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FROM THE EDITORS

Greetings and welcome to the new issue of the journal of Ilahiyat Studies.

Four years ago when we started the journal, we sensed that there was an urgent need for a multidisciplinary journal that would serve as a platform for those scholars with various backgrounds that were doing valuable research in Islamic and religious studies. We are happy now to let our readers and contributors that the feedback we have received about IS thus far has been very positive and encouraging. The belief that the journal is fulfilling its purpose is a fulfilling feeling and is the main incentive that keeps us, as a team, going.

There has been no major change worthy of note in the policy of the IS except that the editorial team is expanding and getting more international and more diversified. We extend a warm welcome to the new members of the editorial team, Asma Afsaruddin, David Thomas, Frank Griffel, Maribel Fierro, Sabine Schmidtke, and Sarah Stroumsa.

We also would like to thank our former members, Adem Apak, Alan Godlas, Ali Utku, Çağfer Karadaş, Celal Türer, Kenan Gürsoy, M. Said Reçber, Musa Yıldız, Recep Kaymakçan, Vejdi Bilgin, and Yaşar Aydılın for their dedication, hard work, and sincerity. A special thank to our former associate editor İsmail Güler for his invaluable contributions from the very first day. We are not saying good bye to him because he will continue to be part of the journal as a new editorial board member.

As in previous issues, this one also contains articles and book reviews that focus on vexing problems related to Muslim life and thought. The first article by Abdessamad Belhaj attempts to analyze the problem of the renewal of Islamic legal hermeneutics, which is one of the most controversial issues currently being debated by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars of Islam today. Dr. Belhaj compares and contrasts the views of al-Būṭī and al-Marzūqī on the question of the extent to which the sources and procedures of istidlāl, legal rea-
soning, embodied in Islamic legal hermeneutics, *uṣūl al-fiqh*, should be restructured.

Mustafa Macit Karagözölğlu’s study asks the question of why the Successors, (*al-tābiʻūn*) have been given a special status not only by the scholars of ḥadīth, but also by the scholars of fiqh, tafsīr, and the rest of other classical Islamic sciences. He addresses the issue first from a historical perspective, and goes on to analyze three *maqṭūʿ* reports as examples to support his argument. His conclusion is that the Successors are important because they were virtuous people, they were closer to the time of the Prophet of Islam, and last but not least they have been regarded as the founders of Muslim scholarly tradition in general.

Vejdi Bilgin’s article is a thought-provoking attempt to question the nature of the relationship between the rulers and the religious elite (*ʻulamāʾ*) within the intellectual history of Islam. Dr. Bilgin argues that there have been two mutually exclusive attitudes regarding the subject matter presented by scholars. The first one is to be part of the ruling class, and the second is to keep one’s distance from it. The ideal attitude, argues Bilgin, seems to have been the second approach. He illustrates his argument by studying al-Ghazālī’s thought as a representative of this “ideal” attitude within its own historical context.

Necdet Subaşı’s essay seeks to show the impact of modernity upon the social structures of traditional societies in various ways. Dr. Subaşı chooses Konya as a test case because it is a city where modern and traditional life forms encounter intensively. Contrary to common belief, argues Subaşı, this encounter creates new opportunities by allowing hybrid identities to emerge and new ways of coping and coming to terms with change as can be seen in the ordinary lives of the people of Konya. Every encounter is also challenging. Towards the end of the essay Dr. Subaşı directs our attention to the areas of tension as well.

As one reads the articles and book reviews, it becomes clear that there emerge more questions than answers to every subject matter treated throughout the journal, and that is good. If understanding is one of the modes of *Dasein*, then we cannot but keep asking questions.

We hope to see you again.
ARTICLES

The Reform Debate: al-Marzūqī and al-Būṭī on the Renewal of Ūṣūl al-fiqh
Abdessamad Belhaj

The Significance of the Successors (al-Tābiʿūn) as Reflected in Early Ḥadīth Collections
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Al-Ghazālī as a Representative and Initiator of the Idealized Attitude in the Relationship between the Class of Religious Scholars and Government
Vejdi Bilgin

Modernization and the Reproduction of Everyday Life in Konya
Necdet Subaşı
THE REFORM DEBATE
Al-Marzūqī and al-Būṭī on the Renewal of Uṣūl al-fiqh

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Abstract

The renewal of Islamic legal hermeneutics has been a subject of controversy since the 19th century. Muslim jurists and thinkers disagree on the extent to which the sources and the procedures of istidlāl, legal reasoning, embodied in Islamic legal hermeneutics, uṣūl al-fiqh, should be restructured. This study deals with one of the most recent discussions on this question, which opposed the Tunisian A. al-Marzūqī and the Syrian M. S. Ramaḍān al-Būṭī. The answers of the two debaters are interesting in more than a case. On the one side, al-Marzūqī argued for an open and collective legal hermeneutics that would function as a public reasoning. On the other side, al-Būṭī adopts a conventional line of thought, defending the methodological self-sufficiency of Islamic law. This paper will investigate the premises, the conclusions, and the counter-arguments of each of the debaters. Besides, light will be shed on the new elements that emerged in the dispute with regard to legal reform in Islamic law.

Key Words: Reform, al-Marzūqī, al-Būṭī, renewal, uṣūl al-fiqh, Islamic legal hermeneutics

Introduction

Since M. ʿAbduh (d. 1905), the renewal of Islamic legal hermeneutics, uṣūl al-fiqh, has been explored in heated discussions. For ʿAbduh, the key-concept of renewing uṣūl al-fiqh is public interest,
Abdessamad Belbaj

mašlaḥa, which should frame the new Muslim legal thought. Without questioning the four traditional sources of Islamic law, he infused a cautious ethical spirit in legal reasoning. In this regard, he drew attention to Abū Ishāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) and his al-Muwāfaqāt fī uṣūl al-sharīʿa, a cornerstone in the Muslim legal ethics, called the higher objectives of Islamic law, maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. The recurrent question of debate is how far one would go to reform the sources and the procedures of legal reasoning.

Jurists and intellectuals disputed ‘Abduh’s legacy. On the one hand, an increasing number of traditionnist jurists adopted, with prudence, ‘Abduh’s perspective. Others, more open to reform such as M. al-Ghazālī (d. 1996), criticized the centrality of analogy and singular reports, khabar al-wāhidī, using the legal ethics of the Qurʾān more freely. The latter would be the umbrella that covers public interest-based reasoning. However, nothing radical emerged out of this approach. Juristic caution and the apology of sharīʿa subsidized the ethics of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa to the traditional uṣūl. On the other hand, Muslim intellectuals employed ‘Abduh’s mašlaḥa-frame to elaborate far-reaching proposals of renewing uṣūl. Thus, in 1980, the Sudanese Hasan al-Turābī challenged traditional uṣūl studies. Although he does not belong to the religious establishment of ‘ulamāʾ, the publication of his Risāla fī tajdid uṣūl al-fiqh al-Islāmī was a turning point. Al-Turābī questions analogy, enlarges the use of maqāṣid and presumption, rejects consensus in its traditional juristic form, and, instead, he calls to a democracy-like consensus. A similar effort of renewal has been undertaken by the Egyptian Hasan Ḥanafi. Contrary to al-Turābī, Ḥanafi lacks juristic training. He suggests transforming uṣūl al-fiqh from a juristic, rational, deductive, and logical science, as he describes it, into a philosophical, humanistic, behavioral, and general field of knowledge. He calls to consider the public interest as a central method of legal reasoning and to discard the the-

oretical traditional *uṣūl*. This proposal did not persuade traditionnist audiences. A serious divide between the legal ethics of the intellectuals and the legalism of the jurists brought ‘Abduh’s synthesis to a deadlock.

In the West, several Muslim intellectuals attempted, in a critical outlook, at the renewal of Islamic legal hermeneutics. In particular, Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), argues for a new dynamic legal hermeneutics; it is an independent reasoning, *ijtihād* that looks at the Qur’ān and the Sunna as scriptures that move innovatively through different social forms. As he puts it, “Islam is the name of certain norms and ideals which are to be progressively realized through different social phenomena and set-ups.” Accordingly, Muslims should seek values in the texts, not in the medieval institutions, and embody these Islamic values in the modern institutions. More radically, M. Arkoun (d. 2010) rejects the notion of *ijtihād* altogether. For him, *ijtihād* is a mechanism of thinking about *shari‘a* within the orthodox perspective elaborated by the classical jurists. He sees a close relationship between the belief in the sacred character of the language of the Qur’ān, law and the claim of truth in Orthodox Islam. In other words, one cannot produce any significantly different *ijtihād* from the traditional *fiqh* as long as the traditional linguistic and anthropological frameworks are maintained. Arkoun also vehemently criticizes the authority of the jurists to be entitled to *ijtihād*. In his view, they took advantage to set the rules of *ijtihād* that ultimately fix the legal qualifications and social norms. Thus, *ijtihād* turned into the application of rules of juridical schools. The traditional Islamic legal hermeneutics should be substituted by Western social sciences. Renewal, as he sees it, is possible only if modern Muslims move from this traditional epistemology to criticism of the Muslim mind; that is, only and only if the mindset becomes modernist, deconstructionist, and secularist.

The wide rejection of al-Turābī’s endeavour, let alone the ideas of Ḥanafi, Fazlur Rahman, and Arkoun, postponed a serious debate on the issue between the jurists and the intellectuals. In the Sunnī Arabic speaking countries, the most audacious jurists would stick to *maqāṣid al-shari‘a* as a complementary approach to traditional *uṣūl*,

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being a safe and conciliatory approach. Conversely, modernist intellectuals rarely dare to venture into the field of *uṣūl*.

Recently, a sober debate took place between the Tunisian Abū Ya‘rub al-Marzūqī and the Syrian Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī (d. 2013). It was published under the title of *Ishkāliyyat tajdid *uṣūl* al-fiqh*. The answers of the two debaters to the questions of definition, modalities, and implications of this renewal are stimulating in more than a case. Al-Marzūqī, the proponent, argued for an open and collective legal hermeneutics that would function as a public reasoning. His belief in human reason and freedom is essential. As a critique of the juristic elitism, he rejected any special authority that would be given to the jurists. Since juristic authority is based on the derivation of judgments through analogy, *qiyyās*, he categorically dismissed this method. In this regard, he recalls Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) as models of a realistic synthesis between reason and transmission. He hails them for their reliance on scriptures and reality rather than analogical reasoning. Thus, in his view, they are the precursors of a deep renewal of Islamic legal hermeneutics. Moreover, al-Marzūqī discards the logical, legal, and linguistic premises of traditional *uṣūl al-fiqh* for their incapacity to grasp the realities of modern times. He suggests the use of political philosophy and ethics as an effective way of renewal to find adequate legal decisions for new cases.

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In contrast, al-Buṭi adopts a conservative line of thought, defending the theoretical self-sufficiency of Islamic law. For him, the notion of public interest, *maṣlaḥa*, is an appropriate frame to tackle new juridical cases. However, public interest should be regulated by the traditional authority of the jurists and the principles of *shariʿa*. As he understands it, the reason for the stagnation of modern *ijtibād* does not lie in the traditional tools and premises of *uşūl al-fiqh*. Rather, it has to do with the inability of *mujtahids* to use these devices. For this reason, al-Buṭi casts off the modernist views of *uşūl* renewal. In his opinion, Islamic legal hermeneutics do not need renewal as they are, in their traditional form, the only appropriate tools for reading the sources of law in Islam. Since these sources are immutable, the tools should not be renewed. The reactivation of *ijtibād* is to be carried out with the same traditional legal reasoning. Thus, it can be said that the ethical view of the philosopher al-Marzūqi clashes with the procedural one endorsed by the jurist al-Buṭi.

Taking up a critical posture, this paper examines the debate under consideration. In order to capture better the intellectual background of the debate, I will briefly introduce the participants. Then, I will explore the premises, the conclusions, and the counter-arguments of each of the debaters. In the first place, al-Marzūqi’s position will be investigated. Subsequently, I will look at al-Buṭi’s rebuttal of al-Marzūqi’s thesis on the new Islamic legal hermeneutics as he perceives it.

I. The Debaters

I begin with al-Buṭi as he is well-known for Western as well Muslim audiences. Born in Turkey in a Kurdish family (Boutan Island, 1929), al-Buṭi is a Syrian religious scholar who became one of the most prestigious religious Sunnī scholars in the last forty years. He synthesized a traditional Azhari training (PhD from al-Azhar in 1965),

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Ikhwānī intellectual line and Sufism. Of particular importance is the influence of Bediuzzaman Sa’id Nūrṣī (d. 1960) on him. Although critical of the Arab socialism and other secular ideologies, he supported the Syrian regime until his death in 2013. With regard to Islamic law, al-Būṭi is a conservative. He enthusiastically defended sustaining the juristic schools, madhābiḥ against a Salafī anti-madhābiḥ campaign. Al-Būṭi won the esteem of traditional Muslim scholars with his book, Ḍawābiṭ al-maṣlaḥa fī l-sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya [The Regulations of Public Interests in Islamic Law]. Herein, he claims that in Islamic law, public interest can only be real if approved by the Qurʾān and the Sunna. In his view, ethics of law cannot renew Islamic law for no consideration is given to ethics outside the texts; religion is the basis of public interest and humans cannot grasp divine wisdom embodied in sharīʿa. His Shāfiʿism is obvious here as he promotes the idea that good and evil are effects of the legal command.

In contrast, Muḥammad al-Ḥābīb al-Marzūqī, known as Abū Ya’rub al-Marzūqī, is unfamiliar to the Western and Islamic informed publics. Nonetheless, he is well-known to the Arabic audiences thanks to his numerous publications, media appearances on al-Jazeera, and controversies he was involved in. Born in Tunisia (1947), he is trained in Paris in philosophy, especially Islamic and Greek philosophies. In several publications, he promotes a new Arab philosophy that includes the religious component, a reaction to largely secular philosophers in the Arab world. He rejects Aristotelian Muslim philosophy and kalām for they are realists, claiming the existence of universals and particulars. Al-Marzūqī is a nominalist who believes in the existence of particulars only. In one of his recent publications, he argues for the unity of philosophy and religion. His Islamic affinities were confirmed in the current political scene of Tunisia as he was a representative of the Islamic political party Ennahda (1911-1912). However, he resigned and distanced himself from politics. His writings focus on epistemology, philosophy of history, and metaphysics. The only publication where he expands on Islamic law is his debate with al-Būṭi.

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11 Ibid., 67.
II. Al-Marzūqi’s Approach

Al-Marzūqi considers that Muʿtazilī theology and Khārijism-Zāhīrīrīsm had a destructive influence on *uṣūl*. According to him, these schools infused a sense of rebellion and non-consensual tendencies into the Sunnī *uṣūl al-fiqh*. The first is responsible for esoteric interpretation while Khārijism and Zāhīrism spread rigid formalism and literalism. Although his affirmation of the Muʿtazilī influence on *uṣūl* is right, his assumption about the esoteric impact of Muʿtazilism on Ḥanafī and Ṣāfīrī schools is debatable. For him, even the juristic use of linguistic interpretation stems from a Muʿtazilī influence.

That said, Muʿtazilīs were not the only ones to practice linguistic interpretation. The latter was common among exegetes and theological schools. Further, he considers the *maqāṣid* theory a by-product of Muʿtazilism. Probably, what lies behind al-Marzūqi’s claim is the promotion of ratiocination, *taʿlīl* by Muʿtazilīs – the asset of the *maqāṣid* theory. Even so, Ashʿarīs and Ṣūfīs also contributed to the development of this theory as shown by al-Ḥākīm al-Tirmīdī (d. ca. 910), al-Juwaynī (d. 1085), and al-Ghazālī (d. 1111).

Al-Marzūqi’s standpoint on the influence of Khārijism-Zāhīrism on *uṣūl* does not reflect the standard view on the matter. In their deliberations, Sunnī juridical schools did not take seriously the Khārijī and Zāhīrī positions. Besides, Zāhīrism rejects the mainstream Sunnī use of *qiyās* and its understanding of juridical consensus. Al-Marzūqi perceives the continuity of Zāhīrism in the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools.

Probably, he was led to think so by the role the three schools assign to traditions. Zāhīrism endorses the literal meaning of the Qurʾān and ḥadīth while the Mālikīs promote the traditions in general, and those of Medina in particular. Finally, the traditionist character of Ḥanbalism is renowned. However, the elaboration of legal-linguistic analysis is not a monopoly of Zāhīrism. Al-Ṣāfīrī (d. 820) should be given some credit with regard to this approach.

There are two exceptions from al-Marzūqi’s overall denunciation of *uṣūl* legacy: Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Khaldūn. In his view, their reflections on language, history, knowledge, and nature are revolution-

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ary and should inspire the desired renewal. On the one side, Ibn Taymiyya, as interpreted by al-Marzuqi, used a critical method of knowledge and nature to purify language and history from formalism and esoteric ideas. That is, he fought the negative influences of Zahirism and Mu’tazilism on Sunnism. Al-Marzuqi praises Ibn Taymiyya’s method based on the Qur’an-hadith, reality, and creation. Ibn Taymiyya is also eulogized for seeking an agreement between nature and law. Here, al-Marzuqi displays an uncommon interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya. While the typical scholarly reception of Ibn Taymiyya highlights his rejection of philosophy, al-Marzuqi perceives him as a nominalist philosopher. According to his interpretation, Ibn Taymiyya criticized Aristotelian realism, which claims the universals exist as such. Against it, Ibn Taymiyya argues that universals exist only as particulars. In addition, in his perspective, Ibn Taymiyya might be the first to consider *ijtiḥād* and *jihād* as individual obligations.

Ibn Taymiyya’s main mission was to de-philosophize Sunnī theology. His claim of the agreement of transmission and reason is apologetic and aims at defending traditions. In this regard, he is not different from any Sunnī theologian or jurist al-Marzuqi rejects. For Ibn Taymiyya, both *ijtiḥād* and *jihād* are governed by the traditions (in *ijtiḥād*) and the state authority (in *jihād*). Moreover, Mu’talizīs, whom al-Marzuqi dismisses, were among the earliest to call to individual responsibility in reasoning and forbidding the wrong.

Al-Marzuqi reads Ibn Taymiyya as a pioneer of renewal of legal hermeneutics who focuses on scriptures and rejects juristic imitation, *taqlīd*. Be that as it may, contrary to Ibn Taymiyya who dismissed philosophy as a tool of attaining “truth,” al-Marzuqi thinks philosophy is able to provide a rational theory of knowledge and to build Islamic law as ethics.

In his admiration of Ibn Taymiyya, al-Marzuqi follows Fazlur Rahman who believed Ibn Taymiyya to be “the only medieval Muslim who seeks to formulate clearly the ultimate issues at stake between the cognitive approach to reality of the Greeks and the ‘anticlassical’

15 Ibid., 52-53.
17 Al-Marzuqi and al-Būṭī, *ibid.*, 66.
18 Ibid., 225.
attitudes of the Koran.” Further, Fazlur Rahman described Ibn Taymiyya as a bright and bold spirit who made an attempt to reopen the gate of absolute *ijtibād*.

As for Ibn Khaldūn, al-Marzūqi accredits him for establishing a philosophy of history to replace theology and Islamic philosophy, *fiqh*, and Sufism. He joins a general appraisal of his legacy among the Muslim intellectuals. However, Ibn Khaldūn conceived his philosophy of history in accordance with the religious and rational sciences of his time. Ibn Khaldūn wrote about, praised and taught these sciences. In his *Muqaddima*, he refers to the mentioned subjects with appreciation.

In the debate, the most surprising position al-Marzūqi endorses is his criticism of *maqāṣid al-shari‘a* and al-Shāṭibī. Since decades, modernists have attempted to use al-Shāṭibī in order to generate an ethical transformation of Islamic law. In spite of this “semi agreement” of intellectuals and jurists on al-Shāṭibī, al-Marzūqi denounces *maqāṣid* theory for its alleged impossibility and immorality. Al-Marzūqi asserts that it is impossible to grasp the higher objectives of God. Without knowing them, one cannot know neither which laws fulfill these objectives. He does not consider induction, *istiqrā‘*, the main method used by the *maqāṣid* jurists, as sufficient to reach certainty. He claims induction to be impossible to carry on in the texts of *shari‘a*. Accordingly, he discards the five necessities of Islamic law (preservation of religion, life, intellect, property, and progeny) as seen by *maqāṣid* theory.

In his view, these necessities should be interpreted as ethical rather than legal principles. For instance, the preservation of religion should not be the imposition of rituals, but the respect of religious freedom. Also, the safeguarding of life concerns the dignified one and not any life. Al-Marzūqi denies that forbidding wine protects the intellect. Rather, it is through the continuous nourishing and developing of intellectual skills and reflection that such purpose may only be accomplished. With regard to property, he requires it to be licit. Besides, he highlights the role of a just state in sustaining such prop-

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21 Al-Marzūqi and al-Būṭi, *ibid.*, 53.
erty. For him, the protection of progeny, as an objective of its own, is irrelevant as life implies progeny.

He also compares *maqāṣid* theory to utilitarianism, which, in his view, is immoral as it is based on pragmatism. For this reason, al-Marzūqī relinquishes analogy, *qiyyās* as well as public interest, *mašlaha*. He deems them inadequate for an Islamic legislation as the jurist who practices them recedes from the texts and ignores consensus. Inasmuch as the legal devices of analogy and public interest are approved, despotism of the *mujtahid* is encouraged. Thus, al-Marzūqī uses a Zāhiri argument to reject analogy and public interest. Zāhirīs claimed the jurist had no authority to legislate. Since analogy and public interest provide the jurist with an authority of legislation, they should not be considered sources of law at all.

As an alternative, al-Marzūqī suggests an Islamic collective ethics that should be the basis of legislation. According to him, consensus can conciliate the Qurʾān and the Sunna on the one side and the world and history on the other. This legislative consensus is expected to by-pass schools held responsible for the spiritual disunity of the *umma*. Al-Marzūqī’s consensus does not bear the meaning it conveyed in traditional *uṣūl al-fiqh* which denotes the consensus of jurists in a specific time (ʿijmāʿ).

More than anything, al-Marzūqī is critical of the juristic authority in the manner of Arkoun. To undermine it, he was led to question the methods of traditional jurists by having recourse to argument from change and from universality. On the one hand, he asserts science is always changing and therefore logical premises of *uṣūl* should be changed. On the other, since, today, most Muslims are not Arabic speaking peoples, legal hermeneutics and legislation should not rely exclusively on Arabic language. He asserts that Islamic law and ethics should be universal.

### III. Al-Būṭī’s Approach

In al-Būṭī’s view, *uṣūl*’s task consists in explaining legal texts and rules. As a discipline, it is based on a set of unchanging linguistic

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and logical principles. Since the premises cannot be renewed, the outcomes cannot be renewed neither. Thus, he rules out any renewal of *uṣūl al-fiqh*’s methodology. For him, changing *uṣūl al-fiqh* implies changing the convention of Arabic language which would undermine the reception of God’s legal norms. Al-Būṭi does not elaborate on the logical part and makes Arabic his main argument against change. It is the case that *uṣūl al-fiqh* is unchangeable, al-Būṭi explains, because no one is allowed to change the Arabic convention. For example, *uṣūl al-fiqh* states that the imperative form implies obligation unless proven otherwise. Al-Būṭi argues that such a rule is established within the Arabic convention of speech. Here, al-Būṭi ignores the long evolution of *uṣūl al-fiqh* until al-Shāfi’i and deals with its history as a static one.

In addition, he perceives the relationship between the speaker (the divine legislator) and the receiver (the Muslim community) as a relationship of subordination. The speaker entrusts the receiver with the meaning of his ideas and the receiver should preserve the intended meanings of the speaker. Al-Būṭi does not explicitly adopt the thesis of the divine origin of language, but it is underlying his argument. For if he thinks language is a human convention, he would have been forced to admit that language evolves. By the same token, al-Būṭi would conceive the convention of language as based on interaction rather than on subordination. His Ash’arī leanings explain his adherence to a conception of an Omni-Legislator God (*al-Ḥākim biwa Allāh waḥdah*).

For al-Būṭi, proponents of a modernist legal hermeneutics are dismissed for lack of a comprehensive and deep knowledge of *uṣūl.* It is obvious that al-Būṭi, by introducing this *ad hominem* argument, tries to delegitimize his adversary. Muslim jurists and the majority of Muslims do not consider intellectuals as religious scholars, ‘*ulamā*’. Sacred knowledge is the privilege of the jurists. Accordingly, al-Būṭi seems little interested in bridging the gap between him and his adversary. Further, he accuses his adversary of spreading doubt about *sharīʿa*. Indeed, al-Būṭi insists on the ill-intended modernist calls to renewal. For him, renewing *uṣūl al-fiqh* would undermine *sharīʿa*

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28 Ibid., 176.
29 Ibid., 168-169.
30 Ibid., 163.
because the certainty of one relates to the certainty of the other. Reforming *usūl al-fiqh*, that is the foundations of Islamic law, would lead to change the regulations of *sharī'a*. One can notice here al-Būṭi’s use of a classical juristic mode of legal reasoning: blocking the means to mischief, *sadd al-dhara'ī*; Anything that might lead to evil should be stopped. Since a new legal hermeneutics would threaten the very existence of Islamic law, it should be denied.

How should a modern scholar deal with *usūl al-fiqh*? In al-Būṭi’s stance, today, like in any other time, the jurists should endorse the conventional rules in *usūl al-fiqh* and use them to understand the legal texts. A modern jurist is expected to renew only his application of these rules. Al-Būṭi describes the current status of *usūl al-fiqh* as an old building that requires re-engagement. Modern scholars should reform the damaged parts of its structure, strengthen it, and renew the style (of writing about it). As a traditional jurist, he subscribes to a superficial approach that maintains the whole edifice. Nothing should be renewed in the contents. However, al-Būṭi admits that modern scholars, provided they have the required knowledge, have a possibility of weighing different standpoints of early scholars, *tarjīḥ*. This is a step back in time after ‘Abduh’s attempt to struggle with the *tarjīḥ* mentality. After all, ‘Abduh promoted a revival of *ijtihād* spirit that brings about independent legal reasoning.

For al-Būṭi, there is no way that Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Khaldūn made a revolution in the history of Islamic law. Al-Būṭi refutes al-Marzūqi’s claim that Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Khaldūn made a revolution in *usūl al-fiqh*. At this point, he advanced several counter-arguments; Ibn Taymiyya’s *usūl* draws on the methodology of the Shāfi‘i school with further insistence on the pre-eminence of traditions. Using the watchword of traditionnalisation, he stood against an increasing logicisation of Shāfi‘i *usūl*. In his time, Ibn Taymiyya resisted the renewal of *usūl al-fiqh*. As for Ibn Khaldūn, he was not an *usulī* in any sense. It is true that he was a Mālikī jurist and judge by profession, but his leanings were much more passionate for history than any other subject. He left no particular reflection on *usūl al-fiqh* which could be seen as innovative. By putting Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Khaldūn in their real contexts, al-Būṭi uses evidence from their writ-

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ings.\footnote{Ibid., 233-244.} His point is that both medieval scholars adhere to the mainstream Sunnī schools.

In contrast to al-Marzūqī’s rejection of *maqāṣid*, al-Būṭī firmly defended its significance in *uşūl al-fiqh*. Not that he would make it a starting point of any renewal. In al-Būṭī’s perspective, *maqāṣid* are the higher objectives of public interest as manifestations of Allah’s judgments. The public interest is also a divine gift. Here, al-Būṭī endorses a typical occasionalist Ashʿarī argument. He denies that the public interest is inherent in human transactions and considers it an instrument of God’s will.\footnote{Ibid., 250.} Therefore, his view is that *maqāṣid* only show the wisdom of *šbarī‘a*. The higher objectives of Islamic law are based on the traditional sources of *uşūl al-fiqh*, mainly the Qur’ān and the Sunna.

At the end of the debate, a major locus of divergence emerges: whether juristic authority should be maintained or not. Al-Būṭī strongly reacts against al-Marzūqī’s call to replace juristic schools with popular will. The jurist sees the danger of turning down the juristic authority in favour of ethics. His mistrust of the public will, beyond traditional law, constitutes the cornerstone of his rebuttal Al-Būṭī counter-argues that the people are divergent and unable to agree on their interests.\footnote{Ibid., 250.} For this reason, he believes they need *šbarī‘a*, the only perfect and universal expression of human welfare. Since *šbarī‘a* requires specific traditional rules of understanding,\footnote{Ibid., 294.} maintaining the authority of the jurists is essential.

For al-Būṭī, the fates of *šbarī‘a* and *uşūl al-fiqh* are inseparable. He compares the reading of *šbarī‘a* texts to reading *The Republic* of Plato. One needs linguistic tools that belong to the same period to understand these texts. However, modern readers do not read *The Republic* with the same kit of tools since the Antiquity. Hermeneutics evolve as culture and society develop.

**Conclusion**

In sum, the philosopher and the jurist could not reach a meeting point in this controversy over the renewal of Islamic legal hermeneutics. Al-Būṭī does not give any concession to modernity as the latter
seems to depose him from his authority. To maintain religious knowledge sacred, he sticks to arguments from authority and classical Arabic. Al-Būṭī suspects modernity and closes all gates that could challenge the legacy. He makes a step backward, compared to ḤAbduh’s approach.

Despite al-Marzūqi’s efforts to shake the jurist’s position, the much awaited debate did not lead to any progress on the issue. The philosopher wanted to push ḤAbduh’s legal reform too far. Not only does he insist on ethics as a replacement of legal formalism, but urges to dismiss juristic authority. He argues for a new Islamic legal hermeneutics without traditional ṣūṣūl al-fiqh. Rejecting his project, al-Būṭī glorifies traditional ṣūṣūl.

It has been shown that maqāṣid model, as promoted by traditional jurists does not contain any possibilities of radical renewal for philosophers. On the one hand, it is based on a traditional dogma of Ashʿarism where ethics justifies law rather than inspires it. On the other, maqāṣid derive from Muslim traditions. Accordingly, opening the gate of maqāṣid does not lead to reform. In this respect, al-Marzūqi’s criticism of the maqāṣid model is an unconventional idea that deserves attention. It shows that the ethics of law, thought to be appealing to philosophers, fail to respond to their expectations.

In a rather blunt way, this clash informs us about the legal reform of ṣūṣūl. A compromise between philosophers and jurists on ṣūṣūl al-fiqh seems to be unreachable. The philosopher, being the proponent of renewal, challenges the traditional jurist who endorses the function of opponent. Since the beginning of the dispute, a peculiar situation took place. The proponent became the opponent, defending his good intentions to bring about change in the ṣūṣūl al-fiqh. By the same token, al-Būṭī endorses the role of the proponent and the guardian of ṣūṣūl al-fiqh. To use juridical terms, legal reform is a plaintiff that ends as a defendant. Here lies the importance of this debate. It depicts the current state of the legal reform as “a suspicious cause.” Jurists do not seem eager to change their methods and enjoy the eternal status of plaintiffs, supported by the confidence of the religious authority.

The question whether to renew ṣūṣūl al-fiqh becomes who speaks for ṣūṣūl al-fiqh? Al-Būṭī recuperates the main argument of the traditionnists which consists in discrediting the religious knowledge of the modernists. The Muslim jurists’ suspicion towards philosophers
with regard to the renewal of Islamic law seems to considerably increase. In contrast, al-Marzūqī makes audacious attempts to renew *uṣūl* and questions the whole traditional *uṣūl al-fiqh*. He attempts to reform *uṣūl* outside the box, taking further al-Turābī’s reformist endeavour. Thus, the philosopher pursues a radical way of revising the whole legacy of *uṣūl*.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUCCESSORS (AL-TĀBI‘ÜN) IN THE EARLY ḤADĪTH COLLECTIONS*

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Abstract

In the early generations of Islam, the Successors (al-tābi‘ün) played an important role by making significant contribution to the formation of Islamic sciences such as fiqh, ḥadīth, and tafsīr. Thus, it is not surprising to see various references to their opinions in the early examples of different Islamic literary genres. For example, early ḥadīth collections include a great number of traditions attributed to the Successors – which would later be called al-ḥadīth al-maqṭū‘ – alongside those attributed to the Prophet. This paper, focusing on the usages of al-ḥadīth al-maqṭū‘ in the early ḥadīth literature, is an inquiry into why the Successors’ opinions constituted such an important part of ḥadīth collections. It argues that the veneration of the Successors is derived from the common recognition that they were better qualified to understand religious texts than later generations and that even their personal opinions were either based on the religious texts or at least consistent with them. The historical basis of this widely accepted recognition is the existence of an intimate and close teacher-student relationship between the Companions and the Successors, which made it possible for the latter to inherit the knowledge of the former.

Key Words: the Successors, al-tābi‘ün, ḥadīth, Sunna, maqtū‘ ḥadīth

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**Introductory Remarks about the Successors**

Scholars of Islamic studies commonly acknowledge that the early generations of Muslims played a fundamental role in the establishment and early development of Islamic civilization. The Companions of the Prophet (al-ṣabāba), the Successors (al-tābi‘īn), and the Successors of the Successors (atbā‘ al-tābi‘īn) all contributed to the flourishing of a new religious world not only by providing the essential manpower for the territorial spread of the early Islamic caliphate but also by laying the foundations of the Islamic sciences, which would later become independent fields of study known as ḥadīth, fiqh, tafsīr, etc. Thus, it is not surprising to encounter a multitude of references to the views or sayings of these early Muslims in various genres of Arabic literature.

This article will attempt to demonstrate the significant contributions of one of the above-mentioned generations, the Successors, as reflected in the early ḥadīth literature and to provide answers as to why traditions coming from this generation constituted an important part of early ḥadīth collections. It will argue that Muslims’ general conception of time, which places a greater value upon earlier generations, and ḥadīth scholars’ belief in the consistency of the Successors’ personal opinions with other reliable traditions, were the two main factors that granted this generation a respected status within the ḥadīth literature. However, before delving into this subject, it is worth defining a few key terms and touching upon the contributions of this generation of Successors to fields other than the ḥadīth.

Successors are described as Muslims who never personally met the Prophet Muḥammad but were able to meet at least one of the Prophet’s Companions at some point during their lives. Historically, the generation of Successors spans roughly from 60-125/680-741, a period politically dominated by Umayyad rulers. Throughout these years, the Successors were major actors in virtually all fields of Islamic scholarship. For example, the early formation of the legal schools in Kūfah and Medina was mostly due to the efforts of Successors such as ʿAlqama ibn Qays (d. 62/682) and Aswad ibn Yazīd in the former city, and Saʿīd ibn Musayyab (d. 93/712) and ʿUrwa ibn al-Zubayr (d. 94/713) in the latter. Ibrāhīm al-Nakhā‘ī (d. 96/715) of Kūfa is also

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associated with the early formation of Ḥanafī legal doctrine. A group of jurists among the Successors in Medina was called the “seven jurists (al-fuqahā’ al-sab‘a),” and their legal opinions were considered true representations of what is known as ‘amal ahl al-Madīna (common practices of the people of Medina).

In theology, figures such as al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) argued for principles that would deeply influence later generations of the Sunnī majority. Al-Baṣrī also seems to have had a distinctive impact with his life and preachings upon early Muslim Sufis. As for Qur’ānic exegesis, Saʿīd ibn Jubayr (d. 95/713) and Mujāhid ibn Jabr (d. 103/721), disciples of the famous companion ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbbās (d. 68/687-8), were the two major authorities whose interpretation of verses received careful attention from subsequent muḥaffāzīn. Tafsīr books, particularly ḥadīth-oriented ones, contain numerous references to the Successors’ opinions along with the explanations of the Prophet and his Companions.

The Successors’ scholarly enterprises were not confined to the Islamic sciences but included fields such as historiography. ʿUrwa ibn al-Zubayr narrated historical accounts regarding the life and cam-

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3 For their identities and contributions to the development of the Medinan school of law, see Cengiz Kallek, “Fukahâ-i Sebʿa [al-Fuqahā’ al-sab‘a],” Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DVA) [Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopedia of Islam], XIII, 214.


5 In modern Turkish literature on Qur’ānic exegesis, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbbās is portrayed as the founder of the Meccan school of tafsīr, see Muhammed Fatih Kesler, Mekke Tefsir Ekolü: Öncüleri ve Göröşleri [Pioneers and Opinions of the Meccan School of Tafsīr] (Van: n.p., 1996), 23-50. Of course, his distinguished disciples who advanced the Meccan school belong to the generation of Successors.

6 Ibn Abī Ḥātim’s (d. 327/938) tafsīr, for instance, is replete with traditions coming from the Successors; see Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Idrīs Ibn Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī, Tefsir al-Qur’ān al-‘ażīm musnad Ḥabīb Allāh wa-l-ṣabāba wa-l-tabiʿīn (ed. Asʿad Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib; Mecca: Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 1997).
paings of the Prophet,\textsuperscript{7} while Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri (d. 124/742) collected historical reports in an effort to systematically establish the Prophet’s \textit{sira}.\textsuperscript{8} Their works marked the beginnings of a Muslim historiographic tradition.

**The Successors in Early Ḥadīth Collections**

The Successors’ most remarkable contribution, however, lies in the development of the early ḥadīth endeavor. In addition to being credited as the first generation to use the \textit{isnāds} (chains of transmission) prior to actual ḥadīth texts,\textsuperscript{9} most of the early systematic compilers of prophetic traditions belonged to this generation, including the famous Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri.\textsuperscript{10} Moreover, recent studies have revealed that the specialists in early transmitter criticism (\textit{al-jarḥ wa-l-ta’dil}) all shared the common feature of being dedicated disciples of certain Successors.\textsuperscript{11}

It is also noteworthy that the following generations recorded the sayings and deeds of the Successors alongside prophetic reports, using a very similar structure. In other words, the Successors were not only intermediaries in the transmission of reports pertaining to the

\textsuperscript{7} ‘Urwa ibn al-Zubayr, the nephew of the Prophet’s wife Ā’isha, showed an obvious interest in the Prophet’s \textit{sira} and reportedly compiled a book on the \textit{maghāzī}; see ‘Abdal ‘Aziz Duri, “al-Zuhri: A Study on the Beginnings of History Writing in Islam,” \textit{Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies} 19/1 (1957), 1-12 (esp. 1-2).

\textsuperscript{8} Al-Zuhri’s reports concerning the Prophet’s biography are collected in the following work: \textit{al-Maghāzī al-nabawiyya} (ed. Suhayl Zakkār; Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1981). Evaluating al-Zuhri’s reports, Chase Robinson identifies him as a “historian by any fair definition of the term.” For the historiography of both ‘Urwa and al-Zuhri, see Chase F. Robinson, \textit{Islamic Historiography} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 23-25. For Duri’s reconstruction of al-Zuhri’s work, see Duri, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{9} It has been almost a convention in ḥadīth works to refer to the words of the prominent successor Muḥammad ibn Sirīn (d. 110/729), who dated the emergence of \textit{isnād} to around the second half of the first century after \textit{hijra}. See, for example, Jonathan Brown, \textit{Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World} (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), 79.


Prophet Muḥammad, but they also became a source, or a final reference point, of early Muslim reports.

The inclusion of numerous reports ascribed to the Successors within large ḥadīth volumes made it necessary for later Muslim scholars to develop a special terminology that would allow them to distinguish between those reports belonging to the Prophet Muḥammad and those attributed to the Companions and Successors. To that end, prophetic traditions came to be called al-ḥadīth al-marfūʿ, whereas reports attributed to the Companions and Successors were termed al-ḥadīth al-mawqūf and al-ḥadīth al-maqṣūṭ, respectively.12

Maqṣūṭ traditions, or personal sayings and deeds of the Successors, appear both frequently and in various occurrences and contexts within the early ḥadīth literature. Here, a statistical consideration is in order. One of the most important early ḥadīth collections, al-Muwāṭṭa by Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), contains 285 maqṣūṭ’s out of 1720 traditions,13 whereas his contemporary colleague Abū Yūṣuf (d. 182/798) mentions 549 maqṣūṭ’s out of 1068 traditions in his Kitāb al-ʿāthār, at least 443 of which came from the well-known Kūfān muḥaddith Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī.14 The fact that Mālik ibn Anas and Abū Yūṣuf were distinguished for their knowledge on both Islamic law and the ḥadīth shows that the Successors’ views played a significant role not only in the early ḥadīth literature but also in legal ijtihāds of the second/eighth-century jurists. ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī’s (d. 211/826-7) al-Muṣannaf includes only 4,000 marfū’s out of 18,000 traditions, meaning that almost 14,000 of the remaining


traditions in his book stem from either the Companions or the Successors. Finally, of Ibn Abī Shayba’s (d. 235/849) Muṣannaf, which consists of 34,840 traditions, almost half, or 15,998, are maqṭū’s.

Having demonstrated the wide use of maqṭū reports in the early compilations, we can now pose the following central questions: What made the generation of Successors so important in the eyes of later Muslim generations? Why were their opinions transmitted alongside Prophetic traditions and included in early ḥadīth collections? Finally, why are the sayings and deeds of the Successors a subject of the science of ḥadīth?

The first thing that catches the researcher’s eye regarding the veneration of this generation is the presence of some commonly cited Qur’ānic verses and prophetic traditions. For example, a Qur’ānic verse in al-Tawba (9:100) reads as follows: The first and foremost (to embrace Islam and excel others in virtue) among the Emigrants and the Helpers, and those who follow them in devotion to doing good, aware that God is seeing them – God is well-pleased with them, and they are well-pleased with Him, and He has prepared for them Gardens throughout which rivers flow, therein to abide for ever. That is the supreme triumph.

The first Emigrants and the Helpers in this verse, i.e., al-muhājirūn wa-l-anṣār, were usually interpreted as the Companions, and those who followed them in devotion to doing good were interpreted as the Successors by many ḥadīth scholars. Hence, the Successors were perceived as a group of people whose sincerity and devotion were praised in the Qur’ān.

The idea of the superiority of earlier generations to later ones also seems to have been supported by certain prophetic traditions. This sentiment is evident in the following ḥadīth: “khayr al-nās qarnī thumma llaḏīna yalinabum thumma llaḏīna yalinabum (The best of mankind is my generation, and then those who follow them

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16 Arif Ulu, Tâbiûnun Sünnet Anlayışı [Sunna Perception of the Tābi‘ūn] (PhD dissertation; Ankara: Ankara University, 2006), X.
and then those who follow them).” Virtually all the major Islamic prosopographical works contain references to these or similar religious texts that indicate the merits of the early Muslim generations. We also have some reports in which the Successors themselves complain about Muslim society’s gradual deterioration. On one occasion, for example, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī laments: “I remember a time among the Muslims when their men would shout (to remind their families) ‘O family! O family! (Look after) your orphan! Your orphan! O family! O family! (Look after) your orphan! Your poor! Your poor! O family! O family! (Look after) your neighbor! Your neighbor! Time has been swift in taking the best of you while every day you become baser.” Furthermore, Islamic eschatological traditions maintain that as the world approaches its end, unpleasant signs will emerge, such as the decrease of knowledge, the spread of miserliness, and people’s indulgence in grave sins, all of which stand in sharp contrast to the shining days of the Prophet and his Companions.

The emphasis on the merits of earlier generations, however, is not unique to Muslims but can also be found in other religious traditions in various forms. In Judaism, for instance, a special importance attached to customs (the minhāj) is a manifestation of reverence to the past and its people. The minhāj receives such a special treatment


22 With a brief look at the fitan and malāḥim (tribulations and great battles) chapters of hadith collections, one quickly notices that the future is usually associated with social and physical deterioration. For an example in which some of the abovementioned signs are included, see Abū Dāwūd, “al-Fitan,” 1 (bāb dhikr al-fitan wa-dalā‘īlīh).

23 “Originally, the term minhāj referred to a practice about which the law was unclear, perhaps where certain details were the subject of debate by the legal authorities. When it was observed that the people followed a particular interpretation or ruling, the practice of the people was decisive and this practice acquired full legal status.” Louis Jacobs, The Jewish Religion: A Companion (New York:
that it is preferred even when it conflicts with a written law.\textsuperscript{24} It is not surprising to notice evident similarities between the role of \textit{minh\textdegree j} in Judaism and that of \textit{\textasciitilde urf} and \textit{\textasciitilde amal} in Islamic law, as they are both based on the veneration of earlier generations and their practices.\textsuperscript{25}

Although this conception of time was one of the prominent factors that paved the way for the veneration of the Successors, it still does not explain the more specific issue of what led the early ḥadīth compilers to collect a multitude of \textit{maq\textdegree t\textasciitilde u} ḥadīths in their works. As mentioned above, the \textit{maq\textdegree t\textasciitilde u} is a report whose text was not attributed to an authority higher than a Successor; as such, it does not carry legal authority as \textit{marf\textdegree u} and \textit{mawq\textdegree f} reports do. A close study of major ḥadīth collections reveals that the importance attached to \textit{maq\textdegree t\textasciitilde u} reports primarily stems from the recognition that the Successors’ opinions were reflective of, or compatible with, the original teachings of the Prophet. For ḥadīth collectors, even if a Successor did not formally elevate a legal statement to an authority higher than himself, it is still possible for the opinion to have a Prophetic origin, or at least to possess some relation to Prophetic traditions. Therefore, the Successors were not perceived as people isolated from their predecessors, but as heirs to religious knowledge inspired by the recent era of the Prophet Mu\textasciitildeammad. Three examples of the use of \textit{maq\textdegree t\textasciitilde u} reports in ḥadīth collections will help us better understand this point.

**Example One**

In the first example, Abū Dāwūd, one of the most famous ḥadīth scholars of Ba\textasciitildera, addresses the issue of accepting payment for prepaid harvests that have acquired damage prior to delivery:

\texttt{حَدَّثَنَا شَلِيْمَانُ بْنُ دَاوُدُ الْمَهْرِيُّ وَاхْمَرُ بْنُ سَعِيدِ الْهَمْذَانِيُّ قَالَ أَخْبَرَنَا ابْنُ وَهْبٍ قَالَ أَخْبَرَنِي ابْنُ جُعْنِجُ وَحَدَّثَنَا مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ مَعْمِرٍ حَدَّثَنَا أَبُو عَاصِمٍ عِنْدَ ابْنِ جُعْنِجِ الْمَغْنِيْ أَنَّ أَبَا الرَّبِّي بْنَ الْمُكَّنِيْ أَخْبَرَهُ عَنْ جَابِرَ بْنَ غَبْرِيْلَ الَّذِي أَسْتَوَى مَحْرَمًا عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ إِنَّ يَغْتَتٌ مِّنْ أَحَدِهِمْ فَأَصَابَتْهَا جَائِحَةُ فَلَا يُحْلِّلُ لَكَ أَنْ تَأْخُذَ مَنْهَا شَيْئًا بِمَتَّ أَخْحَصُ مَالَ أَحَدِهِمْ يَغْفِرُ حَقًا.


\textsuperscript{25} I do not suggest that the \textit{minh\textdegree j} and the \textit{\textasciitilde urf} or \textit{\textasciitilde amal} fully suit each other; but there is no doubt that their justification and implementation by legal authorities stem from very similar considerations. For \textit{\textasciitilde amal}, see below.
... Narrated Jābir ibn ʿAbd Allāh: The Prophet said: “If you sell unharvested dates to your fellow Muslim and a jāʾiḥa destroys the crop, it is unlawful for you to ask for the price. By what right will you take your fellow Muslim’s property?”

Abū Dāwūd devotes the following chapter to determining the exact meaning of the term jāʾiḥa, and both of the ḥadiths he chooses to cite in this chapter are maqṭūʿ: 

حَذَّرْتَ الْمُلْمَانَ بِنْ ذَوَّادَ الْمَفْسِدِيَّ أَخْبِرْنَا أَنَّ وَهْبَ أَخْبَرْنَى عَطَمًا بِنَّ الْحَكِيمِ عَنْ اِبْنِ جَرِّيجٍ عَنْ غُطَاءٍ قَالَ اللَّهُ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ: كُلُّ ظَاهِرٍ مَفْسِدٍ مِنْ مُطْرِقٍ أَوْ بَرْزٍ أَوْ جُرَادٍ أَوْ رَيْحٍ أَوْ خَمْلِيَّ.

حَذَّرْتَ الْمُلْمَانَ بِنْ ذَوَّادَ أَخْبِرْنَا أَنَّ وَهْبَ أَخْبَرْتُ عَطَمًا بِنَّ الْحَكِيمِ عَنْ يَحْيَى بْنِ سَعِيدَ أَنَّهُ قَالَ لَا جَانِثَةٍ فِيْنَا أَصِيبَ دُونَ تَلُّثَ رَأْسِ الْمَالِ. قَالَ يَحْيَى وَذَلِكَ فِيْنَا ضَعْبَةُ الْمُلْمَانِ.

(Chapter Regarding the Meaning of Jāʾiḥa)

... ʿAtāʾ ibn Abī Rabāḥ (d. 114/732) said: jāʾiḥas are obviously ruinous instances of rain, cold wave, locusts, wind, or fire.

... Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd (d. 144/761) said: “That in which under a third of the capital-stock is lost is never a jāʾiḥa.” Yaḥyā said: “This is the sunna of Muslims.”

Apparently, because there was ambiguity in how jāʾiḥa should be defined, Abū Dāwūd needed to cite the opinions of later authorities such as ʿAtāʾ and Yaḥyā, both of whom belonged to the generation of the Successors. Abū Dāwūd was content with citing maqṭūʿ reports along with Prophetic traditions, almost in the same manner as them – i.e., with full insnāds from the Successors down to himself. Regardless of whether this is a correct explanation of what the Prophet meant by the term jāʾiḥa, what is important here is that, although these two reports initially appear to be personal sayings of ʿAtāʾ and Yaḥyā, their context and content suggest that ḥadith scholars noticed their close relationship with marfūʿ traditions. Although maqṭūʿ narrations were not accepted as a legal proof in Islamic law, they were still taken into account as clear guidelines to interpreting the Prophetic Sunna. The connection between the maqṭūʿ and the marfūʿ may not always be as obvious as it is in this example; yet, this does not affect

the approach generally taken by early āḥadith scholars towards the Successors in their collections.

**Example Two**

The second – and more complex – example comes from Mālik's *al-Muwātta‘*, an earlier source of āḥadith and Islamic law.

Narrated ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbbās that the Messenger of Allāh said: “A woman who has been previously married is more entitled to her person than her guardian, and a virgin must be asked for her consent for herself, and her consent is her silence.”

And Yahyā narrated from Mālik that it reached him from Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab that he said: “Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb said: “No woman is married but with the consent of her guardian, or someone of her family with sound opinion or the Sultan.”

And Yahyā narrated from Mālik that it reached him that al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad (d. 107/725) and Ṣalīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh (d. 107/725) were marrying off their daughters and they did not consult them.

Mālik said: That is the matter with us in the wedlock of the virgins.28

When looking at this example, it is important to remember that whenever a single āḥadith contradicts common practices of the people of Medina (*ʿamal abl al-Madīna*) Mālik tends to prefer the *ʿamal* over a single narration, as is the case in this chapter. In Mālik’s view, the practice of the people of Medina is more reliable than a single narration in identifying the Prophet’s original deeds, because the

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former was conveyed from one generation to another, whereas the latter was transmitted solely between individuals. For the purpose of this article, it is sufficient to note that in this example maqṭūʿ traditions were considered to be accurate representations of the ‘amal, the origin of which was assumed to date back to the Prophet. This specific usage of the maqṭūʿ report, as well as other references to the Successors throughout al-Muwāṭṭa, clearly suggest that their opinions were more than individual reasoning, though not attributed to a higher authority with isnād.

**Example Three**

Another example of the use of maqṭūʿ comes from al-Bukhārī’s *al-Adab al-mufrad*, a topical ḥadīth work devoted to Muslim traditions about good manners. After quoting prophetic reports that emphasize the significance of neighbours, al-Bukhārī narrates al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s opinion to determine the neighborhood area.

حذفنا الحسين بن حريث قال حدفنا الفضل بن موسى بن الوليد بن دينار عن الحسن: أنه سئل عن الجار فقال أربعين دارا أمامه وأربعين خلفه وأربعين عن يمينه وأربعين عن يساره.

Al-Ḥasan was asked about the [boundaries] of neighborhood, and he replied: Forty homes in the front, forty homes in the back, forty homes on the right side, and forty homes on the left.\(^{29}\)

This maqṭūʿ report, clarifying the content of marfūʿ traditions, makes readers better understand the prophetic command and apply it in their lives. Having emphasized the extensive rights of a neighbor, al-Bukhārī uses a quotation from a Successor to address possible questions as to where the neighborhood physically ends.

Because maqṭūʿ traditions received a warm welcome from ḥadīth scholars, one might be curious as to what historical factors contributed to this reception. In other words, what historical facts served as the basis for the idea that the sayings and deeds of the Successors were compatible with Prophetic traditions? Early biographical accounts suggest that the answer lies in the close teacher-student relationships that existed between the Companions and the Successors, an arrangement that made it possible for the latter to inherit knowledge and wisdom from the former. The Companions living in Mecca and Medina, as well as those who were sent to cities such as Kūfah and

Baṣra established their own circles of learning, whose regulars were mostly from the generation of the Successors. The Successors not only received prophetic traditions from the Companions but also embraced their methods of reasoning. In fact, those students who were close to certain Companions were referred to as their aṣḥāb (companions), just as the Companions were called aṣḥāb al-Nabī. For instance, Zayd ibn Thābit (d. 45/665) in Medina, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd (d. 32/652-3) and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ẓāliḥ (d. 40/661) in Kūfa were among the Companions who had their own aṣḥāb. Thus, it is possible that the transmission of religious knowledge via an uninterrupted chain of early generations was a significant factor that many ḥadīth scholars had in mind when selecting material for their collections.

For the same reason, it is not surprising that certain Successors are described as the most knowledgeable people about certain Companions' transmissions. For example ‘Urwa ibn al-Zubayr, al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad (d. 112/730), and ʿAmra bint ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (d. 106/724) were experts on ʿĀ‘ishah’s (d. 58/678) traditions. Additionally, Sa‘īd ibn al-Musayyab mastered ʿUmar ibn al-Khattāb’s (d. 23/644) verdicts and legal decisions so deeply that he was called “ʿUmar’s transmitter” (rāwiyyat ʿUmar).

**Conclusion**

The Successors appear to be one of the major actors in the early ḥadīth literature, in parallel to their significance in other fields of the Islamic sciences. Figures such as ʿAlqama ibn Qays, Sa‘īd ibn al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhāṭī, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, and Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhri can be easily identified as the founders of a Muslim scholarly tradition. The Successors were not only transmitters of prophetic reports, but were also sources of Islamic tradition, as their own words were recorded within the literature. Their sayings and deeds became a subject of investigation alongside the Prophet’s teachings. The Suc-

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The Significance of the Successors (al-Tābi‘ūn) as Reflected …

The Successors also introduced the use of *isnād* and transmitter criticism to the Islamic sciences, both of which became hallmarks of ḥadīth tradition.

The veneration of the Successors and their significance in early ḥadīth literature were basically derived from two factors: Muslims’ general conception of time, where earlier generations are thought to be more virtuous and authoritative, and the common recognition that the Successors’ personal opinions were at least consistent with more authoritative and authentic traditions. The historical basis of this recognition is the existence of an intimate teacher-student relationship between the Companions and the Successors. This historical background, along with the two aforementioned factors, has made it possible for later scholars to attribute a privileged status to the Successors in ḥadīth literature.

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AL-GHAZĀLĪ AS A REPRESENTATIVE AND INITIATOR OF THE IDEALIZED ATTITUDE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CLASS OF RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS AND GOVERNMENT

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Abstract

There is no doctrinal approach for the nature of the relationship between the religious class (‘ulamā’) and government in Islam. From the early centuries of Islam onwards, there have been two different approaches. The first approach is to be a part of the governing mechanism, and the second is to be separate from the government. In Islamic tradition, the second approach is accepted as an ideal attitude because it has been supported by major scholars and Sufis from the early centuries on. Al-Ghazālī, who has a very important place in Islamic thought, also adopted this attitude and tried to behave consistently with it during his life. However, what distinguishes him from his predecessors is that he dedicated long passages to this issue in his major work, *Ihya*’. Al-Ghazālī’s attitude, because he is not only followed for his ideas but also for his personal life’s record (*manqiba*), plays an important role by idealizing this second approach. In this paper, I address the intellectual background and the socio-political structure that paved the way for al-Ghazālī’s thoughts and their emergence into the public stage.

*Key Words:* Al-Ghazālī, ‘ulamā’, government, religious class and government
**Introduction**

It is possible to discuss the existence of a class that differs from the public in its religious knowledge and practice, although, theoretically, there is no clergy in Islam. This class is called ‘ulamā’ in the classical sociological analysis.¹ Without doubt, the religious class covers more area than that covered by the term ‘ulamā’. Inclusion in this class is ambiguous because it does not have any place in the doctrine. However, we can establish a criterion that the members should at least make their living from religion or should dedicate an important share of their daily lives to religious and scientific activities despite having another occupation. In this case, we meet a vast religious class that stretches from scholars, sheikhs, teachers to muftis. If the vast masses of people are to be considered, imāms, madrasa students, and Sufi disciples (murīds) are also included into this religious class.

Studies on the social role of the religious class in Islamic history² are rare, and these are mostly biographical in their nature. However, to understand the history of Muslim communities, it is of crucial importance to sort out the attitude of those authorities in the religious field towards various situations, whether these attitudes are same or different. Among these attitudes, the relationship between religion and politics is currently becoming an important subject-matter. The relationships between clergymen and political power constitute only a single part of this vast topic. Because it is difficult to conduct a thorough research that includes the entire tradition of Islamic thought, this study discusses only al-Ghazālī’s case by analyzing his thoughts on the relationship between the religious class and political power and the factors that feed these thoughts, that is, the approach towards addressing these issues, in Islamic tradition and the political practices of al-Ghazālī’s era.

In what follows, I argue that the idealized attitude of the religious class towards statesmen in the Islamic tradition is to refrain as much as possible from any relationship and to protect the glory of Islam

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² For an evaluation about the studies done in the West, dedicated to the ‘ulamā’ as social actors or class; see R. Stephen Humphreys, *İslam Tarih Metodolojisi: Bir Sosyal Tarih Uygulaması* [Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry] (translated into Turkish by Murteza Bedir and Fuad Aydın; İstanbul: Litera Yayınçılık, 2004), 233-257.
and provide religious warnings in the case of association. This idealized attitude arose out of a reaction to the illegal practices of governors throughout history, and not from the basic religious texts. Al-Ghazālī is both representative and the initiator of this attitude, which is idealized by the religious class; thus, he is not an isolated and dissenting figure. In this regard, he was influenced by the attitudes of those scholars and Sufis who lived centuries before him, and he dedicated special chapters to this subject in his Iḥyā’ī. The fact that this issue is addressed in detail in such an important work as Iḥyā’ī led this attitude to become even more idealized after al-Ghazālī.

**The Seljuq Age and al-Ghazālī**

The political structure of the 11th century had a major effect on shaping its socio-economic structure. Similarly, the political structure had a significant influence on al-Ghazālī’s thoughts on the relationship between the ‘ulamā’ and the sultans. Undoubtedly, not all of the thoughts of al-Ghazālī depend on the political-social structure that he witnessed. However, this structure strengthened the correctness and validity of the thoughts that had already been stated regarding the ‘ulamā’-sultan relationship.

Al-Ghazālī lived in an era that can be called “the Seljuq Age.” During this period, the ‘Abbāsid caliphate was in Baghdād and the Fāṭimid caliphate was in Egypt. However, the hegemony of ‘Abbāsids in the eastern Islamic world was symbolic because Baghdād, the center of the caliphate, was under the occupation of the Shi‘ite Buwayhids. Meanwhile, the Ghaznavids represent the largest state in the eastern Islamic world. However, the Seljuqs had emerged as a new power in history, and they were at war with the Ghaznavids. Turkish and foreign historians have called the first half of the 11th century, in which there was no central authority, a “period of anarchy.” After the defeat of Mas‘ūd in the battle of Dandanaqan (1040), the Seljuqs became the dominant power in the region. However, because of the old-age Turkish state tradition of portioning out the country among the heads of the dynasty (sultans) and the other autonomous princes (maliks), the anarchy partially continued.

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4 See ‘Alī ibn Nāṣir al-Ḥusaynī, Abbāru’l-Devleti’s-Selçûkiyye [Akbâr al-Dawla al-
lion and wars unfolded, particularly during the last years of the Sultan Tughrul Beg, in the first year of Alp Arslan’s reign (1063). The period containing the three decades between 1063 and 1092, the year in which Alp Arslan’s son Malik Shāh died, saw a relative stability, though rebellion and wars continued. In the meantime, the country fought wars with the neighboring countries. A struggle for the sultanate started among the sons of Malik Shāh upon his death in 1092 and continued until 1105. In the meantime wars erupted among other autonomous princes. About this period, Bundârî and Ibn al-Athîr both write that a serious anarchy occurred; rulers were weakened because of the wars and security of life and property ceased to exist. With the death of Barkyârûq in 1105, Muḥammad Tapar became the sultan and stability returned.

Al-Ghazâlî, who was a live witness to this period and very close to the state, was born in Ẓūs in the region of Khurāsân in Iran in 1058. He became a student of al-Juwaynî at the Niṣabûr Madrasa of Seljûq History in the Period of Sultan Muḥammad Tapar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayûnlar, 1990), 28.


8 For the wars against the Ghaznavids and the Qarakhânids under the reign of Malik Shâh, see Ibn al-Athîr, al-Kâmil, X, 77, 92, 347-348.

Nishāpūr in 1080. With the help of his previous knowledge, al-Ghazālī was a bright student and achieved a scientific status that enabled him to write his earlier works. After his teacher died in 1085, al-Ghazālī went to the military post of Niẓām al-mulk, which protected many scholars and litterateurs at that time. After spending six years there, he was appointed by the vizier as a professor at the Niẓāmiyya Madrasa of Baghdād in 1091. According to the sources, his years of professorship in Baghdād made this young scholar more famous than the caliph, the sultans, and the religious elite. In 1095, al-Ghazālī resigned from his professorship, and at that time, he isolated himself for ten years. It is intriguing that this period of isolation occurred at a time of political anarchy with the throne wars of the Seljuqs. Al-Ghazālī first went to Damascus and then to Jerusalem. He next travelled to al-Ḥijāz for a pilgrimage. Finally, he returned to his homeland, Ṭūs. Al-Ghazālī became a professor in Nishāpūr in 1106, this time with “the injunction of the sultan.” During this period, the Sultan Muḥammad Tapar was on the Seljuq throne. The sources state that it was Fakhr al-mulk ibn Niẓām al-mulk, the vizier of Sanjar, the ruler (malik) of the region of Khurāsān including the city of Nishāpūr, who invited al-Ghazālī. It is even stated that upon the proposal of the professorship, al-Ghazālī excused himself, preferring to devote himself to religious rituals. However, the vizier insisted, stating that the Muslim community must indeed benefit from such an authority as al-Ghazālī.

It is thought provoking that al-Ghazālī return to his official duties after a long period of isolation and, particularly, after the indictment of Iḥyāʿ. According to al-Ghazālī’s own words, there are various reasons for his return. The injunction of the professorship was strict. Therefore, it is possible to contend that al-Ghazālī chose a way to

17 Al-Ghazālī, *al-Munqidh*, 121.
preserve a good relationship with the government or that he worried about the punishments given to the scholars before him. However, according to al-Ghazālī’s own statement, he thought more practically and wanted to gain political support for the project of reform:

The time is the time of political anarchy, and the period is the period of falsehood. If you try to call people to the right path, today’s men become your enemy. How can you resist them and live with them? This is only possible in a proper time and under the rule of a religious, powerful sultan.\(^\text{18}\)

However, al-Ghazālī’s second professorship represented a troublesome period. After the killing of Fakhr al-mulk, who had invited al-Ghazālī, al-Ghazālī’s rivals successfully publicized propaganda against him, saying that al-Ghazālī insulted the al-Imām al-a’zām. Consequently, al-Ghazālī was summoned to the military post of Malik Sanjar. Al-Ghazālī excused himself, for he had sworn an oath during isolation that he would never go under the service of a sultan and never take salary from official duties.\(^\text{19}\) However, upon the strict order, he proceeded to the military post and appeared in the presence of the malik. Therein, Sanjar showed respect to al-Ghazālī and accepted his wish for isolation.\(^\text{20}\) Thus, after a three-year professorship, al-Ghazālī returned to his homeland, Țūs in 1109. As will be seen, al-Ghazālī strove to keep his personal oath while abstaining from engaging in open conflicts. On the other hand, he did not hesitate to write letters to statesmen to support many scholars’ cause for salary.\(^\text{21}\) In the last years of his life, he received another invitation for the professorship in the Niżāmiyya Madrasa of Baghdād, but he rejected it.\(^\text{22}\) Al-Ghazālī died in 1111.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 121.


\(^{20}\) Hüseyin Zerrinkub [‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Zarrīn Kübl], *Medreseden Kaçış: İmam Gazzâlî’nin Hayatı, Fikirleri ve Eserleri [Ferār ez Madrasa: Dar Bâra-yi Zindağı wa-Andîsha-yi Abû Ḥâmid Ghaẓâlî]* (translated into Turkish by Hikmet Soylu; İstanbul: Anka Yayınları, 2001), 234-236.


\(^{22}\) Ibid., 47-49.

Al-Ghazālī’s Writings on Political Power

Al-Ghazālī produced two works that are closely related to politics: Faḍā’iḥ al-Bāṭiniyya and Naṣīḥat al-mulūk. The former work is also known as al-Mustaṣżibīrī, and was written to prove the legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Mustaṣżhir billāh against the propaganda of the Ismāʿīlīs; this work represents a new understanding regarding the relationship between a weak caliph and a powerful sultan. Accordingly, the appointment of the caliph by the sultan does not harm the legitimacy of the caliphate. Naṣīḥat al-mulūk, which was written in Persian, was dedicated to the Seljuq sultan Muḥammad Tapar or, according to a weaker narration, to his brother and the current malik of Khurāsān, Sanjar. This work is a typical example of the siyāsat-nāma literature, which states the required manners of sultans in government issues.

In Iḥyāʿ ulūm al-dīn, which was penned by al-Ghazālī as a reform project, there are particular sections dedicated to the relationship between ʿulamāʾ and sultans. Occasionally in these sections, al-Ghazālī touches upon his thoughts on the philosophy of politics expressed in Faḍā’iḥ al-Bāṭiniyya. However, he essentially criticizes the attitudes and behaviors of scholars and sultans. As understood from his statements, Iḥyāʿ was written during the period of isolation (1095-1105) that had begun after his resignation from madrasa. The works of scholars such as ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Mubārak, Ḥārith al-


Muḥāsibī, Abū Ẓālib al-Makkī, and ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī regarding mystical issues are among the chief sources of Ḥiyā."^{27}

Al-Ghazālī does not aim to criticize the current political system or oppose the rulers. In fact, he criticizes the ‘ulamā’ class and thus sends an indirect message to the rulers. Although Ḥiyā’ appears to be a work written for the public masses, al-Ghazālī relates the publication of the work to the ‘ulamā’ class and targets them in many places in it. At this point, we can claim that the work includes a substantial criticism of the scholar as a social actor and of the sultans in terms of their relationship to scholars. In the introduction to the work, ‘ulamā’ were specifically targeted, for people need a guide to maintain their lives according to the true path. These guides are the scholars who are the successors of the prophets. However, according to al-Ghazālī, these scholars practically ceased to exist, while people under the guise of scholars remained. Most of these ‘scholars’ chased worldly interests."^{28} We encounter al-Ghazālī’s criticism, if indirect, about power in the Kitāb al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām, a section of Ḥiyā’. Here, al-Ghazālī frequently addresses issues such as the rulers’ lands, buildings, and public services, i.e., bridges and fountains, etc., as well as the salaries that the rulers provide, in terms of religious legitimacy (ḥalāl) and illegitimacy (ḥarām). The fifth (The Legitimate and Illegitimate Salaries and Gifts Given by Sultans) and the sixth (The Legitimate and Illegitimate Aspects of the Company with Unjust Sultans, the Religious Verdict about Attending Their Meetings and Showing Respect to Them) sub-sections are completely related to the rulers and the scholars who have close ties with them. The paper focuses on these two sub-sections.

**Criticism of Government in Terms of Illegal Practices**

Throughout the history of Islam, the sultanate regime has been a system that has been accepted without question. Criticisms within the borders of this regime are leveled at the governors, not at the system. The hopes are always that any negative practices will change with a

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^{28} Al-Ghazālī, Ḥiyā’ ‘ulûm al-dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa, 1982), I, 2.
change in the governor. The fact that political power, until modern times, has not wanted to share its government with others has made the system immune to criticism, and the search for a different system arose under the influence of the West. Despite this general situation, we can contend that a spiritual power has been shaped in the Islamic world and even that this power has occasionally struggled with political power. There are instances in which the struggle turns into a real conflict. We can say that it is not true that political and spiritual authorities always support and complete each other. (To the contrary, the spiritual authority has always felt obliged to correct the mistakes of the political authority.) The religious class has been annoyed by the illegal practices of the holders of power, both in their private lives and in the government of the country. The lack of any mechanism to control the practices of the government has increased this concern. Thus, we can contend that almost throughout all history, the religious class holding this concern has maintained a silent criticism of the government and has tried to keep the balance by building a spiritual authority.

Al-Ghazālī does not criticize the system directly, but he, without doubt, criticizes the holders of power. He sees this criticism as a duty of ‘ulamā’. We can address al-Ghazālī’s criticisms under two subheadings.

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29 Al-Ghazālī states that the real amīr is the one who rules with absolute authority over his lusts and passions. These people who are in the guise of rags are real sultans and amirs (Letters of al-Ghazzali, 23). In particular, the great ascetics have been called “the sultans of the spiritual world.” When ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Mubārak was asked “who are people,” he responded “scholars,” and when he was asked “who are sultans,” he responded “ascetics.” (Abū Nu‘aym Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Īsfahānī, Hilyat al-awliyā’ wa-ṭabaqāt al-asfiyā’ (2nd edn., Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1967), VIII, 167). Sufyān al-Thawrī is known as “the sheikh and the sultan of scholars” or “the amīr of Muslims” (Abū Ḥāmid Farīd al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ībrāhīm al-‘Aṭṭār al-Nisābūrī, Evliya Tezkireleri [Tadhkirat al-awliyā’] (translated into Turkish by Süleyman Uludağ; Istanbul: Kabalı Yayinevi, 2007), 219. There is no doubt that these statements are used in a spiritual/figurative manner. However, it is interesting that material titles are used. The term “sultan,” which has an important place in developing Sufi terminology, is used to either signify God or the Sufi masters. Sultān Walad, Amīr Sulṭān, Shāh Naqshband can be given as famous examples (Ethem Cebecioğlu, Tasavvuf Terimleri ve Deyimleri Sözlüğü [Dictionary of Sufi Terms and Idioms] (Ankara: Rehber Yayincilik, 1997), 651, 655).
Criticism of the Private Lives of the Holders of Power

The private lives of sultans and governors have always been a topic of interest for ‘ulamâ’ because the caliph must observe the religious rules according to the doctrine. However, the practice is not in parallel with the doctrine all of the time. In this regard, al-Ghazâlî states that most of the palaces or residences of rulers are confiscated,\(^{30}\) that they and their servants wear silk clothes, that their rooms have silk rugs and silver plates, and that they utter ugly, false, and curse words in their meetings.\(^ {31}\)

When we in fact examine the historical sources, we clearly see that the private lives of rulers have the potential to attract criticism from the religious perspective. From the Umayyad caliphates onwards, rulers demonstrate practices such as wearing silk clothes, using gold and silver, having singers and drinking alcohol in their private lives. Here, instead of continuous illegality as a general rule, we can talk about a state changing from one power to another. In other words, with an idealizing effort, we can neither claim that all of the caliphs and sultans are very pious people nor that they have illegal lifestyles. Although there are examples demonstrating both types, there are many examples of intermediate types, also. Hence, while some sultans practice very religious deeds, they also simultaneously engage in illegal practices.\(^{32}\) This contradiction that makes looking back difficult. Because it is customary for history books to praise a sultan after his death, we come across a portrait of very wise, just, and religious man. This tendency is normal because these works are dedicated to the dynasty. However, in the same work, it is possible to find negative characteristics and illegal practices from the same sultan.\(^{33}\)

Drinking alcohol as an illegal behavior dates back to the Umayyad

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\(^{30}\) Al-Ghazâlî, Ihyâ‘, II, 143. History books give us some examples. Tughrul Beg, when he seized Nishâpûr, settled the palace of the government (dâr al-imâra) and sat on the throne of the Sultan Masûd; see Ibn al-Athîr, al-Kâmîl, IX, 459.

\(^{31}\) Al-Ghazâlî, Ihyâ‘, II, 144.

\(^{32}\) For the example of the ʿAbbâsid caliph Muktaﬁ billâh (d. 295/908), see Saim Yîlmaz, Muʿtazîd ve Mükteﬁ Döneminde Abbâsîler [ʿAbbâsids in the Period of al-Muʿtadid and al-Muktaﬁ] (İstanbul: Kayıhan Yayınları, 2006), 369.

\(^{33}\) As an example, for the information on Tughrul Beg and some evaluations, see Al-Bundârî, ibid., 4-5, 25, 29; Ibn al-Athîr, al-Kâmîl, IX, 458, 463, 483. For a remark on Muḥammad Tapar, see al-Bundârî, Zübdetü‘n-Nusaha, 113-115. For a remark on Maḥmûd of Ghazna, see Ibn al-Athîr, ibid., IX, 401.
caliphs.\textsuperscript{34} If we take into account some information in classical sources and modern evaluations, we can say that this claim has truth in it.\textsuperscript{35} The sources state that some ‘Abbāsid caliphs\textsuperscript{36} and some sultans such as Maḥmūd of Ghazna\textsuperscript{37} and his son Māsiʿūd\textsuperscript{38} drank alcohol. It is known that Alp Arslān,\textsuperscript{39} who was a very beneficent man,\textsuperscript{40} Barkyārūq,\textsuperscript{41} and Sanjar\textsuperscript{42} were alcoholics. Niẓām al-mulk’s recommendation in \textit{Siyāsat-nāma} that sultans should be careful about their orders when they are drunk\textsuperscript{43} is most likely an allusion to this fact. In addition, in the same work, it is interesting to see many details about how drinking meetings should be conducted, which demonstrate that this custom, drinking alcohol, existed.\textsuperscript{44} Although he is known as a very religious man,\textsuperscript{45} Niẓām al-mulk quit drinking during the last stage of his life.\textsuperscript{46} Undoubtedly, al-Ghazzālī’s ideas on drinking are not like those of Niẓām al-mulk. As vizier, Niẓām al-mulk managed alco-
hol as a state protocol and does not include anything negative about it in his work. Both in his *siyāsat-nāma* and in his letters, al-Ghazālī specifically mentions that rulers must keep away from drinking alcohol.\(^{47}\)

**Criticism of the Financial Practices of the Holders of Power**

Al-Ghazālī attached special importance to the financial practices of rulers. The first reason for this importance is that he wanted to offer a juridical verdict about salaries and gifts received from rulers. The second reason was to provide a religious warning (*al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf*) against injustice.

According to al-Ghazālī’s statements, the sultans racketeer the Muslim people, seize their belongings or take bribes. All incomes depending on these illegal activities are *ḥarām*.\(^{48}\) In addition, the sultans either coercively force workers to cultivate their own lands or pay them their wages from *ḥarām* goods.\(^{49}\) Moreover, the sultans confiscated people’s lands or goods in the name of philanthropy.\(^{50}\) Al-Ghazālī states that the contemporary rulers are addicted to worldly desires and riches.\(^{51}\) Consequently, he says that the fortunes of some partially come from *ḥarām*, while others totally depend on it.\(^{52}\)

One of the important sources of income for the sultan and his army in the Seljuq age was looting. Normally, the lands of non-Muslims should have been looted. However, contrary to Islamic law, the Muslim lands were also being looted because of the irregularity of soldiers\(^{53}\) or sometimes upon the will of the sultans.\(^{54}\) There were cases in which money was taken as a substitute for loot.\(^{55}\) It is possible to see many examples of confiscation, which al-Ghazālī saw as one of the sultans’ ways of earning money.\(^{56}\) Islam accepts the right of own-

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\(^{50}\) *Ibid.*, II, 152.


\(^{52}\) *id.*, *Iḥyāʾ*, II, 136.


ership as a fundamental right. In early times, confiscation began to be used as a punishment for state officials who illegally acquired state goods. Over time, confiscation became an important source of income for the treasury, a practice that continued until modern times in the form of the confiscation of the goods of the rich or even the public. Such practices reached a peak during the fight for the throne between Barkyarq and Muhammad Tapar in 1099-1104. There was much bloodshed at that time. The sultans and maliks levied new taxes because they could not regularly collect the land tax. Moreover, the sultans and maliks seized the lands of the public and distributed them to their commanders.

Another financial practice of the sultans that was criticized is the distribution of treasury goods without any standards or measures. The example given by al-Ghazâli shows that these practices had already existed for a long time ago. These practices inevitably resulted in several serious consequences. Al-Ghazâli addresses the juridical aspect of this subject first, and then analyzes the attitudes of 'ulamâ'.

Consequences of the Rulers’ Ways of Incomes

Al-Ghazâli, with a very idealist manner, ponders over the consequences of the sultan’s illegal income. It appears that al-Ghazâli had a
very strict attitude. For instance, he says that practices such as shopping in markets, crossing bridges, and drinking water from fountains, if they are constructed by illegal income, are not allowed. In regard to the rituals, al-Ghazâli appears to be stricter: one should not perform prayer in a seized land or in a mosque that is built with seized materials, even if it is Jum’a prayer. I believe that this statement of al-Ghazâli is influenced by his predecessors, such as Abû Ishâq al-Shirâzî (d. 476/1083). When the Niżâmiyya Madrasa of Baghdad was constructed, it was determined that the first professor would be Abû Ishâq al-Shirâzî. However, he did not show up for the lesson. Supposedly, a child asked him how he could come to a building that was constructed in a seized land, leading him to choose not to attend. Later, Abû Ishâq had no choice other than to teach, but he never performed his prayers in the mosque of the madrasa concerned. We can see similar behaviors in the ‘ulamâ’ al-salaf (the first generation of Muslim scholars) such as Sufyân al-Thawrî, ‘Abd Allâh ibn al-Mubârak, Bishr al-’Hâfî, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.

According to al-Ghazâli, one should not engage in a commercial relationship with the sultan because most of his goods are ħarâm, and one should not be his representative in shopping. It is also strictly forbidden to buy a young slave (ghulâm), silk fabric, or horse, which are certain to be used in sinful or unjust ways. Similarly, it is forbidden to buy and sell items to or from governors, state officials and servants who are at the sultan’s service because their salaries are derived from ħarâm sources.

Al-Ghazâli particularly addresses the issue of receiving salary or gifts from the sultan. Whether ‘ulamâ’ have an official duty or not, one of the important sources of livelihood for the ‘ulamâ’ class was these salaries and gifts. Al-Ghazâli states that the predecessors’ (salaf) attitude had changed from abstaining from accepting any duty or

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61 Al-Ghazâli, Ḥiyâ’, II, 150.
62 Ibid., II, 152.
64 Abû Nu’aym, Ḥiyyat al-awliyâ’, VII, 40; Farîd al-Dîn ‘Attâr, Evliya Tezkireleri, 221.
65 Farîd al-Dîn ‘Attâr, ibid., 211.
66 Ibid., 148.
67 Ibid., 250.
68 Al-Ghazâli, Ḥiyâ’, II, 149-150.
salary to accepting these incomes on behalf of the poor. However, this case could only be valid for the time of the righteous caliphs, during which the treasury was maintained by means of 

\( \text{halāl} \) methods. The proper attitude for the time of al-Ghazālī was to refuse any salaries or gifts.\(^69\)

The books that tell the life stories of the predecessor ‘ulamā‘ and the ascetics explain that abstaining from accepting any salary or gift from a sultan is a moral virtue. These explanations provide a basis for al-Ghazālī’s thoughts. For instance, when Dāwūd ibn Nuṣayr al-Ṭā’ī (d. 165/781) died, the funeral speech stated, “he did not accept gifts from sultans and amīrs.”\(^70\) According to the narrations, this man refuted Hārūn al-Rashīd when he visited him. Then, upon the request of his mother, he accepted the caliph and preached to him. However, he rejected the ring worn by the caliph as a gift.\(^71\) In this regard, the sources also narrate the words and manners of scholars such as Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq,\(^72\) Sufyān al-Thawrī,\(^73\) Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal,\(^74\) al-Fuṣayl ibn ʿIyāḍ,\(^75\) Abū ʿAmr ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Awzāʾī,\(^76\) Yūsuf ibn al-Asbāṭ,\(^77\) and Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Muẓaffar al-Shāmī, who did not accept any salary, though he was officially the head of the judicial system (qāḍī l-quḍāt).\(^78\)

Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī was aware of the problems caused by the verdict that salary and gifts cannot be accepted. There was the issue of the livelihood of the ‘ulamā‘ class on the one hand, and the necessity of obtaining a salary both to maintain the religious sciences and to solve the juridical and educational problems of the public. In this paradoxical situation, al-Ghazālī holds an approach that can be called “pragmatic.” For example, if someone works for the sake of the public, he or she has the right to obtain his or her salary from the treasury (bayt al-māl). These people include those who are busy with scientific activities, teachers, and muḥadhdhīns, etc. If these

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\(^70\) Abū Nu‘aym, *Ḥiṣyat al-awliyā‘*, VII, 337.  
\(^72\) *Ibid.*, 52.  
\(^73\) Abū Nu‘aym, *Ḥiṣyat al-awliyā‘*, VI, 378.  
\(^76\) Abū Nu‘aym, *Ḥiṣyat al-awliyā‘*, VI, 140.  
people do not obtain their salaries from the treasury, scientific activities and developments will cease. Thus, the ‘ulamā’ must receive their salaries. In addition, the sultans must present specials gifts to the ‘ulamā’. In this case, other people aspire for knowledge and thus science progresses. Al-Ghazâlî does not see the government of the world by a king as something contrary to religion. Religious matters and government are like twins: one cannot live without the other. Religion is protected through the means of scholars and politics is protected by soldiers. The people who attend to these jobs have the right to obtain their salaries from the treasury. Undoubtedly, if the sultan is unjust, he must be dismissed. However, because it is very difficult to dismiss the sultan, the required action is to obey him as long as he is in power. In this sense, a scholar who undertakes an official job can accept a salary and gifts. However, if he or she helps the ruler in political practices, frequently attends his gatherings, or facetiously praises him, he or she will have committed a sin.

The Quality of the Relationship between Scholars and Power

Al-Ghazâlî finally comes to the issue of the position of a scholar towards the governor. The conclusion from the above statements is that scholars must keep away from rulers and restrict their relationships to the level of “commanding right (al-amr bi-l-ma‘rûf)."

Criticism Concerning the Typology of the Scholar

Al-Ghazâlî is aware of that there are many names among the Companions (al-ṣaḥāba) and the Successors (al-tâbi‘ûn) who receive salary and gifts from “unjust imâms/sultans.” However, these scholars did not compromise with the sultans on religious issues. If necessary, these scholars strictly opposed the sultans. In the subsequent period, we must discuss a deep change in the ‘ulamâ’-sultan relationship: in the time of the salaf, the rulers were very happy and honored if important religious scholars accepted their gifts. These predecessors did not refrain from criticizing the rulers for their wrong actions, even if they accepted the ruler’s gifts. These scholars did not help the rulers in unjust deeds and did not attend their gatherings. The predecessors of al-Ghazâlî gave the gifts presented to them to the

79 Al-Ghazâlî, Iḥyâ’ī, II, 140.
80 Ibid., II, 141.
81 Ibid., II, 136-137.
poor. According to al-Ghazālī, the sultans of his day gave gifts to people whom they can use, who legalize their practices, praise them in gatherings, and purify them.\textsuperscript{82} Without a doubt, this change did not instantly begin in the time of al-Ghazālī; rather, it goes back to the first centuries of Islam. For example, al-Ḥasān al-elsing (d. 110/728) criticized the reciters when he saw them waiting by the gates of the sultans’ palaces. He told them that they were losing their prestige and that they should stay at home to regain it.\textsuperscript{83} We can see the same attitude in scholars such as Muḥammad ibn Wāṣi',\textsuperscript{84} Abū Ḥāẓim Salama ibn Dīnār,\textsuperscript{85} and the Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq.\textsuperscript{86}

The change in the character of the ‘ulamā’ class necessitates a typology: (1) “scholars of the hereafter” who do not compromise their religion, even if they interact with sultans; and (2) “scholars of the world” who, with their fatwās, legalize the unjust practices of sultans and accompany them.\textsuperscript{87} Before al-Ghazālī,\textsuperscript{88} we can see this typology in al-Fuḍayl ibn ʿIyāḍ (d. 803).\textsuperscript{89} This typology is also found in one of the sources of Ḥīyā and Qūṭ al-qulūb.\textsuperscript{90} The term the scholar of the world, which is coined as a critical term, is very old. Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) stated that society becomes right if sultans and reciters are right. He maintained that the worst ailment for a society is corrupt scholars.\textsuperscript{91} Criticisms towards the ‘ulamā’ class can also be found in the sayings of scholars such as Mālik ibn Dīnār,\textsuperscript{92} al-Fuḍayl ibn ʿIyāḍ,\textsuperscript{93} Yūsuf ibn al-Asbāṭ,\textsuperscript{94} and Abū Naṣr Yahyā ibn Abī Kathīr.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., II, 139.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibn al-Jawzī, Ṣifāt al-ṣaḥīfa, III, 236. For al-Ḥasān al-elsing’s advice to Saʿīd ibn Jubayr regarding this issue, see Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, Evliya Tezkireleri, 70.
\textsuperscript{84} Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥīyāt al-awliyā’, II, 351.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., III, 243-244.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., III, 194.
\textsuperscript{87} Al-Ghazālī, Ḥīyā, II, 146-148.
\textsuperscript{88} For a statement that the criticism of scholars was already present before al-Ghazālī, see W. Montgomery Watt, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazālī (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), 109-111.
\textsuperscript{89} Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥīyāt al-awliyā’, VIII, 92.
\textsuperscript{91} Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥīyāt al-awliyā’, VII, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{92} Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, Evliya Tezkireleri, 84.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibn al-Jawzī, Ṣifāt al-ṣaḥīfa, II, 241; Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, Evliya Tezkireleri, 124.
The Relationship between Power and the Duty of Commanding Right

According to al-Ghazâli, in an environment where considerable changes are observed in comparison with predecessors, both in terms of character and relationships, the worst event is for a scholar to be in the presence of a sultan. It is appropriate for the sultan to visit the scholar, while it is best to lack any relationship.\(^9^6\) Initially al-Ghazâli narrates many hadiths and the sayings of his predecessors, in which being in the presence of the sultan is criticized.\(^9^7\) In fact, to support al-Ghazâli’s ideas, there are many sayings narrated from his predecessor ‘ulama’ that recommend cutting ties with rulers. Wahb ibn Munabbih said to ‘Atâ’ al-Khurâsânî “Keep away from the doors of the sultans! There is fitna in those places. If you received a worldly good from them, you compromise your religion in proportion.”\(^9^8\) Muḥammad ibn Wâṣî,\(^9^9\) Sufyân al-Thawrî,\(^1^0^0\) Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal,\(^1^0^1\) Ḥātim al-Aṣamm,\(^1^0^2\) and Maymûn ibn Mîhrân\(^1^0^3\) speak similar words. Al-Ghazâli states that he himself had experienced this negative case:

After I left the presence of the sultan, I spiritually examined myself. Although I talked to them harsh and rejected their bad wishes, I saw humiliation in my soul.\(^1^0^4\)

In the past, some scholars did not approve of meeting with rulers, even if the excuse was to tell the truth. For instance, Sufyân al-Thawrî did not accept the seal to govern the Muslim community according to the Qur’ân and the Sunna when al-Mahdî, the new caliph, gave it to him. For Sufyân al-Thawrî, anyone who is in a relationship with the sultan inevitably tends to him. In Sufyân al-Thawrî’s words, one who goes swimming cannot keep from getting wet. Sufyân al-Thawrî does not worry that the sultans persecute him because he says the truth, but he worries that his heart leans on them and does not see their

\(^9^4\) Abû Nu‘aym, Ḩilyat al-awliyâ, VIII, 239.
\(^9^6\) Al-Ghazâli, Ịhyâ ‘, II, 142.
\(^9^7\) *Ibid.*, II, 142-143.
\(^9^8\) Abû Nu‘aym, Ḩilyat al-awliyâ, IV, 29-30.
\(^1^0^0\) *Ibid.*, VII, 28.
\(^1^0^1\) Ibn al-Jawzî, Ṣifât al-ṣafiwa, II, 356.
\(^1^0^2\) Abû Nu‘aym, Ḩilyat al-awliyâ, VIII, 74.
\(^1^0^3\) *Ibid.*, IV, 85.
\(^1^0^4\) Al-Ghazâli, Ịhyâ ‘, II, 142.
wicked deeds. Al-Ghazālī thinks similarly, if in a different context: al-Ghazālī holds that a scholar should not take money from the sultan, even with the intention of giving it to the poor. Otherwise, those who are not aware of the truth may receive the impression that the sultan’s property is ḥalāl and that they may accept it. In the meantime, al-Ghazālī holds that being in the presence of the sultan and close to him functions to legalize his actions in the eyes of the public.

It is inevitable that scholars and the ruler occasionally meet each other. In that case, the ideal option is for the sultan to visit the scholar. Sufyān al-Thawrī says, “the best sultan is the one who sits with scholars and learns from them; while the worst scholar is the one who visits the sultans”. It is interesting that Niẓām al-mulk repeats this saying in his naṣīḥat-nāma. The sources state that scholars such as Muḥammad ibn Aslam, Aḥmad ibn Ḥarb, and Abū Ḥasan Kharaqānī rejected the invitations of rulers. However, these types of actions should be avoided if refraining from being in the presence of a sultan or rising in front of him disturb the social order. Al-Ghazālī considers the sultan to be necessary for the social order. He recommends that the scholar keep away from actions that may harm this order.

In conclusion, al-Ghazālī holds that it is undoubtedly allowed to greet the sultan, to rise in his presence and to treat him well when the sultan visits. If the visit takes place when no one is present, it is preferable not to rise. In this way, the scholar shows the glory of religion and the unworthiness of cruelty. This attitude is important; for al-Ghazālī holds that the sinfulness of the sultan is a result of the sinfulness of the scholar. For him, the scholars at that time had lost a status that had inspired caution in the sultans. If the scholars possessed their

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105 Abū Nu‘aym, Ḥilyat al-awliyāʾ, VII, 40-42.
106 al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ, II, 148-149.
107 Ibid., II, 145, 150.
108 Farīḍ al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, Eviinya Tezkireleri, 223.
109 Niẓām al-mulk, Siyāset-Nāme, 76. Furthermore, for Niẓām al-mulk’s appreciation of these scholars, see Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, X, 209.
110 Farīḍ al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār, Eviinya Tezkireleri, 275-276.
111 Ibid., 592, 598-599.
112 Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ, II, 145.
113 Ibid., II, 145.
former honor, the sultans would not have committed such cruelties.\textsuperscript{114}

Al-Ghazālī dedicated a special chapter to the issue of scholars’ religious warnings to sultans. Accordingly, the scholars must warn the sultans by informing them of the sinfulness of their actions, advising them, speaking to them strictly, or stopping them by force if they observe any evil deeds. Only the first two of these methods can be applied to the sultans. Using force against the sultan is not allowed because it triggers chaos. If strict warnings such as “you cruel man who has no fear of God!” do not cause chaos and do not increase the cruelty of the sultan, they are allowed and even recommended. However, if one is not sure of the possible effects, he must not speak these words. At this point, a scholar does not worry about his own life. The predecessors warned the holders of power, accepting even death, if necessary. Al-Ghazālī mentions that the ḥadîths state that the most valuable jihād is to tell the truth in the presence of a cruel sultan.\textsuperscript{115} The examples given in Ḥiyā\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{1}}} regarding the issue of commanding right (\textit{al-amr bi-l-ma\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{2}}}фт) to the sultans are interesting. Among these examples is Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī, who breaks the wine jar belonging to the caliph Mu’taḍīd. The caliph, who is known for his cruel character,\textsuperscript{116} eventually forgives him.\textsuperscript{117}

Al-Ghazālī, however, returns to the issue of the corruption of the ‘ulamā\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{3}} in giving their religious warnings to the rulers. According to al-Ghazālī, greed in his time is the biggest obstacle to scholars telling the truth. Even if the scholars would be willing to tell the truth, their attitudes and actions contradicted them. Al-Ghazālī relates the corruption of the public to the corruption of the rulers, and the corruption of the rulers to the corruption of the scholars. Consequently, the corruption of social ethics is related to the ‘ulamā\textsuperscript{2}, whose hearts are full of lust for world.\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The relationship of the religious class, who has held a respectable status throughout Islamic history, to government differs from one period to the next. From the scholars who preceded al-Ghazālī on-

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., II, 150.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., II, 343.
\textsuperscript{116} Yılmaz, \textit{Mu’tazid ve Müktefi Döneminde Abbāsîler}, 268-269.
\textsuperscript{117} Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Ḥiyā\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{1}}}, II, 356. Al-Ghazālī provides similar examples in his \textit{naşihat-nâma}; see \textit{al-Tibr al-masbûk}, 19-21.
\textsuperscript{118} Al-Ghazālī, \textit{Ḥiyā\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{1}}}, II, 357; id., \textit{al-Munqidh}, 129.
wards, the praiseworthy attitude of a scholar towards a sultan or a governor is to refrain from any relationships, even with the excuses of official duty, or a visit, etc. If any relationship is established, it is necessary that religion not be compromised. Al-Ghazālī’s predecessors’ practices and words on this subject are collected in long sections in his Ḥiyāṭ. These narrations are transmitted to the next generations as an idealized stance. Al-Ghazālī says that he primarily criticizes the type of scholar, following the example of his predecessors. However, this criticism clearly includes rulers, as well. The relationship between the two classes is important because, as al-Ghazālī believes, the corruption of the ‘ulamā’ is the result of their relationship with government.

The government can easily tend toward illegal actions and no control mechanism has developed, which over time has led to the emergence of “the spiritual sultan” concept, especially among organized Sufi groups. It is possible to see the difference between the material/political and spiritual authority that can be observed in Sunnī Islam as an indication of the disturbance of the religious class because of the actions of the government and the lack of any solution to these actions. The sultanate of the spiritual world stipulates that the social structure, not the political structure, is to be reformed. The sultan is included in the reform project because he is a part of society. I believe that new studies on the development and manifestations of the idea of the spiritual authority, as observed in al-Ghazālī, will provide us with more insights regarding the attitude of the religious class towards government.

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MODERNIZATION AND THE REPRODUCTION
OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN KONYA

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Abstract

In this paper, modernity and the practices of everyday life are evaluated, selecting Konya as a case study. Everyday life reflects the norm of values, approaches, and actions that are brought into being in society in various ways. Konya constitutes a unique example for those who want to observe the continuity of Turkish modernism, because it is a city where modernity and desires for a traditional life meet in a paradoxical manner; it is a unique city in that it enables hybrid encounters of the modern and traditional to occur in everyday life practices. This study is an effort to understand how the attributes of the modern and the traditional shape everyday life, as well as to provide a discussion of its current problems.

Key Words: Everyday life, modernity, religiosity, tradition, traditionalism, Turkish culture, Konya, urban culture, cultural heritage

Yahya Kemal (1884-1958), one of the leading figures of contemporary Turkish literature, could not help asking a paradoxical question while critically examining the social structures transformed in haste by modernity: “Is it possible to wake up for the early morning prayer (şalāt al-fajr) after a night of infidel life?”1 Yahya Kemal personally

1 See Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, Aziz İstanbul [Glorious Istanbul] (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1964).
witnessed the interventions made in the early Republican Era by modernist practices towards the integrity of traditional life, and the excitement that was aimed at completely upsetting traditional ways of thinking, and he thus expressed his observations and his growing worries.

Yahya Kemal argues that șalât, or the prayers made by Muslims five times a day, is at the top of the list of principles that must be preserved and continued. In fact, when common religious references among Muslims are used as a starting point, it is undeniable that șalât is regarded as the central pillar of the faith. For example, within the predominant Islamic tradition, the Islamic faith of a group who does not practice șalât is often questioned. Yahya Kemal’s aforementioned question is not referring to simply any prayer, but the early morning prayer. What makes the question more relevant is the fact that the early morning prayer is especially difficult to practice. This difficulty increases with the increasingly modern way of life.

It is possible for Yahya Kemal’s question to be discussed on several levels. What Yahya Kemal meant by “foreign” (Frenk) life was that the world was now being conceptualized as if it were the West. Traditional ways of life now had to adapt in an increasingly radical manner to the values of the Western (Frenk) world. The dynamism inherent in the westernization process was rendering what is traditional as disputable, eroding and obliterating the value and status of all that belonged to the past. For a typically “modern” man, this approach made compromising the most fundamental components of the traditional the only goal. Thus, the boundaries between the Western way of thinking and the long-established world of the traditional were

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2 The early morning prayer, șalât al-fajr, is considered to be an important dividing line to distinguish the true believer (muʿmin) from the impostor (munāfiq) and thus gains a special status owing to its difficulty. Șalât al-fajr in question is performed in the early hours of the day before the sun rises. The flow of daily routines in the traditional way of living was designed taking into consideration the time of the five daily prayers. To perform the daily prayers comfortably, the activities of daily life had to be planned according to them. Therefore, one who wishes to perform the early morning prayer is expected to go to bed early. However, the only way for a Muslim to perform daily prayers in a modern and secular way of life is to search for suitable breaks for each one.

now being codified as a constant source of tension for the Republican generations. Everyday life had to change.

The question Yahya Kemal asked in fact reflects the paradoxes created by the oscillations and dilemmas between modern and traditional views of life. This question points to an impasse experienced not only by Turks but also by all the “other” societies involved in the modernization process: how could it be possible to wake up for the early morning prayer, or *salat al-fajr*, which is one of the most sensitive presentations of the religious obligations, in a universe where daily life is built on the foundation of *laic* practices and secular demands? What is left of the differentiation of time and space in everyday life? When these differentiations are pondered, the basic question that crystallizes appears to be an impasse that summarizes the *de facto* realities of Muslim communities that have existed for approximately 200 years. The problem revolves around the question, “Could we be both Western and Muslim?”

Modernization brought critical challenges that arose at certain points in Turkey as a result of the reproduction of everyday life, as also occurred in many other traditional communities. The desire for secularization, which is inherent in the founding discourse of modernism, reveals the flexibility of the boundaries of Islamic mod-

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5 Usually, under the title of modernization, three often confused developments are mentioned. The first is a process of confusion and transformation that encompasses the whole society, which is self-originating and self-growing process that arises as a result of fostering independent actions of actors belonging to different social groups. The second is a purposeful re-building process aimed at connecting this process of growth, expansion, and transformation with new behavioral and institutional norms. These two dimensions, which involve economic and social dynamics and the political and legal framework that try to guide them, are together called modernization. The third are efforts to express the gaps and weaknesses under this social structure, which in the narrowest sense of the word come to mean modernism. See İhsan Bilgin, “Modernleşmeğin Şehirdeki İzleri [Marks of Modernisation in the City],” www.arkitera.com/v1/diyalog/ihsanbilgin/modernizm1.htm (2002).
ernization. The style of modernization in everyday life, particularly in cities with traditional leanings such as Konya and Kayseri (both of which do not resist so strongly, but incorporate their own preferences), reflects this flexibility. In this context, certain lifestyles that do not fear resorting to modernity or tradition can be considered serious exceptions to the usual debates and generalizing assumptions of sociologists.⁶

**On Everyday Life**

Daily life reflects the ordinary world of values, attitudes and activities that take shape in various forms in social life. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to consider studies of daily life among the most effective means that can be used to trace changes in social structure; thus, daily life patterns, living designs, mental structures, perceptions of the world, conceptions of life and the confusions and differentiations from the ordinary can be observed clearly.⁷

The significance of daily life arises from the fact that it is the simplest demonstration of reality. Although this topic is regarded as a fairly new area of study in the social sciences, it indicates the original course of social reality. In the same vein, sociological studies focus on

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⁶ A study conducted by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) in 2005 defined the dynamic entrepreneurial spirit and the efforts to join in with the modern in Kayseri, an Anatolian city known for its conservatism, as a Calvinist development of its own kind. In that study, the activity in Kayseri was reflected as a perfect identification of Islam with modernity. According to the study, economic success and social development took the form of a harmony between Islam and modernity. Discussions of Protestantism generated by sociological analyses made to understand the relationship between religion and capitalism since Weber was brought to the agenda as a model that had explanatory power on this issue. It was obvious that when themes of change, progress, and differentiation in the Islamic world came to the agenda, the controversy would get deeper and go in different directions. The worldview of Islam requires new concepts because the means at hand are usually insufficient and useless. Thanks to undeniable examples of the fact that Islamic tradition did not fear from getting in touch with new realities, the new forms generated by these contacts increase and rapidly assume an Islamic character. Even so, this reciprocity may always be a source of surprise for Western researches.

⁷ In this context, the contributions of Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckman, and Henri Lefebvre must be particularly remembered; see Necdet Subaşı, *Gündelik Hayat ve Dinsellik [Daily Life and Religiosity]* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2004).
how people operate in their daily lives. In this framework, ethnography has a particular explanatory power with high sociological value in daily life studies. Accordingly, daily life reflects an experience in which everyone becomes involved in some way. As noted by Henri Lefebvre, daily life in all its ordinariness is composed of repetitions: attitudes at work and outside work, mechanical movements (…), hours, days, weeks, months, years; linear and cyclical repetitions, natural time and rational time, etc. (…) Daily life is a low degree of ‘experience’ and thinking, a degree in which experience and thinking have not separated from one another yet; all that is perceived is a part of a larger universe, and the world is a total of all things.

Thus, daily life is a shared and dynamic world of experience from which objects and abstract concepts are generated.

Daily life is not independent of any discourse that determines itself, no matter which context it is in. Daily life, which is usually bound by ordinariness, is a specific form(ality) that requires a substantial hermeneutic effort, and what comes to surface are the hidden, deep, and strong undercurrents of the social. The system that regulates the flow of daily life is fed by a root paradigm involving the components of sociality and a reference system. This connection moves daily life to a status of a specific road map that renders it a constant determinant at a cognitive level. Thus, each form, action, or type of information that has an equivalent in life that is experienced and exposes itself, reflects the inner world of the social. By pursuing the traces of changes existing in daily life, it becomes possible to demystify and understand the social and economic assets of a world of differentiations and orientations that occur in a specific spatial and social context, or a world that has become ordinary through repetitions and habits. In this framework, daily life demonstrates how values, meanings, and actions that proliferate in a series ranging from the harmony in the relationships between the world and the religion, to the overlapping of the relationships between the state and society, can lead to unity in practice. There, some fanciful ideas, and odd and ambiguous preferences, or anything that has not turned into a daily form or style, carries an alienation that leaves itself outside. In this

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8 See Henri Lefebvre, Modern Dünyada Gündelik Hayat [La Vie Quotidienne Dans le Monde Moderne] (translated into Turkish by Işın Gürbüz; Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1998).
case, the essential goal is to discover the fundamental fragments of
daily life that are interesting but always involved in social life by per-
meating through its effective filters. Furthermore, experimentalism
and genuineness that are inherent in the nature of daily life always
exist together with a grandiosity, style, and system. In short, when
separated from daily life practices, the society’s world of meaning,
mental structures, living patterns, and objects of orientation are re-
vealed. This study focuses on the reproduction of everyday life as a
means of understanding the specific characteristics specifics that
Konya has displayed through its process of modernization.

**Konya: “Encoded” and “Protected” Memory**

Konya can be regarded as an exceptional example in observing
how modernization is faring in Turkey, because it is a model city
where modernity and desires for tradition converge paradoxically like
nowhere else. This existing reconciliation enables the emergence of
new styles in daily life. With respect to the course of Turkish modern-
ization, Konya is worthy of attention due to the interestingly simulta-
neous and unbiased references it makes to both tradition and moder-
nity. Konya’s historical memory as a city and its usual calmness in the
face of all types of novelties distinguishes its form of modernization
from others. First, being one of the few cities that have transcended
the borders of Turkey, Konya sets an unequalled example in pursu-
ing this course: on the one hand, Konya can be defined based on its
classic and traditional urban identity; on the other hand, Konya
demonstrates a desire on the part of the periphery to come to the
center and activates a new potential for concentration. When the his-
tory of Konya is considered in terms of diversification of daily life, it is
always possible to observe in it new strategies for existence. Accom-
pnied by centrifugal tensions, Konya crystallizes the psychological
state of the “provincial” in the process of Westernization and its story
in this context.

In Konya, which is among the leading classic Anatolian cities, the
past is updated anew without being limited only to the remembrance
and conservation of the traditional. At the same time, efforts to create
a new common ground for meeting with the modern are often ob-
served in the historical process. Konya is one of the traditional Anato-
lion cities where all stages of its evolution from the traditional to the
modern are experienced deeply and where the constantly controver-
sial, tense and unsettling effects of change can never be ignored.
However, the ultimate characteristic that separates Konya from simi-
lar cities is that there still exists a piece of world knowledge or a guidebook of everyday life in it, which keeps a balanced distance between the traditional and the modern and even encourages this correlation between the two. Observing how everyday life goes on in the case of Konya appears to prove that demands for change can also be realized without leading to social confusion and “a fit of uneasiness” as is observed in the rest of Turkish modernity. Thus, it can be possible to understand that a typical Anatolian city can have a lifestyle that is open to both the traditional and the modern world without having to lead to a dilemma.

Even when a quick tour is taken through history, it is likely to confront the reality that Konya bears the characteristics of an ancient city. A common point that emerges from all archaeological findings since Neolithic times is that Konya has enjoyed a central status since the very beginning. This status can be explained with reference to its possession of a historically favorable location throughout the ages. Therefore, Konya’s geography, which has continuously been overturned in power since the Hittite times, bears qualities that are worth investigating for their own sake.

Konya has enjoyed a strategic location since the time of the Romans, Byzantines, Muslim Arabs, and the Seljuqs. Additionally, the

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9 Gregory Jusdanis, in a study in which he dealt with the fate of a modernization project in a society unprepared for it, he uses the concept of “belated modernity” and makes remarks about a “fit of uneasiness” experienced by communities in which there is a discordance between projects of modernization and local conditions. In his assessment of tensions between the center and the periphery, and the dominant and the minority, Jusdanis states that this “fit of uneasiness” actually stems from the differences between the West and the local conditions of the countries in the periphery. See Gregory Jusdanis, *Geçikmiş Modernilik ve Estetik Kültür [Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture]* (translated into Turkish by Tunçay Birkan; Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1998).

10 In this framework, Çatalhöyük, one of the oldest human settlements in Anatolia and actually in the whole world is situated quite close to today’s Konya (For Çatalhöyük, please see Hasan Bahar, Güngör Karauğuz, and Özdemir Koçak, *Eskiçağ Konya Araştırmaları I: Phrygia Paroreus Bölgesi Anıtlar, Yerleşmeler ve Küçük Buluntular [Studies on Konya in Ancient Times I: The Region of Phrygia Paroreus Monuments, Settlements, and Small Findings]* (Istanbul: n.p., 1996); Hasan Bahar and Özdemir Koçak, *Eskiçağ Konya Araştırmaları II: Neolitik Çağdan Roma Dönemi Sonuna Kadar [Studies on Konya in Ancient Times II: From the Neolithic Age to the End of the Roman Period]* (Konya: Kömen Yayınları, 2004).
Romans and Crusaders competed in their campaigns from the West to the East with the Mongols, in their incursions from the East to the West, inflicting similar destructions in the course of history. During the time of the Seljuqs, however, Konya began to be defined as a Turkish city, but they managed to keep Konya, together with its other peripheral cultural qualities that it had acquired through history, in a condition worthy of attention. For example, Konya always enjoyed a critical location for the Romans. Likewise, this characteristic was always of interest for the Byzantines. Konya’s cosmopolitan nature and its location as an important station on the way of migrations and the Silk Road were among the elements that reinforced Konya’s significance.

However, today, Konya derives its much-appreciated merit from a past that is primarily shaped by a spiritual tradition. Konya’s past, which can always be associated with a kind of sanctity, provides it with a privilege that cannot be ignored. Konya’s hidden history, or the image this city holds for a typical Konya resident, also exposes an emphasis on the roots of the city associated with a mythical world. It is necessary to note that the sanctity of this city exists in the minds of people from which a series of myths connects it with its pre-Islamic name, Iconium, to its name in the Islamic era, Konya. In this framework, Konya is referred to as “the city of prophets” or “the city of saints.”

Although oftentimes all of these names reflect states where myths and reality intermingle, a rather significant image derives its power from such references. For example, when one glances at the map of holy places in the New Testament, Konya becomes significant for the Christian tradition. This significance primarily derives from the fact that Saint Paul visited this city twice. Another point that must not be ignored regarding the emergence of the city image of Konya is the special significance attached to this city by the Christians during their holy wars, namely, the Crusades.

Undoubtedly, Konya has been a Turkish city for quite a long time. Conquered by the Seljuq commander, Sulaymān ibn Qutalmish, Konya has been in the hands of Muslim Turks since its conquest in 1074. It must not be forgotten that the real image of Konya, which has been

shaped by various efforts of the Seljuqs, Ottomans and modern Turks, can be revealed by associating it primarily with its Seljuq history. Konya served as the capital city during the reign of Anatolian Seljuqs. Although Konya appears to be a city that has continuously changed hands among Muslim communities from that time onward, this phenomenon primarily resulted from its status as a charismatic city.

Indeed, the real quality of Konya that earned it worldwide fame is its association with the famous Islamic mystic Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī. Al-Rūmī is not a mystic whose influence is known and felt only in Konya. In fact, many people who pay respectful attention to his message travel to Konya by the thousands on the anniversary of his death (shab-i ‘arūs), and remember him with ceremonies. Contrary to common perceptions, al-Rūmī assumed the responsibility of the city in a historical sense, and this affinity with him gave the city “an honor,” “a privilege,” and “a source of pride.” Therefore, for an ordinary city resident, Konya is a holy city, which undoubtedly led to this common belief: a city that is blessed will have a deep impact on its daily life. In a blessed city, the things that contravene the “spirituality of the city” are shunned because such things lead to social conflicts that are difficult to settle.

While a reference can be made to the established and positive history of a city, mention can also be made of its mythical history. The meeting point of these two elements has turned Konya into a highly mystical and pious city. Sociologically, the city bases itself on such myths. Therefore, pursuing daily life practices in the case of Konya is of great significance. Al-Rūmī’s discourse and a rich spirituality incorporated in life after being created in such a tradition gradually became the basic norms that form Konya’s actual reality. In short, the overall image created by a combination of these components has given Konya a spiritual and mystical image.

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13 This is so much so that Konya was always in the position of a city over which bargains were made in the conflicts and strife between the Karamanoglu and the Seljuqs. However, the problems caused by this appeal of Konya are quite a few. For example, during Tamerlane’s famous campaign in Anatolia and the Jalâlî uprisings, Konya was in serious trouble.
New Components: “Today, new things must be said”

Since the early times through the present, the traditions that are constantly reproduced in daily life, and above all its past, enable Konya to be described as a respectable and magnificent city and make it necessary to pay attention to it. Konya has always been renowned as a historically prestigious city from the Romans to the Byzantines, the Seljuqs to the Ottomans, and finally to present-day Turkey. Today, Konya attracts attention with a constantly renewed image of its everyday life. However, it is important to question what type of relationship Konya will establish with the global demands in a world consisting of new lifestyles and equipped with new technologies. In this world, new relationships of dependence will likely emerge, and the resultant cultural contrasts will bear social risks.\textsuperscript{14}

When the Republic was founded, Konya had aesthetic qualities that could be considered typical of Seljuq in terms of heritage. Several Ottoman elements were also complementary to these qualities. This aspect of Konya, which has always allowed it to be defined in terms of the traditional and the religious, must be viewed from these fundamental characteristics. As a Seljuq-Ottoman city, Konya implemented its urban development through a combination of family, neighborhood, and religious communities, similar to other traditional cities: the family as the smallest unit, then the neighborhood-protective, as well as encompassing and formations of religious communities that extend beyond local boundaries.\textsuperscript{15}

\footnote{In his descriptions of Turkey’s leading cities in his book \textit{Five Cities} published in the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century, famous Turkish novelist Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar (1901-1972) aptly describes the frustration created by rapid and radical change in the cities, among which Konya was included (2004). What Tanpinar mentions is “the regret felt for those that disappeared from our lives and the enthusiasm felt for the new.” Even so, the dilemma felt by Tanpinar gives way to balance and peace as far as Konya is concerned. Konya clearly retains its exceptional status in this conflict. According to him, Konya possesses a unique correlation of nostalgic feelings towards the past, reality of today, and expectations from the future.}

community, or _jamā‘a_, was part of the social imagination created by the world of daily relationships. An ordinary individual in an Anatolian city internalized the Ottoman identity by roaming through a web of bonds generated by the neighborhood and the religious community. Communal bonds developed around _masjids_, or small mosques, which existed in almost all streets, and mosques and lodges of religious sects that were bigger than _masjids_, which justified the existing variety through larger numbers of participants. The teachings of the ‘ulamā’, the scholars of Muslim theology, were influential in the practical demonstration of religiosity. However, religious communities and groups were equally as important as the ‘ulamā’ – they were structures that tolerated areas of tension between the state and the society. Especially when urban life is considered, the answer to the question of how the gap between the state and the society will be filled, and what social institutions will undertake this responsibility when Muslim communities are concerned, is through religious sects. As emphasized by İşin, this role must be understood properly:

The question of cultural roaming among groups of different status brought along with social stratification draws attention to another manner of activity assumed by sects in urban life. This manner of activity addresses the feeling of belonging to a religious community existing in the collective subconscious of urban residents and help people of different status meet in a common ground by way of mystic metaphors it uses. We may regard the ground where such a union of understanding and feeling materializes as the strongest social structure which enables cultural circulation among the groups in question. The classic assumption that each sect generates the culture of a group of a different status has no validity at all. In fact, we must state here that this joint union of understanding and feeling, termed _nash‘a_, or joy, in the mystical language both substitutes for the dynamics of cultural circulation among status groups and at the same time allows for a form of individual perception best fitting for human nature. The sects’ keeping open such a channel of cultural circulation, both ends of which open to the humans and the society, played the primary role in the emergence of urban life. Moreover, this role has a historical di-

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_Osmanischen Reich_ (translated into Turkish by Elif Kılıç; İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997).

dimension: thanks to such a channel of communication that was granted functionality by the sects on a common cultural ground, knowledge, and experience are passed on from one generation to another and thus the collective memory of the society is established.

It must not be forgotten that in Konya, the ‘ulamâ’ from madrasas (religious schools) and members of religious groups who managed to establish more insightful and lasting relationships with people of all professions and walks of life had an effective role that transformed the natural-secular nature of daily life\textsuperscript{17} – so much so that the historical cost of these roles of the ‘ulamâ’ and the groups almost justifies most of the ideological references that have codified Konya as “the source of religious backwardness/bigotry” since the establishment of Republic.

Turkish modernization upset the established daily life patterns. When tradition is defined, a larger framework that also includes religion is emphasized. Turkish politicians who were nurtured by the founding values of modernization dared to engage in an open conflict with the traditional. Although the speed of the revolutionary orientation of Turkish modernization has considerably slowed today, its effect has gained increasing continuity. The leaders of the new regime, from the very beginning, agreed on disdaining, excluding and when deemed necessary, suppressing religion as a reference value. In this chaotic atmosphere, only a world of reference approved by the state could exist. It was out of the question that Konya could have privileged treatment in its inclusion in modern Turkey’s direction. However, even a simple comparison of what type of appearance modernization allowed could suffice to expose the difference in various regions of Turkey. Indeed, even Konya’s neighbors could not synchronize with Konya in maintaining the delicate balance between modernity and adherence to tradition. As Aktay noted, Konya is unique in this regard because although it has always maintained a lukewarm attitude towards basic tenets of Turkish modernism, Konya has employed a policy of real-politics concerning the nature of modernism – so much so that Konya’s experience of modernization does not conflict ideologically with the discourse of the Kemalist elite; nevertheless, universal knowledge and the reality of everyday

life contribute significantly to the development of this imagination and determination of its direction.\textsuperscript{18}

In the case of Konya, what lies within the content of this contribution is a combination of religion, tradition, and modernity. Both religion and tradition are still the major creators of the mental world of a typical Konya native. The existence and weight of a tradition of common sense and respectable ‘ulamâ’ that did not allow bigotry or heretic sects are factors that should not be disregarded. The weight of ‘ulamâ’ was always visible in the rational characteristic of religious orientations. This emerging weight regarded marginal movements and changes of axis as negative indicators, and such organizational efforts were taken as malformations. Although this weight of ‘ulamâ’ was substantially eroded during the Republican Era, its respectability still holds.

Throughout the Republican Era, as security and controlling devices of the state, İmam-Hatip (Imam and Preacher) Schools,\textsuperscript{19} and also imâms affiliated to Directorate of Religious Affairs, who are in charge of conveying the official understanding of religion to the society,


\textsuperscript{19} Initially, Imam-Hatip (Imâm and Preacher) Schools were established to graduate enlightened religious men. It is possible to categorize these schools as a unique formation in which two different lines of knowledge, namely “worldly” and “otherworldly,” meet in a modern framework. Nonetheless, the Kemalist elite often have misgivings about the knowledge and the human element generated in Imam-Hatip Schools. The rapid increase in their number and their appeal to the public soon made Imam-Hatip schools one of the issues of tension between laicism and religion. Now, Imam-Hatip Schools have been codified by the modernist Kemalist elite as the breeding ground for Islamic movements. Ultimately, many restrictions was imposed on graduates of these schools until very recently.
have displayed an attitude that extinguished tensions and conflicts in the face of every instance of manipulation from the superiors regarding the regulation of daily life. Sermons, lectures, and assemblies of enlightenment, and even religious ceremonies have contributed to the justification of such attitudes. Thus, a certain continuity has been achieved in Konya that has separated spirituality from verbal and formal essentialism in a more radical manner than what has transpired in many other regions of Turkey. The major principle that İmam-Hatip Schools, Higher Institutes of Islam, 20 Faculties of Theology after the 1980s and the personnel at Directorate of Religious Affairs have crystallized for daily life is “to progress;” however, the original goal is not to get away from the main paradigm while implementing this goal. The notion of progress here was different from the notion of progressivism in the Western discourse of Enlightenment. What happened was associating words with Western words in appearance but filling their content with Islamic terminology. The images and the ideas that emerged and proliferated in a new form were entirely modern. Even if they were entangled in the nets of the past, unconditional rejection of the modern did not receive mass approval. In actuality, this situation was a testament to Konya’s uniqueness. Within this combination, Konya has begun to generate concrete examples of its own specific modernization with its characteristics that it has displayed with more emphasis, especially since the 1990s. It is possible to detect a re-reading of the tradition behind all of these. It would be fitting to cite here the sayings of Prophet Muḥammad and Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn which translate as follows respectively: “The one who spent two days with equal performance does not belong to us” and “yesterday went along with yesterday; it is necessary to say new things today.”

Urban life involves a constant search for harmony. The necessity for co-habitation renders efforts in this regard to be highly valuable. In this framework, different criteria are reproduced. Agreeing with the shared principles of the city may create the danger of eliminating

20 Initially, these institutes and faculties were opened to graduate teachers of religion for various secondary education schools, especially İmam-Hatip Schools, or to educate personnel for the religious bureaucracy to be employed as muftis and preachers in the central and provincial branches of Presidency of Religious Affairs. The controversy about the justification and functions of these schools has assumed a permanent status as consequence of the fact that the secular orientations of the state do not have a truly genuine route.
new approaches on an individual or social level. The fear of getting lost in the same pot and course encourages the emergence of ghettos. In contrast, Weber proposes just the opposite: 21 “The city removes all ties.” This “removal of ties” allows for new formations and organizations that will introduce an urban lifestyle. The values, traditions and value judgments are subjected to a new test. However, what continues to exist in Konya is an expression of a different co-existence.

**Aşure (‘Āshūrā’) as a Metaphor for a Model of Cultural Plurality**

The real source of controversy surrounding Konya is whether the newcomers mix with the natives. Every lifestyle proposal that comes from outside will either succeed or adapt to the social atmosphere of the society they join, become creolized through transformation, and will perhaps maintain its specific identity. In fact, however, those who come to Konya add their own characteristics to the city and do not express themselves with a different identity. The fact that those who come from outside are also Muslims facilitates integration. Without explicit suggestion, “The Dome” in Konya attracts and incorporates the stranger to a specific culture, and ultimately makes him either religious or secular. However, individual dissensions cannot evade Konya’s encompassing power. How is it possible that the modus operandi that operates in Konya fosters piety? It cannot be denied that the effects of modernization and westernization that we experience in our lives are felt here as occurs everywhere else in Turkey. The practice of building daily life on secular values functions in Konya just as anywhere else. Nevertheless, mention has to be made of a “specific style” in Konya, because the unity that forms here does not eliminate cultural, religious, and ethnic differences. In fact, it is possible to discuss a common ground among all of these structures.

This common ground in Konya can only be expressed through the metaphor of aşure. Aşure is a dessert that is made from a variety of ingredients. There is a common belief about the origin of aşure, which is made by boiling wheat, chickpeas, and other grains with dried fruit. The day of ‘āshūrā’ is on the tenth of Muḥarram, which is the first of the lunar months in the Islamic calendar. Historical and religious stories note that important events took place on this day in the lives of many prophets. On this day, many prophets were saved

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21 See Max Weber, *Şebir: Modern Kentin Doğuşu [The City]* (translated into Turkish by Musa Ceylan; Istanbul: Bakış Yayınları, 2000).
from various big problems, oppressions, and persecutions. According to these stories, certain incidents occurred on the day of ‘āshūrā’.²² The most frequently made connection with aşure in the Islamic world is the murder of Prophet Muḥammad’s grandson, al-Ḥusayn, at al-Karbalā’. Today, aşure has an important ritualistic value as a constantly updated story among all Muslims, in particular the Shi‘ite and the Alevi.²³

Each ingredient used in aşure manages to retain its specific taste. Furthermore, all these ingredients create a completely new taste. This is more functional for Konya than that of the “salad bowl” given for the American and Canadian cases because of both the cultural uniqueness of the concept of aşure and the unrealistic suggestion that the ingredients that come together in a salad do not undergo transformation. We know that no cultural encounter can be possible without a certain amount of interaction. In the case of aşure, although all the ingredients mix and mingle with one another in the same pot, the ingredients do not change their characteristics in the end. As is emphasized by Boysan, aşure is a mixture of elements that generate a new taste when they come together despite their dissimilarity. For example,²⁴

The truth behind how the chickpea and the dry fig come together cannot be grasped. All the same, just like aşure, there are blends of humans from whose gathering a sweet atmosphere arises and there are cities as their location. (…) However, what gives taste to aşure and heats it is the fire. The name of the fire that enables mixing well in human gatherings is culture. The destiny of human communities not heated by the fire of culture is to remain permanently at the stage of salad.

Thus, a new taste emerges as a combination of each taste felt indi-

²² Among them are God’s acceptance of the repentance Prophet Adam for the sin he committed, the salvation of Noah’s ark from the great flood, Prophet Abraham’s not getting burned in the fire, the ascension of Prophet Driss to the heavens, Prophet Jacob’s meeting his son Prophet Joseph, Prophet Job’s recovery from his illness, Prophet Moses’ crossing the Red Sea and saving the Jews from the persecution of the Pharaoh and lastly Christ’s birth, his salvation from death and ascension to the heavens.

²³ See Metin And, Ritüelden Drama: Kerbelâ-Muharrem-Ta‘zïye [From Ritual to Drama: al-Karbalâ’-Mubarram-Ta‘zïya] (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002).

²⁴ See Aydın Boysan, Nerede Yaşṭyoruz? [Where Do We Live?] (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2004).
Modernization and the Reproduction of Everyday Life in Konya

The sociological literature did not delay in analyzing mental structures and orientations activated by the urban context. In fact, the most profound problems of modern life arise from the individual’s desire to retain his/her existential autonomy and individuality in the face of effective social forces, historical legacy, external culture, and lifestyle.

In this framework, urbanization epitomizes the formation of the “people” in a new formula, and that which is daily reflects meeting points where this variety emerges in search of harmony away from sharp boundaries. According to a common assumption regarding the nature of sociological relationships, while urbanization generates its own tradition, daily life takes form as a harvest ground where materials and accessories in the cultural-intellectual depot are re-processed. Lifestyles and life patterns always emerge by differentiating from urban experiences, but still it is not always possible to talk about the uniqueness of urban practices. The process of urbanization can also be defined as a new aspect of life that introduces changes of social structure such as division of workload and specialization. Ultimately, this process paves the way for secularism, individualization, establishing anonymous and rational relationships. Thus, life’s values, manners, and attitudes begin to be adopted. Tradition is not appreciated and therefore comes into contact with new forms.

In this context, Konya displays a distinct characteristic that sometimes confuses sociological theory. However, the interest in what is

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25 Here there is something different from the one achieved with the “melting pot.” What is expected of each element in the melting pot is creolization. Here, the goal is to create new social and cultural forms or identities out of those who belong to different cultural, religious, and ethnic groups. This “melting pot” is now an amalgam. As transpired from many practices ranging from assimilation to integration, the elimination of the original root in a “melting pot” has been considered among the requirements of the social order (Cf. Nazım İrem “Eritme Pota’nda Eriyen Pota’ya: XXI. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Amerika [From Melting Pot to Melted Pot: America on the Verge of XXIth Century],” Doğu-Bati 8/32 (May-July 2005), 199-219). However, the essence of aşure is to preserve differences with their root qualities and ensure constant maintenance of a balance.

modern is selective. Here, it is difficult to define the traditional characteristic of the city as a monotonous embodiment of the past; it is actually the continuous mobilization of the materials at hand in building bridges between the past, present, and the future. In this framework, the appeal of religion, mysticism and modernity constitutes the fundamental elements of daily life – so much so that even new urbanization strategies usually tend to transform old structural characteristics rather than remove them. Business centers, new neighborhoods, increasing centers of concentration, and diverging orientations in urban atmosphere turn Konya into a mold where differentiations are tolerated.

Undoubtedly, one of the factors that foster this perception is the fact that what is religious has taken a genuine form. When patterns of social life are considered, mosques reflect identity to a large extent and are popular with the jamâ‘ā, or the congregation. Nonetheless, some ancient historical sites that may be cited among the primary indicators of Seljuq and Ottoman existence in the city receive their share of the tensions that arise from daily life practices.\(^{27}\)

\(^{27}\) An ultra-modern shopping center where representatives of all capitalist brands exist was built by the so-called religious capital in the center of Konya. The prominent architectural feature of this center is its revolutionary height and style for Konya. Apart from the traditional Islamists who usually disapprove of high-rising construction (since tall buildings are usually regarded as ominous signs of the Doomsday), this building also received much criticism from the conservatives. Controversy is still going on about the representative quality for Konya of the construction of a new business center with its unusual height even for the whole of Anatolia (42-storey to match Konya’s traffic plate number). Konya’s public opinion has not yet agreed on the name to be given to this skyscraper. Should the skyscraper be referred to with a western name like Kule City (Tower City) or one like Selçuklu Kulesi (Seljuq Tower) which revives historical memories? Now, the building began to be called kule site by the public in daily life thanks to a certain understanding of reconciliation. However, the conservative democrat municipal administration insists on calling this structure Selçuklu Kulesi (Seljuq Tower). The important thing here is not the placement of a rather assertive and imposing building in the center of the city in contrast to the religious objection to the construction of high buildings. The fact that this building is generating a new style of behavior and everyday life culture by bringing along a new type of consumer prototype is a much more important aspect of this building in contrast to the luxury shops in various parts of the city. The interesting thing, however, is the enthusiasm to name a highly modern building with the Seljuq heritage. The building bears no elements of traditional architecture, yet the phrase Seljuq is enough
It is appropriate to say that daily life in Konya is now reproduced by blending the traditional and the modern. As was revealed by research conducted in recent years, Konya displays a cautious attitude towards both zealous Islamic radicalism and equally zealous modernization movements. Although Konya is often cited as a favorable ground for harboring fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, the number of examples that disprove such expectations both in theory and practice are quite a few. Despite the fact that Konya has preferred political tendencies with high Islamic emphasis since the 1970s, it has always demonstrated a measured and discreet attitude to avoid turning this tendency into an urban conflict. In this framework, Konya has set up its inner balance and limited the aspirations of extremists. Despite the visible weight of religious and conservative tendencies, Konya has given support to all of the political parties that have emerged in political arena. However, Konya comes to the fore to activate a search for defined roots. The semantic world created around kule site (Tower Site) goes beyond outward modernization and verbal traditionalism and provokes important questions in the context of Konya about how a new life style can be created.


29 The place which Necmeddin Erbakan, who represents the religious wing in Turkish politics, chose for his project and discourse (Milli Görüş, or The National View) has always been Konya. Nevertheless, this affinity between the city and Erbakan did not prevent the emergence of social democrat or democratic formations in their own way. There is no favorable atmosphere in Konya now to represent Erbakan’s discourse in the political arena. In contrast, conservative democrat Tayyip Erdoğan has managed to be influential in Turkish politics with a grassroots political platform that also includes remnants of the Milli Görüş Movement.

ground as a city where religious tendencies are associated with political demands in daily life.

The remembrance of Konya with a perception of modernity is linked to the economic boom there. The developmental statistics which used to seem to justify the popular perception that Konya is ignored by the administrators of the modern Republic have begun to change rapidly in recent years. Industrial businesses that concentrate in Konya, economic revival, and the development of similar factors that do not exclude traditional and religious points of reference indicate the continuity and prevalence of a remarkable living pattern in Konya. In fact, the industrial sector in Konya leads the entrepreneurs that are called Anatolian Tigers and are expanding rapidly. The holding companies that are established there and developments in the industrial sector operate independently of the religious and traditional reference points.

Thus, urban life is becoming increasingly modern. Modern life can only be based on a system. However, what is unusual is an Islamic modernization and, as has been frequently stated, this brings to mind a totally peculiar concept of modernization. What happens here is the inclusion of both modernity and the reproduced religious and traditional past in daily life rather than the conquest of the center by modernity.

In conclusion, Konya bears the quality of being an interesting city in that it has confronted and gradually reconciled the rules of modern life with its religious orientations which have constantly been given fresh impetus since al-Rûmî, and which have given priority to expertise and genuine knowledge over heretic views. The question to which Yahya Kemal sought an answer requires the implementation of

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33 Anatolian Tigers have represented since the 1980’s the new entrepreneurialism of the religious and conservative businessmen in Anatolia unlike the mostly Ankara and Istanbul-based and state-favored Turkish businessmen.
more insightful research regarding how this conflict has been removed in the case of Konya. The question should be this: what kind of a balance do those who manage to wake up to perform the Early Morning Prayer establish between their daily life and modernity?

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BOOK REVIEWS

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Der Eine und das Andere: Beobachtungen an islamischen häresiographischen Texten
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Frank Griffel
Admirers of Reuven Firestone will not be disappointed with this book, and its intriguing title and subtitle accurately outline its main thesis. There is indeed a theory of when war is allowed and indeed compulsory in Judaism, and it developed out of the Bible and the texts connected to it such as the Apocrypha, and most significantly the commentaries of the Mishnah and the Talmud. Yet since the commentary stage occurred so late in the day, comparatively speaking, what it had to reflect on was not so much the glories of conquest at divine command of the Holy Land, but the bitter defeats at the hands of the Romans and the total devastation of the Jewish polity in what could loosely be called Israel. Firestone suggests that this gave rise to the idea that talking about violent resistance to enemies, let alone war, was a very dangerous enterprise and not to be sanctioned except in very exceptional circumstances. It went along with the very special status of living in Israel, which was in theory desirable but in practice was so full of difficulties that many rabbinic authorities seemed to discourage it. Although the Bible itself is full of references to the Land of Israel and its ownership by the Jews, when this was no longer feasible the idea of living in Israel, and certainly the idea of fighting others in order to live there, became largely irrelevant. As Firestone comments, a long debate was set off by Maimonides and his predecessors, and his rather dismissive remarks about the significance of Israel and the idea of fighting to live there, by contrast with the later Nahmanides who not only set out to refute Maimonides but even moved to Israel himself, with not entirely happy consequences. For Nahmanides living in the Land is of immense significance for Jews, and any obstacles that are in the way must be removed, sometimes violently if necessary.

For much of the last two millennia these debates were more academic than anything else, since the idea that the Jews would return to the Land before the arrival of the Messiah was regarded as far-fetched, and indeed some Jews persist in arguing that a state should not be established before the messianic age. Firestone is quite right in emphasizing that the theological debates that developed over the
acceptability of war has little to do with the thinking of most Israelis, who are profoundly secular. On the other hand, as Firestone shows in what I thought was by far the most interesting part of the book, the religious narrative was often used by the secular in order to establish as wide a consensus among the Jewish public for the measures undertaken by the state, especially measures involving violence. Here the establishment of a state, and its being inhabited by what is today probably a majority of the world’s Jewish population, raised again the issue of when violence is justified. From its earlier near-consensus that violence and war ought to be avoided at all costs, a significant number of Religious Zionists have made much of the idea that in certain circumstances war is not only desirable but in fact compulsory, and to oppose it is a sign of a lack of commitment to Judaism and its law. This is not a reflection on what is pragmatically appropriate, but on what should be done because God wants it to be done, and of course the commentator is aware of what the divine opinion of the issue is. Anyone who disagrees is to be regarded perhaps in very stark terms as a *rodef* or aggressor against the Jewish people.

I could not help wondering whether theology and law in this case is to be praised or criticized for its flexibility. One sometimes feels that theology is rather a loose discipline since it can react to any change in circumstances with some appropriate form of words, in that within the commentary tradition a respected authority can be found to have made a comment that can be used eventually, when the conditions are appropriate. The idea that war could be compulsory, a dormant idea for much of Jewish history when in exile, suddenly came to the fore again when war became more of an option that looked like it might produce results. The way theology works is to assess the relevant scriptural passages and the commentaries on them and develop a plausible interpretation of how the law should go as a result. At different times different interpretations come to the fore, and that makes it look very much as though whatever the circumstances, some theoretical argument can be found to justify or condemn what at that time is appropriate. Yet Firestone seems to be critical of the recent popularity of the idea among Religious Zionism that war is compulsory to protect or even expand the territory of the State of Israel, but why? The fact that until recently it was very much a minority view hardly establishes that it is wrong, and he shows how plausibly they can establish a narrative to support their view. One of the problems that emerges is that although the modern commentators
seem to be basing their rulings on “traditional” views, they in fact eschew the sort of careful weighing of different texts and alternative opinions and arguments. Often what seems to take place is a more mystical process, and here the influence of Abraham Kook is surely significant, but it is difficult to know how to assess a legal ruling which apparently comes about through some sort of intuition and poetic grasp of reality that sounds very moving to the right sort of audience, but dubious to anyone else.

This is in every way an excellent book, detailed and accurate and well-argued throughout. It is always difficult to maintain balance when dealing with a controversial topic, and Firestone is measured throughout, although it is clear where his sympathies lie. The book is certainly now the standard text on the topic and I am sure will remain so for a very long time. A sign of its excellence is that it raises many issues which it does not settle, and readers will find it a stimulating and inspiring read.

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This book by Franz Rosenthal, a scholar in Arabic and Semitic studies, was first published in 1956 and did hardly lose any of its significance until the present day. Therefore it was a splendid initiative to have it re-edited, this time with an intelligent introduction by Geert Jan van Gelder.

Nowadays hardly anybody would easily associate the concept of “humor” with the religion of Islam. The images and faces that we see in the media reflect anger and grimness. Islamic “reality” seems to consist of all too serious debates about the prominent position of Islam and of the socio-political consequences of never ending conflicts in the Middle East.

But whatever the situation may be, the cultural history of the communities in the Muslim world cannot be completely understood without a description of laughter and joy and one of the factors that caused these: humor.

The title of the book is well chosen: with any other title like “Humor in the Muslim World” or “Arab Humor” we would run into the problem of fixing boundaries in time and space. The concept of “Early Islam” rightly links the book to a limited geographical area and also to an Arabic speaking environment.

In his introduction Geert Jan van Gelder puts a number of things in perspective: first of all the character of Muslim scholarship that was a mixed body of all kinds of knowledge in which the phenomenon of jokes was never an abstruse outsider, nor was the theory of laughter and humor. As always Arab scholars had a lot of remarkable things to say about these subjects. He also touches upon the difficulty of cross cultural appreciation of jokes, a well known problem. Jokes and anecdotes will easily fall flat by lack of knowledge of various aspects of another culture, of the referential field. This might be less true for the art of comic ambiguity as I will try to explain later.
Rosenthal too starts his introduction with some noteworthy reflections about humor and he stresses the universality of this phenomenon, also within the context of the “otherworldliness” of Islam. He puts this “otherworldliness” in perspective however by pointing to “cheerful humanity” as one of the character traits of the prophet Muhammad.

His inventory of the Arabic material is extremely useful and complete up to the date of the publication of this book. Meanwhile other sources have emerged, of course, which are easily accessible. Useful too is his enumeration of the Arabic terminology for various kinds of humor like anecdotes, jokes, tomfooleries etc. (pp. 6-7, n. 3 and 4) and his lists of humorists in early Arab history.

The main part of his book focuses on the stories connected with one of these humorists, Ash‘ab ibn Jubayr (d. 154/771). Rosenthal divides his biography of this humorist into two chapters: the “historic” and the legendary Ash‘ab. Most of the material has been taken from the same source as where the translated stories come from: the Kitāb al-aghānī, which serves as a comprehensive collection for earlier sources.

The historic Ash‘ab enjoyed close relationships within the elite in Medina, especially it appears with Sukayna, the granddaughter of ‘Ali, a position that allowed him a “Bohemian” lifestyle. Within the rich and culturally aware circles of Medina at the time Ash‘ab worked as a successful singer who earned considerable amounts of money, a capital that only increased due to his proverbial greed. And it is his greed that forms the core of many of the anecdotes about this man.

Apart from the many anecdotes about Ash‘ab’s greed Rosenthal translated and commented upon other anecdotes that can be divided into categories like: political, religious, ritual, and anti-clerical. Apart from these themes many of his jokes are situated in an urban environment and are often so recognizable that Rosenthal calls them “applicable in our time.” A number of jokes must simply be considered as plainly vulgar.

In his conclusion Rosenthal distinguishes between the historical Ash‘ab, a singer and entertainer, and the legend which served as “a convenient peg to hang all kinds of jokes on.” In this case this distinction is certainly meaningful and wise.
The largest part of the book contains Rosenthal’s translations of the stories about Ash‘ab (pp. 36-131). He arranged these stories as follows: 1. Chronologically following the biography of our hero in the Kitāb al-agḥāni; 2. A few other stories about Ash‘ab from elsewhere in the Aghāni; 3. Stories taken from other sources in the chronological order of these sources.

Are these stories worth reading? Yes they are because they convey an interesting representation of everyday life in early Islam. Are they funny? Not all of them, certainly. And if something, they often produce not more than a smile. But they add to our knowledge and understanding of this part of Arab cultural history, for instance the story (p. 86) about Ash‘ab being forced to go on ḥajj and regretting it all the way. This is part of mistreatment he faces from the governor who is forcing him to join his pilgrimage; one of the dirty tricks this governor plays is to let Ash‘ab almost die from starvation whereas he himself enjoys a copious meal in secret.

Whatever the quality of these anecdotes, one thing about the translation might be considered a bit annoying: I think that the reader would benefit if the translator would have chosen to shorten the isnād at the beginning of each story into some kind of a formula. The isnāds show a variety in length, but even the shorter ones distract from the content of the anecdote. The average reader cannot be expected to find any useful information in these isnāds.

The book concludes with a short appendix on the theory of laughter in the Greek, early Christian, and Arab philosophical tradition.

Some valuable lexicographical work that Rosenthal has done is contained in his “Index of Selected Rare or Explained Words.” This index will probably be a useful source for understanding other texts of the same kind.

More recently another study in the field of humor in the widest sense of the word appeared: Thomas Bauer’s Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine andere Geschichte des Islam (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen im Insel Verlag, 2011). Why are books on this subject so important? Because they offer a major contribution to understanding the (cultural) history of Islam from a point of view that seems to be neglected by many modern scholars in the Arab/Islamic world. They show the human and “humanist” sides of a great civilization, aspects that are all too easily forgotten. The book on ambiguity has
one advantage compared to Rosenthal’s study: understanding ambiguity is less depending on our knowledge of the “there and then,” the circumstances and “otherworldliness” mentioned earlier. It relies more on the knowledge of the language and the understanding of its double meanings (*double entendre*) together with a general awareness of an all too human background which we more often than not share with Muslim civilization.

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Abdulkader Tayob in his *Religion in Modern Islamic Discourse* undertook a careful study of how ‘religion,’ as a key variable in ‘religious studies’ in general and ‘Islamic studies’ in particular, has been employed and discussed by Muslim intellectuals at the end of the 19th century and throughout the 20th century. Tayob discussed engagingly about the status of ‘Religion in Modern Islam’ (pp. 1-22) and argued about its relevance as a distinctive variable; and like many other social scientists he made reference to how and why scholars such as Max Weber defined/explained religion in modern society. Instead of depending upon their interpretations, Tayob brought Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Armando Salvatore’s ideas on board; for him they offered useful insights as to how it should be applied to present-day Muslim societies. Since their respective understandings were appropriate, Tayob employed their theoretical conceptualization throughout his study.

Since Tayob underlined that the study’s concern was “on the fundamental meanings and values that Muslims produced for modern Islam” (p. 15) and that it inspected how religion acted as a key element in shaping the debates in modern Muslim discourse, it allowed him to critically reflect upon “The Essence of Religion and Religion’s Essence” in Chapter 2 (pp. 23-47). In this chapter, which he incorrectly identified as Chapter One (p. 17), the focus was on religion’s definition and meaning. Encountering modernity as an unstoppable process of change, Tayob brought to the fore Sayyid Aḥmad Khan’s ideas and juxtaposed these with those of Muḥammad ʻIqbāl and Fazlur Rahman. As a result of Khan’s support for the scientific approach, Tayob demonstrated how Khan redefined religion.

After Tayob discussed their ideas, he went on to examine the approaches of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ʻAbduh in Chapter 3 (pp. 49-71) titled “The Value of Religion and Islam.” Herein Tayob illustrated how these two, who were influenced by a dominant functionalist approach, made important interventions. Al-Afghānī critiqued Khan as well as other thinkers for their obsession with materialism and he argued that all religions were good (socially and po-
Tayob stated that ‘Abduh laid stress on reason as a pivotal tool for the development of religion and he considered religion as an essential part of human nature (p. 59). One is rather surprised that Tayob did not make reference to Rashid Riḍā’s Ta’rīkh al-Uṣṭāḏ bī al-Imām al-Sheikh Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1931) or to Charles C. Adams’ Islam and Modernism in Egypt (1933); both texts would have added value to his assessment of ‘Abduh.

That aside, al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh’s functional method in dealing with Islamic values provided Tayob the opportunity to turn attention to “Religion, Islam and Identity” in Chapter 4 (pp. 73-99); a chapter in which he interrogated ‘identity’ as a central characteristic of the state and the society. He, however, studied the notion of identity as contained in the works of Ḥasan al-Bannā and Mawdūdī, and Tayob demonstrated how they differed as Islamists in their approach. Tayob, moreover, returned to Khan and ‘Abduh who “posited a universal non-differentiated meaning of Islam” (p. 79); he illustrated how they differed from one another and made inputs to the construction of Muslim identity as functionalists. Building on these points, Tayob reviewed the foundations laid by the Islamists and argued that al-Bannā benefited from ‘Abduh and Mawdūdī gained from Khan’s intellectual experiences. Although Tayob mentioned Sayyid Qūṭ’s name and briefly compared Qūṭ’s views with Mawdūdī’s insights, it might have been educative if he had compared in greater detail the ideas of these two ideologues.

Now when Tayob discoursed about “The Meaning and Symbolism of the Islamic State” in Chapter 5 (pp. 101-126), he did so to “show how the position of Islam in the modern state has become essentially a problem of identity.” Tayob demonstrated how the Muslim state was burdened with the modern meanings of Islam and made reference to ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq who rejected the idea of an ‘Islamic state.’ He was among those who drew a sharp line between the Prophet’s religious and political roles. Tayob juxtaposed the latter’s views with Rashid Riḍā who held an opposing stance. Riḍā theologically proposed a Muslim republic that was to be led by a religious government; an idea that is rather different from Mawdūdī whose views Tayob revisited. Tayob also analyzed Muḥammad al-Ghazālī and Ayatollah Khomeini’s views on the topic.

Tayob then discussed “Religion between Sharīʿa and Law” in Chapter 6 (pp. 127-154). Herein Tayob visited the opinions of three
Muslim legal minds. He first assessed the intellectual appreciation of Asaf Fyzee; the Indian scholar who adopted a gradualist approach to the study of Muslim jurisprudence and who made a clear distinction between religion and law. He then engaged with the views of Abdullahi An-Na‘im – the Sudanese/American scholar. Compared to Fyzee, An-Na‘im, according to Tayob, preferred a radical reformist approach in dealing with Muslim jurisprudence; a method that advocated that *ijtihād* (judicial examination) as a legal tool should not be uncritically accepted but that it be fundamentally employed to bring about sweeping legal reforms that are in line with universal principles such as ‘freedom of religion.’

Being a critical thinker who ardently upholds the principles of secularism, An-Na‘im naturally countered and constantly challenged the conservatives and modernists’ arguments; the upshot of An-Na‘im’s fundamental approach was that he set himself apart from the established conservative scholars such as Mufti Taqi Usmani, the pragmatist Pakistani traditional theologian. Tayob explored Usmani’s ideas and highlighted the fact that though Usmani adopted an “open attitude towards change” (p.146) during modern times Usmani was wary of modernity’s shortcomings. Though Tayob mentioned that Muslim modernists such as Fazlur Rahman were heavily critiqued by Usmani for “simply following the latest trends in the West” (p. 147), he did not indicate why Usmani failed to scrutinize Rahman’s personal engagement with Western thought as an academic and nor did he tangibly demonstrate how ‘religion’ as a pivotal variable was employed in Usmani’s texts. Nonetheless, Tayob provide the reader with a fairly good insight into the varied legal approaches; approaches that accommodated ‘religion’ in the theoretical *shari‘a* frame.

*Shari‘a* as a legal system was also seriously discoursed by female scholarly circles. In Tayob’s “Reading (of) Islamic Feminism: Modernism and Beyond” (pp. 155-180), he evaluated the feminist theory of religion. Before Tayob assessed Nazzira Zin al-Din and Amina Wadud-Muhsin’s views, he prefaced it with an account of women’s place in Muslim beliefs with the intention of showing that many studies neglected to inform the reader to what degree women interact with religion. Tayob critically reflected on their contributions towards the construction of modern Muslim society. Zin al-Din, influenced by ‘Abduh, advocated the ‘moral choice’ approach. Since Zin al-Din’s writings debated the validity of veiling, Tayob did not mention as to whether she made a distinction in her text between religious dictates
and Arab cultural practices. Tayob then focused on Wadud-Muhsin whose text *Woman and Islam* (1992) made waves among Muslim women circles. Seeing herself as a post-modern feminist – influenced by Rahman – who adopted a reader-centred approach, Wadud-Muhsin argued for the support of significant principles that would allow her to deconstruct those advocated by male exegetes and to permit her to hold tight onto universals espoused by ‘feminist agents.’ So for her the reader (i.e., the agent) was ‘a (key) producer of the meaning of the text’ and that reading – as an activity – should not be something that should be left to ‘individual consciousness’ as argued by Zin al-Din (p. 167). Tayob stressed that Wadud-Muhsin remained committed to the sacred text. On the whole, Tayob provided an even-handed treatment of these two women scholars’ insights. He, however, did not hesitate to state where and why their interpretations were inadequate. Prior to concluding his chapter Tayob surveyed the writings of, among others, Mawdūdī, al-Qaraḍāwī, and al-Ghannūshī whose approaches towards women were somewhat apologetic. Whilst Tayob made this observation as well as commending Wadud-Muhsin for having chosen a “more integrated approach to reconciling religion and social values” (p. 179), he also commented upon this approach’s inherent weaknesses.

In his “Concluding Remarks” (pp. 181-186) Tayob stated that the text underlined that (a) the search for real meaning of Islam (i.e., the preoccupation with essence), (b) the efficacy of religious values in public life, and (c) the desire for representation were basically essential features of Modern Muslim society. Consequently, these three issues assisted one in getting a fair insight into the stance of religion within the diverse Muslim discourses throughout the 20th century. Tayob has certainly made a solid contribution to religious studies since it not only familiarized the student with the divergent approaches within specific strands of Muslim thinking, but it also provided him/her with a comparative overview of how intellectuals discoursed about, inter alia, Muslim identity, Islamic state, and Islamic law. It is indeed a text that should be part of the prescribed lists for those doing courses in the field of Sociology of Religion/Sociology of Islam.

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The Essentials of Ibāḍī Islam is a book to be numbered among the literature relating to the theology of a particular branch of Islam, Ibāḍism, with which the work initiates the reader in its excellent introduction. The author of the book, Professor Valerie Hoffman, is well acquainted with Oman and Ibāḍism due to her long involvement with the subject matter and her fieldwork for long periods in the Sultanate. She writes for both students with some familiarity with Islam as well as the discerning academic who enjoys a systematic exposition of historical events, with an extensive (51 pp.) and highly explanatory introduction on the place of Ibāḍism within Islam and the related research (pp. 3-5), the origins and political history of Ibāḍiyya (pp. 5-7), the development of Ibāḍism as a distinct sect of Islam (pp. 17-26), and the distinctive teachings of Ibāḍī Islam (pp. 26-45), with a further elaboration of some very specific Ibāḍī topics, such as: the status of sinning Muslims, the notions of walāya and barā’a, the expectation of reward or punishment in the afterlife, free will versus predestination, the anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Qur’ān, and the debate between various Muslim schools and in popular piety about whether or not they should be understood metaphorically; the use of reason and God’s revelation through prophethood; God’s unity, essence, and attributes; the debate about the creation of the Qur’ān; the principles of jurisprudence amongst Sunnī, Shī‘ī, and Ibāḍī Islam; and the essence of Islam, which includes “all types of religious knowledge – theological, legal, ethical, and mystical” (p. 44).

For a rich exposition of Ibāḍī theology, Hoffman chooses the works of two distinguished modern Ibāḍī theologians, which she translates from Arabic into English, thus making the texts accessible to non-Arabic readers. The two works are: al-‘Aqīda al-Wabbiyya (“The Creed”) by Naṣir ibn Sālim ibn Udayyam al-Rawāḥi (d. 1339/1920), known as “the poet of the Arabs,” in the words of Muḥammad b. Yūsuf Ṭafayyish (p. 48); and Kitāb ma‘ālim al-dīn
The author explains the importance of these books for Ibāḍī theology and the impetus for their composition in her introduction (pp. 45-53). For her excellent English translation of *al-‘Aqīda al-Wabbiyya* (“The Creed”) by al-Rawāḥi, Hoffman consulted available manuscripts which she details for the reader, along with its various printed editions (pp. 50-51). We learn that al-Rawāḥi’s goal was to compose a clear text, in the form of questions and answers about Ibāḍism between student and teacher, for the benefit of the many Omanis – including the author’s family – who immigrated to southern Arabia and particularly the island of Zanzibar in eastern Africa at the end of the 19th century. Al-Rawāḥi, who is known to history as an accomplished poet and judge, was eager to defend Ibāḍi teachings from the surrounding Sunnī theology, and thus systematized the Ibāḍi teachings of the past, which he found scattered in nearly illegible and voluminous works, for easy dissemination to and understanding by the Ibāḍīs. He thus “on the one hand simplifies and elucidates doctrines that must otherwise be gleaned from massive, dense, and often difficult texts; on the other hand, he provides a thorough and fascinating discussion of the doctrines of many other Muslim groups, past and present, on the points at hand, including the differences between the two major schools of Sunnī theology, the Ashʿarites and the Māturīdites.” (pp. 47-48). Thus, al-Rawāḥi’s text, with its outstanding explanation and clarification of concepts, was then – and remains today – an excellent pedagogical tool for introducing Islamic theology in general and particularly Ibāḍi interpretations. In his work, al-Rawāḥi expounds key theological themes such as knowledge of God’s Unity, knowledge of God, God’s essence and attributes, the roots of religion, the impossibility of seeing God, and what is necessary and impossible for God. He analyzes the terms *walā‘ya* and *barā‘a*, which are particularly important for Ibāḍism, inasmuch as they constitute the fundamental legal and theological principles of the Ibāḍī community. Finally, he also examines *How to Deal with People Who are not of Muhammad’s Umma and Knowledge and Action*. Al-Rawāḥi develops these thematic units in seven chapters, which are translated by Hoffman, complemented by rich footnotes that illuminate various points in the text and cross-reference Qur’ānic passages. The text ends abruptly in the seventh chapter, which leads Hoffman to conclude that it “may indicate that the author passed
away before completing the text” (p. 237).

This leads Hoffman to her translation of the second work, *Kitāb maʿālim al-dīn* (“The Characteristics of Religion”), by al-Thamīnī, who lived nearly a century before al-Rawāḥī, because it covers what she sees as an omission in al-Rawāḥī’s work, namely a discussion of the doctrine of predestination, specifically in his sections on *The Necessity of the Absolute Oneness of God Most High* and *What is Possible Concerning the Most High*. At the end of her introduction (pp. 52-53), Hoffman relays the life of al-Thamīnī, his work and the historical context in which he lived and worked (d. 1808), as a pre-eminent representative of north African Ibaḍīsm in the Mzab Valley, “one of the first scholars of the modern Ibaḍi renaissance,” as the author writes at the end of the introduction (pp. 52-53). Hoffman refers the reader to al-Thamīnī’s Arabic edition of the work (1986), noting its typographical errors and other problems, and particularly the tone of the conclusion, which is largely hostile to Ibaḍism and therefore obviously a later addition by another writer. Hoffman continues the method she employed in the first work, translating the third and fourth chapters, with explanations in the footnotes (pp. 240-276).

Valerie Hoffman’s work is complemented by a very informative general glossary (pp. 279 ff.) of Arab-Muslim terms with their definitions, as well as dates where necessary, and a bibliographical dictionary (pp. 291 ff.), in alphabetical order, of historical figures and writers from the beginning of Islam to 1920. The work concludes with a subject-specific bibliography (pp. 313 ff.), as well as a complete and detailed index (pp. 327 ff.).

Until now, research on Ibaḍī theology outside the Arabic world has been limited, although valuable, with essentially only two monographs: that of the Libyan Ibaḍī scholar Ennami, which was published in English in 1971; and that of Cuperly, published in French in 1991. This third work contributes to improving awareness of Ibaḍī theology among the international academic community. The path has thus already been opened, and awaits its completion by other monographs that include more insights into the thought and development of Ibaḍī theology through the centuries. This text is especially important because it sheds light on particular trends and interpretations of Islam, and is imbued with a fresh re-reading and understanding of Islam as something dynamic and ongoing, and not as something static and monolithic. Hoffman, in short, has thoroughly studied and
written about the evolution of Ibāḍī theology during modern times and the articulation of Ibāḍī identity.

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Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karîm al-Shabrastanî (c. 1086-1153) is the well-known heresiographer, author of the Kitâb al-milal wa-l-nihâl, one of the most important sources for the knowledge of the religious sects in Medieval Islam. Perhaps, he is less studied as a theologian, although his Nihâyat al-iqdâm has a distinguished position in the history of philosophical kalâm. As a theologian, al-Shabrastanî wrote a Qur’ânic commentary whose title is Mafâtîh al-asrâr wa-maṣâbiḥ al-abrâr (Keys of the Secrets or Arcana), virtually an unknown work. This book provides the edition and the English translation of a section of the Commentary by Toby Mayer.

In a sense, Mayer’s task has been made easier by the fact that the Mafâtîh survives in a unique manuscript held at the Library of the National Consultative Assembly in Tehran. The manuscript has been edited by M. A. Adharshab and Mayer had made use of Adharshab’s work for his own enterprise producing a nice book well articulated in a long Introduction (pp. 3-59), an accurate English translation with notes, bibliography, and indexes (pp. 61-267), the original Arabic text neatly printed at pp. 1-122 (Arabic numeration). The manuscript of the Mafâtîh contains (1) twelve introductory chapters, (2) the commentary on the Exordium (al-Fâtiha, Q 1), and (3) the commentary on the chapter of the Cow (Sûrat al-baqara, Q 2). (1) and (2) are presented in this volume, respectively providing a full exposition and a good sample of al-Shabrastanî’s hermeneutics (p. 19). Albeit selective, the choice is nonetheless useful to outline the many exegetical problems of al-Shabrastanî’s writing and to introduce in his intellectual world. Actually, the approach to the text is particularly difficult, but Toby Mayer’s care in exploring, analyzing, and commenting the linguistic and theoretical folds of the text is of much help for the...
reader in order to appreciate the complexity of al-Shahrastānī’s argu-
mentation.

One of the main questions in studying Mafāṭih’s author – or per-
haps the main question – is to decide if he was a Sunnī or an Ismā‘īlī. His biographical and bibliographical data are somewhat ambiguous. For instance, he studied in the Niẓāmiyya school of Baghdād, a strongly Sunnī institution. Later he lived for a number of years in Merv under the Sunnī Seljuq rule and “the city gave hope of solid backing for [his] projects” (p. 8). Moreover, his Nihāyat al-iqdām is defined by Mayer as “a plenary treatment of Ash‘arī orthodoxy” (p. 9). The Kitāb al-milal is remarkably objective, although “the differential of the … sections of the book is clearly presented in term of the principle of con-trariety. Moreover, the organisation of the material within these sections explicitly builds on the leitmotif of both hierarchy and con-trariety (al-tarattub wa-l-taḍādd). And again … the account moves from the general level (‘umūm) to the specific (khuṣṣūṣ). These char-
acteristic contours of the Milal … are conceptual talismans with wide and profound applications throughout Shahrastānī’s thought … with their arguably Ismā‘īlī stimulus” (pp. 9-10).

Following Toby Mayer’s analytical guide, we are led to read the Mafāṭih as an Ismā‘īlī document, fully belonging to this specific intel-
lectual tradition. Many clues take us in this direction. The technical concepts and terminology like “accomplished” (mafrūgh) and “in-
choative” (musta‘naф) have a likely Ismā‘īlī character (see translation p. 108, Arabic text p. 50). Two particular points are worth stressing however. The first is a page (translation p. 65, Arabic text p. 3) where, on the one hand, al-Shahrastānī exalts ‘Alī as a precious source of teaching and hermeneutics, while, on the other, attributes the sub-
stantial merit of his formation to an unnamed teacher: “So I [al-
Shahrastānī speaking] searched for the ‘truthful’ as passionate lovers might search. And I found one of God’s virtuous slaves, just as Moses (peace be upon him) searched with his young man: ‘Then the two of them found one of Our slaves whom We bestowed as a mercy from Us, and We taught him knowledge from Our presence’ [Sūrat al-kahf, Q 18]. I learnt from him the ways of creation and of the Command, the degrees of contrariety and hierarchy, the twin aspects of generali-
ty and specificity, and the two principles of the accomplished and the inchoative. I thus satisfied myself with this single bellyful, not those which are the foods of error and the starting points of the ignorant. I
quenched my thirst from the fountain of submission with a cup whose blend was from Tasnim.” Who was this master is left unnoticed, but Mayer asks: “It follows that behind the mystagogue’s intentionally blurred image may lie a living authority in Isma’ili teaching, a learned da’i – a henchman, perhaps, of the inceptor of Nizari Isma’илиsm, al-Hasan ibn al-Šabbāh (d. 518/1124), or even the man himself?” (p. 7). In any case, it is clear that al-Shahrastānī presents the Isma’ili concept of ta'lim (instruction of authority) as a pivotal moment of his formation, with the Isma’ili categories of contrariety and hierarchy fully operating in his methodology.

The second point is not autobiographical but theological and involves tawḥid. We have to connect together a few passages of the commentary through the synthesis of Mayer. The start is Qur’ānic and especially the āyas 26-27 of the Sūrat al-raḥmān (Q 55): “This then is held by our author [al-Shahrastānī] to refer to the great complement to God’s attribute of majesty or transcendence, namely, His ‘bounty’ or ‘creative largesse’ (ikrām) – a complementary rooted in Q 55: 26-27: ‘All that is in the world will pass away and your Lord’s face (or ‘self’) alone will endure in His majesty and bounty’ (dbū l-jalāl wa-l-ikrām). The impact of these two attributes of majesty and bounty is later spelt out in al-Shahrastānī’s statement: ‘He is veiled from them through His majesty, so they may not perceive Him, and He manifests Himself to them through His bounty, so they may not deny Him’ [translation p. 159, Arabic text p. 96]. So it is that these two affirmations [...] capture the paradox that God is at once incomprehensible and undeniable, or as al-Shahrastānī puts it: ‘Insofar as He is He (buwa) He is ungraspable and insofar as all belongs to Him (or is due to Him, lab)” He is undeniable’ [translation p. 144, Arabic text, p. 82]” (p. 38). We can emphasize at least two aspects: 1) divine ipseity (Allah is Himself, Allāh buwa buwa) warrants His transcendence in respect to contingent things of sublunary world: in this sense, God is separated and ungraspable; 2) divine sovereignty relates all the creatures to God: in this sense, God is undeniable as “that dimension which makes other dimensions possible” (F. Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an [Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1989], 4). Both these theological presuppositions are potentially Ismā’ili, but in general Islamic. The same Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), an acknowledged Sunnī thinker, argues in his al-Maṣṣṣad al-asnā fi sharḥ ma‘ānī asmā’ Allāh al-ḥusnā that “You should realize that He [God] is hidden in His manifestation by the intense way in which He
is manifest, for His manifestation is the reason for His being hidden, as His very light blocks His light” (*The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God* [translated with notes by David Burrell and Nazih Daher; Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1995], 134). Both in the Ismā‘īli al-Shahrastānī and in the Sunnī al-Ghazālī *tawḥīd* describes God as simultaneously out of and within reality. This conclusion has a firm Qur’ānic ground, for, on the one hand, “There is nothing like Him” (Q 42:11), while, on the other, “We [God] are closer to him [man] than his jugular vein” (Q 50:16; translations by M. Abdel Haleem).

The Ismā‘īli commitment of al-Shahrastānī in the *Mafātīḥ* can be reasonably accepted however. But the exegetical key is by no means exclusively esoteric. Al-Shahrastānī devotes chapter 8 of his own Introduction to the discussion of *tafsīr* and *ta‘wil*, arguing that the best exegesis is a synthesis of *tafsīr* and *ta‘wil*. Actually, *Mafātīḥ* is partly a classical *tafsīr* and partly an esoteric *ta‘wil*. It is a *tafsīr* as far as it discusses topics like lexicography, grammar, and semantics making good use of the prophetic and *ṣaḥāba’s* traditions (e.g.: “Abū Sa‘īd al-Maqburī transmitted from Abū Hurayra on the authority of the Prophet that he said…”, p. 136; “Al-Rabī’ī ibn Anas transmitted on the authority of Shahr ibn  Ḥawshab on the authority of Ubayy b. Ka‘b who said…,” p. 161, etc.). It is a *ta‘wil* in so far as, going up to the origins (*ta‘wil* derives form *awwala*), it discloses the arcana of the Qur’ānic text in an esoteric – and often philosophical – way. From this point of view, it is interesting to underline that on the whole al-Shahrastānī’s attitude is rationalistic. Toby Mayer says that, on the one hand, “A seeming trait of Shahrastānī’s biography is that despite the mystical zeitgeist and the impingement of Sufi influences throughout his milieu, the Sufi strain of Islamic esoterism leaves no trace on his reputation or extant writings” (pp. 4-5); while, on the other, “the Ismā‘īli stimulus of his thought most shows … a concept of truth in which the religious and the philosophical wholly unite, a complete merger of both ‘wisdoms’ (*jāmi‘ al-ḥikmatayn*)” (p. 46).

*Mafātīḥ al-asrār* is a very stimulating Commentary, be it Ismā‘īli or not, and Toby Mayer has to be congratulated to have made available such a remarkable piece of work.

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Jihād – striving or fighting “in the path of God” – and its aims, legitimation, and practices are topics that in the course of history occupied the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims time and again. The resurgence of jihād since the 1980s has again aroused broad interest in the topic and led to a wave of publications, including studies that deal with the historical aspects of the phenomenon.

The volume under review is such a historical study. Part one contains seven chapters that give an introduction to jihād in 128 pages; part two contains a 70-page edition and translation of Ibn ʿAsākir’s small collection of ḥadīths entitled al-ʿArbaʿīna ḥadīthīn fī l-ḥabīb ʿalā l-jihād (The forty ḥadīths dealing with inciting to jihād) and it also contains a bibliography and an index.

In the first chapter the authors address the life, career, and works of Ibn ʿAsākir. He is most famous for his monumental history of Damascus (Taʾrīkh Madīnat Dimashq), and he also acquired renown among Muslim scholars as a reviver of Sunnism and as an opponent of non-Sunnī Muslim groups.

Chapter two gives a summary of the history of jihād in early Islam. The authors define the term on the basis of Qurʾānic terminology as “warfare against the infidels.” They point out that “violence in the name of religion” is a historical reality not only in Islam but also in Judaism and Christianity. In the Hebrew Bible, for instance, God orders and legitimizes warfare against the enemies of Israel, and in the Christian empires from the end of the 4th century rulers also fought against non-Christian communities inside and outside their empires with the consent of the Church. Against this background, it is not surprising that similar ideas are found in the Qurʾān, which, after all, contains many parallels with Jewish and Christian ideas. The authors use five Qurʾānic passages from sūra 9 (verses 111, 5, 29, 13-14 and
88) to demonstrate the basic principles of militant *jihād* that were current in later Muslim writings.

A few comments on this chapter are in order. The parallels between the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim views on fighting the adherents of other faiths are in principle correct but somewhat superficial. On the one hand the *differences* between the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim views are only adumbrated,¹ and on the other hand the choice of only those Qurʾānic passages on *jihād* which later Muslim scholars considered important prevents one gaining an impression of the overall Qurʾānic approach to *jihād*. Warfare against adherents of other faiths and apostates has many more facets than the verses from *sūra* 9 suggest. A complete picture of the Qurʾānic view on *jihād* is needed in order to assess the historical background and development of these many facets. Only then will the difference between earlier and later Qurʾānic concepts of *jihād* become clear.²

The second chapter concludes with a paragraph on *jihād* and warfare in the period from the death of Muḥammad until the beginning of the Crusader period. The authors sketch the development of classical medieval *jihād* ideology, which was inspired by Qurʾānic verses and ḥadīths, and which was developed in detail by Muslim scholars in the course of the first four centuries of Islamic history.

Chapter three covers the issue of “jihad preaching in Damascus between the first and second Crusades.” It starts with the presentation of ʿAlī ibn Ṭāhir al-Sulamī’s (d. 1106) *Kitāb al-jihād*, which the Damascene author read in public several times after the conquest of Jerusalem by the Crusaders. In a second paragraph the authors identify on the basis of Ibn ʿAsākir’s *Muʿjam al-shuyūkh* a group of ten scholars who escaped from the Crusaders to Damascus, where they preached *jihād* against the invaders. Their preaching probably had an effect on


Ibn ‘Asākir. The authors conclude from these facts that “the intensification and reorientation of jihād doctrine in mainstream Syrian Sunnī discourse” already started early in the 12th century, thus shortly after the Crusaders’ invasion of Syria. This was already remarked on by E. Sivan in his *L’Islam et la croisade. Idéologie et Propagande dans les Réactions Musulmanes aux Croisades* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1968), 28-58, which the authors do not mention.

The fourth chapter is devoted to Ibn ‘Asākir’s role in this process of intensification and reorientation of jihād doctrine. The authors first describe the close cooperation between Ibn ‘Asākir and Sultan Nūr al-Dīn, who took control of Damascus in 1154 after the Crusaders in the second Crusade had unsuccessfully tried to conquer the city. Nūr al-Dīn supported the Sunnī scholars of Damascus in general and Ibn ‘Asākir in particular by ordering the construction of schools and religious buildings, and he employed scholars as preachers in his army. The authors then dwell on Ibn ‘Asākir’s role as a “propagandist of jihād,” which began with his lectures on Ibn al-Mubārak’s (d. 797) *Kitāb al-jihād*, one of the first books written on jihād, and led to Ibn ‘Asākir’s own booklet entitled *al-Arba‘ūn hadithān fī l-ḥathib ‘alā l-jihād* (The forty hadiths for inciting jihād), which he composed at Nūr al-Dīn’s request.

The authors discuss the question of why Ibn ‘Asākir did not compose a detailed compendium of the religious and legal aspects of jihād but merely a collection of hadiths on the subject, that is, sayings transmitted from the Prophet. Finally they refer to authors and scholars who lived at the same time as Ibn ‘Asākir but in other places, and whose writings exhibit similar tendencies of “intensification and reorientation of Sunnī jihād ideology and propaganda.” In this context, I miss a reference to Michael A. Köhler’s study *Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen Orient. Eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhundert* (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), which provides evidence of the fact that Muslim rulers in Syria such as Nūr al-Dīn and later Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn also used jihād propaganda in order to legitimize their rule and increase their power.

Chapter five presents the manuscript of Ibn ‘Asākir’s *al-Arba‘ūn hadithān fī l-ḥathib ‘alā l-jihād*. Its characteristics are described and the teachers from whom Ibn ‘Asākir learned the hadiths in question
are listed. The chapter also indicates the four principal topics to which the narrations can be assigned and, in conclusion, it discusses the role of the Qur’anic verses quoted in the hadiths.

The next chapter is devoted to the manuscript’s colophons and to the question of what can be learned from these colophons about jihād propaganda in Damascus in the 13th century. Colophons are manuscript notes indicating when and where a manuscript’s content was taught, the names of the teachers and students present during the lectures, the owner of the manuscript, and other such matters.

In chapter 7, the authors deal with the “legacy of the intensification and reorientation of Sunni jihad ideology” that arose during the 12th century in reaction to the Crusades and the schisms within Islam, especially between Sunnis and Shi’ites. They also elaborate on the role played by the scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) in this respect.

To summarize, the first part of the book confirms a proposition that has already been put forward in the past, namely that the concept of jihād changed in the course of history, as Islam itself adapted to changing historical circumstances. Such changes could already be seen during the lifetime of the Prophet Muḥammad, and they recurrent later. The Crusades and the religious and political situation of the Islamic world during the 12th and 13th centuries gave rise to new Sunnite jihād concepts. Like earlier jihād concepts, they were based on the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, but they emphasized other passages of these two sources. The authors rightly stress that the concept of jihād that emerged during the Crusades developed into a lasting legacy in mainstream Sunnī scholarship.

The edition and translation of the Arabic text of Ibn ‘Asākir’s al-Arbain hadith fī l-ḥathib ‘alā l-jihād in the second part of the book is of a high quality and it is a welcome addition to the sources available on jihād. However, the transcription of a few Arabic words and several proper names is not correct:


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3 See Motzki, op. cit., note 2.

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The present book is Janos’ revised PhD thesis and consists of four chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction and surveys in three sections followed by a fourth one reserved for conclusions (pp. 111-113) broad themes, namely (1) “cosmology, the sciences, and the scientific method” (pp. 11-43), (2) “astronomy and its place in the philosophical curriculum” (pp. 43-84), (3) “demonstration and analogy: a tension in al-Fārābī’s method” (pp. 84-111). The second chapter, titled “the architecture of the heavens: intellects, souls, and orbs,” treats in four sections followed by conclusions (pp. 201-203) (1) “the celestial bodies” (pp. 115-142), (2) “the separate intellects” (pp. 142-180), (3) “the first (al-awwal)” (pp. 180-189), and (4) “unity and multiplicity” (pp. 190-201). The third chapter under the header “matter and creation: a shift in paradigms?” follows the same basic structure as the two preceding ones and the subsequent chapter. It discusses (1) “the nature of celestial matter” (pp. 203-235), (2) “the origin of matter: from creationism to eternal causation” (pp. 235-311), (3) “strengthening the developmentalist hypothesis” (pp. 312-325) and closes with (4) “conclusion(s)” (pp. 325-332). Chapter 4 on “the aporia of celestial motion” studies (1) “the various motions of the heavenly bodies” (pp. 333-339), (2) “the causes of celestial motion” (pp. 339-355), and (3) “the problem of the particular motions of the planets” (pp. 355-376), wrapped up by (4) “conclusion(s)” (pp. 376-377). After these four chapters follows a brief presentation (4 pp.) of general conclusions, two appendices (pp. 383-402), the bibliography and an index.

Janos tries to combine in his research both history of philosophy and history of science in so far as they concern Islamicate societies and antiquity. This is an admirable effort, given that it is all too rarely undertaken by other researchers, despite the fact that both parts actually formed one whole for authors like al-Fārābī. Another feature of his research that impressed me is the substantial number of texts that he analyzed, both by al-Fārābī and other authors. The attribution of some of these to al-Fārābī has been contested by other researchers
and in one case, Janos provides an argument that they may be mistaken in their evaluation (pp. 258-260). The broad range of texts exploited in this study assures a substantially improved access to al-Fārābī’s thinking. In Janos’ view it even allows one to trace changes in the philosopher’s thoughts. This claim is argued for in Chapter 3. I consider this part as the most fascinating one of the whole book, although I think that ‘creationism’ is an inappropriate choice of term.

Given this number of texts and their individual problems, it would have been helpful for the reader if Janos had added a section presenting each of these texts, perhaps even with a brief survey of their respective content, and the issues raised about them in previous research. Janos’ decision to discuss three of these works in Appendix 1 and others in a scattered manner in different parts of his book creates a substantial obstacle for the general reader. Furthermore, his preference for displaying previous research mostly in the footnotes makes it difficult for the non-specialist to understand in which points the author differs from his predecessors and presents new insights. A case in point is Chapter 2 about al-Fārābī’s views on the composition of the universe and the emergences of its various intellects, soul, and bodies. Here, I was lost in the sensation of having read about this theory a long time ago in English as well as in Russian and found it impossible to see clearly Janos’ new contribution, except for a greater emphasis on Proclus than Plotinus. Additionally, in earlier remarks in Chapter 1, Janos pointed to Aristotelian commentators such as Alexander and Simplicius as possible sources of inspiration for al-Fārābī’s Neoplatonic bent (pp. 25-26), although one would like to have seen Janos present evidence for al-Fārābī’s direct access to these and other ancient Greek texts in Arabic translation (see p. 23).

In contrast, the already mentioned Chapter 3 shows that al-Fārābī read Neoplatonic works differently in his mature age than he did as a novice. To have uncovered this is one of the major new results of Janos’ studies. Other attractive parts of the book deal with al-Fārābī’s epistemology in Chapter 1 (pp. 57-63), in particular his concept of experience (tajriba), or al-Fārābī’s use of and departure from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, Book Lambda in Chapters 2 and 4 (pp. 144-167; 352-355) in his emanationist theories in combination with Neoplatonica and, as Janos argues, texts by three Aristotelian commentators (Alexander, Themistius, and Simplicius).

For a historian of science, the choice of “cosmology,” as Janos calls the main theme of his thesis, implies the necessity to discuss also
astronomy and astrology. For historians of philosophy this may not be a necessary consequence. They might prefer to rather focus on metaphysics or psychology. Both might be inclined to include parts of natural philosophy. Janos’ decision to include all five of these disciplines is to be applauded and constitutes one of the strong points of his book.

As for history of philosophy, Janos demonstrates the great importance of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, Book Lambda in particular for the changes in al-Fārābî’s understanding of the cosmos. Regarding history of science, he sees in two of Geminus’ works the basis for al-Fārābî’s views about the relationship between astronomy, astrology, and natural philosophy (pp. 70-73). He abstains, however, from mentioning that we know only of one of the two having been translated into Arabic (thanks to an extant Latin translation by Gerard of Cremona). This Arabic translation (or perhaps more than one) circulated not as a work by Geminus, but as a text either by Ptolemy or by Proclus. Janos was not, perhaps, aware of this information given in Berggren’s and Evan’s introduction to their edition of Geminus’ *Introduction to the Phainomena* (2006, pp. 102-103) and seems to see no issue with this shift of attribution for interpreting al-Fārābî (p. 71).

In other contexts, Janos describes al-Fārābî’s insistence on the importance of experience and observation for forming new astronomical theories. Janos suggests that the philosopher might have been informed about the latest astronomical research among his contemporaries (pp. 26, 61, 63; see also p. 334 for a related claim). These two positions illustrate the double methodological approach that Janos intended to adopt: considering al-Fārābî as part of “the Greek commentatorial tradition” (p. 4) and the investigation of al-Fārābî’s contemporary “cultural and intellectual milieu” (p. 1). While he proceeded well on the first trajectory, the second remains largely in the background. In my view, this is a general problem of contemporary research, at least in the history of science in Islamicate societies.

Appreciating thus honestly and seriously Janos’ engagement with two major historical disciplines and a broad range of texts and themes, I also see two methodological problems in the execution and rhetorical presentation of his study. One problem seems to be of his own creation, which he could have easily avoided. Subsuming the different ideas, theories, and methods from these disciplines under the neologism “cosmology” (early 18th c) is anachronistic, as he himself signals (see p. 11, n. 1). Moreover, this rhetorical choice contains
the potential for a lack of clarity or even misunderstandings (see for instance the terms “proofs of a cosmological nature,” p. 85, “cosmological demonstration,” pp. 88, 90). Its continuous application as a noun and an adjective brings with it the suggestion that these various theories, problems, and methods indeed formed some unified disciplinary study, suitably called “cosmological inquiry” (p. 91). This certainly means to take things too far.

The second set of methodological and interpretive problems that impacted Janos’ discussion is not exclusively or even predominantly his own doing. It rather reflects the general shortcomings of methodology in history of science in Islamicate societies. Janos’ survey in Chapter 1 illustrates this point nicely. The positions summarized there represent a macro-historical, long-term approach that fails to appreciate the complexity of the details on the ground. This approach results from the preference of a vertical over a horizontal history, which situates scholars, texts, and instruments in a long chain of results, instead of trying to study each one of them in their specific local and temporal contexts. A most explicit statement of this long-term view that treasures continuity over difference is found in the following sentences:

This makes al-Fârâbî a link in the long chain that goes from Geminus, Ptolemy, and Simplicius, through al-Bîrûnî and Ibn Sinâ, to al-Ţûsî, al-‘Urðî, and the Marâgha School of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. More specifically, there are obvious similarities between the astronomical outlook of Geminus, al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sinâ, and al-Ţûsî, which enable one to perceive some continuity in the way these thinkers conceived of this discipline. If al-Fârâbî did not belong to the bay‘a tradition proper, he may nevertheless be said to have anticipated and adopted some of the essential features that characterized its later development. (p. 84)

This kind of statement goes to the heart of the methodological debates that I have been engaged in with friends and colleagues for years. It is impossible to anticipate a later development, unless we believe in the second sight. Only later generations create change. Scholars pick and choose from works of their predecessors what appeals to them and what they find useful for their own work, reformulating and transforming previous achievements. Readers and bibliophiles decide which books to buy and collect. Teachers select treatises suitable for the classroom. And students do or don’t read them.
For understanding al-Fārābī’s works, we can dispense with all later scholars, except when they offer traces of lost works. We need to study his immediate contemporaries, the debates in which they were engaged, the libraries they owned, and the interests of their patrons and readers, in addition to al-Fārābī’s works proper. In the case of al-Fārābī’s involvement with astronomical activities and astrological debates of his period as well as epistemological attitudes in regard to these two disciplines, a study of texts of the ninth and the first half of the tenth centuries by, for instance, the Bānū Mūsā, Thābit ibn Qurra, al-Nayrīzī, or al-Battānī, to offer only a few possible names, would have been perhaps better suited for determining al-Fārābī’s access to actual research literature than any of the ancient and later scholars. Maybe, even the Rasā‘il Ikhwān al-ṣafā’, with their Neoplatonic leanings, might be a potentially suitable source. Not being a specialist on al-Fārābī though, I must admit that these suggested texts and authors may not contribute much, once they were investigated. Yet, a contextual approach taken seriously demands such a study of the presence and immediate past of a scholar. It is an approach that needs to be pursued with greater rigor if we want to come closer to an understanding of the development of a scholar’s views and his working practices within his own time and places of living.

Beyond these two overarching methodological problems, there are several other issues caused partly by the author’s too general language and by his occasional use of overly modernistic terms such as creationism or cosmopolitanism in addition to the already mentioned cosmology, partly by a seeming lack of familiarity with discussions within history of science at large and partly by his willingness to speculate. Some of his claims and conclusions, for instance, are so general as to become false or simply mere rhetoric. Two examples have to suffice here: (1) “Vast observational programs were patronized and implemented by some of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs, especially al-Maʿmūn, which resulted in the composition of new zijes or astronomical tables.” (p. 35); (2) “This overview of the Greek and early Arabic textual and historical contexts places al-Fārābī squarely at the confluence of various scientific, philosophical, and theological traditions, all of which, it may be surmised, left an imprint on the Second Teacher’s method and thought.” (p. 37). However, there was no other caliph of the ninth or tenth centuries who sponsored observations beyond having astrologers as clients. To call the two or three possible expeditions ordered by al-Maʿmūn and the various observations carried out
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by people at his court or connected with it ‘vast observational programs’ is one of a number of extrapolations from slight evidence that appear in the book. The stories about the expeditions have been doubted with arguments of different credibility by King and Mercier (Subayl 1 [2000], 207-241; The History of Cartography: Volume 2, Book 1, pp. 175-188). These supposedly ‘vast programs’ were of so little relevance for the court entourage that none of the ninth-century historians refers to them. Ignoring the issue of the underrepresented historical contexts, the claim of al-Fārābī’s being at some confluence overstates even the broadly conceived discussions that follow later in the book, which nonetheless are carefully limited to a comparatively small number of texts by earlier writers. The claim that all of these traditions left an imprint is again too grandiose. A more cautious one can easily be approved of, because it is improbable that none of those traditions has left any imprint. It is not the general claim that needs proof, but, as Janos goes on to show, the specifics that need to be investigated carefully.

At times, Janos’ conclusions baffled me as when he claims, for instance, that because the philosopher esteemed both Aristotle and Ptolemy as the foremost authorities in their fields he “would have felt the need to reconcile these two authorities.” (p. 37, same idea on pp. 335-336) or that because he advised students to start their education in geometry from solids and move subsequently to surface, line, and point as the more abstract objects, “in geometry, analysis implies a shift from physical three-dimensional bodies to abstract mathematical entities” (p. 108). If al-Fārābī indeed tried to reconcile Aristotle and Ptolemy, something that Janos obviously believes, but does not discuss with the needed clarity, this could have had all kinds of reasons, not merely the fact that he may have considered them the leading scholars of their respective fields. So far, the arguments brought forward by historians of astronomy for the efforts of scholars in different centuries to strengthen the role of Aristotelian physics in Ptolemaic mathematical astronomy did not emphasize their respective standing as a motive nor reconciliation as the main or only goal. As for the second conclusion, I assume this is a misunderstanding of Freudenthal’s arguments on which Janos relies here, since geometry deals with mathematical, not physical bodies. It would be in need of explanation if al-Fārābī believed otherwise. While these critiques may be considered minor, the lack of a thorough analysis of the concepts and terms of nature as used by al-Fārābī contributes substantially to
the unsatisfying discussion of celestial motion and its causes in Chapter 4. I do not understand why Janos abstained from discussing the various concepts of nature in antiquity and tracing the layers of the different Arabic translations of the concept in al-Fārābī’s treatises in the same manner as he did with other terms and concepts (pp. 339-352).

Finally, a few claims or assumptions are simply mistaken, such as the statement that “from Ibn Sīnā onward, ʿilm al-bayʿāb gradually replaced ʿilm al-nujūm in the mainstream philosophical and theological traditions and came to refer exclusively to mathematical astronomy” (p. 45), that Ptolemy’s *Planetary Hypotheses* were a “popular” book in antiquity (p. 333) or the suggestion that *quwwa* in the quote from the *Siyāsa* “may simply consist of a mechanical force transmitted as a result of the proximity of the orbs” (p. 347). A cursory look into major post-classical Arabic biographical dictionaries as well as manuscripts could have clarified that a) the two terms continued to be in use, with some overlapping, and b) that texts identified as belonging to the former discipline included not rarely chapters on the latter. There is only a small number of medieval Greek copies of parts of *Planetary Hypotheses* extant, which all seem to be derived from a single ancestor, Vat. gr. 1594, and equally few secondary testimonies to the work in Greek literature (I thank Alexander Jones, New York for this information). Ignoring the thorny issue of whether there existed a concept of force, the definitions or descriptions of *quwwa* in mechanical texts are connected with weight, specific weight, and the passing of equal distances in equal time intervals and thus are not easily available for the suggested interpretation in regard to the first heaven, its motion, and the motions of all the following orbs, epicycles etc.

Despite these critical comments, Janos is to be congratulated for this work. It re-introduces al-Fārābī into the realm of historical analysis of medieval philosophical thought, rebuts the Straussian approach in the form of Mahdi’s hypothesis regarding al-Fārābī’s political writings (pp. 38-43) and introduces the reader to a dazzling array of philosophical terms, concepts, and positions. It is a work that needs to be read by any serious student of the history of Islamicate philosophy and science.

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The concept of *hikma*, which first appeared in pre-Islamic poetry, exists in every field of Islamic thought. It permeates the Qur’ān and its commentaries, lexicons and dictionaries of terms, law and its sources, mysticism, theology, and philosophy. Hikmet Yaman discusses this concept in all these domains, to the exclusion of law and theology, informing us that “it would be a more realistic project to address *hikmah* in *fiqh* and *kalam* literatures in separate detailed studies” (p. 1, n. 1). To my mind, the author’s explanation for omitting these two important domains of Islamic thought from his presentation seems somewhat opaque, and hence unconvincing. Besides, it weakens the general statement included in the title of the book.

The book is divided into four parts, each treating a separate sphere: lexicography, Qur’ānic exegesis, Sufism, and philosophy. Every part begins with an introduction which elucidates its aims and contents. It would have been preferable to open the discussion with ch. 3 (“Contemporary Western Scholarship on the Meaning of *Hikmah*”), because, in the light of the absence of a comprehensive study of *Hikmah*, this chapter justifies in a detailed manner the composition of the present volume.

No doubt this work is very informative; hence, it supplies the reader with various facets, such as epistemological and practical perspectives, of the topic discussed. Each discussion is based on a variety of primary sources.

The author employs two methodological devices that accompany each discussion. First, *hikma* is dealt with taking into consideration the context of its appearance, and second, Yaman incorporates into the study related concepts, such as knowledge (*‘ilm*) and the derivations of the root *ḥ.k.m.*, such as “wise person (*ḥakīm*).” These two methods help the reader to locate *hikma* in its proper place in Islamic literature. However, sometimes, when the material on *hikma* is scanty, the discussion of related terms becomes the core of the study,
and in such situations, one wonders what benefit to the knowledge of ḥikma is gained from treating ʿilm and ʿaql (intellect) (pp. 107-117 on al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī1 (d. 728) and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 765). The extreme case of this phenomenon is found in the discussion about the Sufi al-Junayd (d. 910), because there our concept is totally absent (pp. 147-149). Also, discussions about various philosophical issues in al-Kindī’s (d. 873) thought (pp. 229-235), though teaching us his views in a lucid way, contribute nothing to our understanding of the concept of ḥikma in al-Kindī, which is fully discussed in the first pages on ḥikma in al-Kindī (pp. 221-228).

Another subject I would expect to find in such a study is the possibility or impossibility of changes in the meanings of ḥikma in the periods and throughout the diverse regions discussed. The author presents the various senses of the term in a comprehensible manner, but does not refer to this question. An examination of the material according to this criterion would show either development of the term or absence thereof in its meanings. For example, are there any distinctions in the meanings of the root ḥ.k.m. and its derivatives in the Medinan as compared to the Meccan sūras?

In the following, some comments on specific issues are made. On page 33, the author distinguishes between the attributes of essence (ṣifāt al-dhāt) and the attributes of action (ṣifāt al-fīl), defining the first term as attributes which belong peculiarly to God, and the second as attributes that other beings share with God but in a different manner. The first definition is not complete, because, for example, the attribute Creator (khāliq) belongs exclusively to God, but is not an essential attribute. The essential attributes are those which eternally exist in God, whereas the factual attributes refer to Him when He does a specific act, such as creation. Also, contrary to what the author says, the Muʿtazilites used these two characteristics of the attributes.²

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1 We do not know for certain who al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī was as a historical figure. Sufis tended to project on him their own views. Even the famous epistle on free will (Risāla fi l-qadar) attributed to him is suspected of being unauthentic. Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma: A Source Critical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 117-123.

In the light of the fact that later commentators such as al-Qurṭubī (d. 1272) and Ibn Kathīr (d. 1372) are mentioned in the discussion, the absence of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) is conspicuous. His amalgamation of many spheres of Islamic thought, like philosophy, theology, Sufism, etc., and his unique method of arranging the exegetical material in a question-answer form make his commentary very interesting. For example, he connects Qurʾān 4:113 (“God has sent down the Scripture and Wisdom [al-kitāb wa-l-ḥikma] to you,” trans. Abdel Haleem) with the concept of ‘isma (infallibility), claiming that God bestowed on Muḥammad the Book and Wisdom to protect him from sins and errors.

Another question one may raise in this context is the supposed connection between the commentator’s ideology and his explanation of ḥikma. In other words, the context to be examined is not only the immediate context of the Qurʾānic text, but also the general cultural environment of the exegete which can influence his understanding of this term.

The author devotes some space (pp. 259-266) to the much debated question of the meaning of the concept al-ḥikma al-mashriqiyya (eastern philosophy or illuminationist philosophy), which is also the title of Ibn Sīnā’s book that only part of which is extant. Contrary to Gutas’ claim that al-Ḥikma al-mashriqiyya indicates oriental philosophy, a philosophy of the East, and that the difference between this book and Ibn Sīnā’s al-Shifā’ is only a matter of style, Yaman opines that this book deals with another kind of philosophy critical of the Peripatetic philosophers and is somewhat inclined toward mysticism. Yaman does not address all the arguments Gutas advanced in his aforementioned article, especially his detailed comparison between al-Shifā’ and al-ḥikma al-mashriqiyya, which was carried out on the basis previously unexplored manuscripts of this work. For example, see the part on the soul in al-ḥikma al-mashriqiyya, which closely follows al-Shifā’.

To my mind, till now, Gutas’ thesis in this article remains unshakeable.

Here some minor comments are noted: On page 102 the term

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4 Ibid., 172.
mukāshafa is rendered “intellectual reflection,” but on page 105 it is altered to “unveiling,” which is the correct translation of the term. The term taqwâ is translated as “God’s consciousness” (p. 140), instead of the usual translation “fear of God.” On page 226, the phrase abl al-ghurbah ‘an al-haqq is understood as “strangers to the truth.” The verb gharaba ‘an means “he distanced himself from,” hence I would prefer to translate this phrase as “those who distanced themselves from the truth.”

I would add to the discussion two treatises written by al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857) – *Kitāb mā‘iyat al-qāl wa-ma‘nāb* and *Kitāb faḥm al-Qur‘ān wa-ma‘ānīb*— which are relevant to the treatment of ḥikma. Another important addition is al-Ghazālī’s *Kitāb al-ḥikma fī makhluqat Allāh*, which deals with the natural sciences.

Notwithstanding these comments, the present volume fills a gap in our understanding of the concept of ḥikma and its cognate terms and hence constitutes a significant contribution to the research on this important term which conveys various meanings in its many appearances in Islamic thought. The numerous primary sources consulted in this work prove the highly significant place assigned to ḥikma by Muslim scholars of early Islam.

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5 (ed. Ḥusayn al-Quwwatī; Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1982).

The problem of religious diversity is one of the most discussed issues in the philosophy of religion. Between Heaven and Hell examines the issue of religious diversity within the Islamic tradition. The book contains thirteen articles, most of which are the result of the “Islam, Salvation, and the Fate of Others” symposium held at the University of Illinois in 2010. The articles are organized into six thematic sections: Historical Dimensions, Diversity and Mercy, Supersessionism and Mercy, Reconceptualising Pluralism, Otherness and the Qur'ān, and Otherness and Inclusion/Exclusion.

The essays in the first section examine classical and modern Muslim approaches to the question of non-Muslim salvation. For instance, in his article, “Failures of Practice or Failures of Faith: Are non-Muslims Subject to the Sharia?,” A. Kevin Reinhart analyzes two different positions held by classical Muslim jurists. Reinhart argues that the development of Islam into a global religion by the late third century and growing concerns about equity caused most Muslim scholars to increasingly assert the position that – in theory, if not in practice – non-Muslims are subject to sharī‘a. In the second essay, entitled “No Salvation Outside Islam: Muslim Modernists, Democratic Politics, and Islamic Theological Exclusivism,” Mohammad Fadel traces changes in Muslim scholars’ approaches toward non-Muslims from classical to modern times. He argues that, legally and soteriologically, these changes can be characterized by a shift from exclusivism to inclusivism. He indicates that the liberal democratic ideals of the modern world are the primary reason for this change of approach. This assertion supports John Rawl’s claim that democracies can tolerate theological exclusivity and that, far from subverting the stability of a democracy, liberal democracy is more likely to subvert theological exclusivity.

In the essays in the subsequent sections, contributors depart from historical analysis to present their own evaluations of the problem of non-Muslim salvation. William C. Chittick argues in his essay, “The
Ambiguity of the Qur’anic Command,” that any claim to possess categorical knowledge about salvation implies the ability to interpret the divine Word and therefore stands on slippery ground. Chittick also claims that pre-modern scholars’ interpretations of other religions were based on insufficient knowledge of these religions. His preferred solution to the problem of salvation is a Sufi approach, which views the problem in terms of self-knowledge or love, rather than a theological approach, which views the problem in terms of reward and punishment. In his “Beyond Polemics and Pluralism: The Universal Message of the Qur’an,” Reza Shah-Kazemi also finds his solution in the Sufi tradition. For him, the universality of the Qur’an, as understood by the Sufi tradition, provides the most effective way to transcend exclusivism without relativizing one’s own faith. He claims that while a literal interpretation of key verses in the Bible leads to exclusivism, literal interpretations of dozens of verses in the Qur’an incontrovertibly uphold a universal religious perspective. Shah-Kazemi adds that the Qur’an defies a pluralist thesis, which claims that the diversity of faiths is the result of human responses to God. Rather, the Qur’an asserts that God is the source of religious diversity, which God ordained so that the members of different religions could compete with each other in goodness. Yasir Qadhi in his “The Path of Allah or the Paths of Allah?” examines classical theological interpretations of the Qur’anic verses related to the salvation of others and then argues that it is difficult to find support for soteriological pluralism in the Qur’an and its classical interpretations.

The question of whether religious pluralism is compatible with Islam is approached from a different angle by Tim Winter in his article, “Realism and Real: Islamic Theology and the Problem of Alternative Expressions of God” Winter argues that religious pluralism is incompatible with Islamic monotheism because Islamic monotheism rejects the idea of a plurality of objects of worship specific to different human groups that mediate between individual worshippers and the ineffable Absolute, an idea that characterizes many forms of ancient paganism. Winter sees the source of pluralism in the paganism of the Greeks and the Romans, who believed in an ultimate deity beyond human knowledge or linguistic expression and accessible to human beings only when manifested in the form of a particular cult figure. Therefore, different nations worship different personifications of the Ultimate. This understanding, Winter argues, not only suited pagan philosophers but was politically advantageous to Roman emperors,
whose subjects worshipped a large variety of deities. Winter further contests that the triumph of Christianity in the Roman Empire suppressed this pluralist approach. The arrival of Islam also asserted in a particularly firm way the monotheistic exclusion of pluralism. Winter believes that Islamic theology also rejects the pagan assumption that language about the divine nature provides subjective information. Classical Sunnī orthodoxy teaches the objective reality of the divine qualities and is therefore incompatible with the pluralist claim. To escape from this difficulty, Winter notes, pluralists frequently turn to Sufi figures such as Ibn ʿArabī. However, Ibn ʿArabī’s view of other religions does not support a pluralist interpretation. For Winter, this does not mean that Sunnī orthodoxy excludes others, for although it claims to present truths about God and the world, it does not totally exclude the claims of other religions.

Criticism of pluralism continues in Muhammad Legenhausen’s article, “Nonreductive Pluralism and Religious Dialogue.” Unlike reductive pluralism, which dismisses the fundamental claims of particular religious traditions, nonreductive religious pluralism recognizes that some of the values held by various religious traditions cannot be reduced to common factors among them. Because there are many forms of religious pluralism, Legenhausen argues that nonreductive pluralism can be defended by Islamic sources.

Sajjad H. Rizvi, in “Oneself as the Saved Other? The Ethics and Soteriology of Difference in Two Muslim Thinkers,” evaluates religious pluralism by drawing upon the arguments of two contemporary Iranian thinkers, M. Mojtahed Shabestari and Abdolkarim Soroush. Rizvi criticizes the jurisprudential and scripto-centrist approaches to the problem of pluralism that dominate Muslim discourse. According to Rizvi, Shabestari and Soroush present an alternative approach. However, they fall short of providing definite answers to basic questions and therefore leave room for further discussion of the issue.

The idea of the ambiguity of the divine Word, mentioned earlier in Chittick’s contribution, reappears in Farid Esack’s article, “The Portrayal of Jews and the Possibilities for Their Salvation in the Qur’an.” Esack argues that the Qurʾān does not take a monolithic position toward Jews. Because contemporary discourse on the Jews is dominated by polemic, Esack’s analysis avoids such an approach to show that because the portrayal of the Jews is not definite, any definitive interpretation of the issue should be considered as at best a selective read-
ing of the text. Consequently, he argues, there is a possibility for pluralities of understanding to exist in a pluralistic world. Esack elaborates that Qur’ānic verses related to the Jews should be read within their historical context. Such readings indicate that the possibility of salvation for Jews may be an equally legitimate interpretation as that supported by the polemicists. Historicizing the text also saves the Qur’ān. It is an inconsistency on the part of Muslim theologians, Esack notes, to reject Christianity’s doctrine of original sin while believing that Jews are condemned because of the indiscretions of their forefathers.

In her “Embracing Relationality and Theological Tensions: Muslima Theology, Religious Diversity, and Fate,” Jerusha Lamptey evaluates religious pluralism using Muslim women’s interpretations of the Qur’ān, Jeannine H. Fletcher’s Christian feminist approach to religious pluralism, and T. Izutsu’s semantic analyses of the Qur’ān. Lamptey argues that contemporary Islamic discourse on religious pluralism, as exemplified in the writings of Asghar Ali Engineer, Mahmut Aydın, S. Hossein Nasr, R. Shah-Kazemi, and M. Legenhausen, prioritizes sameness over difference. She then evaluates three contemporary Muslim women’s interpretations of the Qur’ān (Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, and Riffat Hassan) as they relate to religious pluralism. The principle implication of their interpretations is that although the Qur’ān creates categories to describe religious difference, such as muslim and kāfir, these are not the same as those used in contemporary religious discourse. The Qur’ānic categories refer to dynamic patterns of belief, action, and interaction. Salvation is therefore not determined by membership in a particular religion but by participation in that dynamic pattern.

The discussion of otherness and inclusion/exclusion continues in the book’s final section. In his article, “The Food of the Damned,” David M. Friedenreich sets larger theological questions aside to examine a simple problem encountered by ordinary Muslims, namely, whether they may have lunch with their non-Muslim associates. He claims that medieval discussions about the food of non-Muslims did not consider actual cases. Rather, Sunnī Muslim jurists discussed imaginative cases for pedagogical purposes, and Shīʿī jurists discussed the issue as a form of anti-Sunnī polemic. Friedenreich argues that, unlike medieval Muslim thinkers, many contemporary Muslim writers pay considerable attention to the actual practices of non-Muslims.
In her “Acts of Salvation: Agency, Others, and Prayer Beyond the Grave in Islam,” Marcia Hermansen explores the prohibition of Muslims from praying for deceased non-Muslims. She argues that for an exclusivist Muslim, this prohibition can be tenable. For those who are inclined to pluralism, however, this prohibition may be challenged by means of historical contextualization and textual analysis. Hermansen notes that she, as a Muslim living in a modern pluralistic society, finds this prohibition untenable.

In the final article, “Citizen Ahmad among the Believers: Salvation Contextualized in Indonesia and Egypt,” Bruce B. Lawrence questions whether the pragmatic considerations of this world influence metaphysical reflections about salvation. He demonstrates that practical everyday structures influence and reflect textual interpretations and theological projections of the End. Lawrence suggests that one cannot imagine diversity in the next world unless he or she experiences it in this world. Experiencing diversity, however, does not mean embracing pluralism, which requires recognizing, respecting, and acknowledging diversity as a divinely decreed good. With this in mind, Lawrence examines how salvation is contextualized within two Muslim majority nation states, namely, Indonesia and Egypt.

These articles, together with the foreword by Tariq Ramadan, provide a balanced account of Islamic perspectives on salvation and the fate of others. Unlike earlier works on the subject that passionately advocated John Hick’s pluralist thesis without reservation, the contributors to this volume demonstrate the diverse range of interpretations within Islamic tradition. Most of the contributors are critical of Hick’s pluralist thesis and suggest alternative forms of pluralism.

Muammer İskenderoğlu

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Hossein Modarressi is one of the most unique professors in Islamic studies in Western academia. Trained as a traditional Shi'i mujtahid in Qum and Najaf, and who became established as an interesting editor of texts and intellectual historian in the 1970s (many of those texts having been recently re-published from the Mar'ashî Library in Qum and in the USA), he wrote a dissertation on Islamic law at Oxford and soon after was appointed at Princeton where he has become a leading specialist on Islamic law, especially Shi'i law, as well as on the Shi'i tradition, and trained generations of students in law and philosophy who are a credit to him. This festschrift comprises offerings by a number of his best students and colleagues at Princeton and beyond. The articles are divided into five parts that reflect his output and his interests. The first is on source studies – complementing his work on texts that he edited such as al-Jishumî’s Risālat al-Iblîs. Part two is on the Shi'i tradition on which he has contributed major studies on attitudes to the Qur’ân, on tradition, an influential bio-bibliography of the classical period, his controversial study of the occultation and his forthcoming definitive volume of his vision for Shi’ism. Part three takes up his interests in Islamic law for which he is perhaps best known. Part four takes up his philosophical interests expressed in

3 Kharaj in Islamic Law (Tiptree, Essex-UK: Anchor Press, 1983); An Introduction
his supervision of students and which came from his studies in the Shi‘i seminary. The final part on historical traditions takes up his interests on the histories of Qum and similar studies.4 A final part lists his bibliography and includes a short summary of the significance of his Persian works (recently re-printed) by Hossein Kamaly. Modarressi’s output has been significant and his works have had a major impact in the field – such a festschrift is a wonderful testament to his contribution and the role that he has played through his students in forming the current field of Islamic studies.

The first part on source studies comprises three chapters that closely focus on a singular text or so. Etan Kohlberg looks at a report narrated by Abū Baṣīr on the merits of the Shī‘a recorded in al-Kulaynī’s Rawḍat al-Kāfī and reflects the method of ḥadīth source-critical analysis that seems to be representative of the ‘Hebrew University school,’ focusing on inter-textuality and the significance of texts for an understanding of the formation of the Shi‘i tradition. Behnam Sadeghi’s piece on emendations to the Qurān continues his recent work on the formation and canonization of the text mainly through a critique of earlier engagements with the issue, not least a famous article by Devin Stewart.5 Najam Haider’s article on Mu‘āwiya and his ‘dropping’ of the basmala in prayer complements his recent book on early Shi‘ite and the role of ritual practices in the formulation of identity – and should probably be read alongside recent historiographical studies of Mu‘āwiya by Khaled Keshk (Chicago PhD dissertation) and Ammar Nakhjuwani (Exeter PhD dissertation).

Part two comprises three rather different articles on the Shi‘i tradition. Hassan Ansari’s chapter on the Kitāb al-waṣīyya of ʿĪsā ibn al-

4 Id., Qumnāma: Majmū‘a-yi Maqālāt va Mutūn dar bāra-yi Qum (Qum: Mar‘ashi, 1364 HS [1985]).
Mustafād is a wonderful exercise in bibliography and excavation of the tradition. He notes that the title arises from a genre of texts closely associated with polemics on the imāmate, and suggests that the later tradition’s assumption that he wrote such a work – derived partly from the report on the topic preserved in *al-Kāfī* – suggests an assumption that much of the material collated in *al-Kāfī* was not only orally transmitted but also compiled from earlier works that have not survived, somewhat like an earlier argument and discussion on the so-called four hundred texts (*uṣūl arba’a mi’a*) that supposedly constituted the compilation of *al-Kāfī*. Concomitantly, he suggests a process whereby texts accrued in the later tradition and were projected back to a more classical period – and may account, for example, for the Šafāvid ‘discovery’ of texts, some of which have now been published as the ‘sources’ (*maṣādīr*) for the *Biḥār al-anwār* of al-Majlīsī.6

Asma Sayeed’s chapter on women in Imāmī biographical dictionaries is an expression of contemporary desires to recover women’s voices and recent attempts to find authorities in the early period, not least to juxtapose them with the seeming lack of female authority in the modern period.7 She raises the seeming paradox of the oblivion of women’s voices in a tradition whose founding figures include major female characters. The third contribution in this section by Michael Cook addressing a seemingly obscure point of legal and ritual practice about the inclining to the left in prayer that is predominantly but not exclusively associated with classical Shī‘ī practice. It provides further evidence for where traditionalism seemed to clash with rationalism and the exact sciences and demonstrates Cook’s meticulous concern with textual detail and scholarship – his annotation in endnotes is longer than the actual text!

Part three on law similarly brings together three contributions. Baber Johansen, a colleague of Modarressi at Harvard (since Modarressi beyond his chair at Princeton has affiliations and appointments at


Oxford, Columbia, and Harvard as well), looks at the construction of legal norms in Sunnī law and how meaning is derived for the law, an important topic given some recent reformist approaches to Islamic law. Intisar Rabb, drawing on her magisterial doctoral dissertation supervised by Modarressi on qawā‘id fiqhiyya, considers how the system of legal maxims relates to a minimalist approach to law and the need to deal with the crisis that emerges from the absence of those who are authoritative on the law (such as a Prophet or Imām). Her article is a useful prism for approaching some of the major themes of contention in the study of Islamic law such as the tension between rationalism and traditionalism, or between legal monism and pluralism. Minimalism leads to a position where the ‘right’ answer to a question is the best one that conforms to core values established. This feeds well into recent debates on the ethics of Islamic law and the processes of refining legal practice and moral obligation. Khaled Abou El-Fadl’s chapter makes the link to the contemporary clearer with a contribution on human rights discourse in law, and how the normative requirements of human rights and Islamic traditions may clash. His interest surprisingly lies less in a process of reconciling the two and more in understanding how the two traditions may well be mutually exclusive – and usefully addresses the plurality and heterogeneity of both traditions.

The three chapters in part four on the philosophical traditions are somewhat more indexical. Robert Wisnovsky, who wrote an excellent dissertation on causality in Avicenna under Modarressi’s supervision, introduces a codex of the work of the Christian Baghdādi philosopher Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī preserved in the library of the Madrasa-yi Mervī in Tehran. It includes an edition and translation of the five kepbalāia, and should be read alongside another article on the same codex in the recent festschrift for Dimitri Gutas. Sabine Schmidtke’s article on two commentaries on the logical school text al-Shamsiyya by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī copied by David Maimonides provides further evidence for the importance of the Jewish-Muslim intellectual encounter and the relevance of the Firkovitch collection in St. Petersburg for texts that transmit the intellectual heritage of the Islamic traditions. She includes an inventory of the fragments and an edition in Arabic letters of the Judaeo-Arabic text. Asad Ahmed’s useful article

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on logic in the Khayrābādī school of India is an exercise in Islamic intellectual history in South Asia. He provides a map for transmission of logical reasoning and research through to the twentieth century. It will become a foundational article for any future study of the course of Islamic philosophical traditions in India.

The final part on historical traditions comprises three contributions by Modarressi’s oldest associates, Roy Motahhedeh, Wilferd Madelung, his supervisor at Oxford, and Richard Bulliet, colleague at Columbia recently retired. The former’s study of the ways in which the historiographical tradition imagined the past demonstrates how the Iranian medieval chroniclers conceived of a unified past in which biblical and pre-Islamic Iranian figures merged, in which Solomon and his miraculous throne became associated, via Takht-i Solaymān in Azerbaijan, with Persepolis (takht-i Jamshīd). He shows the accommodation of the Iranian past and how rulers in the medieval period drew upon different patrimonies to construct their own authority – as successors to Solomon, to Cyrus, and to ‘Ali. Madelung’s contribution is somewhat more narrowly focused on al-Ḥasan al-Nawbakhtī on astrologers. Known as the author of a heresiography, al-Nawbakhtī’s Kitāb al-ārāf wa-l-diynāt is lost but Madelung constructs his position based on later citations in works that Madelung knows well such as Ibn al-Malāhimī’s Kitāb al-muṭamad fī uṣūl al-’dīn which he edited with Martin McDermott. Bulliett’s comparative study of conversion to Islam and Christianity takes up the theme that he discussed in a book some time ago. He looks at the role and elaboration of legal traditions within the diffusion of religions. He concludes that it is only once conversion leads to a majority for the imperial faith that legal traditions flourish and reach their culmination.

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In this study, Sean Anthony explores a variety of sources in his quest to explain the influence of the enigmatic ‘Abd Allâh ibn Saba’, who appears in the historical narrative surrounding the murder of ‘Uthmân ibn ‘Affân and subsequent events while also playing a role in the emergence of Shi‘ism, or at least its radical apocalyptic strain. This is no easy task, given the scarcity and inconsistency of reports on Ibn Saba’, as well as the problematic nature of the sources with which Anthony must grapple. His efforts have produced an important, though likely not definitive, treatment of a central figure in early Islamic sectarian history and the polemics surrounding the emergence of Shi‘ism.

Anthony begins with the troublesome corpus of Sayf ibn ‘Umar, upon whom al-Ṭabarî and others relied for material about Ibn Saba’ (or Ibn al-Sawdâ’ as he is sometimes called). After discussing (but by no means solving) questions about Sayf’s reliability, Anthony describes the image of Ibn Saba’ presented by Sayf. He demonstrates that Sayf’s Ibn Saba’ is not dedicated to a specific religious doctrine, but is simply intent upon disrupting the community by sowing the seeds of fiitâ. For Sayf, Ibn Saba’ is not so much a heretic as a saboteur. He serves a crucial purpose in Sayf’s narrative which, while pro-‘Uthmân, also tries to salvage the reputations of ‘Ali ibn Abî Ṭâlib and the other Companions. In Sayf’s narrative, ‘Ali, ‘Â‘îsha, Ṭâlîha, and al-Zubayr all want to resolve their differences peacefully and appear to be on the verge of doing so when Ibn Saba’ and his minions sow discord and ultimately incite violence. In the process, Sayf manages to paint Ibn Saba’ as the originator of several incompatible doctrines, making him the progenitor of both the Shi‘i ghulât and the Khawârij. Anthony carefully navigates Sayf’s corpus, noting contradictions and showing how Sayf’s interpretations differed from others. He also explains frequent implicit references to Christian and Jewish lore to suggest that the construction of Sayf’s Ibn Saba’ took place in a multi-faith milieu.

Turning to the heresiographic sources, which center on doctrine rather than history, Anthony focuses largely on al-Nawbakhtî’s Firaq
al-Shi‘a because it includes what Anthony identifies as the earliest extant accounts of Ibn Saba’. Anthony identifies a number of doctrinal innovations attached to Ibn Saba’, including the assertion that ‘Ali received the wasiyya from Muḥammad, the claim that portions of the Qur’ān had been concealed and were known only to ‘Ali, the belief that ‘Ali either had not died or would be resurrected before the apocalypse, and the practice of cursing the first three caliphs. He focuses most of his attention on two archetypes attached to Ibn Saba’. First, Anthony examines stories in which ‘Ali punishes Ibn Saba’ for his proclamation of ‘Ali’s divinity and/or his claim that ‘Ali was privy to hidden verses of the Qur’ān. The sources include contradictory accounts of ‘Ali’s condemnation of Ibn Saba’. In some, ‘Ali orders that Ibn Saba’ and his followers be immolated for their crimes. In others, ‘Ali exiles Ibn Saba’ to al-Madā’in.

Anthony explains that the exile accounts were crucial to solve the chronological problem inherent in the second archetype upon which he focuses, namely Ibn Saba’’s refusal to accept that ‘Ali had been killed. Anthony connects Ibn Saba’’s belief in the raj’a, or return, of ‘Ali to broader changes in Shi‘i apocalyptic doctrines associated with the occultation of the 12th Imām. He examines and largely dismisses parallels to Christian Docetist beliefs about Jesus. Instead, he focuses on similarities between predictions of ‘Ali’s return and late antique Jewish apocalyptic topoi. His discussion of the heresiographic portrayal of Ibn Saba’ focuses largely on al-Nawbakhtī’s account, but also draws from the broader apocalyptic tradition of the period. Unfortunately, he does not trace the evolution of Ibn Saba’’s image in later heresiographical writings.

Next, Anthony turns to the Umayyad period, where the Saba‘iyya reappear in the midst of al-Mukhtar’s revolt in Kūfah. Here, Anthony tries to determine whether these are the same Saba‘iyya associated with Ibn Saba’, or whether the label had evolved to apply to the ghulat or to the Shi‘a in general. He also considers whether in this context, the label might simply refer to a Yemeni tribal group. Much of Anthony’s discussion, and that in the sources, focuses on al-Mukhtar’s attempt to use what he purports to be ‘Ali’s chair as a talisman around which to rally his followers. Anthony finds a parallel in Jewish stories about the Ark of the Covenant and argues that al-Mukhtar used the chair to justify his religious status as its protector, casting himself in the role of King Saul. There were, of course, questions about what, if any, special powers the Saba‘iyya thought the
chair conveyed and whether any of this had anything to do with Ibn Saba’ himself.

Anthony also discusses the *Kitāb al-irja*, ascribed to al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, which includes a denunciation of the Saba’iyya. The authenticity and content of this source have been much discussed in modern scholarship. Anthony offers no new answers to questions of its provenance, but does show that the beliefs ascribed to Ibn Saba’ in both the historical and heresiographical narrative appear here as well. This suggests that there was a general consensus that the Saba’iyya were excessively loyal to ‘Ali, that they believed he had access to hidden portions of the Qur’ān, and that he would return prior to judgment day to bring justice, etc.

Ultimately, Anthony concludes that Ibn Saba’ in all likelihood existed and that he may have been one of the first to assert that ‘Ali had not died. The sectarian movement around him, however, appears to have developed later. Ibn Saba’ served as a convenient figurehead, in part because his alleged Jewish lineage allowed later commentators to ascribe aberrant doctrines to outsiders. Both Sunnī and Shiʿī writers could use him to dissociate extreme views from orthodox Islam.

Anthony’s work is a welcome addition to the corpus of scholarship on the emergence of sectarian divisions in early Islam. Its focus on doctrinal rather than political divisions is a welcome corrective to shortcomings in some scholarship on the topic. Anthony is thorough, but cautious in his conclusions. He grapples with difficult texts whose authenticity remains disputed without making provocative claims about their provenance. He does a service by contextualizing the emergence of Shiʿism in the larger late-antique apocalyptic milieu. While Anthony’s efforts to uncover the earliest sources is admirable, readers would have benefited from a more complete discussion of how Ibn Saba’’s image evolved in later sources and how he was used in later Sunnī-Shiʿī polemics. Perhaps Anthony will consider this as a later project. The book’s biggest failing is not its scholarship, but its editing. There are copious editing and typographical errors throughout. While these present a mere annoyance to native English readers, some may confound scholars with less proficiency in English usage and misusage. One hopes that these technical flaws do not distract too much from Anthony’s important scholarly contribution.
Josef van Ess’s latest work is a monumental study of the Islamic heresiographic tradition in Arabic and in Persian literatures. In the style of his colossal history of early Islamic theology, the six-volume *Theologie und Gesellschaft* (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991-1997), van Ess surveys in this book writings about religious divisions within Islam. We have come to call these works heresiographies, although that word, which has its origins in Christian literature, does not fully apply. There are not in Islam heresies like there are in Christianity. Where there is no center of orthodoxy there can be no heresies, van Ess argues, and in Islam orthodoxy has always been in the eye of the beholder, meaning the author of whatever heresiography one is looking at (II, 1298-1308).

In Islam, this genre of literature develops out of the famous *hadith* of the 70-odd divisions of Islam. In one of his earlier works of 1975, van Ess already dealt with this *hadith* and some of its numerous variants (*Zwischen Hadīth and Theologie*, 134-136). In a book of 1971, van Ess had also dealt with Mu'tazilite heresiographic writing. He begins this study with an analysis of the *firqa-hadith*. In its most widespread version, it bemoans the fact that there will be more divisions in Islam than in its two predecessor-religions, Judaism and Christianity. In the tradition of Ignaz Goldziher’s *hadīth*-criticism, van Ess is able to show that there are developments in *hadith*-literature, which react to one another. The title of his 1975-study already expressed van Ess’ conviction that much of *hadith*-literature records the theological thought of the early Muslim community. The *hadīth* of the 70-odd divisions in Islam with all its variants is for him a reaction to the trauma of the first civil war. Out of that generates the desire to name the 71 or 72 groups in Islam that will not be saved. Only one, *al-firqa al-nājiya*, will enjoy redemption in the afterlife. This “saved group” (in some versions of the *hadīth* identified with the *al-sawād al-a'ẓam*, the “broad mass” or even the “silent majority,” as van Ess
translates it, I, 40, 43) is the closest one gets to orthodoxy in Islam. Given that almost all groups in Islam engaged in the literary genre of documenting the 70-odd groups, there are as many orthodox views as there are “deviants.” Van Ess is probably right when he argues that the non-centered approach of Islam is far more “normal” and in many ways more original to a religion than Christianity’s search for a center and for heretic peripheries. After all, Islam almost continues – as a monotheist religion – the attitude of ancient polytheism, where there was a broad understanding that all religions worship the same pantheon of gods, albeit by different rites. The pantheon of gods is merely replaced with the understanding that all religions worship the same God.

Van Ess’ more than 1,500 pages of study are divided into three parts. First, there are roughly a hundred pages of analysis of the fiqrā-ḥadīth and how it has been understood by later Muslim scholars followed by a historical survey of works that list and explain the various denominations in Islam. This is the bulk of the 2-volume work, stretching through pp. 107-1197. It begins with authors of the early 2nd/8th century and ends with works that were published in the mid-20th. The third part (II, 1201-1369), titled “What do we mean by Islamic heresiographic literature?” brings together observations on the genre, its techniques, the language it created and used, and the institutions where this happened. The book finishes with a set of very detailed indices.

Rather than simply dealing with heresiographies, van Ess also includes the important works of maqālāt literature that simply enlist different positions to given theological problems. Al-Ashʿarī’s (d. 324/935) Maqālat al-Islāmiyyīn is, of course, the best known representative but van Ess devotes equal space to the slightly earlier maqālāt-book of the Muʿtazilite al-Kaʿbī (d. 319/931), which is extant in a single manuscript but has, for reasons that may lie in its state of preservation, only partly been edited. Lacking a proper edition, van Ess makes diligent and laudable efforts to reconstruct its shape and content from later quotations (I, 351-362). The three great books of Islamic comparative religion, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī’s al-Farq bayna l-firaq (I, 667-711), Ibn Ḥazm’s al-Fiṣal fī l-milal (II, 837-856), and al-Shahrastānī’s al-Milal wa-l-nihal (II, 860-900) are discussed in great detail as are those of the second and third row of authors in this genre, such as al-Nawbakhtī (d. c. 310/922), al-Maṭāʿī (d. 377/987), al-
Van Ess does not neglect the “smaller” books of the genre either – sometimes just a few obscure folios in a manuscript. On occasion he masterfully reconstructs a lost work from information he finds in later writings. Since almost every major thinker in Islam contributed to this genre, most are dealt with here. Although simply titled Beobachtungen, “observations,” it is clear that van Ess aims at an exhaustive catalogue of heresiographic and doxographic literature in Islam – as long as those doxa (Greek for “opinions”) have their roots in Islamic thinking. Philosophical doxographies such as that of pseudo-Ammonius or the Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma are not a part of this study and are only dealt with as a source material in works like al-Shahrastānī’s al-Mīlal wa-l-nīḥal.

The philosophers are not considered one of the 73 divisions of Islam because they did not generate in the historical process of Muslim divisions that begins with Abū Bakr’s appointment to the caliphate or, more objectively, with the murder of ʿUthmān 24 years later. That is why van Ess also does not consider their schools a part of this book’s subject (II, 873). One could ponder, however, how the pattern of the 72 or 73 sects misrepresents the true divisions within Islam, where after the mid-3rd/9th century the Muslim falāṣīfa play an important role in doctrinal debates and will continue to do so until the modern period. Books that do not aim to explain the 70-odd divisions, such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) recently edited al-Rīyāḍ al-mūniqa fi arā’ abl al-ʿilm, sometimes include the falāṣīfa. Often, however, they simply do not consider them Muslims, like al-Ashʿarī who omits them from his Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn but is said to have included them in a second, similar book on the teachings held by non-Muslims (Maqālāt ghayr al-Islāmiyyīn), which is lost (I, 456). We do not know whether al-Kindī (d. c. 250/865), for instance, was part of that book or whether it limited itself to the pre-Islamic philosophers. The fact remains that Muslim doxographic and heresiographic literature played an important role in the construction of Islam’s self-understanding as a religion (or even: a culture) that is significantly different from the intellectual traditions of antiquity and late-antiquity in the eastern Mediterranean. Muslim philosophers never fully agreed with this and they often found followers among Western researchers, most recently among those who put early Islamic history in a late-antique context. The fact that the Islamic attitude to heresies continues that of late antiquity (see above) is another piece of evidence for those who argue for continuities rather than drastic
ruptures.

This book is not written for beginners in the field. Van Ess assumes that his readers know a lot about the history of Islamic thought. Like others of his works lately, the book is written in the style of an oral conversation between author and reader (in a German “Plauderton”). Van Ess puts to paper whatever he finds noteworthy about the texts he discusses and their authors. For the accomplished reader of German, this makes a good and often also a quick read (the 1,500 pages can be easily read cover to cover), yet I am not sure what those who have to learn German will say. The chatty tone allows van Ess to fling in some comments about contemporary journalism and tourism (II, 650, 737) as well as his discomfort with the recent reforms at German universities (I, 431). This approach never manages to be particularly systematic and sometimes leads to omissions, as when one misses the death dates of authors such as al-Ḥākim al-Jishumi, which is simply omitted among all the interesting chitchat about him (II, 761-766). In other publications we would call this frowsy or sloppy. That is, however, the impression one gets about van Ess’ system of bibliographical referencing. Almost in the style of the 19th century, he simply lists the name of an author in a footnote (e.g. “Rudolph”) together with a page reference, assuming that his readers will know which publication is referred to (in this case Ulrich Rudolph’s *Al-Māturīdī und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand*). Several quotes (e.g. I, 66 or I, 75-76) are not identified and the book lacks a key of abbreviations. One would need a certain amount of imagination to understand that “Fs.” is the abbreviation for “Festschrift” and a firm grounding in classical studies – as van Ess certainly assumes his readers have – to realize that “apū” stands for the Latin *antepeanultimo*, meaning the third line from the bottom of a page. The more common Latin abbreviation “*ibid.*” does not always refer to the last mentioned bibliographical entry but may point to the most important text that the passage discusses. A good desk editorial would have established a more stringent style, but even de Gruyter publishers, despite its prohibitive price range, seems to think that dispensable.

Van Ess’ “observations” focus on the individual primary text and what it says. It concerns itself much with philology in the sense that it tries to show who read whom in this genre and who copied from whom. While it does engage closely with the teachings of individual
authors it is not a monograph study that aims at systemic overall conclusions (a “thesis”) about the genre of heresiography and doxography in Islam. In its third part, it brings interesting observations on the “art of heresiography” (see e.g. II, 1243), yet although it notes that ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) was the first to introduce a border between erring and unbelieving groups who both consider themselves Muslims, the book fails to note the significance of this step. “Unbelief” (kufr) becomes a more and more important concept within the development of this genre and it is not really dealt with systematically by van Ess. His most enlightening discussion of this subject is on pp. II, 1287-1295 where he deals with the recently edited Kitāb al-baṭbṭ ‘an adillat al-takfīr wa-l-taṣdīq of the Mu’tazilite Abū l-Qāsim al-Bustī (d. c. 420/1029). Yet every discussion of takfīr should start by pointing out that it means very different things to different people. While some authors give it a distinctly legal sense and call for the death penalty of those found to be Muslim kuffār, for others, the accusation of kufr bears just the slight stigma of holding wrongful convictions. ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī’s distinction between the ahl al-ahwā (the erring groups) and those “who claim to belong to Islam, yet do not” introduced a new way of thinking about the Muslim community that paved the way first to al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) and Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 728/1328) infamous condemnations of their doctrinal opponents and, later, to the often deadly practice of political takfīr in the 20th and 21st centuries. While van Ess’ study focuses on the primary texts he presents to his readers, and while he also notes in great detail what relevant secondary literature exists, he rarely engages seriously with the latter and does not discuss the pros and cons of certain interpretations. He misses, for instance, the central importance of the legal tool of the ʻistīʻāba in any Muslim scholars’ assessment of kufr and takfīr. No legal harm could be done to unbelievers as long as this “invitation to repent” from one’s assumed unbelief was generally applied. Once the right to repent could be denied (beginning with the persecution of Ismā‘īlī missionaries in the mid-5th/11th century), the thinking about the community of Muslims and its periphery changes.

Yet together with its numerous observations on individual texts, van Ess’ latest book is full of interesting comments on such subjects as “Islam” as a mere construction of out- and insiders (II, 1309) or on Islamic orthodoxy as shaped by “communities of common understanding” (Verstehensgemeinschaften, II, 1328). It presents an im-
mense amount of new material and is – plain and simple – an enormously diligent piece of work that brings together decades of careful reading of Islamic texts.

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Page references to works referred to in the text should take the following form: (Touraine, 1995: 9-10). The verses of the Qurān should be referred to as follows: Q 2:23; Q 17:108; the references from the Old and New Testament should carry chapter number and name, and verse number.

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