9, I2 and I6 as the acceptable loadings on its first LV. In other words, whereas the PAF extracts logically homogeneous items on its first LV, i.e., they are all intrinsic, the first LV extracted by the ML comprises logically heterogeneous items, i.e. they are both intrinsic and extrinsic. Furthermore, Ep3, the item loading the highest (.73) on LV1 extracted by the ML, shows its strongest relationship with Ep2, i.e., .58, among the 210 CCs. This magnitude of CC is far below the CC of .71 obtained between I1 and I5. The extraction of an item with a low CC as the highest loading item on the first factor provides the second reason to question the acceptability of ML as an extraction method employed in the SEM in that it is a matter of parametric estimate rather than empirically observed correlation to suggest the CC of .58 rather than .71 as the first LV explored by a psychological measure such as the ROS.

#### **4. Conclusion**

This study explored the factorial validity of the Persian ROS by administering it to a representative sample of undergraduate university students in Iran. When the three methods of ML, PAF and PCA were applied to the data, four LVs were extracted indicating that the ROS is neither a two nor a three dimensional measure of religious orientation as suggested in the literature. It was also found that the PCA and PAF yield different number of acceptably loading items whose mean differs significantly from method to method. It is suggested that the PAF is adopted in extracting factors because it neither inflates the items loading on the first factor nor distorts the magnitude of items which load acceptably on other factors when they are rotated and thus provides a more accurate measure of whatever factors instruments such as the ROS are designed to measure.

A comparison of the four factors obtained via ML and PAF in the present study suggest that the former extracts its first factor from the items whose CCs are noticeably lower than the ones obtained by the PAF and thus necessitates running several ML analyses before a logically acceptable pattern of loadings could be found among the items comprising the ROS when SEM is adopted as a confirmatory method of factor analysis. In contrast, a single run of the PAF provides the most empirical type of loadings among the items which show strong correlations with each other. The findings of the present study, there-

fore, suggest that the PAF be adopted not only in exploratory but also in confirmatory studies to validate psychological measures in various contexts such as Iran and Poland. In other words, the adoption of PAF as a confirmatory method will possibly yield similar or comparable results in countries where different religions are practiced.

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## Appendix

The English back translation version of the Persian ROS used in the present study (PS) and its descriptive statistics along with those of Brewczynski and MacDonald (2006) [BM06]

No	Factors		Item	PS		BM06*	
	PS	BM06		Mean	SD	Mean	SD
11	1	1	I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.	3.5	1.3	4.1	1.1
12	2	1	Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Divine Being.	4.1	1.0	3.8	1.2
13	-	-	The prayers I say when I am alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as those said by me in the presence of people.	2.6	1.1	4.2	1.2
14	1	1	It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and meditation.	3.6	1.1	3.7	1.4
15	1	1	My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.	3.5	1.2	3.8	1.3
16	1	1	Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life.	3.8	1.2	3.6	1.4
17	3	1	I read the literature about the religion.	3.2	1.2	2.6	1.3
18	3	-	If I were to join a mosque group, I would prefer to join (1) a Quran Study group, or (2) a religious group.	3.1	1.3	4.3	1.0
19	3	-	If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend mosques.	2.8	1.2	4.2	1.0
Es1	3	2	The mosque is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships.	2.7	1.2	2.0	1.2
Ep2	2	3	The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.	3.6	1.3	4.0	1.1
Ep3	2	3	What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike.	3.6	1.3	2.3	1.4
E4	4	1	It doesn't matter so much what I believe so long as I lead a moral life.	2.7	1.2	1.5	2.5

E5	4	1	Although I am a religious person, I refuse to let religious considerations influence my everyday affairs.	2.5	1.1	2.0	1.2
E6	4	-	I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray.	2.2	1.1	2.0	1.2
Ep7	3	3	A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my mosque is a congenial social activity.	2.5	1.0	3.2	1.4
E8	4	-	Occasionally I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to protect my social and economic well-being.	2.3	1.1	3.3	1.4
Ep9	2	3	The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection.	3.5	1.2	3.2	1.5
E10	3	1	Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life.	2.8	1.1	1.4	0.7
Ep11	2	3	Religion helps to keep my life balanced and steady in exactly the same way as my citizenship, friendships, and other memberships do.	3.6	1.1	1.4	0.9
Es12	3	-	One reason for my being a mosque member is that such membership helps to establish a person in the community.	2.4	1.1	2.8	1.5

\* Means and SDs are rounded up



## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*

by Andrew Rippin

Oliver Leaman



*Maintaining the Sacred Center: The Bosnian City of Stolac*

by Rusmir Mahmutćehajić

David Fideler



*Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*

by Frank Griffel

Veysel Kaya



*The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists*

*Imagined a Revealed Law*

by David R. Vishanoff

Wilferd Madelung



***Muslims Their Religious Beliefs and Practices***, by Andrew Rippin, (The Library of Religious Beliefs and Practices), (4<sup>th</sup> edn., London & New York: Routledge, 2012), ix + 356 pp., ISBN 978-0-415-48940-9, \$44.95 (paperback)

A question it is always interesting to pose is what makes a textbook successful. This book by Andrew Rippin is much used as an introductory text on Islam and Muslims, my students certainly think highly of it, and yet the market is full of such books, guides to the material that one would expect to find in such a book. What we get with Rippin though is no “Islam for Dummies.” Much of the discussion takes place at a pretty high level of scholarship and the student is introduced to the sorts of arguments and issues that confront anyone interested in Islam, not a watered-down version. That is what makes this book useful, it treats its readers with respect and they return the compliment.

The book covers the expected topics, and the emphasis throughout is on the approaches to religion by Muslims, with their variety of traditions and beliefs. The state of Arabia before the arrival of the Prophet is described, then the Prophet himself and the Qurʾān, with quite a bit of discussion of the controversies surrounding its origins and organization. Theology, jurisprudence, politics, philosophy and ritual are well described, as are the varieties of ways of being a Muslim, which is a welcome theme of the book throughout. Given this emphasis I was a bit disappointed that all the images in the book are the stereotypical ones of women in hijab, men in ritual dress and so on. I would have loved to see just one picture of a man going to drive a bus in Vancouver or a woman in Ankara going to her law office, or vice versa, and both looking like everyone else without any especial religious identification, and yet just as much Muslim as anyone else.

A very large part of the book deals with modernity and perceptions of Muslims in the modern and especially Western world. Personally when I hear the word “modernity” used in connection with Islam I tend to writhe in agony. It is such an overdone topic, and I tend to resent the implication that Islam has any particular problem with modernity, which anyone looking at the huge number of books on the topic would naturally assume was the case. On the other hand there is undoubtedly a great deal of interest in the issue and so an

extensive treatment is no doubt appropriate. Here Rippin as ever does a good job, covering a variety of countries and cultures, and bringing out the various ways in which the modernity issue has been taken. A variety of thinkers are mentioned, which is excellent, and this to a degree represents the scope for debate and disagreement within Islam, something that superficial acquaintance with the religion doubts exists. Rippin avoids the temptation to pontificate, and students reading his work will be discouraged from doing so also, one hopes, since the very diversity of views on the religion defies easy generalizations and obvious shared positions.

If one were to cavil, there are things which might be addressed in the future. The index is not much good, it leaves out lots of terms that students are likely to look for. For example, niqab, burqa, veiling, shirk, music, architecture, art and conversion are not in the index, nor is Palestine or Wahhābī, and so readers who see these terms somewhere else and want to find out what their links are with the lives of Muslims have no easy ways of locating the relevant passages of the book. There are not enough cross references in the index to direct the reader to the relevant indexed terms. On the other hand, there is an excellent glossary and a really helpful list of sūras from the Qurʾān at the back of the book. I was disappointed that there is so little on material culture, on building, art, ornamentation, music and so on, since these clearly have played a considerable role in Islamic life and provide useful ways of discussing the religion and controversies within it through the use of objects. We tend to get the idea of a religion based on ideas and practices which is unembodied in anything physically solid. Finally, the Gülen Movement in Turkey and beyond no doubt deserves the discussion it receives here, since it is an interesting phenomenon, but Rippin fails to mention the less glamorous but equally significant Nurcu Movement which exists as a separate entity. Gülen is certainly a disciple of Saʿīd Nūrsī, but the text does not mention the fact that there are two separate movements, albeit no doubt often united in ideological interests and commitments. The Gülen Movement is regarded by many in Turkey and elsewhere as rather sinister and authoritarian, something which does not emerge at all in the discussion in the book.

I thought the last part of the book which looks at perceptions of Muslims in the twenty-first century is also a little unbalanced. Rippin does point to a variety of attacks that have taken place on Muslims in

the media and political system, and a growing suspicion of the community and its real intentions and attitudes. Islamophobia is a significant phenomenon and well worth discussing, as are the other issues that Rippin notes in this section. On the other hand, there are now well-established Muslim communities living all over the world and generally thoroughly part of the social fabric of the cultures of which they are a part. As so often, good news is not really newsworthy, and yet despite the machinations of cynical politicians and zealous religious leaders from all communities intent on upsetting the acceptance of Muslims in society, they have on the whole been accepted in countries with non-Muslim majorities. In Muslim majority countries we are beginning to see today parties come to power with a marked Islamic orientation and again this seems to pass off without too much shock and awe. We should not only ponder over the problems that have arisen but also celebrate the successes, since there are perhaps far more of the latter than their opposite.

It is precisely because the book elicits these sorts of comments that it is so useful in stimulating discussion in the classroom, based as it is on a thorough analysis of the facts and a lively contemplation of their meaning.

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***Maintaining the Sacred Center: The Bosnian City of Stolac\****, by Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, (translated from Bosniac by Desmond Maurer; with a preface by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and an introduction by Ivo Banac; Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom Books, 2011), 312 pp., ISBN: 978-1-935493-91-4, \$24,95

### ***Exploring a Sacred Landscape***

*Maintaining the Sacred Center* explores the symbolism and “sacred geography” of the traditional Bosnian town of Stolac. The book lovingly recounts its beauty, the tragic story of its destruction, and the hope and possibilities engendered by its reconstruction and renewal.

*Maintaining the Sacred Center* is a lyrical work, and in many ways a personal one, deeply rooted in the author’s knowledge of Islamic mysticism, his first-hand knowledge of Stolac (his family’s home), and the historical realities of Bosnia. Focusing on the *čaršija* or town center, Rusmir Mahmutćehajić draws upon the language of symbolism and the perennial philosophy to illuminate Stolac as a sacred city and to throw light on human nature – our human relationships to society, to one another, to the natural world, and to the transcendental. In short, this is a book that has something to offer all readers with an interest in the deeper meanings of the sacred, and in what it means to truly be human.

*Maintaining the Sacred Center* is, in a sense, an extended exploration of the relationship between the inner self and the outer world, both of which, ultimately, form a greater unity. As many traditional philosophers have realized, the larger cosmos and human self are co-implicated in the quest for knowledge and understanding. As Mahmutćehajić writes, “We cannot orient ourselves as human beings, without taking into account existence as a whole and every aspect of our own selves” (p. xxii). In order to know ourselves, we must understand the world and the greater order from which we have emerged. In this sense, cosmology, anthropology, epistemology, and spirituality cannot be separated.

Traditionally, these relationships engaged the attention of the greatest scientists, who were also philosophers. But in recent times, the role of science has become limited to a far more narrow pursuit, based on the reductionistic premises of positivism: that only what can

be measured is real. At the same time, scientific positivism and instrumental reason – carrying with it the assumption that human beings exist with the primary purpose of manipulating the world and nature – has become enshrined as the primary valid way of envisioning the world. This has led to a kind of reductionism, and a severe flattening of our rich, multidimensional, and pluralistic human nature.

In short, for some centuries now, the human soul, and what is required for soulful living, have become increasingly marginalized. What we are left with is mere instrumental knowledge and techniques for the manipulation nature (and other people); and what is lost is a satisfying vision of human fulfillment. We are thus left with the situation, aptly described in one prophetic utterance: “Where there is no vision, the people perish” (Proverbs 29:18).

*Maintaining the Sacred Center* is a welcome contribution to the project of rediscovering meaning, depth, and spirituality in the fabric of what has become a disenchanting world and landscape. In this work, Dr. Mahmutćehajić turns to the deepest and most beautiful insights of the Islamic tradition, which teaches that all human beings are “created from one soul” (Q 7:189) and which instructs its followers to “make no distinction between any of His prophets” (Q 2:285). This is the generous, inclusive vision of Islam, overflowing with a divine mercy that sent no less than 124,000 prophets to humanity, so that “there does not exist a people or language which has not received its Book” (p. 61) – a generous vision that promises salvation to all people, to all “People of the Book,” who surrender their hearts to the divine. In this way, Mahmutćehajić embraces the prophetic tradition, which is central to the book’s methodology. As he writes, “the Stolac *čaršija* cannot be understood in whole or in part so long as one ignores prophecy and revelation as sources of knowledge. This neglect is a crucial element of all modern philosophy, which looks to modern science for the only undeniable source of knowledge” (pp. xxii-xxiii).

Given the fact that Mahmutćehajić is a professor of applied physics, the reader must assume that he doesn’t reject modern science entirely, but recognizes science’s limitation in providing a complete human model. Deeper forms of knowledge are needed, and “Only unity of knowledge and being can bring us satisfaction.

Only then can we become what we love. Only then is the goal of our journey within our grasp” (p. 27).

### ***Reading the Book of Nature***

Drawing on the traditional idea of humanity as microcosm – the embodiment of all the qualities in the greater cosmos – Mahmutćehajić explores the reciprocity that exists between our inner souls and the outer world. In the Islamic tradition, these qualities are the Most Beautiful Names – the divine attributes. “God made man in his own image” – Adam, the primordial archetype of humanity – “And he taught Adam all the Names” (Q 2:31). In other words, these divine qualities of creation were all inscribed within the archetype of humanity.

“Everything in the world or in ourselves is a sign,” Mahmutćehajić writes, and this provides a foundation for his entire work. Referring obliquely to the Qur’ānic verse “We will show them Our signs in the horizons [outer world] and within themselves” (Q 41:53), the author writes that the divine “names” were “scattered across the horizons, but they were also gathered within the human self before we came into existence” (p. 86). Because of this reciprocity between the inner and the outer, every aspect of the traditional town center in Stolac is both sacred and symbolic. On the one hand, the *čaršija* emerged as a sacred structure through divine inspiration and human activity, to outwardly mirror the divine qualities present in the human soul. On the other hand, it functioned as a sacred landscape to remind its inhabitants of their inner divine nature – the divine qualities, names, or attributes that exist within – the remembrance of which leads to human fulfillment.

Over the course of the last century, however, humanity’s inner knowledge of the divine has become progressively obscured, due to reductionistic ideologies that have rendered the world increasingly opaque and the reality of the sacred increasingly distant. This increasing forgetfulness, Mahmutćehajić argues, led to the gradual destruction of Stolac and its sacred edifices, which began slowly in the late 1800s and reached a crescendo in 1993 with the terrifying destruction of the city square, all the mosques in Stolac, two thousand homes, and the expulsion of the entire Muslim population during the war against Bosnia. This, Mahmutćehajić argues, is a painfully extreme example of what has happened to many other sacred cities

around the world, whose intrinsic nature has been forgotten under the spell of modern ideologies, allowing their outer manifestations to slip into oblivion, because they are no longer understood.

Worse than any such loss, however, is “failing to understand that what has been lost can be recovered” (p. xix). From this perspective, *Maintaining the Sacred Center* is devoted to re-discovering, or once again unveiling, the sacred meanings inherent in Stolac’s architecture and layout.

The focus of the book is the *čaršija*, the center where all things meet. “The cardinal points of the world meet in the human self,” writes Mahmutćehajić, while, in the outer world, “The equivalent in the traditional Bosnian town is the *čaršija*, the central public area where markets were held” (p. 3). The word *čaršija* itself refers to the four cardinal directions, and the *čaršija* was both the sacred and commercial center of the town – the center and the goal – a meeting point that brought people and their actions together, and sent them out into the world. For Mahmutćehajić, Stolac is nothing less than “an image of the human soul.”

Flanked by mountains in a beautiful valley, nineteen pathways led into the *čaršija*. And in nineteen beautiful chapters, Mahmutćehajić expounds the sacred symbolism of the town. These chapters explore such themes as The Garden, The *Miḥrāb*, Doors and Windows, The Valley and the Mount, and many more – too many to be discussed meaningfully in a short review.

### ***The Path toward Recollection***

In one of the most beautiful chapters, “The Labyrinth,” Mahmutćehajić refers to the labyrinthine structure of the *čaršija* and the spiritual journey it implies. The journey, of course, is to the sacred center, corresponding to the innermost center of the human being. Of the nineteen pathways leading into Stolac,<sup>1</sup> each pathway ultimately led to the Čaršija Mosque, and, within the mosque, to the heart-shaped *miḥrāb*, symbolizing compassion, spiritual orientation, and recollection. At the *miḥrāb*, duality is erased, and the worshipper’s intrinsic nature is made clear: “To journey is to seek hidden gold,

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<sup>1</sup> Nineteen is the numerical equivalent of the Arabic phrase *al-Wāḥid*, “the One” or “Unity,” one of the divine names. The Čaršija Mosque also had nineteen pillars.

which is simply the light that lies hidden at the heart of our original nature” (p. 96). Moreover, the correspondence between inner and outer holds true:

The center of the valley is the *čaršija*; the center of the *čaršija* is the mosque; and the center of the mosque, the *mibrāb*. The center of the world is the human being; the center of the human being is the heart; and the center of the heart is Intellect or Spirit (p. 31).

Yet even if the center is forgotten, it still exists, like a sun hidden behind clouds: “The sacred center did not cease to be. It simply became concealed in the labyrinth of the world and the darkened self” (p. 112). Everything in the world and ourselves is a sign, but the *purpose* of those signs is to reawaken us, through recollection (Greek: *anamnēsis*), to our true and original nature, “our perfection,” which is not bound by time. (In this sense, Mahmutčehajić’s account mirrors Platonic understandings of the soul’s journey as one of recollection.)

This recollection leads to a kind of transformation or *metanoia*, especially in terms of perception. Through reaching the center again, a realization of Unity and Peace occurs. The divine names or qualities, scattered throughout the world, once again become gathered together in the human soul. And significantly, at this point, a transformation in perception takes place: paradise is restored, for the city is then restored “to its original nature as the garden” (p. 94). “The goal for us is to fulfill our authentic potential and return to the garden, in which the outer and inner were one” (p. 113). As the author writes in one beautiful passage,

When we lost paradise, its contents did not disappear, the beauty of its waters and springs and paths and trees. They merely became dispersed, occluded, and difficult to approach ... Our coming together and returning to our original perfection means bringing together the signs in the world and in ourselves so that we see the truth of creation within everything. This truth of creation connects everything that has been scattered (p. 88).

Expressed in technical terms, Mahmutčehajić presents the reader with “a realized eschatology”: the experience of paradise, or the kingdom of God, is not limited to the afterlife, but accessible here and now, given the appropriate knowledge and faculties of perception. As the philosopher Plotinus wrote, the once-legendary Golden Age is not something in the distant past, but present now, for those who

possess the eyes to see it.<sup>2</sup> And a similar point is made by Jesus in the gnostic *Gospel of Thomas*, 131: When a disciple asks Jesus “When will the kingdom come?” Jesus replies, “... the Father’s kingdom is spread out upon the earth, and people don’t see it.”

Wendell Berry once wrote that “There are no unsacred spaces. There are only sacred places and desecrated spaces.” In a postscript entitled “My Ruins,” Mahmutćehajić recounts in heartbreaking detail the destruction of Stolac, analyzing the various ideologies that led to its desecration in different periods, including the destruction of the Muslim graveyards between 1949 and 1960, where the author’s own relatives were laid to rest. He explains how the tombstones were shattered to provide materials for new building projects, and recounts other atrocities that befell the city, including its plunge into hell in 1993, when the *čaršija* was leveled and all Muslims were forced to leave the city. But, in Mahmutćehajić’s own words, “there is no loss we cannot recover, no suffering from which we cannot learn” (p. 93).

In some ways, this book might have also been entitled “Restoring the Sacred Center.” In 2003 the mosque and *čaršija* were declared national monuments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 2004 reconstruction of the mosque was complete. Despite immense suffering, the sacred, and that which is divinely beautiful, can still shine through, should we have the eyes to see it. A poetic, learned, and lyrical work, *Maintaining the Sacred Center* provides us with a glimpse of paradise, seen despite suffering, and a foundation for seeing and reclaiming the sacred in the modern world.

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\* The original edition of the book: *Stolačka Čaršija: U Vidiku perenijalne filozofije* [The Stolac *Čaršija*: In Light of the Perennial Philosophy] (Zagreb: Izdanja Antibarbarus, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> See Plotinus, *The Enneads* 5.1.4 (trans. Stephen MacKenna; Burdett, NY: Larson Publications, 1992). Based on his pun, the Golden Age, as *Nous*, is ever-present.

***Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology***, by Frank Griffel, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiii + 408 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-533162-2, \$74 (hardback)

This is an illuminating book, both in its form and its substance, and it is possible for the avid reader of the history of Islamic thought initially to become excited when skimming through its contents. The author has successfully overcome the obstacles inherent in addressing such a common and well-researched topic in Islamic studies (that is, al-Ghazālī [d. 505/1111] and his theology and philosophy) by thoroughly discussing the most recent scholarship in the area. Because the book has from the time of its publication received the praise it truly deserves, I will present a different understanding of several important issues it addresses and supply several criticisms rather than providing a descriptive outline of the book.

However, before proceeding, a few comments regarding this book's place in Turkish academia are in order, given that a translation will soon become available of Turkish readers.<sup>1</sup> It will surely take its place in the Turkish corpus al-Ghazālī produced thus far, most of which depends on translations from al-Ghazālī's own works. From the Ottoman period onward, Turkish academia has never lost its respect for Ḥujjat al-Islām al-Ghazālī despite the fact that it has predominantly followed the heritage of the famous theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606), who was a fierce critic of al-Ghazālī. This respectful attitude can be observed in the *Tabāfut* of Khojzāda (d. 893/1488), in which both al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī were saluted as "al-Imāmān (the Two Imāms)." The acceptance of al-Ghazālī's works continued even after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, a period whose beginnings noted serious difficulties in religious publication, and the acceptance extends to the present day. The fact that we have five different Turkish translations of al-Ghazālī's magnum opus *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* suffices to show how desperately the Turkish people feel themselves in need of a correct understanding of the work of this great Muslim scholar. In addition, *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, as demonstrated by its title, is also consistent with the place given al-Ghazālī in the history of Islamic thought, since al-

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<sup>1</sup> *Gazālī'nin Felsefî Kelâmı* (translated into Turkish by İbrahim Halil Üçer; Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2012, forthcoming).

Ghazālī has been put at the very core and beginning of the new period in Kalām, which was called “the philosophical theology” (tr. *felsefî kelâm* or *müteabhirîn-i mütekellimîn*), by the common theological material in the hands of Turkish students today.<sup>2</sup> However, there is still a lively ongoing debate on whether al-Ghazālī deserves this place, given what we have learned, as we develop a deeper understanding of the thought and school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), the crucial place of which (and not that of al-Ghazālī) as the turning point for the methodology of Islamic theology has been emphasized by such eminent Ash‘arī scholars as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.

The most crucial aspect in evaluating al-Ghazālī’s philosophical stance is a consideration of his sources, and this task inevitably brings to the forefront the ideas of his master, Abū l-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085). Although identifying parallels with the philosophical terms contained in al-Juwaynī’s works is at first glance exciting, one must be very cautious in tracing back to any philosophical roots ideas which were already present in Kalāmīc literature. Falling into this trap is even easier when examining works written after Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) because authors from this period onward are in danger of being labeled producers of “a post-Avicennian work.” In this regard, the author of this book accepts that al-Ghazālī’s teacher, al-Juwaynī, was “the first Muslim theologian who seriously studied Avicenna’s books” (p. 29; however, al-Juwaynī’s knowledge of Avicenna’s philosophy is contradictorily questioned on p. 134), and it appears that this conclusion is mainly drawn by asserting that al-Juwaynī developed a proof for the existence of God that depends on the trio of the terms necessity, possibility and impossibility (*wujūb*, *imkān/jawāz* and *imtinā’*). Griffel, however, does not or could not provide us with any direct evidence demonstrating al-Juwaynī’s relation to Ibn Sīnā’s works. The only early, albeit unreliable, source of such evidence, a source which is not in Griffel’s bibliography, might be Abū ‘Abd Allāh

<sup>2</sup> Bekir Topaloğlu, *Kelâm İlmi – Giriş [Islamic Theology – Introduction]* (Istanbul: Damla Yayınevi, 1981), 28 ff. This idea was undoubtedly taken from İzmirli İsmail Hakkı’s *Yeni İlmi Kelâm*, and he was also a dedicated follower of Ibn Khaldūn in assessing the general history of Kalām, which was presented in his *al-Muqaddima*.

al-Māzarī (d. 536/1141), who peculiarly commented that al-Juwaynī was a contemporary of Ibn Sīnā and had discussions with him!<sup>3</sup>

A century before Ibn Sīnā, Muslim theologians were well aware of the terms *wājib* (*ḍarūrī*), *mumkin* (*jā'iz*) and *mumtani'* (*muṣtaḥīl*), and theologians defined them as general judgments or judgments of reason (*qaḍāyā 'aqliyyā*) to be applied to our logical statements. Here, one must remember that this was the very context in which al-Ghazālī used these terms in his *Tabāfut*, a position Griffel defines as nominalism (p. 97). The works of Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī al-Balkhī (d. 319/931), as we learn from quotations in al-Maḡdisī's (d. after 355/966) *al-Baḍ' wa-l-tārikh*, al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and from his follower Abū Salama al-Samarqandī (lived in the second half of the fourth/tenth century), provide us with enough reasons to conclude that this trio of terms was already in circulation in theological works as well as in their philosophical counterparts, as it is in al-Fārābī's works (see especially his *al-Nukat fī aḥkām al-nujūm*). Later from the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century on, we come across to the instances in which the trio was used as a methodological framework to be applied to the general outline of the Kalāmīc viewpoint regarding "the nature" of God, His attributes and their relation to the universe, as seen in the works of Abū Ja'far al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), al-Juwaynī and al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490). Furthermore, those terms did not wait to observe Ibn Sīnā's works to gain their meanings on the ontological level. The author of *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, al-Kātib al-Khwārazmī (d. 387), had already made the clear distinction that God is the necessary being (*wājib al-wujūd*), while other beings are contingent (*mumkin al-wujūd*). From the fourth/tenth century onwards, the *mutakallimūn*, such as al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) and Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), tended to see necessary existence (*wujūb al-wujūd*, *wujūb al-thubūt*) as a term corresponding to the classical divine attribute of eternity (*qidam*). They made use of "the necessity" in their establishment of the eternal existence of God, having formulated that proposition as an ontological rule in the form of the principles "if the eternity is established for something, it is impossible for it to become non-existent" (*mā thabata qidamub<sup>ā</sup> imtana'a adamub<sup>ā</sup>*), or "the eternal cannot become non-existent" (*al-qadīm lā yu'dam*). Being a

<sup>3</sup> Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Māzarī, *Īdāb al-maḥṣūl min burbān al-uṣūl* (ed. 'Ammār al-Ṭālibī; Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2001), 123.

faithful disciple of his master al-Ash‘arī (d. 324/935-36) (“*sbaikbunā*” in the words of al-Juwaynī), a thorough and careful examination of al-Juwaynī’s *al-Sbāmīl* demonstrates that al-Ash‘arī (most probably together with his contemporaries and successors) suggested an ontological proof for the existence of God implying the distinction between necessary and contingent beings and clearly emphasizing the particularization (*ikbtīṣāṣ, tarjīḥ*) of God, a proof that we know as “*dalīl al-imbkān.*” Because the early *mutakallimūn* held that God’s existence is only achievable by way of proving (*istidlāl*), not by necessity (*ḍarūra*), they hesitated to accept a way that proposed necessary knowledge and depended completely on the concept of being. This is the reason why they debated whether dependence on the mere concept of being is reliable, as observed in Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī’s (d. after 420/1029) *Fī l-tawḥīd*, and why Ibn Sīnā at the beginning of the metaphysics of his *al-Shifā’* recommended the *mutakallimūn* to depend on the concept of existence and leave behind their classical method *istidlāl bi-l-shāhid ‘alā l-ghā’ib*. With all this in mind, it is quite doubtful that al-Juwaynī departed from his predecessors and proposed a new way of proving God’s existence in Ash‘arī theology. Note that the proof he used in his *al-‘Aqīda al-Nizāmiyya* mainly relied on the principle of particularization (*takḥṣīs*), rather than on a dichotomy between the contingency and necessity of beings. Thus, the conclusion al-Juwaynī reached (that there must be a chooser to create all things *the way* they exist now) was a precept Ash‘arī theologians already accepted before al-Juwaynī. This observation runs contrary to Griffel’s position, which places al-Juwaynī at the center of the issue. Thus, Griffel’s conclusions regarding Ibn Sīnā’s application of the three terms to the existence of God and the acceptance of that application by such Ash‘arī theologians as al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Tūmart (d. 524/1130) (p. 79) must be seriously revised. Undoubtedly, al-Ghazālī and Ibn Tūmart could have been directly influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s works, but this must not lead us to a one-dimensional reading of the case that assigns all the credit to Ibn Sīnā, who was not at all an original thinker on this issue. The fact that only a few works of the classical Ash‘arī scholars are extant is a critical obstacle to any attempt to answer the questions surrounding the relationship between theology and philosophy in early Islamic thought.

This particular, yet important, issue is but one example that brings to our attention the complex nature of the interaction between *kalām*

and *falsafa*. It questions a linear understanding of the history of Kalām with regard to the proposition that philosophical thinking mainly began with al-Juwaynī and that his disciple, al-Ghazālī, was naturally influenced by him. In this sense, the act of discussing “al-Ghazālī’s philosophical theology” goes beyond the simple concept the book’s title initially suggests. It can be said that, arguably, all the main objections al-Ghazālī raised against philosophers in *Tabāfut al-falāsifa* were continuations of the early Mu‘tazilī-Ash‘arī theological tradition, as demonstrated by his discussion in the third introduction to his work, in which he propose to use Mu‘tazila’s and others’ views to invalidate (and thus silence) the pseudo-demonstrative proofs of philosophers. Accordingly, al-Ghazālī’s fundamental principle regarding the most crucial issue dealt with in *Tabāfut*, that is, the problem of the eternity of the world, was a restatement of the classical stance that predated al-Ghazālī’s work and can be found in theological as well as jurisprudential writings. This stance can be summarized as “the eternal being cannot have a cause.” The same applies to his stance on philosophers’ views contained in chapter seventeen, where he places the concept of “possibility (*imkān*)” at the center of the discussion and maintains the classical theological principle that “the impossible cannot be subject to the power of God” (*al-muḥāl lā qudrat<sup>a</sup> ‘alayh<sup>b</sup>*). This was, again, the very context in which the earlier Mu‘tazilīs discussed the nature of the omnipotence of the Creator and the position of other beings: whether they are possible or impossible according to God’s power. If we recall the section on the general concept of “being and thing” in Ibn Sīnā’s *al-Shifa’/al-Ilāhiyyāt*, we see that even Ibn Sīnā dealt with the issue after having considered related discussions in Mu‘tazilī theology. Therefore, evaluating al-Ghazālī’s philosophical theology, as it is called, cannot be accomplished successfully without underlining the importance of an earlier theological tradition, whether Mu‘tazilī or Ash‘arī.

Overall, this book provides a very intricate account of the issues it treats, but problems occur in some of its details that might lead the author to draw the wrong conclusions. For example, the author calls a passage by ‘Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī (d. 525/1131) a “pseudo-Avicennian quote” because he could not find it in any of Ibn Sīnā’s writings, although al-Hamadānī had attributed it to the latter (pp. 84-85). In fact, it is contained in one of Ibn Sīnā’s letters to the famous

mystic Abū Sa‘īd Abū l-Khayr found in Ibn Sīnā’s corpus.<sup>4</sup> We can also come across to some efforts which try to decipher the meaning of the “mysterious” correspondence between Ibn Sīnā and Abū Sa‘īd afterwards. Among these efforts is a short commentary by one of the Ottoman mystics Jamāl-i Khalwatī (d. 899/1494), in which he interestingly used the vocabulary of Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) to make sense of the text.<sup>5</sup> In this case, the quote cannot be interpreted as an inspiration of al-Hamadānī by some Ghazālīan explanations. Accordingly, quick and sweeping conclusions should be avoided in ascribing the originality of some concepts or views to al-Ghazālī. The author’s explanations of the concept of “the chains of events” can be re-considered in this regard (p. 80). Seeing “something strikingly new in al-Ghazālī’s *fatwā* against three teachings of the *falāsifa*” (p. 103) might not be entirely correct because, as was shown above, al-Ghazālī mainly followed a pre-existing tradition. To provide a particular example, denouncing philosophers as unbelievers due to their views on the eternity of the world was already a de facto position for Muslim theologians (see Abū l-Qāsim al-Bustī’s [d. 420/1029] *al-Baḥṭh ‘an adillat al-takfīr wa-l-tafsīq* for attitudes similar to that of al-Ghazālī’s in other issues). To argue “For al-Ash‘arī, there is neither causality nor laws of nature” (p. 127) would be an unfair judgment of al-Ash‘arī due to the scarcity of the sources. The list of al-Ghazālī’s most influential students the author provides to prove the judgment that “al-Ghazālī was by far the most influential religious figure during the sixth/twelfth century” (p. 95) might be considered controversial, and the reasons for the inclusion of some persons attributed as “followers” of al-Ghazālī deemed unconvincing, if we carefully consider each these persons and their views as Griffel presents them. As an example of a possible misunderstanding, the author believes that al-Ghazālī’s third argument on the issue of the eternity of the world is probably not from the works of Ibn Sīnā (p. 165); however, a reading of Ibn Sīnā’s relevant sections in *al-Sbīfā’/al-Samā’ al-ṭabī‘ī* and his *al-Najāt* disproves this conclusion. Last but not least, the author’s approach to the issue of God’s necessity in all aspects and under-

<sup>4</sup> ‘Abd al-Amīr Shams al-Dīn, *al-Madhbhab al-tarbawī ‘inda Ibn Sīnā min kbūlāl falsafatibī l-‘ilmīyya* (Beirut: al-Sharika al-‘Ālamiyya li-l-Kitāb, 1988), 398.

<sup>5</sup> See the forthcoming article which includes the Arabic text: Veysel Kaya & Ulvi Murat Kılavuz, “An Example of the Mystical Avicennism in the Ottoman Thought – Aqsarāyī’s Interpretation of Ibn Sīnā’s *Risāla ilā Abū Sa‘īd Abū l-Khayr*”.

standing of it, both regarding the texts of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī, are in question (p. 271). At first, neither Ibn Sīnā nor al-Ghazālī used the phrase mentioned “to express that God’s actions follow with necessity from His essence.” Ibn Sīnā basically used this principle to prove that there are neither *genera* nor parts (*ajzāʾ*) for God; thus, He is not subject to change (See Ibn Sīnā, *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* and *al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-maʿād*). Griffel’s reference to al-Ghazālī’s usage of the phrase “*min jamīʿ jibātih*” as spatial direction (p. 272) is controversial. In addition to these examples, an ambitious reader might be distracted by some “trivial” information that interrupts the flow of the text, such as the Qurʾānic account of lifespan (p. 188), the depiction, description and historical information regarding al-Ghazālī’s water clock (p. 238-239) and the detailed depiction of Oğuz Turks’ murderous act (p. 76), all of which might impair the systematic structure of the work.

Claiming to be the most thorough examination to date of al-Ghazālī (in English), Frank Griffel’s study without doubt deserves to be a handbook for students and researchers of Islamic studies in both his quest to assemble and evaluate data pertaining to the life and thought of this prominent Muslim thinker and also in presenting a starting point for deeper discussions in our attempt to understand the heritage of Islamic thought.

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***The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law***, by David R. Vishanoff, (American Oriental Series: 93), (New Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 2011), xxi + 318 pp., ISBN: 978-0-940490-31-4, \$46 (cloth)

The hermeneutical aspects of Islamic legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*), defined by the author of the present book as “the part of legal theory that focuses on the analysis and interpretation of the language of a scriptural canon” (p. xiii), has in recent decades been subject of a few significant detail studies, but not of any comprehensive systematic treatment. The present book provides a first comprehensive and systematic analysis of the development of Sunnī legal hermeneutics from its origins through the first half of the 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century, described by the author as “the formative or preclassical period of Islamic legal hermeneutics.” The classical period, Vishanoff explains, began “in the second half of the 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century, which witnessed a sudden proliferation of major works that would become enduring points of reference for the discipline by scholars such as Abū l-Walīd al-Bājī, Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī, Abū l-‘Uṣr al-Bazdawī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, al-Sarakhsī, al-Ghazālī, Ibn ‘Aqīl, and Ibn Barhān” (p. xv).

The founder of Sunnī legal hermeneutics in Vishanoff’s view was al-Shāfi‘ī in his famous *Risāla* at the beginning of the 3<sup>rd</sup>/9<sup>th</sup> century. Before that time some hermeneutical concepts had been developed in the disciplines of Qur’ānic exegesis, theology and law, but no comprehensive hermeneutical theory for the interpretation of revealed texts, Qur’ān as well as Sunna. Together with his theory of an Islamic law based entirely on revealed texts, al-Shāfi‘ī elaborated a hermeneutics for the interpretation of these texts that recognized both their ambiguity and their ultimate clarity and was flexible enough for “negotiating the problematic relationship between the evolving and contested discourse of positive law and an evolving and contested body of authoritative texts” (p. 61). Al-Shāfi‘ī’s project of negotiating the relationship between revealed texts and legal rules (of positive law) set the course for the development of classical legal theory, even though it developed further significantly in some aspects before it reached its classical form.

Al-Shāfi‘ī’s approach to legal hermeneutics did not prevail in Sunnī Islam until the 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century. Vishanoff enumerates four alternative

concepts of Islamic law entailing different views of legal hermeneutics while competing with al-Shāfiʿī's "law-oriented" concept. In chapters 3-6 he analyzes their background and their final state at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup>/10<sup>th</sup> century. Chapter 3 deals with scripturalists, who sought to base the religious law exclusively only on the Qurʾān. As their most important representative Ibn Ḥazm is chosen and thoroughly discussed by Vishanoff. Chapter 4 deals with the rationalist later Baṣran Muʿtazila, with al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār as their main representative. Chapter 5 is devoted to the Ashʿariyya, who defended anti-Muʿtazilī traditionalist doctrine with rationalist argumentation. Vishanoff analyzes the legal and hermeneutical thought of al-Bāqillānī as their principal representative. In chapter 8 he discusses the hermeneutics of the Ḥanbalī Abū Yaʿlā Ibn al-Farrāʾ, describing it as based on intuitive grasp of "performative speech" and as law-oriented like al-Shāfiʿī's hermeneutics, yet distinctive in not seeking to derive all Islamic law ultimately from the Qurʾān.

In the concluding chapter 7, the relevance of the predominance of al-Shafīʿī's law-oriented paradigm in Sunnī legal theory to the contemporary Islamic legal discourse is discussed.

The book in general reflects penetrating thorough research and careful interpretation of a wide range of legal sources and secondary studies, and its major conclusions are set forth convincingly. The reaffirmation of the pivotal role of al-Shāfiʿī's *al-Risāla* in the conception and elaboration of mainstream Sunnī legal theory against recent views questioning this role is to be appreciated. Both achievement and problematic of al-Shāfiʿī's hermeneutics within his legal theory are perceptively analyzed.

There are some inadequacies and errors in the treatment of legal and theological thought deviating from the mainstream. Only one point may be noted here. Vishanoff's recognition of scripturalism in the sense of exclusive adherence to the letter of the Qurʾān as a third division besides rationalism and traditionalism in early Islamic jurisprudence (see p. 37) is misleading. The basic division among early Muslim religious scholars, theologians as well as jurists, was between rationalists, who considered reason essentially capable of recognizing justice, good and evil, and thus as the ultimate judge of religious law and good conduct, and traditionalists who denied human reason any epistemological role in religious law. Scripturalism was not constitutive of a third separate division and was compatible

with either traditionalism or rationalism. Chapter 3 on early scripturalists thus groups together legal scholars of entirely divergent outlook and background. The Khārijites may be described as scripturalists since for historical reasons they insisted on strict literal compliance with the commandments of the Qurʾān. Yet the great majority of them, moderate Ibāḍīs as well as radicals, were basically traditionalists supporting the Sunna and relying on *ḥadīth*. Only a minority inclined to the Muʿtazila and rationalist interpretation of the law. The commandments and prohibitions of the Qurʾān were for the Khārijites law in the strict sense, obligations (*farḍ*) enforced by legal sanctions. Sunna was generally understood in the original sense of the term as merely recommended, praiseworthy action and good conduct.

The Muʿtazilī al-Nazzām, on the other hand, was essentially a rationalist theologian. He viewed the law and good conduct as recognizable and definable by rational investigation and rejected the *ḥadīth*-based Sunna both as full of contradictions and superfluous. He insisted on literal acceptance of Qurʾānic legislation without extending it by analogical reasoning because he considered it as part of scriptural revelation that was not amenable to rational interpretation and could not be integrated into the rational system of law. The later Baṣran Muʿtazila, in contrast, endeavored to rationalize Qurʾānic legislation fully in the context of their rational legal thought.

Dāwūd al-Iṣbahānī and the Zāhiriyya are erroneously also classed by Vishanoff as scripturalists. They may properly be described as literalist in their strict adherence to the letter of the Qurʾān as well as the *ḥadīth*-based Sunna and their rejection of any extension of the law by rational analogy. They were radically anti-rationalist traditionalists. The meaning of the term scripturalism should not be extended to cover *ḥadīth* texts in addition to the holy Scripture, the Qurʾān. Vishanoff's criticism of Hallaq that he "misconstrued the Zāhiriyya as traditionalists" (p. 106, n. 257) is inappropriate.

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## CONFERENCE REPORTS

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*International Conference: "Takfir: A Diachronic Perspective,"* 24-26 October 2011, organized by Camilia Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro and Sabine Schmidtke as part of the project "Rediscovering Theological Rationalism in the Medieval World of Islam," at the Center for Human and Social Sciences (CCHS), Madrid-Spain

Kadir Gömbeyaz



*International Symposium on Mullā Khusrāw,* 18-20 November 2011, organized by the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University & Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, Bursa-Turkey

Abdessamad Belhaj



**International Conference: “Takfir: A Diachronic Perspective,”** 24-26 October 2011, organized by Camilia Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro and Sabine Schmidtke as part of the project “Rediscovering Theological Rationalism in the Medieval World of Islam,” at the Center for Human and Social Sciences (CCHS), Madrid-Spain

*Takfir*, the act of accusing an individual or group that self-identifies as *mu'mins*/believers of in fact being *kāfirs*/unbelievers because of their beliefs and/or acts, is not simply a practice of naming. Rather, it has serious theological, legal, and social consequences. Thus branding someone as an unbeliever entails that that person will be subject to the special laws governing unbelievers, including prohibitions against marrying or remaining married to a Muslim, inheriting from a Muslim, being buried in a Muslim graveyard when he/she dies, and so on. Therefore, the practice of *takfir* should not be undertaken lightly. It should be kept in mind that the act of naming someone as *kāfir* in *takfir* is a label given by the other, and is not a self-appellation. Faith and unbelief are, however, inner states, and cannot be known by other individuals. To declare that someone is an unbeliever is to claim to know his/her inner beliefs, sincere thoughts, and feelings. However, how could that be possible for a human being? If it is not possible, why issue the accusation of unbelief? Because *takfir* is a useful weapon, which allows someone to get rid of his/her opponents instead of having to encounter them intellectually. Declaring that someone is an unbeliever trivializes what that person says or suggests regarding religious issues.

Furthermore, individuals or groups that falsely seem to be believers are seen as uniquely dangerous to the Muslim community, more so even than open unbelievers. Therefore, *takfir* can be used to legitimize the use of violence, making it a useful tool for radical groups (both historical and present-day) that wish to take violent actions against their Muslim or non-Muslim rivals. At the same time, these potentially violent consequences have caused the majority of Muslim community to see *takfir* as a questionable practice in its own right, and many have attempted to restrict the limits of *takfir*, although what beliefs and acts justify the use of *takfir* been controversial and vary from scholar to another as well as from sect to another. Never-

theless, despite these efforts, individuals and groups continue to suffer from the alienation caused by *takfir*.

The international conference “Takfir: a Diachronic Perspective,” which took place at the Center for Human and Social Sciences (CHSS) in Madrid on 24–26 October 2011, was concerned with *takfir* as an ongoing phenomenon from the beginning of Islam to the present day, including the historical roots of *takfir*, such as its emergence and theoretical foundations; individuals and groups that suffered from *takfir*; the understanding of *takfir* by prominent figures in and schools of Islamic thought; and the contemporary manifestations of *takfir*.

The twenty-nine papers presented at the meeting’s eleven sessions bore out the conference’s diachronic/historical focus, covering *takfir* from the beginnings of the practice up to modern times. Below, I have tried to provide some brief insights about these papers in separate paragraphs following the order of the sessions.

*Takfir* was first practiced by the Khārijīs when they denounced ‘Alī, his followers, and all-non Khārijī Muslims as infidels. The Khārijīs also believed that a Muslim who commits a capital sin becomes an unbeliever and should be expelled from the Muslim community. Hussam S. Timani discussed the religious and political foundations mostly referring to modern literature on the Khawārij. Ersilia Francesca traced the doctrine of *takfir* and its practical, mostly political, aspects in Ibādism, a sect that emerged from the Khārijīs, focusing on the concepts of *walāya*, friendship towards individuals who follow the rules of religion, and *barā’a*, hostility towards those who fail to be good Muslims by committing a capital sin or persisting in a minor sin.

*Takfir* has been used against many groups since the inception of the practice. As an example of this practice, Steven Judd discussed the Umayyad-era Qadarites, examining how they were treated by later Muslim thinkers and the larger Muslim community. Miklos Muranyi surveyed the hostile relationship between Sunnīs and Shī‘īs in the history of Qairawān and the use of *takfir* by that city’s Sunnī population toward other theological and juridical groups. Istvan Kristo-Nagy focused on the use of *takfir* against the Zanādiqa, a label usually applied to dualists such as the Manicheans.

Zoltan Szombathy provided literary samples from medieval Muslim poets and writers that led their authors to be declared unbelievers, and questioned the principles and circumstances underlying such accusations. Sebastian Günther studied *takfīr* in the 9<sup>th</sup> century Ḥanbalī Sunnī circles. In doing this, he introduced the *Kitāb sharḥ al-sunna*, a theological treatise attributed to Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Bāhili (better known as Ghulām Khalīl), which is probably the earliest extant attempt to explain what *sunna*/orthodoxy in Islam means. The attendees were gratified to learn that this book has been edited by Günther based on its unique manuscript and will be published very soon. Sonja Brentjes' paper was devoted to the relationship between 'Muslimness' and 'scientific identity' of mathematicians and medical scholars in biographical works. Some accounts set these identities in opposition to each other, whereas others suggest that faith played a positive role in the scholars' scientific activities.

Maribel Fierro pointed out that accusing someone of unbelief – “falsely,” of course – is included by some authors in lists of improper actions that can lead believers to misbehavior and even sin. She analyzed the traditions that criticize the use of *takfīr*, and dealt with the relevant cases. Camilia Adang focused on Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), the famous Andalusian theologian and jurist, who held that *takfīr* has serious results and therefore should only be used with extreme caution.

Eric Chamount explored the relationship between *ijmāʿ*, meaning the unanimous agreement of the community, and *takfīr*, here understood as exclusion from the community, in Sunnī Muslim legal theory, drawing on the examples of Abū Ishāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083) and al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090). He also explored the practice of *takfīr* in contemporary political Islamism. Another interesting paper was presented by Robert Gleave, who questioned the possibility of *takfīr* in theory and practice, with a particular focus on its interaction with the Shīʿī practice of *taqiyya*, i.e., hiding one's true beliefs to avoid persecution from the Sunnī majority. He traced discussions of this issue in the statements of the Shīʿī Imāms and in the writings of subsequent medieval Shīʿī jurists. Both Hassan Ansari and Sabine Schmidtke dealt with the Muṭarrifites, a Zaydī group from 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century Yemen, who were accused of heresy and unbelief by the other Zaydīs because of their doctrinal approach. Ansari and Schmidtke supported their points about the Muṭarrifites and the social and political factors be-

hind the *takfir* by selecting passages from the writings of anti-Muṭarrifite scholars.

Daniel De Smet pointed out the porous border between *īmān*/faith, *kufir*/unbelief, and *ghuluwwu*/extremism in the doctrine of the Ismāʿīlīs, who were themselves accused of unbelief by other Muslims, both Sunnīs and Twelver Shīʿīs. Ella Landau-Tasserón focused on Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), the main authority cited by contemporary radical Muslims to support their legitimization of violence, whose views on *takfir* are expressed in various contexts and scattered throughout his writings. Livnat Holtzman discussed the views of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355), the Ashʿarī-Shāfiʿī scholar and judge of the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Holtzman drew attention to al-Subkī's reluctance, as a chief judge of Damascus, to use *takfir* against the later Ḥanbalīs (such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya [d. 751/1350]), despite the fact that he had accused them of being anthropomorphists, because of the practical and juridical results of transferring the highly theoretical doctrinal debate into this realm.

Michael Ebstein's contribution was concerned with pluralistic and anti-takfirī attitudes in Islamic mysticism. Referring to the writings of Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) and the epistles of Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, two significant but controversial mystical corpora in Islam, Ebstein highlighted the religious and philosophical foundations of this approach and tried to demonstrate the impact of Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ on Ibn ʿArabī. Farid Bouchiba explored the thoughts of Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490), last of the great Ashʿarīs, presenting an account of that scholar's theory of *takfir* (which Bouchiba considers original and innovative) based on the chapter devoted to the subject in al-Sanūsī's *Muqaddimāt*. Yohanan Friedmann's paper focused on late medieval Ḥanafī legal texts from Central Asia, arguing that these gave special attention to the question of how a Muslim becomes an apostate, unlike earlier texts, which mostly dealt with the punishment for apostasy. Friedmann tried to characterize the material in the Central Asian books by giving interesting examples from the texts.

Sajjad Rizvi made a five-point presentation on philosophers who were accused of unbelief in a number of Ṣafavid-era works with special reference to Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1045/1635). Intisar Rabb's presentation examined how blasphemy was adopted as a punishable crime by Islamic jurisprudence, especially in the 4<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century, and demonstrated how the flowering of theological thought in that era

shaped the definition of this crime. Ignacio Gutierrez De Teran concentrated on the impact of the so-called *kutub al-milal wa-l-niḥal*, heresiographical works designed to introduce and (mostly) defame the beliefs of the all theological sects save for the one adhered to by the author. When the main modern factions of Islamic turn to othering and exterminating each other, they are still influenced by these works.

Following the papers concerning *takfīr* in the classical period of Islam came a number of interesting treatments of the modern situation. Ahmad Mousalli gave some insight into the use of *takfīr* by contemporary radical Muslim movements that are unhappy with the way governing elites are running the state. These movements have encountered repression and violence from the elites, which has led them to seek isolation and separation from society to protect their ideological purity from the erroneous beliefs and values of other Muslim groups, or to find that their goals can best be achieved through violence and terrorist actions under the name of *jihād*. Justyna Nedza explored the religious references and practical consequences of the thought of three contemporary Saudi radical scholars (‘Alī al-Khuḍayr, Nāṣir al-Fahd and Aḥmad al-Khālidi) known as the “takfīr-troika,” who have used *takfīr* to legitimize armed struggle against “unbelievers” including the Saudi rulers and the rest of the western-influenced Muslim world. Stephanie Lacroix investigated the theological beliefs of Juhayman al-‘Utaybī, a faithful proponent of *Ahl al-ḥadīth*, which emerged in the 1960s under the guidance of Sheikh Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī. *Ahl al-ḥadīth* developed a very restricted view of *takfīr*, although it is a sub-school of *Wahhābism* which has used *takfīr* very extensively. Al-‘Utaybī’s rejection of *takfīr* pushed his followers to embrace messianism to justify their revolutionary actions, including their seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1979.

Roswitha Badry focused on the *takfīr* of political, academic, and literary figures who are women’s rights advocates in Arab countries, such as Tūjān al-Fayṣal from Jordan, Nawal El Saadawi from Egypt, and Laylā al-‘Uthmān from Kuwait. Joas Wagemakers discussed the *takfīr* of democracy and democrats by radical Islamists, and the ways in which these ideological attacks are justified. He also showed the differences among radicals’ positions on this topic and finally analyzed the actual application of these views in three specific times and

places (Algeria in the 1990s, Iraq since 2003, and Jordan since 1992), taking their political context into consideration.

Orkhan Mir-Kasimov contributed a paper on Ḥurūfism, one of the Shī‘a-inspired messianic movements of the 8<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup>/14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries, treating the accusations leveled against the movement by its opponents as well as the Ḥurūfīs’ responses and attempts to legitimize their own doctrine. Mir-Kasimov underlined the changes in the ways that the Ḥurūfīs determined the concepts of “true belief” and “heresy” after a similar messianic movement, the Ṣafavids, rose to power in Īrān, although Ḥurūfism itself eventually failed in politics. His paper also described the reception of Ḥurūfism in the late medieval and modern Muslim societies. As the last presenter of the conference, Daniel Lav discussed the various interpretations of Ibn Taymiyya’s theology of *īmān* in modern intra-salafī polemics.

The conference ended with a concluding panel, chaired by Camilia Adang, which allowed three well-known figures in Islamic studies, Josef van Ess, Yohanan Friedmann, and Wilferd Madelung, to offer their opinions on the issue of *takfir* and the papers presented at the conference.

As we have seen, the rich content of this conference provided the audience with the opportunity to discuss many different aspects of *takfir*. However, I cannot help but say a few words about the significance of the choice of *takfir* as the theme for this conference. *Takfir* is a hot issue due to its being one of the main practices of contemporary radical Muslim movements that construct their paradigms around violent acts. However, its choice as a conference theme could have raised suspicions about the aims of the conference in the minds of those who are uncomfortable with the fact that Islam has been mostly identified with the ideas and acts of these radical movements in recent times, and the fact that, as a result of this identification, *takfir* has been seen as a distinguishing practice of Islam despite its never having been adopted by the majority of the Muslim community but rather by a limited number of groups over the centuries. Nevertheless, when we take the papers presented at the conference into consideration, we see that they mostly treated their subjects in an academic way and held to the limits of scientific discourse, without repeating or producing hostile accusations. It could even be said that the conference created a nurturing atmosphere for researchers of classical Islamic sciences. This positive atmosphere gives us a good reason and oppor-

tunity to congratulate all those involved: the host, Maribel Fierro and her team; the organizers, who put in so much effort; the presenters, whose papers were products of meticulous and rigorous scholarship; and finally, the participants, who enriched the conference with their interesting questions and comments.

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**International Symposium on Mullā Khusraw**, 18-20 November 2011, organized by the Faculty of Theology, Uludağ University & Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, Bursa-Turkey

Mullā Khusraw (d. 885/1480), one of the earliest prominent Ottoman scholars, was the theme of the international symposium held in Bursa, Turkey, on 18-20 November 2011. In addition to thirty five Turkish participants from different Turkish universities, five foreign researchers represented Hungary, Italy, the United States and Canada. The purpose of the twenty two papers presented at the conference was to bespeak attention to the personality, the works, and the influence of Mullā Khusraw. It is regrettable that neither the *Index Islamicus* nor the *Arabic Union Catalogue* contains a single publication on Mullā Khusraw. To provide an accessible scholarly work on his scholarship, the organizers intend to publish the proceedings during the year. In particular, Ottomanists and Islamicists would welcome this publication.

The scope of the conference was introductory, holistic and descriptive. The reason of such an approach is justified, on the one side, by the scarcity of scholarly insights in Mullā Khusraw's writings. On the other, most of his works are still unedited. As a starting point, the papers of this conference will be a necessary reference for any research on Mullā Khusraw as well as on early Ottoman intellectual history. At any rate, the conference claims legitimately an impact on how the role of Mullā Khusraw was perceived in the formative period of Ottoman culture.

The scholarly presentations covered five major topics: the biography of Mullā Khusraw, his contributions to science, law, spirituality, and literature. The first topic was addressed by four speakers. A general outlook of the Ottoman culture and society was presented by Remzi Demir. Vejdi Bilgin tackled the issue of *fāsād al-zamān* (corruption of time) as a recurrent motif in Sunnī beliefs and traditions whereas Tevfik Yücedođru offered an insight on the meaning of *Abl al-sunna* in the interpretation of Mullā Khusraw. A great deal of information on Mullā Khusraw himself was provided by Ferhat Koca while Mefail Hızlı elucidated Mullā Khusraw's teaching activity at the *madrassa* of Bursa.

The impact of Mullā Khusraw on the Ottoman scientific thought in his time is evident. In this regard, Mullā Khusraw's *Risāla fī l-mushkilāt al-mashbūra fī 'ilm al-bay'a* on astronomy was assessed by İhsan Fazlıoğlu. As for his famous treatise *al-Muḥākamāt*, which reveals his keen propensity for argument, it was examined from different perspectives by three speakers. İbrahim Halil Üçer discussed some logical problems of definition in relation to metaphysics as seen by Mullā Khusraw. The realistic argumentation of Mullā Khusraw was emphasized by Jonathan A. C. Brown. Further, A. Belhaj explored the dialectical structure of Mullā Khusraw's book, which combines logical coherence and ethical concerns.

Mullā Khusraw's contribution to law was by far the most important field discussed in the conference. Indeed, twelve presentations addressed Mullā Khusraw's legal scholarship. Most presentations disclosed theoretical questions of *uṣūl al-fiqh* as seen by Mullā Khusraw. Recep Cici inspected his place in Ottoman legal thought. The theory of *ijtibād* according to Mullā Khusraw was framed by H. Yunus Apaydın. Aisha Y. Musa canvassed the relationship of reason and transmission in Mullā Khusraw's conception of *Sunna*. Abdurrahim Kozalı examined Mullā Khusraw's *Sharḥ uṣūl al-Bazdawī*. M. Salih Kumaş reiterated the meaning of *ijtibād*, *taqlid*, and *madbbab* bigotry in Mullā Khusraw's writings. *Fiqh* matters provided opportunities to observe Mullā Khusraw's work as a mufti. In this respect, Nicola Melis studied *Kitāb al-jihād* from Mullā Khusraw's *Durar wa-Ghurar*. The legal opinion of Mullā Khusraw on the issue of patronage, *walā'* was analyzed by Şükrü Özen. Finally, Eugenia Kermeli inquired into Mullā Khusraw's view of the legal status of non-Muslims.

In addition to Ḥanafī law, an Ottoman scholar would be required to have predilection for Sufism and kalām. It is of importance then to show Mullā Khusraw's Sufi connections. This task was carried out by Abdurrezak Tek. Conversely, kalām seems to be neglected by Mullā Khusraw. However, Orhan Şener Koloğlu investigated an aspect of his theology through the study of his understanding of *ḥusn-qubḥ* problem, which is closely related to legal theory as well. Walid A. Saleh displayed Mullā Khusraw's craft as a commentator on the Qur'ān while his gloss on *al-Muṭawwal* was shown by Musa Alak to be a noteworthy work in Arabic rhetoric. İsmail Güler demonstrated the literary skill of Mullā Khusraw through a "parallel" poem (*naẓīra*). Be that as it may, none of the speakers claimed Mullā

Khusraw to have transformed the mentioned disciplines. Yet it is instructive and interesting that they highlighted the interdisciplinary of Mullā Khusraw's scholarship, his interest in the culture of his time and his open-mindedness.

Research results were sometimes fascinating as several participants provided cases where Mullā Khusraw was practicing *ijtibād*. Nevertheless, most speakers agreed that he did not try to go beyond the Ottoman cultural system. As Tevfik Yücedođru puts it, since there was no fire in the Ottoman system at the moment, Mullā Khusraw did not proceed to extinguish it. Probably, what the Ottomans needed most was an effective legal apparatus. Therefore, Mullā Khusraw directed his efforts to legal scholarship. With this in mind, the conference was informative inasmuch as it introduces us to the Ottoman intellectual processes in the 15<sup>th</sup> century.

Several speakers suggested continuing further reflection and study of Mullā Khusraw. On the one hand, a pressing necessity to edit his manuscripts was frequently expressed. Sometimes speakers were limited in their conclusions in the lack of an established corpus of Mullā Khusraw. On the other, the research trend shows that law was at the heart of the Ottoman society and its culture. For that reason, a more comprehensive study of practical questions of *fiqh* is anticipated to be of utmost significance.

Finally, refreshing ideas were emerged at the conference, mainly the idea of a co-inclusive study of religious and historical aspects of Ottoman culture. Thus, the conference itself was a successful example of the probing of a decisive period in the Ottoman intellectual history. A close reading of religious and literary texts of Mullā Khusraw is likely to help historians understand better the perception of Ottoman realities by an outstanding member of the Ottoman intellectual elite.

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## OBITUARY

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*Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (1956-2011): A Reflection*

Ian S. Markham





## **IBRAHIM M. ABU-RABI (1956-2011): A REFLECTION**

Ian S. Markham

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Abu-Rabi was a child of the world. He was a Palestinian born in Nazareth in 1956; he was educated at Roman Catholic schools on the West Bank. He obtained his Bachelor's degree from Birzeit University in 1980. He then moved to the United States, getting a Masters of Arts degree in political science from the University of Cincinnati in 1982. And then he went to Temple University in Pennsylvania for a further Master's degree in religious studies. He remained at Temple University for his PhD studies. He obtained his doctorate in Islamic Studies in 1987 where he worked with Dr. Leonard Swidler. He held both Israeli and US passports; he worked with Christians, Jews, and Muslims. He spoke a multitude of languages – Arabic, English, Hebrew, Urdu, and, at the time of his death, was working on Turkish. Among his many honors, he was appointed in 2006 the Senior Fulbright Scholar in Singapore and Indonesia at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

His academic career started with an appointment at Virginia Commonwealth University, followed by the University of Texas at Austin. Upon his death he was the holder of the Edmonton Council of Muslim Communities Chair in Islamic Studies, at the University of Alberta. He was the first holder of this chair; his task in this University was to build up its reputation as a center of Islamic Studies. He did this work well, building partnerships around the world. A skill he had learned at Hartford Seminary in Connecticut.

Hartford Seminary was an intriguing school. It was first and foremost a Christian seminary, with a United Church of Christ foundation. He was always present at the weekly Seminary chapel, often being the worship leader. He was a committed Muslim; this was the primary prism through which he saw the world. And it was out of this deep sense of commitment to Islam that he worked with Christians.

In term of scholarship, his first substantial book was the *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York, 1996). In many ways this was a book ahead of its time. He was anticipating the Islamist movements that were to become so significant in the subsequent decade. Perhaps his finest book was his *Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in post-1967 Arab Intellectual History* (London: Pluto Press, 2004). With his proficiency in languages, he was accessing the primary sources in ways that many Western commentators on Islam were not able to do so. In this book, the breath of his reading was remarkable and the connections in terms of trends were striking.

He approached questions primarily as a political theorist. His analysis had an almost Marxist sensitivity. He understood the challenges facing the Middle East to have their roots in the colonialism of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The economic factors were primary. However, Abu-Rabi was always aware of the complexity of the many factors that created a culture. He rarely generalized from one setting to another. So, for example, he often stressed the differences between Islamic political culture in the Middle East with that found elsewhere in the world.

Indeed his interest in non-Middle East forms of Islam is part of his enduring legacy. He knew countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey extremely well. It was his passion for introducing to the world the complexity of Islam that led to much of his work as an editor of books. For example, he was responsible for the initial collections of essays in English on the Turkish Islamic thinker Bediuzzaman Saʿīd Nūrsī. At a time when the scholarly world was still largely unaware of his significance, Abu-Rabi edited the volumes that made scholars of Islam aware of Nūrsī.

Perhaps the aspect of his work, he was most proud of, was his responsibility as co-editor of the prestigious journal *The Muslim World*. He took pride in creating themed issues (some looking at Pa-

kistan, others at a particular Islamic thinker). The quality of the journal (along with its subscribers) grew significantly in this period. It was this interest in quality that led him to support and serve many conferences and journals. It was in this spirit that he served on the editorial board of *Ilabiyat Studies*.

As a friend, he was loyal and committed. With his wife Fatima, he opened his home often and generously. He had a delightful sense of humor and a strong sense of hospitality. He loved his children. His premature death leaves an irreplaceable gap for so many of us.

Yet we are grateful for the service and insight he offered the academy, scholarship, and his many students. As a result of working with Abu-Rabi, many of us saw the world differently. This was his gift to us all.

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Full name(s) of author(s) must be listed, along with university or professional affiliation, address, city, state, country, phone/fax number(s), and email address where you can be reached. Provide a two-sentence biography that we can use in your article. Current information only.

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