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FROM THE EDITORS

In this issue of *Ilahiyat Studies* we present four articles and seven carefully selected books, reviewed by well-qualified reviewers in their respective fields.

The first paper in the issue is “*Kenosis* (Self-Limitation of God): A Philosophical and Theological Approach” by Hasan Özalp. The article focuses on an age-old problem of the theistic concept of God and its relation to the issue of the absolute perfection of God and related topics. In his attempt to elucidate the problem of *kenosis*, the author presents a careful analysis of some of the leading scholars in the field with different religious, philosophical, and cultural backgrounds. As the author makes it clear, the article raises more questions than answers, which will invite other scholars to be part of the debate.

Our second paper revisits in three steps one of the controversial topics in the field of history of Islam by asking the question of “Was Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī ‘Exiled’ to al-Rabadha?” Mr. Hançabey presents a nuanced analysis of various positions on the topic without siding with one or the other of these positions because the multiplicity of narratives makes it scientifically impossible to determine which position is more accurate. What becomes clear, however, is that the uneasy relations between ʿUthmān and Abū Dharr had great impact upon the religious, ethical, and political climate of the following generation of Muslims.

In her article “Tanners of Bursa in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” Dr. Maydaer treats one of the oldest occupations of human race, tannery as it pertains to the cultural, commercial, and religious life of Bursa. The subject-matter itself is interesting; but what makes it even more interesting and valuable is the fact that it is the first study that examines the tannery as an occupation and the way it was part of the commercial and religious life of Bursa, bringing to light one of the
least known and yet very effective shapers of society in many respects.

February 28, 1997 is remembered as a postmodern coup d’etat in the psyche of the Turkish society. Our final article “The Ebb and Flow of Religious Education in Turkey since February 28, 1997” by Mehmet Bahçekapılı analyses and evaluates the ebb and the flow of religious education since that ‘coup.’ The author aims to establish a close relationship between the changes in religious education policies and the changes in political life of Turkey. He argues that the new era, as the author puts it, which started in 2002, ushered in a counter-acceleration in religious education as the political climate of Turkey changed, providing the reader with ample statistical evidence. The article suggests that governmental role in religious education should be kept at a minimal level to allow civil religious organizations to flourish, thus reducing the risk of using religion as a political tool to manipulate the masses.

Our readers will find the books section very fulfilling because Mr. Gömbeyaz was able put together a very nice collection of review essays, again. In the mean time, we thank all our contributors and readers for their continued support and look forward to seeing you in the next issue of Ilahiyat Studies.
ARTICLES

Kenosis (Self-Limitation of God)
A Philosophical and Theological Approach
Hasan Özalp

Was Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī “Exiled” to al-Rabadba?
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KENOSIS (SELF-LIMITATION OF GOD)
A Philosophical and Theological Approach

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Abstract
The theistic concept of God is grounded in the absolute perfection of God. This belief has a philosophical and religious foundation. However, the idea of a perfect being also leads to various problems. Some philosophical and theological approaches attempt to solve such problems by limiting the attributes of God. Among them, kenosis offers solutions to certain difficulties in classical theism. However, it also creates additional issues. This study discusses the history of and problems associated with the limitation of God.

Key Words: Kenosis, self-limitation of God, omniscience, omnipotence, process philosophy, tzimtzum theory

Introduction
For a philosopher or theologian, the concept of God evokes several concepts and initiates discussions related to creativity, greatness, holiness, infinity, omniscience, omnipotence, and immutability. At a higher level, the focus is on the ontological and epistemological aspects of God, which are at the core of metaphysical discussions. Such discussions center on questions of how the metaphysical identity of God, as a transcendent being, can be comprehended within the ontological, epistemological, and linguistic limits of the physical world. How does God communicate and interact with nature, man, and history as an endless being with unlimited attributes? A simple analogy (with all its deficiencies) illustrates how this is possible: an adult who seeks to
Hasan Özalp

communicate with a child must simplify his perceptions and act to the child’s level. This reduction is inevitable even though the interlocutors share the same ontological identity and mental and linguistic structure. Is God, who wants to communicate with man (a being with a different ontological, linguistic, and mental quality), and the universe (a separate substance), subject to certain restrictions when performing such an act? Although such issues are often considered theological, both metaphysics and hermeneutics address this problem. Discussions of the ontological and epistemological self-limitation of God rely on the concept of kenosis. The conceptualization of the term kenosis is concerned with establishing the identity of Jesus in the New Testament. Therefore, the issue is theological and represents a major problem of Christology. Nevertheless, the nature of God has been debated for centuries. Therefore, the general problem is establishing the content and functionality of the nature and attributes of God. This study seeks to explain the concept of kenosis – the limitation of God – and discuss the answers to questions resolved by or arising from the concept.

1. Concept and History

Kenosis (Greek: Κένωσις), derived from the late Greek keno, means to empty something, to include nothing, and to be deprived of potency and puissance, objectivity, and essence. According to Christian theological doctrine, kenosis was the voluntary relinquishment by Jesus of divine attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence to become a man. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Evangelical German theologians used kenotic Christology to justify and better comprehend incarnation. Later, Anglican and Russian Orthodox Churches accepted the concept. Paul’s discussion of the nature and deeds of Jesus in the book of Philippians in the New Testament constitute the theological basis of kenosis.¹

The first person to use the term “kenosis” was Theodotion (2nd century AD), the Hellenistic thinker who translated the Hebrew Bible into Greek for the first time. Theodotion used the word as a theological term in his Greek translation of Isaiah¹ 34:11.² However, Gregory of

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² All citations from the Bible are based on the New American Standard Bible,
Nazianzus (4th century) and Cyril of Alexandria (5th century) employed this theological term to express the nature of Jesus as discussed in Philippians. In the Latin translation of the New Testament, *kenosis* corresponded with terms such as *semetipsum exinanivit* (self-emptying) and *exbausit semetipsum* (complete emptying), as seen in Tertullian’s (*160-225*) *Adversus Marcionem.*

Kenotic Christology, established in subsequent centuries through analyses of the New Testament, concentrates on the incarnation of Jesus. His incarnation indicates that he possesses two natures (hypostatic union), namely, divine and human. Is Jesus human or divine? If he is divine, why does he possess human attributes such as the ability to eat, drink, or die? If he is a God in the form of a man, then his attributes have been limited to those of a man. This question is addressed in Philippians 2:5-8 in the New Testament, which reads,

> Have this attitude in yourselves which was also in Christ Jesus, who, although He existed in the form of God, did not regard equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied [kenosis] Himself, taking the form of a bond-servant, and being made in the likeness of men …

In the text, Paul tells the Philippians in Macedonia that Jesus has a divine essence but that he relinquished his divine attributes to become an object to God. He eluded divine substance, albeit voluntary, and one who eludes divine substance has either eluded divine attributes as well or has limited himself with respect to these attributes. Today, the kenotic study of theology seeks to reconcile the nature of Jesus as a true historical divinity with his existence as an actual human being. In general theological terms, the problem is not that of a man (or Jesus) becoming God but the humanization of God – the positive and negative aspects associated with God’s assumption of a limited human na-

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2 “But pelican (or owl or jackdaw) and hedgehog will possess it, and owl (or great horned owl) and raven will dwell in it; and He will stretch over it (Edom) the line of desolation (or formlessness) and the plumb (stones of void) line of emptiness.”


4 Philippians 2: 5-8.

ture. However, how can the passages of Holy Scripture that appear to favor creation out of nothing accord with kenotic theology?

A philosophical and theological approach similar to kenosis is the theory of tzimtzum, a concept proposed by the Kabbalistic school of Jewish mysticism. The theory explains the cosmic formation of the universe and cosmic history. According to some researchers, the cosmology of tzimtzum influenced kenotic doctrine. They suggest that the idea of creation in Christianity was constituted pursuant to tzimtzum.

Lurianic Kabbalah, founded by Isaac ben Solomon Luria (1534-1572), has also developed a concept to explain the limitation of God. This approach, expressed by the theory of tzimtzum, explains how God created the universe and offers a way to balance God’s transcendence and imminence. The tzimtzum theory seeks to answer the question, “if God is everything, how can He be a distinct being from the world?” In other words, if God is omnipresent and encompasses everything, where is the universe? Is God the universe? Is the universe God? In the context of the panentheistic mystical aspect of the Kabbalah doctrine, the concerns of Luria seem relevant. According this doctrine, God, who is divinely infinite (ein sof), has withdrawn (tzimtzum) to make space for beings other than Himself, leaving empty space. This process, called tzimtzum, began with creation. The divine emanation subsequently occurred in this space, and the formation of the cosmic system began.

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6 Oliver D. Crisp, *Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 118. According to Crisp, kenosis has two forms: ontological and functional. However, because he focuses on the debate about incarnation, particulars will not be described here. Kenotic Christology treats the nature of God, while kenotic theology discusses the possibility of Jesus’ divinity.

7 For discussions of the incarnation of Jesus and creation out of nothing, see Simon Oliver, “Trinity, Motion and Creation ex Nihilo,” in David B. Burrell, Carlo Cogliati, Janet M. Soskice, and William R. Stoeger (eds.), *Creation and the God of Abraham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 133-151.


10 See Pinchas Giller, *Reading the Zohar: The Sacred Text of the Kabbalah* (New
The fundamental elements of the cosmology of tzimtzum include i) God created empty space to limit His essence and create; ii) God withdrew into Himself for Himself; and iii) God remained God.\textsuperscript{11}

As scholars have noted, God first limits Himself or His power, after which the creation (or cosmic becoming) occurs. Tzimtzum is this ontological self-limitation of God.\textsuperscript{12} By means of this theory, Solomon Luria both manifests the transcendence of God and claims that the universe is a distinct substance from God. Tzimtzum also offers a new theodicy, stating that the source of evil in the world is independent from God. In addition, Luria rejects the concept of the eternal knowledge of God, creating the possibility of an unknown future and a range of possibilities for action in the world. According to Moltmann, the tzimtzum theory encompasses all models about the limitation of God.\textsuperscript{13}

The Lurianic theory of becoming bears certain similarities to the Neo-Platonist theory of cosmic emanation. Both theories describe the cosmic formation using the term “emanation.” The limitation of God within Neo-Platonist emanation theory will be treated later in this paper.

In the modern era, a group of theologians, philosophers, and scientists led by Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) developed process theology, which favors the ontological and epistemological limitation of God. The issue of limitation is an important component of process philosophy, which attempts to construct the relation between God, nature, and man via the dualistic nature and knowledge of God. This construction has made a notable contribution to the modern theology of nature. However, Javier


Monserrat, who studies kenosis and the relationship between God and nature, does not consider kenotic theology to be an interpretation of process philosophy and theology. This argument led to a debate about the relationship between the concept of the trinity and natural theology. Process philosophy’s approach to the issue will be addressed in other sections. In the present article, the problematic aspect of kenosis will be addressed and the relevant ontological limitation of God’s omnipotence and omniscience will be discussed.

2. Kenosis as Problematic

Since ancient times, almost every monotheist religion has professed a common conception of God as eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, having an immutable nature, and a perfect and absolute being. Lurianic thought differs from theism because it establishes equality between transcendence and imminence, whereas kenotic Christology departs from the dual nature of Jesus to distinguish the divine from the human and natural and to reconcile the two despite this distinction. Considering that kenotic theology appeared as late as the 19th and 20th centuries, it evidently takes a different approach than tzimtzum theory and Christology. Kenotic theology focuses neither on the Jesus’ becoming God nor on the humanization of God. In the words of Swinburne, kenotic Christology does not consider science and potency as part of the essence of God. Therefore, the understanding of God in classical theism does not completely satisfy kenotic theologians. For which problems, then, does kenosis offer a solution? What are its philosophical and theological justifications?

As science, historical analyses, and New Testament research pro-


gressed in the 19th century, the nature of Jesus again became a subject of debate. The Graf-Wellhausen school and radical Tübingen school defended the Old Testament and New Testament, respectively, against evolutionary theory’s criticisms and argued for the doctrine founded on the divine and unique nature of Jesus. Therefore, in the 19th and 20th centuries, as humanism and the natural sciences became dominant, kenotic theology was sustained by kenotic Christology and by certain common points of departure from tzimtzum cosmology that ascribed the limited attributes of man to God to limit the latter.

The God-nature and God-man relationships reflect the main concerns of kenotic theology, which concentrates on the following issues: i) The potency and nature of God (if God created the universe Himself and imposed the laws that ensure its operation, man will always need God to orchestrate these processes). ii) The knowledge of God and man (if God has infinite knowledge, man cannot have free will). iii) The necessity of the ontological and epistemological limitation of God.

Therefore, the primary objective of kenotic theology is to limit the potency of God and provide nature with autonomy so that it can act independently from God. This approach limits God in spatial terms by limiting his potency, pushing Him out of nature and thereby enabling science and scientific research. The second limitation is temporal and limits the knowledge of God to make man a free agent. Such limitation requires the exclusion of God from the present and future acts of man. All of these limitations eventually restrict the nature of God.

3. The Nature of God and Its Ontological Limitations

Lurianic Kabbalah’s tzimtzum theory, kenotic theology, and process philosophy are based on the ontological limitation of God. Monserrat claims that his new scientific theology is independent of process philosophy; nevertheless, his understanding of God prescribes the limitation of God as a substance. The ways in which tzimtzum theory and kenotic Christology restrict God as substance were discussed above. Despite being introduced as a new line of thought, process theology philosophically relies on tzimtzum theory and kenotic theology. Indeed, process theology remarkably resembles the image of God developed by Descartes (1596-1650) and Spinoza (1632-1677) in their theories of substance. The crystallization of this influence is apparent in the relation established by Spinoza between “nature naturing” (natura

naturans) and “nature natured” (natura naturata). As Arıcan indicates, God is both absolute substance and nature, or creative nature.\footnote{M. Kazım Arıcan, *Panteizm, Ateizm ve Panenteizm Bağlamında Spinoza’nın Tanrı Anlayışı* (İstanbul: İz Yayınıncılık, 2004), 71-72.} Arıcan’s statement, “everything is within God,” incorporates Spinoza into the group of panentheist philosophers to which Whitehead also belongs.\footnote{*Ibid.*, 166.}

The present chapter will primarily analyze the ways in which God is understood in kenosis and in process philosophy, which have similar philosophical backgrounds. The concept of God in process theology will be briefly discussed, as will the relation between its premises and the understanding of God in classic theism. The possibility of the ontological limitation of the concept of God in classic theism will also be explored.

The fundamental motive of process philosophers is to advance the modern natural sciences. During the transition from Newtonian physics to Einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, the universe abandoned its solid matter status for a changing and metamorphosing structure. As Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) indicates, in the pre-modern era, the universe was conceived as a machine, while it is now considered an organism.\footnote{See Muhammed İkbal (= Muhammad Iqbal), *İslâm’da Dinî Düşüncenin Yeniden Doğuşu* (translated into Turkish by N. Ahmet Asrar; İstanbul: Birleşik Yayınıncılık, n.d.), 54-71.} Therefore, the perception that God created the universe from a single substance is insufficient to explain the dynamic structure of the universe. To address this issue, Whitehead developed a new concept of God that emphasized such deficiencies and inconsistencies, especially those related to the idea of absolute substance. In particular, the excessive emphasis on the metaphysical and the idea that substance excludes religious experience led Whitehead towards a new conception of God. Thus, giving nature autonomy, he attempted to solve the problem of free will.

Convinced of the insufficiency of traditional cosmic systems, Whitehead attempts to establish a new system. According to him, Aristotle’s (384-322 BC) Prime Mover is a being with certain attributes that make it a logically necessary component of Aristotle’s cosmic system. The Aristotelian Prime Mover had an initially voluntary and later compulsory
influence on Judaism and Islam before influencing Christianity.\textsuperscript{21} Iqbal, agreeing with Whitehead, notes that the early Muslim Kalam scholars “read the Qurʾān under the light of Greek thought, and could comprehend – albeit not completely – that the essence of the Qurʾān was in opposition with classic ideas only 200 years later.”\textsuperscript{22} The later medieval and modern philosophers ascribed certain metaphysical qualities (such as simplicity, immutability, etc.) to the Aristotelian Prime Mover to imbue it with a special capacity; they attributed to the Prime Mover absolute transcendence and conceived it as an imaginary and deceptive element that preceded the world.\textsuperscript{23} If metaphysics were to be built upon physics, the Aristotelian physical and cosmic system would have to be rejected; it is now considered incorrect.\textsuperscript{24}

Whitehead develops a cosmic theology of his own – natural theology – to overcome such problems and establish a new cosmology.\textsuperscript{25} The nature of God constitutes the core of his theology. According to Whitehead, God has a dipolar nature, one pole constant and other variable. This structure, which Whitehead calls Primordial Nature, corresponds to the immutable character of God.\textsuperscript{26} Consequent Nature is the aspect of nature that is realized and that realizes itself within nature. This dimension of God is involved in the process of development and change; it changes with nature. The realization of the consequent nature of God and its relationship with nature has three purposes: to ensure i) an infinite conceptual realization; ii) the multiple solidarity of free physical realizations within the temporal world; and iii) the ultimate union between the multiplicity of actual reality and conceptual primordial reality. This nature, which is present in physical processes, is the energy of physical development. It does not merely create the universe, but protects it. This nature is the source of order and the poet

\textsuperscript{25} Whitehead’s work is entitled \textit{Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology}.
that leads the universe with patience.\textsuperscript{27}

As Whitehead and other researchers suggest, God is a limited concept in ontological terms and with respect to knowledge and potency.\textsuperscript{28} Specifically, the consequent nature of God has almost nothing in common with the immutable, simple God of classical theism.

The theistic concept of the nature of God is generally based on holy writ, human experience, and philosophical investigation. All theistic religious faiths consider God to be a perfect being.\textsuperscript{29} According to this belief, God is not limited; He has the attributes of simplicity, incorporeality, immutability, and impassibility. All of these attributes correspond to the substance that reflects the perfection of God. Whitehead's God, however, possesses a dipolar constitution. In this respect, his theory is contrary to both the simplicity and immutability of God. Moreover, Whitehead reduces God to a passive being under the influence of nature.

Whitehead's revision is based on the following question: If God had an immutable and absolute nature, how would He interact with nature? Whitehead answers this question by ascribing a dipolar character to God. However, God's simple substance and thus immutable nature, or, as Whitehead criticizes, His single substance, does not prevent Him from interacting with nature. For example, several Qur'\textsuperscript{ā}nic verses, including "I have created with my hands"\textsuperscript{30} and "I breathed into him of My spirit,\textsuperscript{31}" point out the imminent character of God in direct relation with the universe. Other passages, such as "He begetteth not, nor is He begotten, and there is none like unto Him"\textsuperscript{32} and "there is nothing whatever like unto Him,\textsuperscript{33}" stress His transcendence as a substance distinct from nature. Therefore, God can be both transcendent and imminent in the same substance, indicating that He is active in different states. Although Whitehead ascribes to God a consequent nature to

\textsuperscript{27} Whitehead, \textit{Process and Reality}, 347; John B. Cobb, Jr. and David R. Griffin, \textit{Süreç Teolojisi} (translated into Turkish by Tuncay İmamoğlu and Ruhattin Yazoğlu; İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2006), 72-73.

\textsuperscript{28} See Aydin, “Süreç (Proses) Felsefesi Işığında Tanrı-Âlem İlişkisi,” 68.

\textsuperscript{29} Wierenga, \textit{The Nature of God}, 1-5; Webb, “Perfect Being Theology,” 227.

\textsuperscript{* All citations from the Qur'\textsuperscript{ā}n are based on the translation into English by Abdullah Yusuf Ali.

\textsuperscript{30} Q 38:75.

\textsuperscript{31} Q 15:29; 38:72.

\textsuperscript{32} Q 112:3-4.

\textsuperscript{33} Q 42:11.
emphasize the natural sciences and the imminence of God, he cannot
avoid also ascribing to God the character of a constant substance, as in
classical theism.

This limitation creates an additional problem about the simplicity
and immutability of God. First, the simplicity of God (He is not com-
posite) does not allow for His disintegration, and in this He differs
from the material universe. Simplicity necessarily requires a thing to be sin-
gle and immutable. The nature of God, however, comprises two
changes: God either expands (or advances) or contracts (as in
tzimtzum). Both are impossible, or at least controversial, if God’s sub-
stance is simple. This substance does not consist of parts; God does not
have accidental features, and a distinction cannot be made between
His content and form. Because the substance of God is simple, He is
immune to change and therefore cannot be incorporated within cate-
gories of time and space. As discussed above, this characteristic of God
is the most apparent attribute that distinguishes Him from those He
creates/brings into being. Since Thales, most Eastern and Western phi-
losophies and theologies have agreed on this issue of immutability.

However, if the substance of God undergoes any change whatsoever
(horizontal/expansion or vertical/advance), then God becomes imper-
flect. Similarly, if God’s substance contracts, why does God reduce and
degrade Himself to a lower category? Multiple verses in the Hebrew
Bible, including “I am who I am,” “but You are the same, and Your
years will not come to an end,” and “Jesus Christ is the same yester-
day and today and forever”39 emphasize His immutable nature. Addi-

34 Robin Le Poidevin, “Kenosis, Necessity and Incarnation,” The Heythrop Journal
54/2 (2013), 216; Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee, WI:
35 Michael J. Dodds, The Unchanging God of Love: Thomas Aquinas and Contem-
porary Theology on Divine Immutability (2nd edn., Washington, D.C.: The Catho-
lic University of America Press, 2008), 134-161; Eleonore Stump, “Simplicity,” in
Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn (eds.), A Companion to Phi-
36 See İsmail Erdoğan, “Tanrı’nın Değişmezliği Problemi,” Uludağ Üniversitesi
İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 13/1 (2004), 39-52; Richard E. Creel, “Immutability and
Impassibility,” in Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn (eds.), A
Companion to Philosophy of Religion (2nd edn., Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010), 322-323.
37 Exodus 3:14.
38 Psalms 102:27.
tional expressions of approval and reiteration in the Qurʾān, such as “Verily, I am Allah”\(^{40}\) stress the immutable nature of God and His independence from time and space.

One might ask, “Does God have the will and freedom to expand and contract His own substance?” Such a question ignores that the debate focuses not on God’s attributes, but His substance. Therefore, the question is moot; God, in an ontological sense, is God because He has an immutable substance.

Like all other philosophers and theologians, Whitehead explores how the relation between being and becoming is established and which of the two is dominant. To explain becoming, Whitehead limits and reduces being both ontologically and epistemologically. This strategy both provides the law of nature with autonomy and allows man to act freely. However, in the process, God becomes free from holiness, according to kenotic Christology, and is humanized.

4. **Limitations in the Relation between God and Nature: Omnipotence**

According to classical theism, God’s omnipotence indicates that He has endless and unlimited power and ability to act. Therefore, the omnipotence of God complements His attribute of knowledge / omniscience (ʿilm). In other words, if God were omniscient but not omnipotent, this would create a deficiency and inconsistency. The same insufficiency would appear if He were omnipotent but not omniscient. Therefore, knowledge and potency are not entirely independent attributes of God. Potency actually means to create and maintain that which is created by orchestrating and coordinating it through knowledge.

There are several reasons to limit God’s potency. First, His endless power leads to the perception of a God who is a despot. Second, such limitation decreases God’s absolute intervention in the universe and creates space for the natural sciences. Al-Ghazālī (1058-1111), for example, rejected causality to defend the limitlessness of potency, claiming, “it is not the fire, but either Allah in person or, through His mediation, the angels, who burn the cotton.”\(^{41}\) Therefore, the dismissal of...

\(^{40}\) Q 20:14.

\(^{41}\) Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Filozofların Tutarsızlığı (Tabâfüt al-falāṣīf)* (ed. with Turkish translation by Mahmut Kaya and Hüseyin Sanoğlu; Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2005), 166-167.
causality not only restricts but abolishes science’s freedom of movement. Third, this view ironically provides God with a more active role in universe. The transcendent God of classical theism is conceived of as distant from the universe. In process philosophy, however, the consequent nature of God coexists with the universe. This approach renders God more active in nature. This again raises the question of the place of science and scientific laws in a nature in which God actively exists. The limitation problem appears at this juncture because in the course of creating the universe, God also creates Himself. Specifically, the consequent nature of God knows and creates during the formation of the universe. Fourth, the problem of evil must be resolved. If God does not know and does not create the universe (due to His limited potency), the evil in the universe occurs independently from God. Therefore, God cannot be held responsible for evil. Next, I will demonstrate how potency is limited.

According to tzimtzum theory, God withdraws Himself and creates a space in which the universe can come into existence. Consequently, the universe is a form independent from God because it consists of the space from which God has withdrawn. Therefore, neither the universe that comes into existence in this space nor any deficiency and evil in this universe can be associated with God. Tzimtzum theory therefore implicitly and indirectly limits God.

Pursuant to the doctrine of kenotic Christology, once God voluntarily renounces his divine qualities and assumes a human identity, He simultaneously relinquishes attributes that express His perfection, such as knowledge and potency. This is a limitation and it is God, who is the being subject to these limitations.

The most systematic conceptualization of the limitation of the potency of God is found in process philosophy. The central thesis of process philosophy concerns primordial and consequent, or divine and earthly, elements. The divine (primordial) corresponds to the immutable nature of God, while the earthly and actual reflects His changing nature. Hence, God has a metaphysical nature in one sense and physical nature in another. God, therefore, exists in relation to the physical world. Creation is clearly the most fundamental concept used to explain this relation. Whitehead and Hartshorne both accept the idea of creation. To them, however, creation does not mean to create some-

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thing out of nothing in the classical sense. According to Hartshorne, creation means to determine the undetermined, to assign the unassigned and thus to contribute to the richness of reality.\(^{43}\) In other words, creation produces something new and is the particular determination of each act by the being actualized through the experience.\(^{44}\) Hartshorne considers creation not as empirical knowledge but as an experience that occurs within itself. For him, creation occurs throughout the universe. Specifically, everyone and everything is a creator of his or its respective form of becoming: to be is to create.\(^{45}\) As noted earlier, creation is the formation of the consequent aspect of God, the universe and the self-generation of beings through simultaneous processes. This conceptualization of creation also reflects how process philosophy understands causality.

Iqbal, who envisages limitations to creation, makes, like Hartshorne, a deduction between experience and actuality. Iqbal says, “universe is a free creative act, in view of the similarity of our conscious experiences.”\(^{46}\) According to Iqbal, nature is not a mechanical structure.\(^{47}\) For him, “nature is a living, ever developing organism with no outward boundary against its growth and expansion. Its only limit is within (italic belongs to us). That is, the One who animates and feeds the whole is the ubiquitous Person.”\(^{48}\) Consequently, Iqbal, who begins with the knowledge of Allah, eventually advances to His potency; he limits God’s knowledge and potency to allow the continuous self-actualization of nature and to maintain the meaning and continuity of its dynamism.

No doubt, the emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation on the

45 Ibid., 74.
46 İkbal, İslâm’da Dinî Düşüncenin Yeniden Doğuşu, 77.
47 Notably, Iqbal cites modern physics and biology data on the topic.
48 İkbal, ibid., 84. Polkinghorne states the following about how nature abandoned a mechanical structure to become a living organism: if nature is an organism, God is naturally the soul of this world (John Polkinghorne, Faith, Science & Understanding [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000], 107). Pursuant to such a deduction, if nature has a soul, as Polkinghorne says, this soul belongs to God. This view leads to the consequent nature of panentheism, in which God instils life in nature but is also formed by it.
freedom of the all-inclusive Ego. But this limitation is not externally imposed. It is born out of His own creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participators of His life, power, and freedom.\textsuperscript{49}

Iqbal is aware that such limitation requires the denial of an advanced level of potency, and he explores this problem. For Iqbal, the Qur\'ān does not relish abstract rules; moreover, modern philosophy has yet to apprehend relativity.\textsuperscript{50} According to Iqbal, the potency of abstract concepts is a blind, uncontrolled power reminiscent of tyranny.\textsuperscript{51} Consequently, he discusses evil\textsuperscript{52} and the freedom of man\textsuperscript{53} in his search for the solution to the abovementioned problems. Likewise, Hartshorne argues that God saves Himself from tyranny by allowing the formation of free beings.\textsuperscript{54}

Scholars such as Aydîn, C. A. Kadir and M. S. Raschid argue that Iqbal restricts God, but Nached Qutab rejects Iqbal’s concept of “limited”.\textsuperscript{55} According to process philosophy, God’s primary nature is unlimited, but His secondary nature is limited. God’s character, for Iqbal, is not entirely balanced; however, God is unlimited in terms of acting with nature and knowing each of His actions, and it is evident that the acts and knowledge of God are actualized at the moment of becoming.\textsuperscript{56} Iqbal appears to restrict God for a reason. He clearly expresses limitation; therefore, any contradictory statement requires an explanation beyond a literal interpretation. God is explicitly restricted regardless of content and character.

\textsuperscript{49} İkbal, \textit{ibid.}, 112.
\textsuperscript{50} Today, philosophy understands and has moved beyond the theory of relativity. The present challenge is to explain being and becoming via quantum physics. In quantum philosophy, God knows every past and future possibility and knows the future as a determined future.
\textsuperscript{51} Charles Hartshorne, \textit{A Natural Theology for Our Time} (6\textsuperscript{th} edn., La Salle, III: Open Court, 1989), 119; İkbal, \textit{ibid.}, 112-113.
\textsuperscript{52} İkbal, \textit{ibid.}, 113.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, 120.
\textsuperscript{56} Mehmet S. Aydîn, “Muhammed İkbal’ın Din Felsefesinde ‘Ulûhiyet’ Kavramı,” 209.
Is it impossible, then, to restrict God in any manner? The “paradox of the stone” (omnipotence paradox) is a striking example of the inherent contradiction between God and His potency:

(i) God either can or cannot create a stone that He may not lift.
(ii) If God *creates a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it*, He is not omnipotent.
(iii) If God *cannot create a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it*, then He is not omnipotent.
(iv) Therefore, God is not omnipotent.57

In this example, God is either unable to create such a stone or cannot lift the stone He created. In any case, the outcome indicates that He lacks infinite power. A theist cannot reply in the affirmative to the question “Can God create a stone bigger than Him?” because it is impossible to imagine something greater than God. Numerous similar examples could be cited. When God creates by selecting one among the endless possibilities within His infinite knowledge, is that not an indication of limitation? There are other paradoxical questions that challenge the omnipotence of God, such as whether God can create a circle in the form of a square without deteriorating the latter, make $2+2$ equal 5, change the past, kill Himself, fit the world into something the size of an egg, and hold man in both a sitting and standing position.58

Theology generally considers creation as the free act of God executed through His reason and will. In other words, the universe was not formed unconsciously but by the will of God.59 Given the attributes shared by God and man, the abovementioned problems can be viewed in two ways. In the first, the facts contradict logic and potency. In the second, the facts comply with logic but contradict potency. The first perspective addresses whether God acts according to his potency, but acts illogically. Such a suggestion propels God into the realm of absurdism. For example, if God has the power to make $2+2$ equal 5, and He does so, then God is potent but unreasonable. In this example, God

contradicts Himself; a premise that is illogical for man is also illogical for God. The question of God’s ability to commit suicide is resolved by a similar approach. In this approach, which Ibn Ḥazm called absolutely impossible, God is no more a simple substance and therefore no longer possesses the quality of God.60 The problem is one of logic, not potency. God is God because He does not die. According to al-Ghazālī, the field of potency cannot include something impossible; therefore, a thing that is established as a condition without being a condition cannot exist.61 The falsity of the premise arises from the breach of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction; an illogical premise cannot be made reasonable by adding God to the beginning.62 Therefore, if the potency does not produce something illogical, this does not indicate limited power.

The second problem addresses God’s conformity with logic but not potency. The most typical example of this is the creation itself. God’s choice to create one thing among the infinite unlimited possibilities restricts Him. His potency is restricted by existence, but it cannot be used to limit Himself.63 For example, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) argues that God cannot breach the law of time when discussing a case in which “God restores a woman, who has lost her virginity, to her previous condition.” He concludes, “God may forgive the sin of that person, and restore her bodily chastity through miracle, but cannot make something, which has already happened, not happened.”64

God created the universe, one of many possibilities (man was also one of the possible alternatives) and thus restricted His potency. However, this does not indicate the limitedness of His knowledge and potency. Knowledge and potency are limited, but God created a form (the universe) by His free universal will. This paper does not subscribe to the “possible worlds” theory of al-Ghazālī and Leibniz (1646-1716).65 God could have created the universe in a far superior form and He

60 Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, 585-586.
61 Al-Ghazālī, *İtikadda Orta Yol* (al-Iqtisād fī l-iʿtiqād) (ed. with Turkish translation by Osman Demir; İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2012), 91.
63 Keith Ward, *Rational Theology and the Creativity of God*, 84-85.
64 Umberto Eco, *Yorum ve Aşır Yorum* (translated into Turkish by Kemal Atakay; 4th edn., İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2008), 42.
65 For further discussion, see Ormsby, *ibid.*, 139-215.
could have brought man into being in a far superior form. However, God chose this form among all possible forms. This fact may seem to indicate the limitedness of potency; however, it is an indicator of the limitlessness of His will. Once God created the universe in its present form, He created man in a form suitable to live in the universe. With His potency, He could have created man in a more superior form within the limits of the universe. However, His knowledge restricted His potency in an exercise of wisdom. Though God has endless potency and knowledge, this does not make Him a tyrant. His knowledge and other attributes, such as mercy, control His potency. “Control” does not mean “limit” in the sense of “reduce;” instead, this term indicates that God’s attribute of potency acts in compliance with attributes such as knowledge, mercy, justice, etc.

God’s creation of the universe in a given form shows the independence of His will, not the limitedness of His power. This fact also disproves Keith Ward’s argument that God has a simple substance and is therefore necessary and has no freedom of choice during the act of creation. The idea of a necessary being refers not to an ontological but to a logical necessity. In addition, even if an ontological necessity were in question, this would establish the existential, not the actual, necessity of God.

The idea of a self-sacrificing God who limits Himself to provide nature with autonomy and set man free solves several philosophical and theological problems. However, this view also raises additional philosophical and theological questions. Within this system, God is not active but only seems active. A God who is creative but not active approximates the deistic concept of God. It may be more accurate to describe this hidden God (deus absconditus) — who limits Himself while providing the world with autonomy to conduct scientific research — as a quiet, calm master of the cosmos.

5. Limitation of the Relation between God and Man: Omniscience

God’s knowledge is one of the principal problems of philosophy and theology. The problem centers on questions of what, how, and how much God can know. Classical theism perceives the knowledge

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66 This paper accepts the anthropic principle, or the synchronization between man and universe, as a theological reality.

67 Keith Ward, *ibid.*, 73-75.
of God as determinist knowledge, meaning that God knows and understands everything that will happen in the future. The indeterminist approach restricts the knowledge of God through certain philosophical and theological considerations. According to the determinist approach, God’s omniscience and essential perfection allow Him to know everything; omniscience means to possess an eternal knowledge of all. This definition indicates the essence and perfection of God and emphasizes that God knows all. God’s infinite provides us with insight into what He knows. The omniscience of God has temporal and spatial dimensions. Temporally, God simultaneously knows the entire past, present and future. Spatially, God possesses knowledge about man, nature and history throughout time. God therefore knows everything except Himself, independent of temporal and spatial conditions and limitations. A perfect being has impeccable knowledge.

The perfection of divine science creates two problems. First, God, who has a simple substance, has the ability to change because He has knowledge about change. Second, free will is challenged. Free will is an issue, not because God knows past and present, but because He knows the future, or what is yet to happen. If God knows that which is to come, then the choices and actions of man are known in advance. This foreknowledge is also final knowledge of a fact, making man the puppet of a prescribed fate and giving rise to the problem of free will, often debated in the fields of theology and philosophy. Indeed, such discussions are relevant because the philosophies and theologies that stipulate the limitation of God’s knowledge are based on such concerns. Below, the theological debates about the limitation of God’s knowledge are summarized.

The statement that “the knowledge of God changes when the subject of the knowledge changes” can be explained in two ways. According to the first explanation, God knows the universal; the second explanation is based on the limitation of the knowledge of God. According to Aristotle, God, who is the Prime Mover, cannot think about anything but Himself because of the simplicity of His substance. Because

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70 Hartshorne, *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes*, 26; Mavrodes, “Omniscience,” 255.
everything other than God is composite, or subject to change, if God had knowledge of something ever-changing, his knowledge would change. Therefore, God only thinks about and knows Himself.\textsuperscript{71} Hence, Aristotle restricts God, and Peripatetic tradition has abided by the Aristotelian conception of God. Although the words of Aydı̇n are subject to interpretation, he suggests that the God of Plotinus is not a being who knows in the theistic sense.\textsuperscript{72} The Peripatetic Muslim philosophers, including Alfarabi (872-950) and Avicenna (980-1037), systematically extended and maintained this tradition but took a different approach to the knowledge of God. According to Avicenna, God knows all; nothing can be hidden from Him. However, God knows the particular in a universal manner.\textsuperscript{73} In discussions of “God’s lack of knowledge on particulars,” al-Ghazâlî declares Avicenna an unbeliever for restricting the knowledge of Allah.\textsuperscript{74} As Averroes (1126-1198) indicates, categories such as universal and particular belong to man and allow him to better understand existence. For God, however, such classifications are impossible. Therefore, the knowledge of God is universal and encompasses the particular.\textsuperscript{75}

Arguments about substance, such as “if the knowledge of God changes, then He also changes,” do not seem sufficiently consistent. According to Averroes, the assertion that God undergoes a change when a particular changes is incorrect because it is the particulars (objects, facts, etc.) that change, not God.\textsuperscript{76} Avicenna’s thesis of universal

\textsuperscript{71} Aristotle, \textit{Metafizik} (translated into Turkish by Ahmet Arslan; Istanbul: Sosyal Yayınılar, 1996), 519-522.

\textsuperscript{72} Aydı̇n, “Süreç (Proses) Felsefesi Işığında Tanr-Âlem İlişkisi,” 81.


\textsuperscript{74} Al-Ghazâlî, \textit{Filozofların Tutarsızlığı}, 225.


\textsuperscript{76} Ibn Rushd, \textit{Felsefe-Din İlişkileri (= Faṣl al-maqâl and al-Kashf ‘an minbâj al-adilla)} (translated into Turkish with an introduction by Süleyman Uludağ; İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınılar, 2004), 134-135; id., \textit{Tutarsızlığın Tutarsızlığı}, 257. Averroes’ quotation from the Qur‘ân about the limitlessness of the knowledge of God
knowledge seems to resolve this problem. Because God is not included within any category of knowledge, his is a universal knowledge that includes particulars. Therefore, divine science never changes.

The absolute perfection and transcendence of God can also limit His knowledge. Ashʿarī kālām scholars defend this position, asserting that God has such absolute perfection that He does not need to follow any wisdom or rule (example) in His acts of creation. Such an approach sentences the knowledge of God to total non-existence. Even man acts pursuant to knowledge and rules. This philosophy causes Averroes to accuse the Ashʿarī scholars (especially al-Ghazālī) for considering “God as an eternal man, and man as a mortal God”.77

With few exceptions, the theological approaches of mainstream Judaism78, Christianity,79 and Islam80 accept the temporally and spatially omniscient character of God and do not restrict Him.81 However, this view inevitably raises certain issues regarding the abolition of human freedom and the tyranny of God. Within the intellectual tradition of tzimtzum cosmology, the doctrine of kenosis and process philosophy seek to resolve these problems.

Unlike traditional Judeo-Christian conceptions of God, kenosis ontologically limits God, restricting several of His attributes, including potency and, especially, knowledge. This point emphasizes the parallelism between knowledge and potency, the relation between which

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is relevant here: “Should He not know - He that created?” (Q 67:14).

77 Ibn Rushd, Tutarsızlığın Tutarsızlığı, 257.

78 “Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times things which have not been done, saying, ‘My purpose will be established, and I will accomplish all My good pleasure’” (Isaiah 46:10). “Behold, the former things have come to pass …” (Isaiah 42:9).

79 “Says the Lord, Who makes these things known from long ago” (Acts 15:18). “And there is no creature hidden from His sight, but all things are open and laid bare to the eyes of Him with whom we have to do” (Hebrews 4:13).

80 “Nor is there aught of the unseen, in heaven or earth, but is (recorded) in a clear record.” (Q 27:75). “With Him are the keys of the unseen, the treasures that none knoweth but He. He knoweth whatever there is on the earth and in the sea. Not a leaf doth fall but with His knowledge: there is not a grain in the darkness (or depths) of the earth, nor anything fresh or dry (green or withered), but is (inscribed) in a record clear (to those who can read)” (Q 6:59).

81 For further discussions, see Tamar Rudavsky (ed.), Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic Jewish and Christian Perspectives (Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media, 1985).
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obstructs the free will of man. According to John Lucas (1879-1934), although God has the potency to realize everything He knows, He does not do so. Instead, God limits His infallible knowledge and potency to render man a free agent. This is not an imposed restriction, but a voluntary self-limitation.\(^\text{82}\) Anthony Kenny considers the views of Lucas inconsistent. According to Kenny, if the limitation of God’s knowledge is a voluntary restriction, then God’s knowledge is logically possible but unnecessary. Therefore, God, who allegedly knows all, reduces His knowledge to human knowledge for the sake of freeing man.\(^\text{83}\)

For Kenny, 16th century Jesuit philosophers Francesco Suarez (1548-1617) and Luis de Molina (1535-1600) better reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Molina treats the coexistence of divine knowledge and human freedom as a counterfactual condition that occurs in different ways under different circumstances. Molina suggests that God knows what any possible creature will freely do under all possible circumstances.\(^\text{84}\) In addition, he makes a distinction between the personal knowledge and free knowledge of God and, like Leibniz, distinguishes between the possible beings, produced by and, therefore, God’s potential knowledge of these two types.

The arguments made by process philosophy about divine knowledge, which were primarily developed by Whitehead and Hartshorne, are also problematic. A dualist conceptualization of God proposes two types of knowledge that necessarily differ from one another. Nonetheless, there are difficulties in reconciling these apparently paradoxical types of knowledge.

According to Whitehead, God knows all because of His primordial nature. However, this omniscience differs from that of the God of classic theism who knows the past, present and future. In the statement “God knows all,” “all” refers to facts that are either possible or actual. Through His omniscience, God knows the actual as actual and the possible as possible. Therefore, God cannot know possibilities yet to be actualized.\(^\text{85}\) Because all possibilities are yet to be actualized, “God


\(^{83}\) Ibid., 61-62.

\(^{84}\) Ibid., 62.

cannot know the future.” For God, the future is “a field of possibilities and probabilities determined one way or another.” suggesting a divine nature whose limited knowledge makes God almost human; even a man can know the actual as actual and the possible as possible. Indeed, in a determinist universe, man, like Laplace’s demon, can almost precisely know certain things. Thereupon, man, who is created by or coexists with God, knows more than God. Consequently, man becomes equal or superior to God. This approach is criticized by al-Ghazālī in his discussion of the God of emanation theory: “The creatures of God are valued above God” and “God becomes dead, unaware of what is going on in the universe.” Because of God’s consequent nature, He actualizes Himself in the process of creation and does not know even His own essence. However, in the peripatetic tradition, God at least contemplates and knows His own personality.

Iqbal’s position in this debate was described above. Indeed, Iqbal justifies his position in a more comprehensive manner than Whitehead:

If history is regarded merely as a gradually revealed photo of a predetermined order of events, then there is no room in it for novelty and initiation. Consequently, we can attach no meaning to the word ‘creation,’ which has a meaning for us only in view of our own capacity for original action. The truth is that the whole theological controversy relating to predestination is due to pure speculation with no eye on the spontaneity of life, which is a fact of actual experience.

As this passage indicates, Iqbal, like other panentheist thinkers, restricts the knowledge of God to allow free human action. Iqbal also intends to set nature free, allowing the universe dynamism and saving it from the monopoly of determinism. As Aydın states, Iqbal is neither panentheist nor determinist. More precisely, he supports neither extreme imminence nor extreme transcendence.

Iqbal seeks a solution to the problem of evil, which he articulates as follows: “How can the universal potency and benevolence of Allah reconcile with the terrible and abundant malignity and evil in the universe?” One way to solve the problem is to restrict God and absolve

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87 Al-Ghazālī, Filozofların Tutarsızlığı, 107.
88 Ibid., 72.
89 İkbal, ibid., 112.
90 Aydın, “Muhammed İkbal’in Din Felsefesinde ‘Ulûhiyet’ Kavramı,” 208.
91 İkbal, ibid., 114. Because our main concern is not how Iqbal sees the problem of
Him of any responsibility, as the concepts of tzimtzum and kenosis do, to provide both nature and man with autonomy. Allah provided man with free will because of His confidence that man would strive in this growing and expanding universe and finally overcome evil. Thus, Iqbal, by limiting the knowledge and potency of God, makes man, not God, assume the cosmic risk and, as an ignorant being, according to the Qur'ān, solve the problem of evil.

God’s knowledge of variable human actions does not cause Him to change. It is impossible that the “omniscience of God requires Him to do all He knows.” This proposition is based on the following deduction by Aquinas: “Whatever God knows should exist, since even whatever we know has to exist. The knowledge of God is more precise than ours.” However, there is no such obligation. First, it is wrong to establish an analogy between God and man or to expect all divine knowledge to be actualized. Even some theoretical human knowledge has, at least for now, no corresponding manifestation in reality. Moreover, in addition to knowledge, God has many other names or attributes, including love, mercy, reassurance, patience, forgiveness and evil, this discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. For the problem of evil in Iqbal, see Mevlüt Albayrak, “İkbal’de Tanrı’nın Kudreti ve Kötülük Problemi,” Tasavvuf: İlim ve Akademik Araştırma Dergisi 3/7 (2001), 185-193; Ruhattın Yazoğlu, “Süreç Teolojisinde Kötülük Sorunu,” EKEV Akademi Dergisi - Sosyal Bilimler - 10/29 (2006), 135-144.

92 İkbal, ibid., 120.
93 İkbal, ibid., 121.
94 “We did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains; but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it: - He was indeed unjust and foolish.” (Q 33:72).
96 Anthony Kenny, “Tanrı’nın Önceden Bilme’si ve İnsan Hürijeti (= Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom”, in Anthony Kenny [ed.], Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969])” (translated into Turkish by Hanifi Özcan), Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 6 (1989), 627. Interestingly, Aquinas contradicts his own tradition by stating that God does not know the “forthcoming” or the “probable,” which restricts Him. This is so because the forthcoming and probable are not actually present. However, according to Aquinas, God knows even the existing particulars. In more technical terms, knowledge is subject to the known. This logic is clearly circular (See Kenny, ibid.; Muhammet Tarakçı, St. Thomas Aquinas [Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2006], 53).
guidance. Because God simultaneously possesses all these attributes, His knowledge should comply with them. Otherwise, if God were to do everything that He knew, His other attributes would be meaningless and God would become a self-contradictory tyrant who performs unwise deeds.

In the modern era, theologian and biochemist Arthur Peacocke (1924-2006) and pure physics and theology scholar John Polkinghorne (b. 1930) are among those who consider the limitation of God’s knowledge and potency necessary to establish a relationship between the natural sciences and divine activity. Peacocke refers to Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty, remarking that God may not know certain unpredictable probabilities about the universe. According to Peacocke, some subatomic particles, non-linear structures and dynamic macroscopic systems are unknown to us; the same may also be true for God. This obscurity is not a logical obligation but arises from the essential characteristics of such structures. Hence, neither man nor God entirely knows them. According to Peacocke, also a panentheistic philosopher, creation is a process. Peacocke also believes that God renounced His potency to create a freely becoming and conscious man.97

John Polkinghorne defends a similar position. For him, instead of maintaining a distinction between creator and creature, God introduces pure knowledge into the universe without adding energy. The universe remains in a state that requires energy and epistemic causality.98

Conclusion

The essentially perfect, omniscient, and omnipotent God of classical theism is subject to several philosophical and theological questions and problems. Classical theology proposes the perfection of God because perfection provides God with infinite knowledge and potency, determining nature and restricting the freedom of man. However, restricting God to allow the autonomy of nature and freedom of man also creates problems. Classical theism, for example, renders God absolute and

98 Polkinghorne, *Faith, Science & Understanding*, 124. Polkinghorne’s conception of the relation between God and nature should be treated in a different study. He conducts the discussion in terms of quantum philosophy. Therefore, basic knowledge about quantum physics is needed to properly comprehend the subject.
man limited by God’s will. Tzimtzum and process philosophy, however, limit God’s power over nature and man and thus reduce and restrict Him. Although it is assumed that God voluntarily limits Himself, such a restriction is ascribed to God by scholars.

Kenosis addresses problems arising from Christian theology’s claims about the nature of Jesus. In Islam, Muḥammad is considered a man, and there is therefore no debate about his nature. Hence, a kenotic approach is irrelevant in Islamic thought. This is not, however, to say that there is no problem in Islamic thought regarding divine knowledge and potency.

The virtual humanization of God and establishment of His quasi-equality with man by freeing Him from the siege of divine knowledge is an attempt to show that man is free in his actions and that nature has dynamism. This strategy resolves several human-based problems. Nevertheless, can a being who ontologically and epistemologically reduces Himself, rendering Himself ordinary to free man, and who is called God because He possesses attributes humans do not, remain God if He, albeit voluntarily, relinquishes such attributes?

Unless God knows the future and can change what He knows, what is the purpose of praying to and worshiping Him? If God is empty or limited, the laws of nature can be explained without God and man becomes merely a mortal being. If this is so, then human virtues have no meaning or value except in this world.

Today, approaches proposing the self-limitation of God are still debated, especially in the natural sciences, allowing the problematic of this study to be discussed more specifically in the context of thinkers such as Moltman, Wanstone, Polkinghome, and Peacocke. The problems resolved and generated by these approaches, which appear to be a different form of determinism, should also be discussed.

These debates seek to justify the relation between God, nature and man; indeed, they ensure a dialectic of ideas and an intellectual productivity. Due to the dialectic nature of this issue, the problem may remain as unresolved in the future as it is today.
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WAS ABŪ DHARR AL-GHIFĀRĪ “EXILED” TO AL-RABADHA?
A Review on the Relations between Caliph ʿUthmān and Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī

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Abstract

The period after the Prophet Muḥammad is significant in many respects. In particular, the events that took place during the time of the third caliph ʿUthmān, have a distinct importance because they had a profound impact on the future development of Islamic society. An important aspect of this period that affected political, religious, and social life during Islamic history was the relation between Caliph ʿUthmān and Abū Dharr, which resulted in Abū Dharr going to al-Rabadha. There are significant differences in the narratives related to these events. In some accounts, Abū Dharr went to al-Rabadha on his own request, whereas in others, he was sent into exile by the Caliph ʿUthmān because he protested his regime for corruption. This article aims to examine the relations between Caliph Uthmān and Abū Dharr in three steps: Abū Dharr's leaving to Damascus; the events that occurred between Abū Dharr and Muʿāwiya; Abū Dharr's coming back to Medina and then leaving (or being exiled) to al-Rabadha.

Key Words: Caliph ʿUthmān, Abū Dharr, al-Rabadha, exile, fitna

Historians generally divide Caliph ʿUthmān’s reign (644-656) into six “good” years and six “bad” years. The events from around the year 30/650-651 which occurred in the second six-year term are significant in many respects because they had a profound impact on the future development of Islamic society. In particular the events that took
place between Caliph ʿUthmān (d. 35/656) and Abū Dharr (d. 32/653) and that resulted in Abū Dharr going to al-Rabadha\(^1\) deserve consideration. First, it should be noted that there are significant differences between the narratives related to these events. However, it is accepted by historians that Abū Dharr went to al-Rabadha due to criticism, but at first sight it seems unclear whether he went upon his own request or was sent into exile by the Caliph. According to some narratives, the reason he was sent to al-Rabadha as an exile was that he expressed criticism toward Caliph ʿUthmān because he changed the Sunna of the Prophet and the policy of the previous two caliphs, and because of his donation from \textit{bayt al-māl} to his close relatives. In addition Abū Dharr criticized Muslims who were hoarding wealth. In the narratives of the exile it is argued that some prominent ʿṣāḥāba such as ʿAli ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAwf (d. 32/652) criticized Caliph ʿUthmān due to his attitude towards Abū Dharr. According to the other narratives Abū Dharr came to Medina from Damascus, then left to al-Rabadha on his own request.

In the historical sources there are two different groups of narratives of Abū Dharr’s arrival to Damascus. According to the first group by Ibn ʿAsākir (d. 571/1176), Abū Dharr was residing in Medina. He had come to this region (\textit{Bilād al-Shām}) to participate in the conquest of Palestine, and he met Caliph ʿUmar in Jābiya.\(^2\) He subsequently went to Damascus.\(^3\) The second group of accounts says that,

\(^1\) Al-Rabadha was a village located a three day distance from the Iraqi side of Medina; see Abū ʿAbd Allāh Shihāb al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd Allāh Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, \textit{Muʿjam al-buldān} (Beirut: Dār al-Dīn, 1977), III, 24.

\(^2\) Jābiya, a city eighty kilometers south of Damascus, is situated in Jawlān, not far from the site of modern Nawā. It was used as an administrative center in the time of the Ghassānids. In Islamic period, it was conquered during the time of Caliph Abū Bakr (d. 13/634) and became a military base (\textit{jund}) of this region. The importance of Jābiya increased during the time of Caliph ʿUmar (d. 23/644) and he visited there to decide upon conditions in the new conquests. A meeting of the generals and principal officers was held there and has remained famous with the name \textit{yawm al-Jābiya}; see Henri Lammens and J. Sourdel-Thomine, “al-Djābiya,” \textit{The Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition}, II, 360; Mustafa Fayda, “Cābiye,” \textit{Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)}, VI, 538.

Caliph ʿUthmān had sent Abū Dharr to Damascus a second time. There are three different narratives. According to the first narrative by al-Balādhuри (d. 279/892-893), Abū Dharr settled in Damascus where his maktāb was and in the time of the pilgrimage he came to Medina. However after the pilgrimage he did not return to Damascus and began to live in Medina. When he saw that the buildings reached to Salūṭ, he asked ʿUthmān for permission to leave Medina for Damascus.⁴ According to the second narrative Caliph ʿUthmān heard that Abū Dharr said “ʿUthmān has changed the Sunna of the Prophet and the policy of the previous two caliphs.” Because of this, he sent him as an exile to Damascus, near Muʿāwiyah.⁵ According to the third narrative quoted by al-Masʿūdī (d. 345/956), Abū Dharr went to Damascus, ʿUthmān b. Affān, The Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition, X, 948.


⁴Abū Dharr was recorded at Diwān al-Shām.

⁵Salā is a hill on the outskirts of Medina; see Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Muʾjam, III, 240-241. Al-Maqdisi called that place Sayf; see Abū Naṣr al-Muṭḥahhar ibn Ṭāhil al-Maqdisī, Kitāb al-badr wa-l-tārikh (ed. Clément Huart; Baghdad: Maktabat al-Muthannā, n.d.), V, 94-95.


⁷Abū l-ʿAbbās ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ḥāfiz Isḥāq ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥāfiz al-Ṭāhil, Tārīkh al-Yaʿqūbī (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1960), II, 171. Della Vida also has argued that Abū Dharr was exiled to Syria with some of his companions; see G. Levi Della Vida [R. G. Khoury], “ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition, X, 948.
because Caliph ʿUthmān posed a question in a gathering, which Kaʿb al-Akhbār (d. 32/652-53) attended, asking whether anyone else has the right to the property of a person who gives alms. Kaʿb expressed the opinion that no one had has this right. The Caliph posed another question asking whether it is lawful to spend funds from bayt al-māl for themselves. Kaʿb replied that there is nothing wrong with that. Abū Dharr became enraged because of these responses and struck his chest while raising his stick. His words are recorded: “Oh son of a Jew! What leads you to talk about our religion?” ʿUthmān who was uncomfortable due to these words reacted against him and said “Oh Abū Dharr! How much are you paining us? Get out of my sight.” Because of the Caliph’s attitude, Abū Dharr left for Damascus.8

Considering these narratives, it is clear that Abū Dharr joined the conquests in Syria and, after some time, returned to Medina for pilgrimage. He stayed in Medina for a while and when he saw that the buildings in Medina reached the foot of Salā, he asked ʿUthmān for permission to leave Medina for Damascus because the Prophet had told him to do so.9 In fact, according to the account that is mentioned in al-Mustadrak and accepted as authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), Umm Dharr, Abū Dharr’s wife, said that ʿUthmān did not exile Abū Dharr; rather he left Medina and went to Damascus on the advice of the Prophet.10 Furthermore after Abū Dharr came to Medina from Damascus, he asked


9 Also Rihan says, Abū Dharr spent his time mostly in Syria and in Egypt under the Caliphate of ʿUmar (13-23 AH). He came back for a short period to Medina on ʿUthmān’s accession to power. He, however, did not remain there for long and asked the caliph to let him to go to Damascus. See Mohammad Rihan, The Politics and Culture of an Umayyad Tribe: Conflict and Factionalism in the Early Islamic Period (London & New York, NY: I. B. Tauris, 2014), 147-148.


II

After Abū Dḥarr returned from Medina to Damascus, he criticized Muʿāwiya as well as the Muslims who hoarded surplus wealth and did not spend it in the way of Allah. In his criticisms he recited a verse (34) from sūrat al-Tawba as evidence.\footnote{“O you, who believe! Lo! Many of the (Jewish) rabbis and the (Christian) monks devout the wealth of mankind wantonly and debar (men) from the way of Allah. They who hoard up gold and silver and spend it not in the way of Allah, unto them give tidings (O Muḥammad) of a painful doom.” According to al-Ṭabarī, this verse is both of particular and of general application. It is of particular application to those Muslims who do not pay the poor-rate on their property and to Jews and Christians who are infidels; see al-Ṭabarī, Jāmīʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwil āy al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984), IX, 117-122. Al-Rāzī however, as Cameron says, mentioned three cases: this verse alludes to rabbis and monks, b) to those Muslims who were niggardly with regard to the poor-rate, and c) to all those who hoarded wealth and did not produce the imposts whether they were rabbis, monks, or Muslims; see Abū ʿAbd Allāh Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī al-mushabbhar bi-l-Tafsīr al-kabīr wa-Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1990), XVI, 36; also see Alan John Cameron, Abū Dḥarr al-Ghifārī: An Examination of His Image in the Hagiography of Islam (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1982), 73-74.} His views attracted attention from poor people and those who opposed the government. Therefore an opposition movement began against the government and the rich. After this Abū Dḥarr fell out with Muʿāwiya. Historical sources provide narratives about Muʿāwiya sending Abū Dḥarr from Damascus to Medina. Al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) said that many things have been recorded about why he sent him into exile and most of which he is unwilling to mention. After making this statement, al-Ṭabarī cited an account by Sayf ibn ʿUmar. Accordingly, when ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saba\footnote{ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sabaʾ also was called Ibn al-Sawdāʾ, Ibn Ḥarb, and Ibn Wahb.} came to Damascus he met\footnote{ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sabaʾ also was called Ibn al-Sawdāʾ, Ibn Ḥarb, and Ibn Wahb.} Abū Dḥarr and said, “Abū
Dharr, are you surprised by Muʿāwiya saying ‘the public money is God’s property (al-māl māl Allāh)?’\textsuperscript{15} No doubt, everything belongs

However, it is not clear whether he was a real personality. Sayf ibn ‘Umar, one of al-Ṭabarî’s sources, was the chief authority for Ibn Saba’’s political activity against Caliph ‘Uthmān; see M. G. Hodgson, “ʿAbd Allāh b. Saba’,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition, I, 51. Without entering debates on the historical existence of ‘Abd Allāh ibn Saba’, I refer to Yūsuf al-‘Ishsh’s substantial findings on the main narratives related to the events of fitna which occurred in the time of Caliph ‘Uthmān and ‘Ali. The reports regarding these events have reached us mainly through three narrators, Abū Mikhnaf, al-Wāqidi, and Sayf ibn ‘Umar. Although these three narrators transmitted the same events, there are significant differences in their reports. In addition they have been criticized by muḥaddithūn. Because of this, al-‘Ishsh says that these narratives must be compared with other reliable reports that mention the same events to decide which is true. For this purpose he identified three reports narrated by eyewitnesses of the events. These reports belong to Abū Usayd al-Anṣārī’s mawla Abū Saʿīd, Aḥnaf ibn Qays, and Abū Khunays Sahm al-Azdi. Finally, he compared these reports with three other narratives and concluded that the narratives by Sayf ibn ‘Umar point in the same direction of these three reliable reports. For more information see Yūsuf al-‘Ishsh, al-Dawla al-Umawīyya wa-l-ābdāb allāti sabaqath wa-mabbadat labā ibtidā mu min fitnat ‘Uthmān (2\textsuperscript{nd} edn., Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1985), 33-40, 65 ff. It must be noted that some scholars who consider the differences between the historical narratives and ḥadīths, state that Sayf is an authority and imām on history; see al-Dhahabi, Mīzān al-ʿībadī fī naqd al-rijāl (ed. ‘Ali Muḥammad al-Bijāwī; Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrīfa, 1963), II, 255; Abū l-Faḍl Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Ali Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Taqrīb al-Tabādhīb (ed. ‘Abd al-Walāḥ ‘Abd al-Lāṭf, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn., Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrīfa, 1975), I, 344. Also see Fayda, “Seyf b. Ömer,” Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (ĐLA), XXXVII, 37.


\textsuperscript{15} Wilferd Madelung has connected, as Sean W. Anthony states, the term māl Allāh with the caliphal title khalīfat Allāh; see Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 84. Anthony criticizes two aspects of Madelung’s argument. The first one is that this term is redolent of the events that occurred in al-Kūfa, particularly Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ’ declaration of Sawād and ‘Uthmān’s expression to ‘Abd Allāh ibn Masʿūd about bayt al-māl. The second is that this articulation of māl Allāh, which is attributed to Ibn al-Sawdāʾ, appears only in Sayf’s narrative about Abū Dharr; see Sean W. Anthony, The Caliph and the Heretic: Ibn Saba’ and the Origins of Shiʿism (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2012), 56, also fn. 130. Madelung’s
to God. But he intends to seize it for himself by the exclusion of Muslims and to delete the Muslims’ names from the fiscal registers.” Abū Dharr came to Muʿāwiya and said, “What leads you to use the term ‘God’s property’ for the public money of the Muslims?” Muʿāwiya responded “God be merciful to you Abū Dharr. Are we not God’s slaves, the public money His property, the created world His creation and public authority His authority?” Abū Dharr said, “Do not use this expression.” Muʿāwiya said “Indeed, I do not say that the public money does not belong to God, but I shall call it ‘the property of the Muslims.’” After that Abū Dharr continued to warn the rich to aid the poor people and said “There will be branding irons from a fire to those who treasure up gold and silver and do not expend them in the way of God, and with this iron their foreheads, sides, and backs shall be branded.” Because of his words, the poor people were angry at the rich and they remained in a difficult situation. The rich people who were uncomfortable, came to Muʿāwiya and reported their discomforts. Muʿāwiya reported to ʿUthmān that Abū Dharr rendered him helpless. ʿUthmān wrote to him in response: “Verily, dissension (fitna) has protruded its snout and eyes and poised to jump. Do not scrape the scab, but rather dispatch Abū Dharr to me. Send a guide along with him, give him adequate provisions, and treat him gently. Restrain the people and yourself as far as you can, for you will keep control of affairs only so long as you keep control of yourself.” Thus, Muʿāwiya sent Abū Dharr with a guide to Medina.16

16 Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, IV, 283-284; The History of al-Ṭabarī, XV, 64-65; also see Abū l-Ḥasan ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī l-tārīkh (ed. C. Johannes Tornberg; Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1965), III, 114-115. Hishām Jaʿūt argues, without justification, that this narrative by Sayf ibn ʿUmar cannot be accepted; see his al-Fitna: Jadaliyyat al-dīn wa-l-siyāsa fī l-Islām al-mubakkir (4th edn., Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalʿa, 2000), 75, fn. 1. Mahmut Kelpetin evaluated this narrative in a different way and criticized Sayf ibn ʿUmar by arguing that in this narrative it is meant to be explained that Abū Dharr in point of fact did not think about the subject like this. Abū Dharr influenced by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sabaʿ, criticized first Muʿāwiya and then Caliph ʿUthmān. In continuation of his remark, Kelpetin claimed that the reason that impelled Sayf to such a depiction was that Abū Dharr had been exiled; see his Hulefāʾyi Rāṣidīn Dönemi Tarihi: Seyf b. Ömer ve Tarıbcılıği (İstanbul: Siyer Yayınları, 2012), 250. However, Ahmet Güzel
Before addressing the events that occurred after Abū Dharr had arrived in Medina, I will note other narratives that mentioned different events that caused him to be sent to Medina. Mu‘āwiya built a palace in Damascus, which was called al-Khadrāʾ. Abū Dharr criticized him by saying that if it was built with public money it was betrayal and if it was built with his own money it was a waste. His criticism against Mu‘āwiya continued. Ḥabīb ibn Maslama\(^{17}\) (d. 42/662) came to Mu‘āwiya and informed him that Abū Dharr was inciting the populace of Damascus against him. He recommended that Mu‘āwiya exile Abū Dharr and his family if necessary. Mu‘āwiya wrote a letter to ʿUthmān and said that he wanted to dispatch Abū Dharr to Medina.

ʿUthmān accepted his offer and ordered Mu‘āwiya to convey him to Medina [in contrast to the previous narrative] on the roughest mount.\(^{18}\) It was also reported by al-Yaʿqūbī (d. 292/905) that Abū Dharr was sent to Medina for another reason. Abū Dharr used to sit in the mosque and went on to make the previously reported statements. People crowded around in growing numbers to hear him. Furthermore he stood at the door of Damascus when he prayed the morning claimed that it was not reasonable that ‘Abd Allāh ibn Sabaʾ inculcated Abū Dharr on Mu‘āwiya. Abū Dharr was one of the first Muslims, hence further explanation is needed that he was carried away by the incitement of ‘Abd Allāh ibn Sabaʾ; see his “Mu‘āviye ve Hz. Osman’a Muhalefeti Ekseninde Ebû Zerr el-Ğıfârî,” \textit{Marife} 12/3 (2012), 60. If the \textit{one-sentence speech} between Abū Dharr and Ibn Sabaʾ in the first part of the narrative and the main discussion between Abū Dharr and Mu‘āwiya on the \textit{sabab al-nuzūl} of the verse (34) from sūrat al-Tawba are taken into account, however, it is clear that Abū Dharr has a distinctive opinion about \textit{kanz} and \textit{infaq}. Therefore it is rather difficult to talk about the incitement or the effect of Ibn Sabaʾ on Abū Dharr. Hence, it could be said that Abū Dharr encountered Ibn Sabaʾ who told him about some practices of Mu‘āwiya which he was unfamiliar. After that he went to Mu‘āwiya and argued with him over this. Any other claim would be a forced interpretation of the narrative.

\(^{17}\) Ḥabīb ibn Maslama, born in Mecca in 610 or 620 AD, was a companion of the Prophet. He joined the conquest of Syria and distinguished himself in the fights against the Byzantines. By order of Mu‘āwiya, he conquered Armenia in 22/642. He was one of the persons who Mu‘āwiya consulted, and was a brave commander. After ʿUthmān’s death, he supported Mu‘āwiya against ʿAlī. He was appointed as a governor of Armenia in 41/661 and died there in 42/662; see Asri Çubukçu, “Ḥabīb b. Mesleme,” \textit{Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi} (DİA), XIV, 372-373. Fück has argued that he was not a companion of the Prophet; see J. W. Fück, “Ḥabīb b. Maslama,” \textit{The Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition}, III, 12.

prayer and said: "The train carrying the fire came. God may curse those who advise good but they themselves avoid it, and those who desist others from evil but they themselves act upon it." Mu'āwiya wrote to ʿUthmān, saying, “You have incited Damascus against yourself through Abū Dharr.” ʿUthmān wrote back telling him to set Abū Dharr on a packsaddle without a cover and send him to Medina.\footnote{Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 171-172.}

When Abū Dharr reached Medina, he entered ʿUthmān’s presence, and ʿUthmān said “O Abū Dharr, why are the Syrians complaining about your sharp tongue?” Abū Dharr described what had happened. ʿUthmān explained his policy of not forcing people to be ascetics, rather he was required to invoke them to care about God’s commandments and to follow the path of moderation. Abū Dharr then asked permission to leave Medina. ʿUthmān replied that if he wanted, he could stay in a place close to there. But Abū Dharr said that the Prophet commanded him to leave Medina when the buildings reached Salʿ. ʿUthmān replied that it would be good to do as the Prophet commanded him. Abū Dharr settled in al-Rabadha and Caliph ʿUthmān gave him a small herd of camels and two slaves, and instructed him to come to Medina occasionally to avoid getting used to the customs of Bedouins.\footnote{Al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, IV, 284; The History of al-Ṭabarī, XV, 65-66; also see Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, III, 115. Keaney has argued that this narrative is the typical Sayf account in which ʿUthmān is portrayed as an ideal ruler, responding promptly and wisely to complaints in the provinces and trying to find a just solution. In continuation of her remark, she claims “Sayf thus brings a faḍāʾil sensibility of ʿUthmān and key companions to bear on issues of political policy. While the ruler is not shown exercising religious authority, there is no tension in Sayf between politics and piety, between secular and sacred authority. While this was the ideal believed to have been modeled by Muḥammad, by the third/ninth century, the situation in practice was very different.” See Heather N. Keaney, Medieval Islamic Historiography: Remembering Rebellion (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 38. Keaney’s approach, which attempts to interpret Sayf’s account on the basis of two modern concepts, secular and sacred, is disputable because it is unfeasible to evaluate the early era of Islamic history with such concepts, particularly, if there is no hint of religious and political distinction in the state administration. Additionally, there is no doubt that this point of view would bring about anachronism.}

In the conversation mentioned above, ʿUthmān explained as a caliph his limits of power in matters of financial skill. As Aḥmad Jawdat Pasha (d. 1895) says, although ʿUthmān was a caliph; he did not have
the authority to distribute the surplus wealth that was in the hands of the rich Muslims giving their alms. Because they gave their alms, they could acquire possessions.\(^{21}\)

In the historical sources other accounts were also narrated about Abū Dharr going to al-Rabadha on his own request. The reliable account on this subject is reported by Zayd ibn Wahb (d. 83/702). According to this narrative, Zayd ibn Wahb went through al-Rabadha and encountered Abū Dharr. He asked what had moved him to settle there and Abū Dharr replied that when he was in Damascus, he recited a verse (34) from surat al-Tawba. Muʿāwiya argued that it did not concern Muslims but rather Jews and Christians. However Abū Dharr declared that it was revealed concerning Muslims as well as Jews and Christians. Muʿāwiya then wrote to ʿUthmān complaining about him, so the Caliph wrote to Abū Dharr to come to Medina. When Abū Dharr arrived in Medina, the people gathered around him as if they had never seen him before. Abū Dharr explained to ʿUthmān what had happened between him and Muʿāwiya. Upon this, ʿUthmān told him that if he so wished he could relocate to a spot where he would be a neighbor. Zayd ibn Wahb said “That is what moved Abū Dharr to settle in al-Rabadha.” At the end of the narrative Abū Dharr says that if an Abyssinian were to be invested with authority he would hear and obey him.\(^{22}\) Ibn Ḥajar, the commentator of al-Bukhārī, said of the narrative by Zayd ibn Wahb that although ʿUthmān had wanted Abū Dharr to leave Medina out of fear of the spread of fitna, Abū Dharr went to al-Rabadha on his own request.\(^{23}\) Al-Qaṣṭallānī, another shārīf of al-Bukhārī, said that some people condemned ʿUthmān because he sent Abū Dharr into exile. Zayd ibn Wahb asked Abū Dharr about this matter and Abū Dharr explained what happened. Accordingly, al-Qaṣṭallānī mentioned that Muʿāwiya’s soldiers tended to Abū Dharr, and that Muʿāwiya was afraid of conflict between the Muslims. ʿUthmān also feared the people of Medina as much as

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\(^{21}\) Ahmad Jawdat Pasha, *Kisâs-i Enbiyâ ve Tevârib-i Hulefâ* (Istanbul: Bedir Yayınevi, 1966), I, 455; also see Âdem Apak, *Hz. Osman Dönemi Devlet Siyaseti* (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2003), 156.


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Muʿāwiya had feared the people of Damascus. Because of this, Abū Dharr went to al-Rabadha on his own choice.24

Although there are alternative narratives mentioned by al-Yaʿqūbī, al-Baladhurī, Ibn Aṭham, and al-Masʿūdī that have many irreconcilable contrasts with the account by Zayd ibn Wahb al-Juhani, the latter should be superior to others in terms of three aspects: (1) Zayd ibn Wahb is an eyewitness and one of the main sources of these events. Because he met with Abū Dharr in al-Rabadha and talked with him about the matter, then narrated what occurred between Abū Dharr and Caliph ʿUthmān and why and how Abū Dharr came to Medina and then departed from Medina to al-Rabadha. (2) There are other reliable accounts that have parallels with Zayd’s account. For instance, according to the narrative by Muḥammad ibn ʿUthman, after Abū Dharr came to Medina, he warned ʿUthmān as he had warned Muʿāwiya in Damascus. However, when Abū Dharr saw that ʿUthmān did not incline to him, he went to al-Rabadha on his own request, and Muʿāwiya sent his household after him.26 It is also narrated by ʿAbd al-ʿAbbās Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Qaṣṭallānī, Irshād al-sāriʿ li-sbarb Ṣabiʿ al-Bukhārī (Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Maymaniyya, 1304 H.), III, 12.

24 Muḥammad ibn ʿUthman, mawla of Anas ibn Mālik, has been accepted as thiqa (trustworthy). He had narrated from some of the ṣaḥāba such as Abū Hurayra and ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar. Al-Shaʿbī and Qatāda also narrated from him; see Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, IV, 284-285; The History of al-Ṭabarī, XV, 67.

25 He is from the tābiʿīn and has been accepted as thiqa; see al-Bukhārī, al-Tārīkh al-kabīr, V, 118, al-ʿIjlī, Maʿrifat al-thiqāt, II, 38.

26 Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh, IV, 232.

ṣahāba such as ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ‘Uthmān ibn ʿAffān, and ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib.\(^{30}\)

This account by Zayd ibn Wahb is also accepted as reliable by modern scholars. For instance, Cameron mentions that the earliest available and reliable account on this subject is narrated by Zayd ibn Wahb, who tells us, quite briefly, that Abū Dharr settled in al-Rabadhā because of a difference of opinion with Muʿāwiyah on the interpretation of verse 34 of sūrat al-Tawbah.\(^{31}\) Cameron also explained his contention that Abū Dharr’s controversy was with the whole class of those who secularized the theocracy of Islam and that due to the failure of his preaching he withdrew from Damascus to Medina and thence to al-Rabadhā.\(^{32}\) According to Amḥazūn, this narrative is the most reliable account among those about Abū Dharr going to al-Rabadhā.\(^{33}\) Considering this narrative, Yiğit states that Abū Dharr had been sent by Caliph ʿUthmān to al-Rabadhā on his own request.\(^{34}\) However, Aydını argues that Caliph ʿUthmān chose al-Rabadhā, because of its solitude and because some acquaintances of Abū Dharr were living there. It cannot be determined, however, who made this decision about Abū Dharr going to al-Rabadhā.\(^{35}\)

In contrast to the narratives above, there are some accounts about Abū Dharr being sent by Caliph ʿUthmān to al-Rabadhā as an exile. According to the narrative by al-Yaʿqūbī, when Abū Dharr arrived in

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\(^{31}\) Cameron, *Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī*, 64, 66.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 115.


\(^{35}\) Abdullah Aydını, “Ebū Zer el-Gifārī,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, X, 267. Jobson, without making any preference, has indicated that Abū Dharr retired or was sent to al-Rabada where he died in 32/652-653 or 31; see J. Jobson, “Abū Dharr al-Gifārī,” *The Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition*, I, 114. The opinion of Güzel, however, is similar to that of Aydını; he argues that al-Rabadha was chosen by Abū Dharr; see “Muâviye ve Hz. Osman’a Muhalefeti Ekseninde Ebū Zerr al-Ḡifārī,” 52-54.
Medina, he said that the Prophet Muḥammad, in warning the people of the malicious rule of the Umayyads, said, “When the children of Abū 1-ʿĀṣ reach the number of thirty, they make the Islamic treasury as their own and the servants of God as their slaves.” ʿUthmān said that he had heard that Abū Dharr narrated this hadīth. Abū Dharr replied that he heard the Prophet saying it. Upon this, ʿUthmān asked ʿĀlī ibn Abī Ṭālib whether he had heard the Prophet say what Abū Dharr narrated. ʿĀlī replied in the affirmative and said that according to the word of the Prophet, greenery (al-khaḍrāʾ) never shaded and earth never bore a man more upright than Abū Dharr. After this conversation Abū Dharr stayed a few days in Medina until ʿUthmān commanded him to leave Medina. Upon this, Abū Dharr asked the Caliph whether he would expel him from the sacred city of the Prophet. ʿUthmān replied that he would. So, Abū Dharr countered by saying that he would go to Mecca. The Caliph rejected this, and Abū Dharr said “To al- Başra.” However ʿUthmān replied “No,” so he said “To al-Kūfa.” Again ʿUthmān did not accept and replied, “I send you to al-Rabadha where you came from and where you will die.” He then commanded his cousin Marwān to take him off.⁶

⁶ Al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 171-172; also see al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 54; Ibn Aʾtham, Kitāb al-futūḥ, I, 374-375; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-dhabab, II, 349-350. This narrative related to the Umayyads is mentioned in some sources. Al-Dhahabī said that it was munqatī (disconnected); see al-Ḥākim al-Nīṣabūrī, al-Mustadrak, IV, 647. Cameron associates Abū Dharr’s request to go to al-Kūfa with ʿĀlī’s residence there; see Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, 87. In some narratives, it is said that Abū Dharr was subjected to ill-treatment by Marwān and a quarrel occurred between ʿĀlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and Marwān. Accordingly, ʿUthmān told Marwān to lead Abū Dharr away and ordered him not to let him talk to anyone. After they left there, ʿĀlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and his two sons as well as ʿAbd Allāh ibn Jaʿfar and ʿAmmār ibn Yāsir went out with him. Abū Dharr went up to ʿĀlī, kissed his hand and wept, saying that when he saw him and his son, he was reminded of the saying of the Prophet, and that he could not be patient and wept. ʿĀlī also spoke to him, but Marwān tried to prevent him by saying that the Commander of the Faithful had forbidden anyone to speak to Abū Dharr. Thereupon ʿĀlī raised his whip and struck Marwān’s camel in the face saying “Get out of my sight! May God cast you into the fire!” Then ʿĀlī escorted Abū Dharr. Because of this matter, the relations between ʿUthmān and ʿĀlī became strained; see al-Yaʿqūbī, Tārīkh, II, 171-172; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 54; Ibn Aʾtham, Kitāb al-futūḥ, I, 376; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-dhabab, II, 350. Vaglieri, based on this narrative, has argued that when Abū Dharr was exiled from Medina because of ʿĀlī’s salutation to Abū Dharr in spite of ʿUthmān’s prohibition, a violent dispute occurred between ʿĀlī and ʿUthmān;
As Milḥim rightly argues, this narrative reflects al-Yaʿqūbī’s negative approach against Caliph ʿUthman and the Umayyads. Al-Yaʿqūbī tried to confirm the word of the Prophet about the Umayyads, which he based on Abū Dharr, with the ḥadīth in which the Prophet praises Abū Dharr. In this point it should be kept in mind that a number of reports were narrated both in favor of the Umayyads and against them, and that most of them were fabricated due to political events.

It is also said that when Abū Dharr reached Medina, he began criticizing ʿUthmān because he appointed some people in governmental affairs, who did not reach the age of maturity, because of his establishment of state land (ḥimā) and because of creation of close ties with al-ṭulaqaʿ. Due to his criticism, ʿUthmān ordered him to leave the city. Thereupon Abū Dharr said, “To Mecca.” ʿUthmān replied, “No”. So he said, “To Jerusalem.” Again ʿUthmān did not accept. So Abū Dharr said “To one of two cities [al-Kūfa or al-_BUSRA].” ʿUthmān

see L. Veccia Vaglieri, “Ali b. Abī Ṭālib,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition, I, 382. It is clear in this narrative that ‘Ali has been presented as a person who opposed Caliph ʿUthmān. Therefore these and similar narratives were clearly produced as a result of the efforts to bring ‘Ali against ʿUthmān.


38 For further information concerning this kind of narratives, see İrfan Aycan, Sultanata Giden Yolda Muaviye bin Ebī Sūfyan (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2001), 34-45; also see Apak, Hz. Osman Dönemli Devlet Siyaseti, 156.

39 The reason of Abū Dharr’s criticism was that although Marwān was under age, ʿUthmān appointed him as kātib. Thus when he was the Caliph’s kātib, he should be in his twenties; see Aycan, “Mervân I,” Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA), XXIX, 225.

40 The ḥimā is the land that is open to everyone for grazing of animals, and that is prohibited to appropriate of property; see Abū l-Hasan ʿAli ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb al-Māwardi, al-ʿAḥkām al-sulṭāniyya wa-l-wilāyāt al-diniyya (ed. Aḥmad Mubāraκ al-Baghdādi; Kuwait: Dār Ibn Qutayba, 1989), 242. The institution dates back to the pre-Islamic Arab society. To protect their flocks from the ill-effects of drought, the powerful nomadic lords used to reserve to themselves the grazing and watering rights in certain rich pasturages. For more information see J. Chelhod, “ Ḥimā,” The Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition, III, 393; Mustafa Demirci, İslâmın İlk Üç Asırında Toprak Sistemi (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003), 174-186.

41 Al-ṭulaqaʿ was the name given to people who became Muslim after the conquest of Mecca and were not treated as captives; see Abū l- Faḍl Ibn Manṣūr ibn Mukarram Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Anṣārī al-Miṣrī, Lisān al-ʿArab (Beirut: Dār Şādir, 1955-1956), “ṭlq” s.v.; al-Ṭabarî, Tārīkh, III, 61.
replied, “I exile you to al-Rabadha.” which he eventually did. Abū Dharr lived in al-Rabadha until he died. 42

Madelung argues on the basis of the narrative by al-Balādhurī that ‘Uthmān ordered Abū Dharr to be sent to Medina by Muʿāwiya and, as Abū Dharr continued his ‘agitation,’ he was exiled to al-Rabadha in the desert. 43 Balcı has mentioned almost all narratives without making any distinction between them and asserts that the true essence of Abū Dharr going to al-Rabadha is not clear. However, he claims that according to the flow of events, Abū Dharr was forced to leave the city and he had let this decision pass unchallenged because he knew himself as a person who caused fitna. 44 Jabali did not comment on other narratives, but considering the narrative by Ibn Aṯtham he argues that this exile was one of ‘Uthmān’s policies and seems to indicate that it was ‘Uthmān who forced Abū Dharr to leave Medina and that it was ‘Uthmān who sent him into exile outside the city. 45

42 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 52-53. It is also narrated in Ansāb al-asbrāf that when Abū Dharr came to Medina from Damascus, ‘Uthmān said to him that it was better for him that they stay together than remain apart ‘Uthmān also gave him some milch camels. However, Abū Dharr said that he had no need of this and he went al-Rabadha and died there.

43 Madelung mentions that the Kūfan and Baṣran traditions mostly affirm that Abū Dharr was exiled by ‘Uthmān against his own will. As for the Medinan tradition, it was divided into the Sunnī and the Shiʿī. According to the former, the Sunnī, Abū Dharr went voluntarily. According to the second, the Shiʿī tradition, which is the tradition of al-Wāqidi, he was exiled by ‘Uthmān against his will; see Madelung, The Succession to Muḥammad, 84, fn. 24. Madelung has also argued that ‘Uthmān mistreated Abū Dharr arrogantly as well as ‘Abd Allāh ibn Masʿūd and ‘Ammār ibn Yāṣir; see ibid., 87. If his relied upon account which is narrated by al-Balādhurī from al-Wāqidi, is taken into consideration, it is understood that he prefers the Shiʿī tradition of Medina.


Lastly, we would like to note some other narratives with doubtful reliability. These narratives note that some prominent ṣaḥāba such as ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn ʿAwf criticized ʿUthmān due to his policy on Abū Dharr. According to a narrative by al-Balādhurī, after Abū Dharr had died in al-Rabadha, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib went to ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn ʿAwf and accused him by saying that he had elected ʿUthmān as a caliph. Thereupon ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn ʿAwf replied, “O ʿAlī! If you want take your sword I will also take my sword. Because ʿUthmān did not keep his promise he had given me.” After that, he expressed his deep remorse in choosing ʿUthmān as a caliph.\(^6\)

As mentioned above, after Abū Dharr died in al-Rabadha, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib held ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn ʿAwf responsible for this event. Despite this ʿAlī did not react to him when Abū Dharr was “exiled” to al-Rabadha. Therefore, a reaction of ʿAlī to ʿAbd al-Rahmān after two or three years is not plausible. Furthermore there is no account, except the narrative by al-Balādhurī that mentions ʿAbd al-Rahmān’s criticism of ʿUthmān on Abū Dharr’s death in al-Rabadha. His words, which are related to taking his sword, are narrated on other events. For instance in a narrative by Ibn Aʿtham\(^7\) ʿAbd al-Rahmān used the same expressions when he criticized ʿUthmān because of his donation from bayt al-māl to his close relatives. Therefore this situation casts a shadow on the reliability of this narrative.\(^8\) The existence of some accounts noting that ʿAbd al-Rahmān had died earlier than Abū Dharr increases the doubts about this narrative.\(^9\)

\(^6\) Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, V, 57. In this passage ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn ʿAwf allegedly refers to the question he posed to ʿUthmān before his election of caliph. In the shūrā council appointed by Caliph ʿUmar, ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn ʿAwf asked, “Will you give me your oath based on the Qurʾān, the practice of his Prophet and the deeds of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar.” ʿUthmān replied, “Yes indeed.”

\(^7\) Ibn Aʿtham, Kitāb al-futūḥ, I, 371.

\(^8\) For the narratives about Caliph ʿUthmān’s donation to his close relatives and assessment of them see Milḥim, al-Muʿarrīkhūn al-ʿArab, 96 ff.

\(^9\) According to an account by Ibn ʿAsākir, Abū Dharr came to ʿUthmān one day and the inheritance that ʿAbd al-Rahmān had left at his demise, was being distributed by ʿUthmān. Caliph ʿUthmān said to Kaʿb al-Akhbār, “O Abū Ishāq! Do you see the goods which are given its alms? Shall the owner [ʿAbd al-Rahmān] be accountable for these goods?” Kaʿb confirmed that which the Caliph had said. Thereupon Abū Dharr raised his stick and struck Kaʿb’s head while saying to him
IV

When the accounts above are considered together, it is understood that the matter of whether Abū Dharr went to al-Rabadha on his own request or by exile is very controversial. Nonetheless three main points must be noted about the narratives regarding the matter: The first is that these accounts can be divided into three main groups: Abū Mikhnaf Lūṭ ibn Yaḥyā (d. 157/773-774), Sayf ibn ʿUmar (d. 180/774), and Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Wāqiqī (d. 207/823). The books of these historians, *akhbāriyyūn*, have been largely lost but they have reached us from the next generation of historians such as al-Yaʿqūbī, al-Balādhurī, and al-Ṭabarī. Here it must be noted that Sayf’s accounts were narrated only by al-Ṭabarī, and that although al-Balādhurī narrated from Sayf in *Futūḥ al-buldān*, he ignored his accounts about incidents of the *fitna* in Ansāb al-asbrāf. Sayf, unlike the others, did not implicate the ṣaḥāba in the events of *fitna* and defended the caliphate of ʿUthmān. Furthermore, he emphasized the unity of Islamic umma. The reason for al-Ṭabarī’s choice is derived from his approach to the events; his viewpoint has parallels with that of Sayf. The best example of this can be seen in his expression “many things have been recorded as to why he sent him into exile, most of which I am loathe to mention.” As for other historians, if al-Yaʿqūbī who did not disclose his sources regarding the events of *fitna*, is excluded, al-Balādhurī, Ibn Aṭham, and al-Masʿūdī, a later historian who apparently benefited from al-Yaʿqūbī and al-Balādhurī, come to the forefront. A common feature of these historians is that their accounts mainly follow the tradition of al-Wāqiqī and Abū Mikhnaf who were pro-Shiʿite. This aspect is clearly understood through the ac-

“Son of a Jew! Do you think that he will not be accountable because of his goods of which he had paid its alms?” He then recited some verses to him; see Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tārīkh*, LXVI, 197; also see Ibn Shabba, *Tārīkh*, III, 1036-1037; al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, 411.


counts of the period of *fitna*, which are narrated by them. In fact, according to these narratives Abū Dharr is always represented as a ṣaḥabi protesting the “corruption” of ʿUthmān’s regime and calling for a restoration of the ascetic piety and social equality of the community. It must be emphasized that a general characteristic of these accounts is that ʿAlī has an important and positive role in the events, and he is reflected as a companion who supported the Caliph ʿUthmān despite his many mistakes and who interceded on Abū Dharr’s behalf.

The second is that the text which Sayf provided is most coherent one. As for the other narratives, Abū Dharr was exiled to Damascus as well as al-Rabadha. However within the framework of narratives, the matter that cannot be resolved is that the same reasons are associated with both his exile to Damascus and to al-Rabadha. Additionally, in these accounts, different justifications have been argued about Abū Dharr’s exile to al-Rabadha, so they have contradictions. Therefore this case weakens the reliability of the accounts and renders the subject incomprehensible.

The third is that some contemporary scholars, such as al-Ghabbān and Amḥazūn, have found that the *isnād* of the narratives by Ibn Saʿd, al-Bukhārī, and al-Ṭabarī much more reliable than others. As a result, if all of these are taken into account it is clear that Abū Dharr went to al-Rabadha on his own request.

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TANNERS OF BURSA IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

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Abstract
Tannery, which is one of the most ancient occupations in the history of mankind, has an important place in Turkish-Islamic crafts because of the nomadic culture. Tannery maintained this status during the Ottoman period. Tannery also has an important position among other occupational fields because Akhī Awrān, who was regarded as the founder of Akhism, was a tanner. The Ottoman regulations bound by provisionism (iʿāsha) policy regarding meat consumption and raw skin deeply affected tannery and tanners. No emphasis on tannery has thus far been provided concerning Bursa, which was the first capital of the Ottoman Empire and was better known for its silk production. Examining the situation of tanners and tanneries in Ottoman Bursa, this article provides clues concerning the importance of tannery in Bursa during the Ottoman period, thus contributing to the field.

Key Words: Tanner, tannery, Ottoman State, Bursa

Introduction
Processing animal skin is as old as human history. The importance of skin is naturally crucial for human beings to meet their needs for clothing. The usage of skin was not restricted to clothing; many items, such as paper, shields, and water tanks, were manufactured from skin
or covered with skin to be more strong and stylish.\(^1\) In this regard, tannery is considered one of the oldest occupations in history. This occupation was also necessary for Turks who bred stock and were nomadic people. Saddle scarves, kumis *tulums* (leather bottles), metal appliqué belts, skin dresses, coats with furs, boats, and battle tools were recovered from Hun Pazirik *kurgans*\(^2\) in Middle Asia and demonstrate how extensive skin usage was at that time.\(^3\) This widespread usage led to the improvement of tannery craftsmanship, and Turks brought this craft to Anatolia when they immigrated there. Therefore, in the time of the Seljuqs, Beyliks and finally, the Ottomans, the tannery craft maintained its improvement and witnessed its golden age in the Ottoman period.\(^4\)

The fact that the respected Akhī Awṛān,\(^5\) who was the founder of Akhism and accepted as the pīr of 32 guilds, was a tanner contributed to the high position of tanners throughout the Ottoman period.\(^6\)

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1. For goods produced from skin see Melda Özdemir and Nuran Kayabaşı, *Geçmişten Günümüze Dericilik* (Ankara: T. C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 2007). For example, Sofra-i Bulghārī (Bulghārī is a type of Russian *masbin* (tr. *meşin*), which we frequently observe in sixteenth century *terek*es, is a table covered with leather. Bursa Shar’iyya Court Records (*sijil")s (hereafter, it will be indicated as BSR), A 191, 20a-22a.
2. *Kurgan* is the name for small hills made by soil over graves in antiquity.
4. *Ibid*.
5. His real name was Naṣīr al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad al-Khūyī, and his personal record is Abū l-Ḥaqāʾiq. He was born in 566/1171 in Khūy, which was in West Azerbaijan of Iran. With Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī and his master Awḥad al-Dīn Kirmānī, Akhī Awṛān came to Anatolia in 602/1205 and began to work as a tanner. The organization he founded based on the teachings of *futuwwa* organization was helpful for the organization of craftsmen guilds. For detailed information; see Fatih Köksal, *Ahi Evran ve Abilık* (2nd edn., Kırşehir: Kırşehir Valiliği Yayıncılık, 2008).
6. As İlhan Şahin indicates, these references should be comprehensively reviewed to ensure the accuracy of our knowledge concerning Akhī Awṛān. Accordingly, we must adopt a cautious approach regarding information on Akhī Awṛān’s tannership; see İlhan Şahin, “Ahi Evran,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, I, 529-530. In fact, in a small *matbaawi* of 167 couplets on Akhī Awṛān in the early 14th century, Gulshahrī depicts him as a typical Sufi dervish. For further information, see Franz Taeschner, *Gülschehris Mesnevi auf Achi Evran, den Heiligen von Kirschebir und Patron der türkischen Zünfte* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1955).
There are many studies regarding the position of respected tanners’ guilds in the Ottoman State and the tanneries where the tanners perform their crafts. In Suraiya Faroqhi’s work, *Cities and Citizens in the Ottomans*, the chapter, “The production of skin, the skin crafts and the city bazaar,” offers important information regarding skin production in the Ottoman State. Faroqhi provides information concerning all Anatolia. In addition, there are also volumes that examine the tannery of a single city. However, these compositions generally address tannery in Istanbul, except the works that discuss it in Manisa or Denizli. Zeki Tekin authored a PhD dissertation on tannery in Istanbul up to the Tanzimat Period and an article on Istanbul tanneries. Moreover, “Ottoman Tanners” by Miyase Koyuncu evaluates the subject as an occupational issue and examines tanners and their problems as a guild in the Ottoman Period. Onur Yıldırım in his article “Osmanlı İaşeciliği ve Esnaf: On Sekizinci Yüzyıl İstanbul’unda Debbağlılar” evaluates eighteenth century tanners in Istanbul in the context of the provisionism (iʿāsha) policy of the Ottoman State.

Melda Özdemir’s article on the craft of tannery in Turkish culture

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and her work on tannery in its historical context are informative for researchers in the field. In addition to all of these compositions, it is possible to obtain information regarding tanners in most studies on Ottoman guilds. There are several studies on tanners in the Ottoman period and the craftsmanship of leatherworking. However, none of these studies are limited to tanners in Bursa, the first capital of the Ottoman Empire. Using the documents in the related periods, this article will evaluate tanners in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Bursa and identify the city’s importance in leatherworking.

**Tannery and Tanners in Bursa**

There is limited information concerning the local characteristics of tanneries in Anatolia. However, it is known that tanneries were founded near seas or rivers because the process of tannery required a lot of water.

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15 Tekin, “İstanbul Debbaghaneleri,” 350. For example, tanneries of Manisa, which are founded in three different locations, can be seen on the riverside. Gökçen, XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıl Vesikalarına Göre Manisa’da Deri Sanatları Taribi Üzerinde
first rule of founding a tannery was to find a location next to the wa-
ter.\textsuperscript{16}

The tannery of Bursa was located in Çakır Hamam, east of Hisar, along a river that flowed from Pınarbaşı through Tahtakale until it converged with Gökdere.\textsuperscript{17} Because Bursa was located on the inner side of the wall at that time, this location was excluded from the city walls. However, the tannery of Bursa was close to the Sultanate Gate, which was one of the gates of the Bursa fortresses. Because of this proximity, another name of the Sultanate Gate was “The Tannery Gate.”\textsuperscript{18}

Similar to other cities, tanners of Bursa were situated along the riv-
er.\textsuperscript{19} Tanneries were built on city peripheries because of the bad odors and pollution they produced.\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, because of Islamic city traditions, tanners performed their craft in the city’s outskirts.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, tanneries could have ended up in the center of city because of expansion of the city’s boundaries. In this case, tanneries were generally moved to another location or their environments were cleaned.\textsuperscript{22} Some places near tanneries in Bursa were rented on the condition of forestation.\textsuperscript{23} However, thus far, no evidence exists regarding whether tanneries were moved because they disturbed the environment. In contrast, from the fifteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century Bursa tanneries remained at their locations even after their surroundings were populated. Therefore, it can be

\textit{Bir Araşturma,} 8, 9.

\textsuperscript{16} Tekin, “İstanbul Debbaghâneleri,” 351.
\textsuperscript{17} Ergenç, XVI. Yüzyılın Sonlarına Bursa, 57; BSR A 153, 23b, 110a.
\textsuperscript{18} Saadet Maydaer, Osmanlı Klasik Döneminde Bursa’dan Bir Semt: Hisar (Bursa: Emin Yayınları, 2009), 177.
\textsuperscript{19} BSR B 18, 2b; B 18, 25a.
\textsuperscript{20} Tekin, “İstanbul Debbaghâneleri,” 350.
\textsuperscript{22} Tekin, “İstanbul Debbaghâneleri,” 351. Tanneries shared a similar outcome in many Ottoman cities. Initially established at a location inside city walls near the departure gates in Aleppo, Tunis, and Cairo, tanneries were soon moved outside of the castle because their malodour disturbed the public as the cities grew. For further information, see André Raymond, \textit{La Ville Arabe, Alep, à l’Époque Ottomane (XVIe-XVIIIe Siècles)} (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1998), 129, 131-136.
\textsuperscript{23} BSR B 18, 55b.
clearly seen where tanneries were located in a Bursa map of 1862. In his work about his journey to Bursa in 1901, Ḥusayn Waṣṣāf stated that tanneries in Bursa were near Pınarbaşı Graveyard, and there was a very unpleasant odor in the area. A former tanner, Vehbi Take, indicates that the tanneries of Bursa were established in their usual places, i.e., the valley from Pınarbaşı to Çakirhamam, until 1937 and that Pınarbaşı water was used to wash the skins. This waterway extended to Ulucami (Grand Mosque) in some locations.  

Complaints concerning the water pollution that tanneries caused were occasionally recorded in court records. For example, in the seventeenth century, tanneries were the subject of complaints regarding how their used water affected clean water. After an investigation, it was determined that the water of the Mecnun Dede neighborhood was under the tannery’s water; but there was no possibility that the unclean water affected the clean water because the clean water went underground and was properly covered. However, as a precaution, the tanner was required to fix the damaged side of the waterway with isolation equipment.

The area where tanneries were located were also called Debbağlar Mahallesi (Tanners’ Neighborhood). According to the first taḥrīr record of Bursa in 1487, there were 23 homeowners, 60 houses – 37 of them rentals – 10 single (unmarried) people, 5 tenants and 5 owners. Therefore, Debbağlar Mahallesi had a dense population compared with other neighborhoods in the fifteenth century. In subsequent years, the population of the neighborhood did not increase but decreased. According to 1521 taḥrīr records, there were 41 homeowners, 20 tenants, 8 owners and 5 single tenants. In 1573, there

25 BSR B 32, 2a.
27 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Tapu Tafrir Defterleri (TTD) 23, 31.
29 Ibid., 7.
were 47 homeowners and eight tenants. A merchant at that time, Khoja Ece, donated a considerable amount of money to the foundation (waqf) of the neighborhood’s mosque.

The oldest document concerning Debbağlar Çarşı (Tanners’ Bazaar) is the foundation voucher (waqfiyya) of Mullâ Fanârî issued in 1430. In this waqfiyya, Mullâ Fanârî wanted a mosque built in De Paslar Çarşı. Four tannery stores were built under the mosque built in Çarşı and would later operate for 500 years. According to the bookkeeping records of the waqf, these stores were active for a long time and provided money to the waqf. Mullâ Fanârî was not the only person who gave a store to the waqf in De Paslar Çarşı. Çakır Agha, who lived at the time of Murâd II and Meḥmed II and served as Bursa Subaşı, donated four stores to the waqf. Stores or their locations in De Paslar Çarşı may have belonged to other waqfs as well. However, not all the stores in the tannery belonged to waqfs; there were also mulk stores. Sometimes, tanners gave their own tannery stores to waqfs. In this case, a tanner would donate all tannery tools with the tannery. Tanners announced that they would use these stores during their lifetimes, however, after their death, their children or their designee would use them.

30 Ibid.
32 Başkanlıktar Osmanlı Arşivi, Vakfıyeler, 19/6.
33 Mullâ Fanârî, or Sheik al-Islâm Mawlânâ Shams al-Dîn Meḥmed al-Fanârî, was the first sheikh al-Islâm of the Ottoman State and a prominent scholar.
34 For detailed information regarding Mullâ Fanârî’s waqfs in Bursa, see Maydaer, “Molla Fenârî’nin Bursa’daki Vakıfları,” in Tevfik Yüceoğlu et al. (eds.), Uluslararası Molla Fenârî Sempozyumu (4-6 Aralık 2009 Bursa) – Bildiriler – (International Symposium on Molla Fanârî [4-6 December 2009 Bursa – Proceedings –) (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayınları, 2010), 95-110.
36 Kâmil Kepeçioglu, Bursa Küttâğı (MS Bursa, Bursa Yazma ve Eski Basma Eserler Kütüphanesi, Genel, 4519) I, 326. Several estates and tanneries belonged to the Çakır Agha Foundation in the 17th century and were used illegally by other foundations. After complaints, the foundation gained back its rights. BSR B 117, 20b; B 117, 52a.
37 BSR A 8, 143a, 145b; A 67, 448a; B 117, 52b; B 118, 93a.
38 BSR B 132, 34a.
39 BSR A 67, 448a; A 43, 37a.
The estimated number of stores in tanneries was approximately eighty. According to a document dated 13 Rabī‘ al-ākhīr 1069/8 January 1659, there were 86 stores in the tannery; however, 30 were eventually damaged.\(^40\) The number of stores in the tannery is very important for the tannery craftsmen because obtaining the skins that tanners would process, i.e., the required raw materials, was constrained by regulations of the guild. Accordingly, the skins were collected in a place called *lonca yeri* (place for guild)\(^41\) and divided according to the number of tannery stores after the tax was paid.\(^42\) If there were 86 stores in the tannery, stock was divided into 86 parts and every owner of the store bought the skins to process them in his own proportion. This proportion was generally a fraction of 120 sheep and 60 goat skins.\(^43\) In the seventeenth century, the structure of the tannery was so consistent that the place-owners continued to obtain their own proportions even after some stores were damaged. Naturally, this unfairness caused unrest among tanners, and afterwards, 30 damaged stores were required to become operative again or the skin parts would be divided into 56, which was the number of the active stores.\(^44\)

Not everyone had the liberty to open a tannery where he wanted because of the strict rules of the tanners’ guild. The number of stores and masters in an Ottoman city were defined according to the need at the time. Any increase in the number was related to the capacity of the economic situation.\(^45\) Several conditions controlled if a change in

\(^{40}\) BSR B 132, 34a.

\(^{41}\) *Lonca yeri* is a type of bourse where craftsmen exhibit their products and obtain the required raw material; see Tekin, *Tanzimat Dönemine Kadar Osmanlı İstanbul’unda Dericilik*, 46. *Lonca yeri* in Bursa was near İnebey Hamamı in the 1930s; see Kazıklılı, “Yüzyıllın Debbağî Vehbi Take,” 59.

\(^{42}\) In Bologna, the leathers were shared pursuant to a hierarchical order of the guild during the 16\(^{th}\) and 17\(^{th}\) centuries. Pursuant to regulations of 1557, 550 leather shares were distributed and allocated by splitting the guild members three ways. The first group comprised the guild master and council officials who obtained 215 leather shares. The eight members in the second group were given 191 shares whereas the third group of 14 tanners received 149 shares; see Poni, “Local Market Rules and Practices,” 91-93.

\(^{43}\) Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City*, 52; Tekin, “İstanbul Debbağâhâneleri,” 350; BSR B 132, 34a; B 53, 103a; B 118, 93a, 95a; A 153, 137a, 156b; B 18, 25a; B 59, 30b.

\(^{44}\) BSR B 132, 34a.

\(^{45}\) Mübahat Kütküoğlu, “Osmanlı İktisadi Yapısı,” in Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (ed.),
the ownership of the store was required. According to these conditions, after his death, a tanner’s right to operate the store could be transferred to his son or apprentice under the rule “if the master dies, his part or his store will be given to his son or his worker.” This right of operation could also be transferred to daughters of the owner.

In addition to inheritance, the transfer of the operation of the tannery store was also possible by sale. In this transfer, not only the right of the operation was conveyed but also the skin portion of the store. For example, if the mediety of a store, which has a 120-skin portion, was purchased, a 60-skin portion was also attained with the store.

The value of a tannery was different according to its location, size, and other qualities. When the mediety of a tannery was considered *mumtāz* (good quality) in documents, it could reach 20,000 *akçe* (asper); for example, one-third of another *mumtāz* store was valued at 5,000 *akçe* with the mediety of tannery tools and a 40-skin portion. The mediety of another store was sold for 8,000 *akçe* with a 60-skin proportion. There were also tanneries that operated as rentals. The annual rent of a tannery store belonging to Çakır Agha Foundation was 720 *akçe*. Because having a store in the tannery area also meant owning the skin portion, even a ruined, burned, or severely damaged store could have a buyer. In fact, it is not exactly known what tanneries in Bursa physically looked like, however, either the essence of their activities or the explanations in the documents show that they were somehow engaged with water. Principally, tanneries were built near rivers. In addition, there were other water sources, such as fountains, wells, etc. There were also many mills used in grinding acorn, which is important for the tanning pro-

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46 BSR B 14, 81a; Kütükoğlu, ibid., 610-611.
47 BSR B 14, 81a. In Bologna, when a guild member, such as a councillor died, his rights descended from father to the oldest son, then to other sons and brothers, and finally to other relatives. The only condition for inheritance was that the inheritor must be a man. Poni, “Local Market Rules and Practices,” 93.
48 BSR B 118, 93a.
49 BSR B 18, 2b, 25a.
50 BSR B 118, 93a.
51 BSR B 117, 52b.
52 BSR A 11, 230b; B 18, 55b.
53 BSR B 18, 2b, 25a.
cess.\textsuperscript{54} In addition, there were some buildings called ḥujra (room) in the tanneries. Some of these buildings were located above the stores, whereas others were established neighboring one another.\textsuperscript{55} The toilets required for tannery workers were placed in the Debbâğlar Çarşısı.\textsuperscript{56}

The sale of the processed leather in Bursa occurred in tanneries. When tanners received protests against this practice, they found a way to acquire a firman to remain at their tanneries to sell their goods; they obtained even a fatwā from sheikh al-Islām.\textsuperscript{57}

The sale prices of the skins were defined by narkh (price fixing).\textsuperscript{58} According to Qānūnna-i Iḥtisāb dated 907/1502, the price of skin products were defined under the following statement:

\begin{quote}
... the best of sakhtyān\textsuperscript{59} is red, and if it has no defect let its price be 20 akçes; if it is naftī, jigharī, and other seven colors in a good condition without any defect let its price be 16 akçes. Let the price of the lesser quality ones be 12 akçes. Let the fixed price (narkh) of enormous mashīn be 6 akçes regardless of its color; the middle-sized be 5 or 4,5 akçes, and the smaller be 4 akçes. Let the narkh of sheep mashīn be 4 akçes if it is high quality, and the lower one be 3 akçes. Let the price of the rawhide of black female cattle be 12 akçes and 25 akçes if tanned. Let the price be 90 akçes and 130 akçes if tanned, for the rawhide of black male cattle.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

A document dated 1006/1598 dictates the prices of the non-processed sheep skins that were bought from butcheries.\textsuperscript{61} According to this document, butcheries could sell to tanners untagged sheep skin for seven akçes, tagged skin for three akçes and ṭāwūsdānī sheep skin for six akçes. In another document of 1581, a male sheep

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{54} BSR A 8, 180a; B 122, 123b; B 18, 2b, 84b, B 118, 93a. Istanbul tanneries had a mill carried by animals, which was used for grinding acorn; see Tekin, “İstanbul Debbaghâneleri,” 351.

\textsuperscript{55} BSR A 67, 448a.

\textsuperscript{56} BSR B 18, 2b.

\textsuperscript{57} Faroqhi, Osmanli‘da Kentler ve Kentiller, 199 (quoted from Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Mühimme Defteri, 90, 86, no. 291).

\textsuperscript{58} Narkh is the highest price for a good established by authorities. For detailed information see Kütükoğlu, “Osmanlı İktisadi Yapıları,” 562-565.

\textsuperscript{59} Sakhtyān is processed, colored, and polished hide.

\textsuperscript{60} Kanunname-i İhtisab-i Bursa, 22.

\textsuperscript{61} BSR A 153, 8a.}
with tail could be sold for three *akçe*, and a female sheep could be sold for two-and-a-half *akçe*.\(^62\)

**Problems of Tanners**

*Secret Deals*

The skins divided among tanners were slaughtered by butchers, and butchers could not have sold them to others.\(^63\) This necessary interaction between the butchers’ and tanners’ guilds did not occur between other guilds.\(^64\) This necessary dependence could cause problems between the two guilds and some guild members tried to disrupt the stable structure.\(^65\) For example, collected sheep, lamb, and goat skins had to be distributed to tanners by *yiğiðbaðısa* and *kethüdas* (*kad-khūdā*) after the animals were slaughtered by butchers of Bursa and the taxes paid. However, some tanners made secret deals to buy the skins before the distribution.\(^66\) These events surfaced after other tanners complained. Complaining craftsmen argued that the harm was not only to them but also to the state. The state’s interest in the unrecorded sales was because the goods were untaxed.

In the Ottoman State, it was prohibited to export products from where they were produced unless they were surplus.\(^67\) Thus, leather was subject to restraints because it was a strategic item. Skins from slaughtered animals were prohibited from sale to other cities.\(^68\) However, there were people who defied the ban in several ways. For example, Muṣṭafā Beshe ibn ‘Abd Allāh, a janissary, wanted to sell 50

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\(^{62}\) BSR A 113, 127a.  
\(^{63}\) BSR B 118, 95a.  
\(^{64}\) Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City*, 51.  
\(^{65}\) A similar relationship is also present between the tanners and butchers in Bologna. For relations between tanners and butchers in Bologna, see Poni, “Local Market Rules and Practices,” 83-101.  
\(^{66}\) BSR B 118, 95a; A 169, 87b, 173a.  
\(^{67}\) Kütükoðlu, “Osmanlı İktisadi Yapı,” 571. The same prohibition was also imposed in Bologna. Most of the leather produced by tanners was sold to shoemakers. Nevertheless, shoemakers were not compelled to purchase the entire amount of offered leather. This fact led to tension between the two guilds, especially when the unsold leather began to dry and lose its quality and weight. In these times of low local demand, the tanners tried to export at least some of the unsold leather. However, they needed the approval of the shoemakers’ guild for this export. For further information, see Poni, “Local Market Rules and Practices,” 89.  
\(^{68}\) BSR A 153, 8a.
skins in another city. Tanners applied to the court to prevent the sale, then the court seized hides from Muṣṭafā and distributed them among tanners.\footnote{BSR B 26.} In the Ottoman State, priorities were given to local craftsmen, to the degree that many firmans issued prohibitions on the sale of skins to foreign locations unless local needs were met.\footnote{Koyuncu, 18. Yüzyı̈lin Ikinci Yarısında Osmanlı Esnafi (İstanbul ve Bursa Örnekleri) (PhD dissertation, Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008), 167; Faroqhi, Osmanlı da Kentler ve Kentliler, 194, 195.} The primary goal of this prohibition was to provide the local people with varied and cheap products and services. With this policy called provisionism, the state accepts its responsibility to meet the needs of society as its primary duty and does not allow the random sale of raw skin, which has both primary and strategic importance.\footnote{Koyuncu, 18. Yüzyı̈lin Ikinci Yarısında Osmanlı Esnafi, 164. Mehmet Genç, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınlanı̈n, 2000), 60. For detailed information on the attitude of the Ottoman State in the raw material as part of provisionism policy; see Yıldırım, “Osmanlı İaşeciliği ve Esnaf.”} Therefore, the state enacted regulations centered in qaḍās, which were selected as consumption areas. To maintain the balance between production and consumption, the state wanted the needs of people of the qaḍā to be met primarily; if there was a surplus, the state allowed the good to be exported to other cities, primarily Istanbul. If still more surplus remained, it was exported to other countries after the taxes were paid.\footnote{Genç, ibid., 61.} When the price for the consumer is fixed, the profit margins of the craftsmen and the merchants in buying and processing the raw material were roughly defined. If some people damage the production chain, there is a general harm to all. Therefore, the craftsmen operate in strict cooperation and are ready to exclude anyone who would break the system. Following a protective policy, the state maintains the status quo and backs the craftsmen. In sixteenth and seventeenth century Bursa, complaints in the skin market were particularly raised regarding “secretly buying skins.”\footnote{BSR B 53, 103a; B 132, 34a; B 118, 95a; B 50, 30a; A 169, 87b; A 153, 8a, 137a, 156b; B 32, 70b.}

The tanners had priority in buying all the skins of slaughtered animals in Bursa. Distribution of the skins to tanners was defined by specific regulations. According to these rules, all skins were collected and counted in a location called lonca yeri in the presence of tannery
craftsmen and then distributed to each tanner according to his share after the tax was paid. In this system, because how much one gets was regulated by rules, there was no chance to obtain more money by producing more skins; the provisionism policy of the state did not allow this. However, some craftsmen who wanted to increase their income by having qualified and more skins sought ways to escape the system. For that, the tanners arranged secret deals with butchers and bought the skins in places where animals were slaughtered. Buying in this way, the tanners could obtain the best quality skins. The price the tanners paid to the butchers did not create any loss because they evaded the tax. Furthermore, by taking their shares in the normal skin distribution, the tanners increased the amount of raw material they could process, thus, increasing their income. Therefore, “secretly buying skins” was lucrative. However, for the tanners who did not arrange secret deals, this lost opportunity meant an economic loss. Because of this loss, the secret deals were strictly controlled both by other craftsmen and the state, and the skins were seized by the government if any were found. This issue was not unique to the craftsmen in Ottoman Bursa. In the 16th century, the rich tanners in Bologna were accused of purchasing leather in the secret rooms of butcher shops. This act was specifically prohibited by the tanners’ guild, and the offender was fined 10 golden scudi.

Another important fact is that in Bursa, these complaints were coming from only tanners, not from butchers. Butchers were not willing to complain because they were selling skins to one another secretly. This situation was not causing any economic harm to the butchers. Therefore, there was no difficulty for a butcher to sell his animal skin secretly or openly. However, the problem was what price was offered, and price was an extensive debate between butchers and tanners. For a time, complete liberty of prices applied. The fact that butchers raised no complaints when secret deals were made be-

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74 BSR B53, 103a; A 169, 87b.
75 BSR B 118, 95a.
76 BSR B32, 70b.
78 Ibid., 92. Scudi (singular: scudo) is the coin used in Italy until 19th century. For further information regarding the relationship between guilds, see Eunjeong Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2004).
79 Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City*, 55.
between tanners and them may be because most of them were occasionally engaging in unrecorded sales. 

Similarly, tanners who complained to one another when buying raw materials were also subjected to complaints by keçecis for secretly trying to sell wool to them. Allegedly, some of the keçecis were going to the tanneries and secretly buying their goods, a situation that harmed keçecis. This practice damaged the system for keçecis and created injustice.

Skin, which is a raw material for tanners, becomes a valuable raw material for all craftsmen who make items from leather after it is tanned. The processed skin for every craftsman is different. Thus, there are problems regarding the sale among craftsmen who use different types of processed skin. For example, pabucçus (shoemakers) complained about merchants who bought skins by secretly paying more whereas it was the shoemakers’ right to buy the skins after tanning. Black particle sakbyān and white mashin were allocated to shoemakers, and a merchant could buy only what was left over. Therefore, complaints concerning secret deals in buying skin were not only caused by problems among tanners. Difficulties also occurred because of the secret sale of skin between producers and merchants who sometimes participated in the production process and only when buying and selling goods.

**Conflicts regarding the Sale of Rawhide**

Secret buying and selling were not the only activities that disturbed tanners. In some cases, legal sales caused economic harm to the tannery craftsmen. Postal sellers, smiths, and stallholders legally bought rawhide (gön), which was brought to the center of Bursa in the seventeenth century. However, the fact that all of these craftsmen bought rawhide created problems for tanners. After applying to the court, tanners had only the right to buy rawhide that was imported from other cities. Tanners wanted to have all the skins whether they came from the places they lived or from other cities. The judgments of the court seem to have preserved the rights of tanners. This result

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80 BSR B 114, 56b.  
81 BSR B 50, 30a.  
82 The word gön has ambiguities. Faroqhi indicates that it is a type of rough skin; see her, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentliler, 200.  
83 BSR B 114, 124a.
likely ensured the functioning of the current leather market without downswing. As the tanners in Bologna lost their privileges as the butchers had the right to sell leather to anyone without regard to guild membership, and as butchers obtained the right to process leather, Bolognese tanners suffered significant and long-term crises. In the coming period, the government restored the tanners’ former rights and power; as of 1656, butchers once again had to sell leather exclusively to tanners.  

Thanks to these rights granted to tanners in Ottoman Bursa, tanners were able to maintain the advantage regarding rawhide purchase for a long time. However, occasional debates with butchers concerning prices and paying methods ended this monopoly and for a short time, led to a free-market economy.

The debates regarding skin were most likely because of skin scarcity. Those who caused these troubles were merchants called *madrabaz*, tanners who make secret deals, and other craftsmen such as shoemakers, bootsellers, etc. When some tanners in Bursa expanded their business volume in the seventeenth century, they began to use more skins. These tanners turned out to be merchants. These wealthy tanners had many tanneries and began to dominate average-size tanners by having a larger portion of the skin trade. These large-scale store owners were not satisfied by the number of skins distributed in the guilds, and they tried to buy skins through other methods, thus, breaking the balance created by the guilds.

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85 Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City*, 55. The lack of raw materials caused serious problems through a rise in prices and unemployment in not only the tanneries but all sectors of the Ottoman cities; see Oya Şenyurt, “Onsekizinci Yüzyıl Osmanlı Bașkentiinde Taşçı Örgütlenmesi,” *Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Mimarlık Fakültesi Dergisi* (METU JFA) 26/2 (2009), 104.
86 BSR B 50, 30a.
88 Bologna underwent a similar process in the 16th century. Wealthier and stronger tanners were accused of buying large portions of leather from the butchers to the detriment of poorer tanners. At one time, nearly all leather was purchased by wealthy tanners, and the leather was sold to shoemakers at inflated prices and for loans; see Poni, “Local Market Rules and Practices,” 91.
Effects of Seasonal Availability of Meat on the Leather Market

Compared with other raw materials skin cannot be changed and increased if demanded. This difference is because animals are slaughtered for their meat, not their skin. Therefore, the amount of skin raw material must be restricted by the amount of slaughtered animals. In accordance with provisional policy, the Ottoman State created regulations to provide cheap consumption of meat to its citizens; the palace people and the military class had priority then the Istanbulites. The state established a system called jalabkashânness and through some agents, brought animals from farms to be slaughtered. These agents, called jalabkashân, had their own fortune and collected animals primarily from the Balkans, Middle Anatolia, and Cilicia Taurus. However, there were occasional problems with this system, especially concerning the red meat supplies. From the sixteenth century on, the government ordered sheep to be brought to Istanbul without any distribution. Indeed, when the number of livestock suffered a serious decline in 1595 because of epidemics and extreme cold, the Beys of Konya and Karaman received an imperial decree stating that 200.000 sheep were to be sent from the region to Istanbul. However, this situation is not typical because these large-scale orders were mostly allocated from rich pastures in the Danubian states. Anatolian supply was often at a secondary level; so, orders up to 100.000 were always provided by East Anatolia, especially by Turkmens. Therefore the high demand for livestock in 1595 at a time of scarcity, drought and lack of livestock was one factor that triggered the Jalâlî revolts.


The fact that these orders concern more Balkan provinces indicates that Anatolia had a weaker relationship with Istanbul in meat supply. Only small amounts of sheep brought from Eastern Anatolia reached Istanbul; most sheep were being sold in other cities.

Meat prices in Bursa were required to be less than Istanbul *narkh* by 50 dirham to encourage animal shipping from Bursa to Istanbul. In addition, there were animal scarcities in some seasons because of the natural process of stockbreeding. This scarcity occurred because lambing season was at the beginning of spring. Accordingly, the flock cannot be moved before April or May. According to the transportation ability at the time, it would take until November to get the flock to where it was slaughtered. Thus, there was a genuine meat scarcity because of the decrease of the animal numbers from December to April. A firman dated 993/1585 indicates that butchers in Bursa began to give up their occupation. The state interfered and gave the Bursa judge the authority to direct all butchers who had given up back to their occupations. This situation shows how difficult it was to obtain meat in Bursa at that time. All of the issues that limited the amount of red meat necessarily affected the amount of skin as well. Animal scarcity for meat consumption caused difficulties concerning the raw material for the skin market. An evaluation of the skin market in Bursa is deeply connected to the number of animals consumed as meat.

**Conclusion**

Being one of the oldest crafts of Turks, tannery maintained its importance in the Ottoman period, and Bursa had its place as a tannery center. The problems of Bursa’s tanners were not different from counterparts in other cities such as Istanbul. All craftsmen had difficulties in obtaining skin. Bursa tanners were also angered by the problem of “secret deals” among craftsmen. The Bursa tannery was

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96 Greenwood, *Istanbul's Meat Provisioning*, 34. There were some precautions such as grazing in nearby places to survive the scarcity.
97 Faroqhi, *Osmanlı'da Kentler ve Kentliler*, 293.
98 Ibid.
founded outside the city by the river, similar to other cities. However, contrary to other cities, the Bursa tannery continued to be located in the same place and did not frequently change its area even after its surroundings were populated from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries. In Bursa, the place where the skins were tanned and the place where they were sold was the same. This means that the tanner craftsmen sold their goods in the tanneries without taking their skins to the market.

Because Bursa is famous for the production of fabric and its sericulture, its place in tannery has not been examined properly. If Bursa, an important center for skin tanning and leather production, is thoroughly examined, it will contribute to understanding the economic life of a city that was at the top of the important trade routes.

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THE EBB AND FLOW OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN TURKEY
SINCE FEBRUARY 28, 1997

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Abstract
This study aims to analyze and assess the ebb and flow of religious education in Turkey since February 28, 1997, after the military intervention also known as a postmodern coup d’état. Although the study focuses on the period after February 28, 1997, it also addresses the historical and political background relevant to this period. Accordingly, the phases of religious education since the early years of the Turkish Republic are treated briefly. In addition to structural and institutional changes regarding religious education, the qualitative and quantitative changes in the field after February 28 are also analyzed. The study reveals a close relationship between the changes in religious education policies and the changes in political life in Turkey. Therefore, the process of February 28 has transformed social and economic life, military structures and education, whereas the legal and structural changes in education have influenced religious education above all. This effect is clearly observed on both religious education institutions and students in these schools. The new era of political changes that began in 2002 introduced a counter-acceleration in religious education, as in the country’s general politics. Consequently, fields restricted during the process of the February 28 reforms again underwent a period of expansion. The study concludes that the governmental role in religious education should be minimized, and civil religious education should be supported to become stronger so that the field of religious education can avoid such influence from political changes.

Key Words: February 28 process, religious education, Imam-Hatip schools, Qur’anic courses, civil religious education
Introduction

The changes to and tendencies of religious education policies in Turkey’s republic period occur in line with political circumstances. Political structures and actors have always influenced religious education policies. However, there is a structure that should not be overlooked because it also prescribes the politics in some ways. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has included four different social classes: governmental elites (political and bureaucratic structure), social elites (the capital-managing power), the military structure, and the public. The first three can be considered the elites of the new Republic, whereas the last includes “the others.”

Instances of political change in Turkey occur due to an alliance or conflict between these four classes. These moments of change have had various effects on religious education. Consistent with such changes, the republic era witnessed some periods when individuals’ freedom of religious education was subject to restrictive practices and times when this freedom was expanded.

One of the most noteworthy moments regarding the transformation of religious education in Turkey is the process that began on February 28, 1997. Following the “postmodern coup,” some strict and harsh decisions were made about religious education, followed by similar actions.

As one of the important transformative points in Turkish religious education and the focus of our study, the process of February 28 reforms is worth analyzing because the era includes a series of activities consistent with the intention of government to change the society in a specified form and direction. In the words of Subaşı (2005; 2009), the postmodern coup period is the most recent of several reformation processes by the state to “make a man of,” “educate,” and “tame” the masses that define themselves as conservative and religious. In the wake of social transformation activities that date back to the Republic’s early years, the field of religious education faced numerous formal and institutional problems and issues with those who provide and receive services. Due to the multidimensional effects of February 28 on religious education, the changes to and tendencies of education policies require further explanation.

This study seeks to identify structural and institutional changes and tendencies in religious education in the wake of the February 28 reforms. In this respect, the study includes quantitative (changes in
number of students, teachers, and institutions) and qualitative (changes in educational programs, standards, available opportunities, and tendencies) changes in religious education services from 1997 to 2014. Because after February 28, the progress of religious education occurred in two different periods (1997-2002 and 2002-2014), the changes and tendencies are analyzed in consideration of these subsections.

**Background and Phases of Ebb and Flow in Religious Education**

The process of modernization/westernization has notable effects on education in Turkey, particularly on religious education. The westernization, which began in the late Ottoman era and accelerated in the Republic period, has many effects on various domains, including education, law, art, and politics. The modernization process, which was more “occidentalism” than “westernization,” is considered to be an important phase of transformation in recent Turkish history (Tuna, 2013: 273).

The main and initial event of Ottoman modernization was Tanżımât (Reorganization). The modernization and secularization movements at that time marked an important process of transformation for modern Turkey in social, political, cultural, and economic terms. The reform era that began with Tanżımât dominated the relationship between the state and religion in both the Ottoman Empire and the new Republic. This tendency proceeded consistent with westernization. Conversely, although Ottoman reforms to westernize and secularize society were influential on the social, political, and educational aspects of the state, the references to religion, and Islam in particular, are far from over. Nonetheless, a relative relaxation occurred in the relationship between religion and the state (Commins, 1993: 39; Okumuş, 2006: 260).

The effect of Tanżımât on the relationship between religion and the state places the Reorganization in a remarkable position in Turkish political and educational history. As Başgil (1998) indicates, prior to Tanżımât, the government system was connected to religion since its foundation or even since the acquisition of the caliphate by the Ottoman Empire. After Tanżımât the government system evolved and developed into a semi-religious, secular structure and this process continued until 1924, the date when the caliphate was abolished. In this respect, Tanżımât can be considered an important transformation
After the Independence War in the early 1920s, no radical reforms to religious education policies occurred, mainly because most deputies in the First Assembly were either religious functionaries or graduates of madrasa (Demirel, 2010). Between 1924 and 1946 in the Republican period, religious education underwent its first radical transformation. The period was vital for construction of new Turkey because the country entered a process of modernization. The dominant Kemalist structure at the time understood modernization differently than it was in the Ottoman Empire. The latter aimed to blend the technique of Western civilization with the moral values of Muslim civilization, whereas the New Republic elite argued that they could realize modernization not through Islam but via “national identity/nationalist ideology.” The Turkish nation-state departed from the Islam-based Ottoman worldview and grounded its existence on rejection of the Ottoman heritage. Therefore, the national principles offered the power to transform Turkey and ensure westernization (Çiçek, 2005: 123-124). However, nationalism could not be sufficient to assure Turkish modernization and westernization. Another important power was needed to support nationalism: “secularism.” According to Kemalist intellectuals, the greatest obstacle in face of modernization reforms was traditional religious conservatism, which had to be fought. Therefore, nationalism and secularism were put into practice to complement one another ( Özdalga, 2007: 54). In those days, religious education policy was formed by government interventions on religion and religious education pursuant to requirements and rules of modernization and westernization (İnan, 2007: 12) rather than being based on needs and tendencies of religious life and its actors.

From 1924 to 1946, secularist policies for dismissal of religion from government agencies and its depreciation before society were based on the objective of modernization and building a democratic country. The pre-republican association of religion and government, or religion-based government approach gave way to a political stand which embraces government-based religion in new Republic period (Başgil, 1998: 201). Consequently, the Republic period witnessed the intervention and restriction of the state on religion instead of the opposite.

Another period of important changes to religious education policies was between 1946 and 1980. This period can be called “the mul-
ti-party system and return of religious education.” Teaching of the Qurʾān, once banned, was partially permitted in this era, Imam-Hatip Schools were re-established, and religious higher education began through the establishment of the Faculty of Theology in Ankara and other subsequent High Institutes of Islam throughout Turkey. The curricula of primary and secondary education also incorporated courses on religion in this period.

The civil religious education since the early years of the Republic survived after the 1960s via formations of communities and orders. The designers of the military coup on September 12, 1980 tried to restrict and terminate the uncontrollable civil religious education by means of a “state religion” project. The most apparent indicator of the project is that the course “Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge” became compulsory in primary and secondary education pursuant to Article 24 of the Constitution in 1982.

Another stage of transformation for Turkish religious education was the period between 1980 and 1997. Religious and moral education gained legitimacy before the government because it was assured by the Constitution. In the 1980s, government policy about religion and Islam underwent a radical change in form and content (Cizre, 2005: 107). Having kept the religion under its thumb until 1950, the Turkish state gradually liberalized it for the sake of political unity in the country and to avoid undesirable foreign ideologies. This process of liberalization rendered the religious sphere more advanced and powerful in collaboration with political and economic structures. After the coup of 1980, the military-led government needed to ground its legitimacy on a new base in its relationship with the society. Consequently, the government had to flee from the insularity of the laic-modernist project and recognize Islam, which is the most important indicator of local identity (Cizre, 2005: 109).

**February 28 Process and Religious Education**

In the 1990s, in addition to the Motherland Party (ANAP) and Right Path Party (DYP) with a conservative base, there were the Nationalist Task Party (MÇP) under Alparslan Türkeş and the Reformative Democracy Party (IDP) of Aykut Edibali. The most surprising party in this period was the Welfare Party (RP) of Necmettin Erbakan because it represented political Islam beyond conservatism. In 1991, RP participated in general elections together with MÇP and IDP and was elected into parliament with 16.8% of votes. The change established a
serious rival for ANAP and DYP who had the voters’ support for 11 years (Çakır, 1994: 30).

As of 1991, both the vote rate and political role of RP increased. Primarily considered a mass party, RP diffuses towards a broader base. The local elections in 1993 demonstrated that RP became more popular because the party won metropolitan municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara in addition to the Anatolian, East Anatolian and Southeast Anatolian regions, where lower and middle classes were more common. The rapid rise of the Welfare Party caught the attention of the army, capital, and other bureaucratic powers.

The rise of conservative and political Islamist establishments began with Turgut Özal, and they continued to advance in economic terms as well. As a result, the government and social elite who administered the state collaborated with the army to build a common opposition against political Islam. A notable process of defiance was started by public agencies and institutions and elite and military influence, including “social pressure groups” or “unarmed forces” such as jurisdiction, politics, media, syndicates, and the business world, against the coalition government of RP and DYP established on June 28, 1996. The process peaked on February 28, 1997.

In the wake of the National Security Council (MGK) meeting on February 28, 1997, a series of decisions were made under the title “Measures to be taken to prevent reactionary activities against the regime,” in addition to MGK Decision no. 406. At the MGK, the army requested the government to actualize these prescribed decisions. The general intent of these decisions under eighteen articles was to restrict the influence of religion in every domain and to constrict, control, and oversee the religious living spaces. The decrees meant elimination of religious values of the society and the nullification of social will and requests through power (Can, 2010: 13).

A review of MGK decisions reveals three different types of restrictive measures on religion: 1. Measures to restrict religious activities in social and economic life, 2. Measures to restrict religious activities in military space, and 3. Restrictive measures in education. The first two types are not treated here because they do not relate directly to the transformation of formal and common religious education. The third type is analyzed in detail due to its direct connection with our study.
Restrictive Measures Concerning Religious Education

The main reform requests via MGK decisions were about the educational system. Consistent with the intention of fulfilling these requests, the government was given specific advice regarding the actualization of certain legal and structural reforms about education at the MGK meeting. The MGK recommended that the government “realize any administrative or legal regulations to require eight years of compulsory education, transfer the control and responsibility of Qur’anic courses to the Ministry of National Education (MEB), prevent participation in Qur’anic courses until the completion of eight years of compulsory education, ensure that the institutions to train religious officials serve the Law on the Unification of Education and train personnel consistent with requirements” (MGKK, 1997). These provisions in MGK decisions signaled radical reforms in three domains by means of transition to continuous education: Qur’anic courses, Imam-Hatip High Schools and faculties of theology.

During the process of the February 28 reforms, the most concrete example of intervention in education is continuous education. The objective was to ensure passage to continuous education as soon as possible. The continuous compulsory education, which came into effect via law no. 4306 on August 18, 1997 following the military intervention on February 28, 1997, is a new form of Turkish modernization under the guidance of the army, state, and social elites.

The underlying reason for continuous education, which was a necessary step for modernization, was the will of the state to keep the public under domination and control (Bahçekapılı, 2012: 65).

Fields of Intervention on Religious Education after February 28, 1997

The educational bans and oppression during the process of the February 28 reforms resemble and share a close connection with past practices. The legal and structural reforms in the early years of the Republic were implemented again after February 28 to eliminate the visibility of religious education at the governmental and social levels.

Upon the actualization of the eight years compulsory education law in 1997, the change in the system brought many radical alterations to formal and informal education. Accordingly, in formal education, the primary and secondary schools were unified as “elementary schools” to provide eight years of continuous education, and the sec-
ondary school section of all vocational high schools, particularly Imam-Hatip, was closed. Conversely, the Qur’ānic courses, arguably the most important element of informal education, were subject to notable restriction. Upon the implementation of the law on continuous education, Imam-Hatip secondary schools were closed, and Imam-Hatip schools became institutions to serve only at the high school level. The law on continuous education was not the sole legal regulation on Imam Hatip. Moreover, a new practice imposed a different coefficient that practically hindered Imam-Hatip graduates from entering any university other than the faculty of theology. The regulation aimed to reduce the desirability of Imam-Hatip schools and cause their eventual “automatic” extinction as in the 1920s because they were already unable to attract sufficient numbers of primary and secondary students and were far from being preferred for university entrance as well.

I. Changes in Religious Education Institutions from 1997 to 2002

Legal and Structural Changes Regarding Qur’ānic Courses

The provision in the MGK decisions that “necessary administrative and legal regulations should come into effect so that Qur’ānic courses in which only children who have completed 8 years of basic education can enroll operate under the responsibility and control of the Ministry of National Education” represented a major change in the following process. This MGK decision came into effect in 1999. Pursuant to additional article 3 via Code no. 4415 accepted on July 22, 1999 to Code no. 633 of June 22, 1965 on the establishment and tasks of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the enrollment in Qur’ānic courses stipulated completion of eight years of compulsory education.1 In addition, children must have completed the fifth grade in primary-secondary schools to attend short-term Qur’ānic courses in the summer. These legal regulations are unfortunately questionable based on the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey as well as international conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

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1 Another legal regulation on age limit in Qur’ānic courses is the “Directive by the Presidency of Religious Affairs on Qur’ānic courses, Dormitories and Student Pensions” no. 23982 on May 3, 2000. Both this directive and the eventual instruction pursuant to the directive imposed age limits for Qur’ān learning.
Quantitative Changes in Qur’ānic Courses

From 1999 to 2002, there were three types of Qur’ānic courses: (1) long-term courses, (2) courses to train ḥāfīẓ (people who have memorized the Qur’ān), and (3) summer courses. The number of students and instructors in these courses underwent notable changes between the years mentioned.

Upon the psychological oppression of conservative and religious masses after February 28 and the legal regulations in the same period, the number of students, instructors, and courses underwent a sharp drop in the 1997-1998 academic year. The total number of students in Qur’ānic courses was 173,147 in 1995-1996, but the number fell to 164,308 in 1996-1997 and to 108,829 in 1997-1998. This drop continued for approximately four years, and the number of students had decreased to 95,437 by 2000-2001.

Source: The data were obtained from the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey and Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), 2010: 302-305.²

² There are slight differences between the Turkish Statistical Institute’s (TÜİK, 2010: 302-305) data and the figures of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Although our study is based on TÜİK data, because the student enrollment numbers from 2005 to 2010 are restricted beginning with the spring term, we used the data from the Presidency of Religious Affairs for this period.

*Source:* The data were obtained from the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey.

### Quantitative Changes to Ḥāfīz Training at Qur’ānic Courses

Another object of intervention in the wake of February 28 and continuous education law was the “ḥāfīz training.” Upon the actualization of continuous education in 1997, eight year continuous primary-secondary school became compulsory. Consequently, the lectures in Qur’ān and ḥāfīz training were notably hindered. The number of ḥāfīzs was 5.008 in 1998, but it fell to 4.463 in 1999, to 4.292 in 2000, 2.920 in 2001, 1.876 in 2002, and 1.417 in 2003.
After February 28, Code no. 4415 and Directive no. 23982 stipulated that children attending summer Qur’ānic courses must have graduated from the fifth grade in primary-secondary school. As a result, a sharp drop in the number of students was observed.

In 1999, before the prerequisite, the number of students in the courses was 1,526,466 in 1996, 1,432,417 in 1997, and 1,294,531 in 1998, but it dropped to 686,318 in 1999. As of 2000, a relative rise in these students has occurred. However, the 1999 enrollment figures were only attained again in 2005 (Bahçekapılı, 2012: 105).
Another educational institution affected by the process of February 28 reforms is Imam Hatip High Schools. Indeed, the primary target of the February 28 intervention was Imam Hatip High Schools. Together with the actualization of eight years of compulsory continuous education, the secondary schools within Imam Hatip High Schools were closed, and no students at secondary school level were allowed as of 1998. In the 1996-1997 academic year, a total of 318,775 students were present in Imam Hatip Secondary Schools. Upon the implementation of the law on compulsory continuous education, these schools graduated the final students and were closed in 1999-2000.

In the 1997-1998 academic year, 59,830 students were enrolled in Imam Hatip High Schools, but the number decreased to 18,391 in 2001-2002. As of 2001-2002, a partial rise was observed.
The conceivers of February 28 reforms were not content with the ability of the law on eight years of compulsory education to block Imam Hatip Schools. Accordingly, the secondary schools within Imam Hatip institutions were closed pursuant to the law. To decrease the popularity of Imam Hatip High Schools, the “coefficient difference per field” came into effect. Prior to the 1999-2000 academic year, all high school graduates were able to enter any higher education program depending on the two-stage “Student Selection and Placement Examination” (ÖSYS) applied by the Student Selection and Placement Center (ÖSYM), regardless of their previous area of specialization. As of 1999, a single examination was applied for student placement in universities, and the Weighted High School GPA (AOBP) came in force. Pursuant to this system, the score of the student at “Student Selection Examination” (ÖSS) was assessed together with the average ÖSS score of his/her high school. On July 30, 1998, with a regulation on article 45 of the Code no. 2547, Council of Higher Education (YÖK) opted for “field coefficient” as of 1999. Thus, the AOBP of Imam Hatip students would be multiplied by 0.5 or 0.2, depending on whether the chosen program is in their area of specialization, respectively.

Despite the coefficient difference as of 1999, the graduates of Imam Hatip High Schools were able to enter programs other than
their own, such as law, politics, and various faculties of education. In 2003, YÖK started a new system of coefficient difference to prevent Imam Hatip graduates from enrolling in various programs. According to the rule, the AOBP of graduates of vocational high schools would be multiplied by 0.8 or 0.3, depending on whether their chosen program is within their area of specialization, respectively (ÖSYM, 2003). Thus, not only the Imam Hatip but all vocational high school graduates were completely excluded from higher education programs other than their own.

The new coefficients for vocational high schools in entering higher education affected both Imam Hatip High Schools students and those of other vocational high schools. Following the application of the regulations, the vocational high schools, which provide training in technical and occupational fields, were no longer able to send students to institutions of higher education.

Source: Council of Higher Education (YÖK), 2007: 249
The Imam Hatip High Schools did trained qualified vocational students and prepared many young people for various education programs. In 1988, the share of Imam Hatip High Schools graduates in undergraduate programs was 3.4%, and the percentage increased to 10.6% in 1997, and 12% in 1998. In 1999, the new coefficient rule caused a notable drop in the number of Imam Hatip High Schools graduates who passed the university entrance exams. The continuous compulsory education and coefficient rule affected the academic success of both Imam Hatip High Schools and all vocational high schools.

Upon such hindrances to Imam Hatip graduates pursuing higher education, the civil initiatives searched for new solutions. The most striking initiative provided possibilities for education abroad for Imam Hatip High Schools graduates so that they can continue their higher education. For example, under the leadership of the Association of Imam Hatip Schools Graduates and Members (ÖNDER), educational services were conducted in Vienna, Austria to ensure higher education for such graduates, and hundreds of students studied subjects such as medicine, architecture, psychology, and engineering at the University of Vienna.
Religious Higher Education between 1997 and 2002

Prior to 1982, three types of religious higher education institutions existed in Turkey. Beyond the Faculty of Theology in Ankara, the Higher Institutes of Islam in various cities filled a significant gap in the country together with the Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Erzurum during the years when religious education was abolished. Pursuant to Higher Education Code no. 2547 on November 6, 1982, the number of universities arose to 27, and all higher education institutions were incorporated within the universities in their respective cities. Consistent with the provisional clause 28 of the code, the religious higher education institutions were transformed into faculties of theology and became a part of the university in the city. In the following process, the faculties of theology became five-year educational institutions with 1 year of preparatory classes and 4 years of undergraduate studies.

The faculties of theology maintained the single program structure from 1982 to 1997, before the reconfiguration of YÖK’s decision no. 97.23.1660 on July 11, 1997. From then on, the single-program structure of the faculties was changed, and they comprised two programs: the Undergraduate Program on Theology and the Program of Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge Teaching. Each program accepted its individual students and graduated them. The former theology undergraduate program that enabled pedagogic formation courses graduated its final students in the 2001-2002 academic year. Because no pedagogic formation courses are present in the new undergraduate programs of theology opened in 1998-1999, the students who graduate from these programs have had to earn the non-thesis master degree from Ankara University to become teachers at secondary education institutions. Indeed, the creation of the department on Primary School Teaching of Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge is another attempt to weaken religious higher education because the employment opportunities for theology graduates became fewer and the credits earned for religious/vocational lessons in the department of Primary School Teaching of Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge were decreased. This department was later removed from the Faculty of Theology and incorporated within the Faculty of Education.

In the late 1980s, the 2-year vocational schools of theology were established by the consent of Council of Higher Education to enhance occupational knowledge and skills of religious officials within the Presidency of Religious Affairs. However, they stopped admitting
students in 1999, and the students eventually disappeared. These schools still admit no students.

An analysis of student quotas in religious higher education indicates a decline after 1999. In 1999, the first teaching program under the faculties of theology admitted 1,280 students, and 640 others could enroll in the Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge Teaching department. The decrease in student quotas continued until 2008. Upon the changes to YÖK personnel by the 60th government of the Republic of Turkey in 2007, the quotas allocated to religious higher education increased.

II. Religious Education after 2002: A Milestone

The early general election on November 3, 2002 is one of the milestones of Turkish political history. The election had notable effects both on dominant political parties throughout the process of February 28 and on the position and future of the army that had gradually become dominant in political life since 1960. The election was a turning point for putting democracy into orbit, saving it from becoming a militarist structure. In addition to its political consequences, the election was vital for religious education as well. The political progress as of 2002, namely, the demilitarization and democratization requests, influenced general politics and religious education policies. The legal regulations on religious education encouraged progress consistent with public requests. Consequently, both the public and civil religious education attained a more legitimate structure (Bahçekapılı, 2012).

Qurʾānic Courses and the Presidency of Religious Affairs

The legal regulation on July 22, 1999, which imposed age limitation on the children participating in Qurʾān training, was abolished on September 17, 2011 following a new legal amendment.

In 2004, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (DİB) undertook a reconfiguration of education programs to enhance the quality of education at Qurʾānic courses and to render the activities more efficient and effective.

The content of curricula at long-term Qurʾānic courses was improved. The effects of February 28, together with implementation of eight-year continuous compulsory education, altered the profile and requirements of students. The subjects of faith, prayer, prophetic bi-
ographies, and morals were added into the curriculum to meet the new requirements.

In addition, the ḥāfiẓ training program was restructured in 2010 to increase the quality of education and to ensure becoming ḥāfiẓ in a shorter time. The new ḥāfiẓ training program consists of three periods: a preparatory class, memorizing, and reinforcement. Each period consists of three basic fields: Qurʾān, Religious Knowledge, and Social Activities. In addition, the program includes 30 course hours per week (DİB, 2010: 8-11).

Today, the “Curricula of Summer Qurʾānic Courses Curricula,” prepared by DİB under consent no. 63 on October 11, 2005, are applied in summer Qurʾānic courses. The education at summer Qurʾānic courses is at least 3 hours per day. The schedule is designed to have 3 classes, each corresponding to a 3-week education process. The objectives are to provide “the skill of reading the Qurʾān” and “fundamental religious knowledge.” The learning domains are classified as Qurʾān, faith, prayer, morals, and biography of the Prophet. One hour is allocated to the Qurʾān and its meaning, and another hour is reserved for lectures on faith, prayer, prophetic biographies and morals (DİB, 2005: 9). A striking point in the curricula of summer Qurʾānic courses is the new “class” system. Pursuant to the new system, students proceed faster than before in learning Qurʾān and basic religious knowledge because they do not have to repeat the formerly gained knowledge and skills. In addition, new textbooks have been prepared to match the new program.

**Quantitative Changes to Qurʾānic Courses after 2002**

In the wake of elections in 2002, the limitations against religious education were abolished. Consequently, the interest and demand in Qurʾān education notably increased.

Article 15 under decree law no. 653 on September 17, 2011 abolished the age limitation for Qur’ânic courses. Consequently, the number of students in long-term Qur’ânic courses increased as of the 2011-2012 academic year. The figures rose to 290,818 in 2012 and 908,589 in 2013.

Consistent with the increase in students, the number of Qur’ân teachers and courses also increased significantly. There were 4,822 instructors of long-term Qur’ânic courses in 2001-2002, but the number shifted to 5,484 in 2002-2003, 5,607 in 2003-2004, 6,078 in 2004-2005, 3,833\(^3\) in 2005-2006, 10,771 in 2006-2007, and 9,775 in 2007-2008. Upon the abolition of the age limitation in 2011, the number of instructors increased parallel with student enrollment numbers and became 36,208 (including unpaid, contractual, and permanent instructors).

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\(^3\) The occasional drop in the number of religious officials within the Presidency of Religious Affairs, such as in 2006, is due to the transition of certain officials to Ministry of National Education as teachers via inter-institutional transfer.
The figures for the 2012-2013 academic year include unpaid instructors in addition to contractual and permanent teachers.

**Source**: Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), 2010: 302-305; the quantitative data between 2010 and 2013 were obtained from the Presidency of Religious Affairs.


**Quantitative Changes in Ḥāfīẓ Training**

In 1998, 5,008 students were in ḥāfīẓ training. The figures declined to 2,920 in 2001, 1,876 in 2002 and 1,417 in 2003. As of 2002, due to the liberal atmosphere ensured by the political structure in religious education, certain positive changes were observed in ḥāfīẓ training and long-term Qur’ānic courses.
The data between 2010 and 2013 were obtained from the Presidency of Religious Affairs.

Ḥāfiẓ training lasts 6 months to 2 years. There were 1,554 students who began studies in 2002 and obtained a ḥāfiẓ certificate in 2004. The number increased steadily to 1,708 in 2005, 1,826 in 2006, 2,074 in 2007, 2,364 in 2008, 2,985 in 2009, 3,511 in 2010, 4,215 in 2011, and 4,766 in 2012. In 2013, the number of students in ḥāfiẓ training dropped to 4,544. Between 1998 and 2013, the total number of certified ḥāfiẓ has reached 49,523, including 25,594 men and 23,929 women.

Quantitative Changes in Summer Qurʾānic Courses

Prior to the prerequisite in 1999 of graduation from fifth grade in primary school, the number of students in summer courses was 1,526,466 in 1996. However, 686,318 studied in the courses in 1999. The enrollment numbers decreased briefly in 2000, and the 1996 numbers were not attained again until 2005. The number of students in summer Qurʾānic courses increased remarkably after 2008 with 1,801,150 in 2008, 1,881,637 in 2009 and 1,881,137 in 2010.

As a result of Article 15 under decree law no. 653 on September 17, 2011 abolishing the age limitation for Qurʾānic courses, enrollments in summer Qurʾānic courses increased in all subsequent years except 2011. Student numbers reached 3,203,562 in 2012 and 3,059,380 in 2013. Thus, upon the abolition of the age limitation for summer Qurʾānic courses imposed by February 28 reforms, the stu-
dent numbers attained the highest level in 2013 and doubled from figures prior to the February 28 intervention.

**The Reconfiguration of Imam Hatip Schools**

The political power changed hands in 2002, whereupon a remarkable change of policy came into effect regarding Imam Hatip Schools to strengthen their institutional structure. The positive attitude of political power towards Imam Hatip Schools and the expansion in the employment potential of their graduates increased interest in these institutions among students and their parents.


*Source: The data were obtained from the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey.*
In 2011 and 2012, Imam Hatip Schools underwent a restructuring process. On December 1, 2011, the coefficient difference against Imam Hatip Schools was abolished. Then, on March 30, 2012, the 12-year discontinuous compulsory education of 4+4+4 came into effect under code no. 6287. The number of Imam Hatip Schools and the number of enrolled students then increased. In 2012-2013 and 2013-2014, 167,471 and 178,663 students were enrolled in Imam Hatip High Schools, respectively. As a result, the number of students in Imam Hatip High Schools rose to 380,371 in 2012-2013 and 474,135 in 2013-2014.

The number of schools increased parallel to the number of students. There were 537 schools in the 2011-2012 academic year, 711 in 2012-2013, and 846 in 2013-2014.

As the Discontinuous Education Rule of 4+4+4 came into effect in 2012, primary schools, secondary schools and high schools were no longer interdependent institutions. Thereupon, Imam Hatip Secondary Schools were re-established after a fourteen-year break. As of 2012, it is possible to establish separate Imam Hatip Secondary Schools or to incorporate them within Imam Hatip High Schools, depending on the circumstances. The number of independent Imam Hatip Secondary Schools reached 945 in 2013-2014, enrolling 184,061 students. Four hundred and twenty-three Imam Hatip Secondary
Schools were established within Imam Hatip High Schools, and they admitted 55,688 students in the 2013-2014 academic year.

Upon the implementation of different coefficients in 1999, the placement rate of Imam Hatip High Schools students in undergraduate programs decreased. The rate was 12% in 1998, but it fell to approximately 3% in 2002, 2003, and 2004 (See Ünsür, 2005: 289).

However, the placement rate has increased since 2008 to 13,4% in 2009, 17,6% in 2010, 13,3% in 2011, 12% in 2012, and 14,5% in 2013.

**The Organization of Religious Higher Education**

The first major organization of religious higher education in the post-2002 era came in 2006. Pursuant to decree no. 2006.5.2375 on May 26, 2006 by YÖK, the Elementary School Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge Teaching program was removed from the Faculty of Theology to be incorporated within the Faculty of Education.

Due to the new regulation, a Faculty of Theology exclusively had the undergraduate theology program. This change was notable because the Faculties of Theology, which had trained teachers since 1949 and were defined as “an institution to train teachers” under article 3 of Code no. 3580 in issue 20215 of the Official Gazette on July 04, 1989, were made obsolete in terms of teacher training as of 2006. Another prerequisite required students from undergraduate theology programs to accomplish the exclusive 1,5-year non-thesis master’s program within Ankara University to become teachers. In the subsequent years, institutions other than Ankara University were allowed to provide the non-thesis master’s program, and its duration was decreased to 1 year. As of 2010, graduates of the theology program may become teachers if they complete a 1-year pedagogical formation process at any Faculty of Education.

The Department of Elementary School Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge Teaching was returned to the Faculty of theology, pursuant to the decree by the Board of YÖK on May 10, 2012. Thus, Faculties of Theology reclaimed their position as teacher-training institutions. According to a new regulation in 2014, the admission of students into the Department of Religious Culture and Knowledge Teaching will stop as of academic year 2014-2015. Therefore, the influences of February 28 on religious higher education are about to vanish.
Another important issue in religious higher education is that in 2010, the private universities were allowed to establish higher education institutions on religion for the first time. Such enterprises serve as a milestone for the demilitarization of higher education.

In 2010, 23 faculties of theology operated in Turkey, and the number increased to 62 in 2012 and to 96 by June 2014. In 2012, the student quota of faculties of theology reached 13,000, including the Faculties of Islamic Sciences and International Faculties of Islamic and Religious Sciences. The figure reached 15,460 in 2013.

Today, there are 96 Faculties of Theology in Turkey, 51 of which continue student admission and education. Of the faculties, 47 of 51 have daytime education programs with a total student quota of 5515. There are 41 active evening education programs of theology incorporating 4,805 students. There are 39 departments of Elementary School Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge (DKAB) Teaching in Faculties of Theology, and they enroll 2,820 students. In these faculties, there are 30 evening education programs of DKAB with 2,240 students. As a result, the quota for Faculties of Theology reached 15,460 by 2013. Ten Faculties of Islamic Sciences, established together with Faculties of Theology, admit students. Four of these are private universities, and the remaining 6 belong to the state. Two Faculties of Islamic Sciences include an “undergraduate program of Islamic sciences.” Up to 160 and 80 students are admitted in daytime and evening programs, respectively. Five Faculties of Islamic Sciences comprise “Elementary School Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge Teaching (DKAB)” department with quotas of 320 and 195 for daytime and evening education, respectively. The four private Faculties of Islamic Sciences offer the “undergraduate program of Islamic sciences” with a total quota of 200. The remaining 35 Faculties of Theology do not yet offer education due to lack of academic staff.

**Education Reform “4+4+4” and Its Effects on Religious Education**

The major event in religious education since 2012 occurred with regard to Education Act 4+4+4. Pursuant to the new regulation upon the “Code on Amendments on Code of Elementary School and Education and Other Codes” no. 6287 on May 30, 2012, compulsory education in Turkey was changed from eight-year continuous education to twelve years of discontinuous education as 4+4+4. Previously organized into elementary and secondary education, the education
system adopted a 3-phase structure with 4 years for each of primary school, secondary school and high school.

By virtue of this act, the secondary schools, which constituted the second stage of elementary education, became independent institutions and included various new learning fields to enable students to discover themselves and their areas of interest. The Ministry of National Education expects the new structure of secondary schools to “enable the growth of students as freer individuals” by means of multiple selective courses (MEB, 2012: 3). The eight-year-long compulsory education requirement was considered the reason behind many problems such as equal opportunities in education, the ability to meet demand and requirements, and compliance with international practices (See Kaymakcan, 2012: 7). Together with the reform, students gained the right to study in institutions consistent with their areas of interest.

*The Inclusion of Selective Religious Courses in Primary and Secondary School Programs*

One important reform under the Compulsory Education Act 4+4+4 is inclusion of new courses on Islam within the curriculum, in addition to Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge that has been studied from 4th to 12th grade since 1982. Pursuant to decree 69 on June 25, 2012 by the MEB Turkish Education Board, two hours of selective courses titled Qurʾān, the Life of Muḥammad, and Basics of Religion are established in the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th grade in secondary school. It is also possible to select these courses for two hours per week in high school grades 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. The courses are noteworthy because the education schedule is configured in a modular manner. Therefore, students may either select them regularly as of 5th grade or in later grades. In ordinary secondary schools, the courses are available as selectives, whereas they are required the Imam Hatip Secondary School curriculum.

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4 In the 2012-2013 academic year, 647,349 secondary school students chose to take the course of Qurʾān, 426,836 students selected course of the Life of Muḥammad, and 212,134 students selected the Basics of Religion (the total number of secondary school 5th class students is 1,193,993). As for high schools, the courses on the Qurʾān, the Life of Muḥammad, and the Basics of Religion were selected by 385,101, 573,362, and 431,610 students, respectively (the total number of high school 9th grade students is 1,318,260); MEB, 2013.
Another change as a result of the new education act – courses on the Qur’ān in the curriculum – is unique in the history of religious education. In the Republic of Turkey, these lessons first occurred in the curriculum in 1924 under the title *Course on the Qur’ān and Religion* only to be removed from primary school curriculum in 1930. It is worth noting that a course with the name “Qur’ān” occurs in the curriculum after a eighty-year break.

The course of the Qur’ān aims to ensure that students are aware of the place of the Qur’ān in life, read it in a proper manner, memorize certain chapters and verses and are informed about its content. In this respect, the course is organized into two units from 5th to 8th grade: “the Qur’ān and its message” and “Reading and Memorizing the Qur’ān” (KKÖP, 2012: 6-8)

The main objective of the course “The Life of Muḥammad” is to teach the life, personality, and examplariness of the Prophet Muḥammad. In this context, the education schedule is based upon 6 fields: “The Life story of Muḥammad,” “Muḥammad in daily life,” “Muḥammad as an example,” “Muḥammad in social life,” “Muḥammad and family,” and “Muḥammad and social communication” (HMHÖP, 2012: 7).

Another selective course on religion is the Basics of Religion. The course aims to ensure that students comprehend the fundamentals of the Muslim faith and are informed about the general features of Islam, its view of life and the universe, basic prayers and their practice, and about basic principles that constitute and sustain the society (İTDBÖP, 2012: 2).

*After the New Education Act: Demilitarized Religious Education and Legalization*

The government has played an important part in the development, formation, and progress of religious education since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. The state has been a decisive, important power regarding the theory and practice of religious education in formal and informal institutions for approximately 90 years. The restrictions or liberalization of religious education occurred in response to government’s will. The political will that shapes government has been influential on religious education policies.
The ebb and flow in religious education after February 28 has followed a course where the political changes are dominant, as observed in diagrams.

The interventions and restrictions against religious education are omnipresent throughout the Republic era, and February 28 was the latest incident. Consequently, the pious public had to search for new methods. Refusing to succumb to governmental oppressions and bans, the religious elements of Turkish society gathered around several civil organizations to establish stronger, more active, and dynamic institutions to transfer their values to posterity. Along with the change of vision for civil religious education, many aspects of education were reconfigured including instructors, curricula, training materials and venues. The Qurʾān and religious sciences were previously taught via traditional methods. However, a student-centered and learning-based approach is popular in modern education centers. The civil religious curriculum is enriched through new areas of learning that will contribute to the socio-cultural and religious development of participants, and training materials are provided.

The most important change to civil religious education is the expansion of the target group. After February 28, public religious education targeted children and youth in formal education and mostly adult women in the informal area. For example, in the 2012-2013 academic year, 95% of the students at long-term Qurʾānic courses run by the Presidency of Religious Affairs were women, and men were only 5%. However, civil religious education targets a vast area without any limitations on age and gender. Informal religious education activities by civil institutions vary in terms of the educational level of participants. Housewives are the most common participants of informal religious services run by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. However, the civil religious education activities attract women from various educational levels and lines of business. That the women are more active participants in both types of activities is indeed an unexpected consequence, even for the actors of February 28. The conservative and relatively undereducated women made good use of the process and succeeded in enhancing their educational level in general knowledge and in religion in particular.

Another important development in civil religious education occurred in this period: the gradual professionalization of institutional structures. Religious education activities were previously limited by the inner structure of orders and communities who undertook civil
religious education. Subsequently, the activities enjoyed a notable outward expansion. The religious education activities became institutionalized. Teachers and instructors, who once worked as public servants but had to leave for various reasons, focused on civil religious education and transferred their knowledge to the civil domain. Consequently, civil activities gradually became more professional.

The supportive government policies since 2002, particularly as of 2011, and the positive changes in formal and informal religious education, lead to discussions about the future. According to data from our survey, most people who enter religious service argue that governmental supervision and control of religious education should continue. Conversely, many people believe that the state’s role in religious education should end. In other words, they are uneasy with governmental intervention in religious education. In general, both groups want the government to be supportive in structural terms and supervise quality so that the religious education appeals to broader masses with higher quality. Moreover, both groups seek a system where the civil institutions have executive authority (Bahçekapılı, 2012).

Almost 2.5 million students choose selective courses about religion during formal education; 900,000 people participate in long-term Qur’anic courses within the scope of informal religious education, and another 3 million attend summer Qur’anic courses. These figures render the future of civil religious education debatable. Upon the abolition of the age limit for informal religious education, the number of students increased dramatically in 2012. By 2013, the boom proceeded and surpassed the previous figures many times more. According to one study (Bahçekapılı, 2012: 235), the citizens choose public religious education primarily due to their confidence in the state, though factors such as quality, efficiency and sustainability also play a part. Nevertheless, the quantitative rise in public religious services may lead to a qualitative degradation in upcoming years due to the lack of instructors and training spaces. On such an occasion, religious education may regress in quality and efficiency and fail to meet the expectations, perhaps causing civil religious education to become popular again. The Presidency of Religious Affairs provides approximately 4 million citizens with religious services per year, but almost 80% of these activities take place in mosques that are not suitable for education, and the institution cannot employ as many religious officials as needed. Similarly, the formal religious education by
the Ministry of National Education faces a serious shortage of teachers. The shortage is 18,000 teachers for the 2013-2014 academic year, and the figure is expected to reach 50,000 in the upcoming years. The deficiencies of public religious education may gradually pave the way for increased interest in civil religious education. In this regard, the government should realize the necessary legal regulations for ensuring alternatives to civil religious education. The government should stop supporting state-based religious education and develop a new approach and system based on the collaboration between government and civil initiatives.

**Conclusion**

The ebb and flow in approaches and practices regarding religious education in Turkey has been closely related to political changes. Since the early years of the Republic, the policies against religion and religious education were based on the modernity perceptions of Kemalist ideology. This perception, and the secular approach and practices, were seriously influential on the matter. This process in the early Republic era was in stark contrast to the religious values, comprehension, worldview, and lifestyle of most of the Turkish public. Consequently, such policies could not achieve consistency and followed a fluctuating course. Similar to those before and after 1950, the developments after February 28, 1997 are clear indicators of this fact.

The process of February 28 reform implementation can be considered an important moment for development and reform in religious education and for the establishment of new tendencies. The process of the February 28 reforms was apparently a political and military counterstrike. The underlying project was a type of social engineering. In this respect, February 28 and the following period is almost a symbol of long-lasting governmental intervention on religion and the attitude against such intervention.

After the February 28 intervention, Qur’ānic courses, Imam Hatip High Schools, and Faculties of Theology were subject to erosion in legal and structural terms. Apart from the interventions on religious education institutions, girls were deprived of their right to education due to the headscarf ban, and the future of many Imam Hatip High Schools students was blocked because of coefficient differences. All these realities had destructive effects on the religious portion of society.
As of 2002, the political developments, efforts to demilitarize and democratize influenced religious education policies and the general politics of Turkey. In this era, legal regulations on religious education contributed to a more independent progress in the field. Such moves ensured a more legitimate structure for religious education through both the government and civil initiatives. However, because religious education was neglected for a long time and the developments suffered occasional obstacles, the scientific view on the field was negatively affected and eventually led to an eclectic structure.

In this context, the society has various expectations from both the government and civil initiatives. Above all, the religious education should be designed to cover all section of society. To that end, a need exists for a philosophical view of what type of individuals we want to teach and for developing this type of projects.

One of the notable results of this study is that the civil aspect of religious education should be reinforced to ease the effects of politics and its ebbs and flows. Therefore, various centers should be established to support the religious education field, and the affairs should be managed by and around such centers. Because centers under total governmental control cannot avoid political interventions, the civil society must be eager and supportive of a more independent mode of religious education in Turkey.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Qur'ān and the Aramaic Gospel Traditions
by Emran Iqbal El-Badawi

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Muhammad al-Atawneh

According to an early report attributed to Zayd ibn Thābit, Muḥammad once asked him, ‘‘Do you know Syriac well? Some books have come to my attention.’ I said, ‘No.’ He said, ‘Learn it.’ So I learned it in nineteen days’.”¹ There is nothing implausible about the veracity of this report; Syriac was a widely spoken language among the Christians who lived on the Arabian periphery in the first third of the seventh century CE. What is more, on the evidence of the Qurʾān itself a good case can be made that contemporary Arabic-speaking Christians professed their faith in an idiom that often reveals its Syriac affinities. It is also plausible that the Prophet would have been interested in the contents of any Syriac books that could easily have come to his attention and that he would have turned to Zayd for help in learning about their contents. After all, as scholars both Muslim and non-Muslim have long pointed out, some seventy percent of the so-called ‘foreign words’ in Qurʾānic Arabic are Syriac in their etymologies, indicating that much of what the Qurʾān says especially about Christian beliefs and practices, and much of its recollection of biblical passages as well, unsurprisingly betrays a Syriac connection.

In recent years, and especially after the publication of the important work of Tor Andræ (1885-1947) in the last century,² scholars have become ever more aware of the importance of the Syriac language and its literature as a background for a better understanding of the full import of the Qurʾān’s religious idiom, especially in regard to themes and narratives already familiar from Christian tradition. And ever since the publication of the first edition of Christoph Luxenberg’s Die syro-aramäische Lesart des Koran,³ researchers have outdone

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² See especially T. Andræ, Die Person Muhammeds in Lehre und Glauben seiner Gemeinde (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1917) and Der Ursprung des Islams und das Christentum (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1926).
³ Christoph Luxenberg, Die syro-aramäische Lesart des Koran: Ein Beitrag zur...
themselves in the search for Syriac resonances both in the Arabic Qurʾān’s language and in its discourse. As many reviewers have shown, the search has produced mixed results. While thanks to their discovery of comparable phraseology or whole passages in Syriac texts that shed interpretive light on the topical background of a number of recitations in the Qurʾān, some scholars have made important contributions to the effort to understand the Arabic scripture better than heretofore against the background of its Late Antique religious antecedents revealed in Syriac texts, other not so careful writers have been engaged in the unhelpful and reductive search for what they think of as the Syriac or Syro-Aramaic ‘sources’ of the Qurʾān.

Emran El-Badawi’s new book is inspired with enthusiasm for the interpretive potential inherent in reading selected Qurʾān passages in the light of what he calls “the Aramaic Gospel traditions,” by which he means primarily Syriac translations of the Gospels and of the Gospel according to Matthew in particular. His proposal is that in specific instances in the Qurʾānic text, in which, as he puts it, “general linguistic relationships are outwardly apparent … philological, grammatical, lexical, phonological, and orthographical correspondences, … the text is checked alongside earlier Biblical, Rabbinic, Apocryphal, Pseudepigraphal, homiletic, historical, and epigraphic literature to identify if it has a precedent, or echoes a source, outside of the Aramaic Gospel Traditions.” (p. 49) Following this search, once El-Badawi has satisfied himself that a given Qurʾān text is in his opinion linked to the Aramaic Gospel traditions on the basis of the outward textual correspondences he has listed, he formulates a hypothesis concerning their relationship. He says, “The driving principle mediating the Qurʾān’s use of the Aramaic Gospel Traditions is dogmatic re-articulation.” (p. 49) By the term ‘dogmatic re-articulation’ El-Badawi seems to mean that in his view the Arabic Qurʾān can be seen intentionally to re-phrase in Arabic the very wording of selected Gospel or other biblical verses in order to re-interpret them or to correct them from the Qurʾān’s perspective, or even from that of later Islamic teaching about God and creation, and to remove any ‘Christological constructs’ that might have been put upon them (cf. p. 5). In the conclusion, El-Badawi writes, “Concerning its dialogue with the Aramaic Gospel Traditions, this study has argued that ‘dogmatic re-

articulation’ was the fundamental literary strategy on the part of the Qurʾān to promote a vision of ‘strict monotheism’; to a sectarian Arabian audience.” (p. 207) He concludes that “the Qurʾān is in close dialogue with the text and context of the Gospels through their transmission in the Syriac and Christian Palestinian dialects of Aramaic. We may also conclude that this dialogue was mediated through the literary and hermeneutical strategy dubbed ‘dogmatic re-articulation’” (p. 212).

Throughout the book, the author regularly speaks of a Qurʾān verse or verses as being in dialogue, close dialogue (p. 212), even strong dialogue, with a particular Gospel verse or verses (p. 158); he speaks of the Qurʾān as emending a Gospel phrase (p. 156), as replacing pronouns (p. 155), as affirming imagery (p. 153), and of course as re-articulating the wording of verses, according to what El-Badawi perceives to be the countervailing Qurʾānic or Islamic value or teaching. He even assigns percentages for the inter-scriptural dialogue he envisions: “Matthew demonstrates a 20 percent dialogue with the Qurʾān, ... Mark with 12 percent, ... Luke at 10 percent, ... John ... 2 percent, ... 11 percent of the Qurʾān is in dialogue with the entirety of the Aramaic Gospel Traditions. Conversely, 12 percent of the Gospels are in dialogue with the whole Qurʾān.” (p. 210) As for the topics of the selected verses in dialogue that are discussed in the book, chosen, as mentioned above, according to their perceived, outward congruence in topic, phraseology and choice of words, they include passages that address four categories that el-Badawi says “are salient to both scriptural traditions” (p. 207). He calls them: “the prophets and their righteous entourage; the evils of the clergy; the divine realm; and divine judgment and the apocalypse” (p. 207). In charts included as appendices at the end of the volume, the author provides what he calls: “a parallel index of verses and subjects,” “data typology,” and “raw data.” (pp. 221-251) The charts convey a sense of objectivity that camouflages the subjective fact that all the ‘data’ are collected according to the author’s own perceptions of their correspondence with a set of criteria of his own choosing. In this reviewer’s judgment, no Qurʾān passage cited or closely examined in the course of the study gives any overt indication of an intended, intertextual dialogue in writing with any verse or verses in any of the Gospels in any language.
One would get a better sense of El-Badawi’s methodology by considering an extended instance of its application in a particular instance and in detail, in which he alleges that the Qurʾān is in dialogue with a particular Aramaic Gospel passage and dogmatically rearticulates it in accord with the Qurʾān’s own message. Unfortunately, the brief compass of a book review does not offer one sufficient space to display the method fairly. Suffice it then to draw the reader’s attention to the briefest of examples among the many more detailed ones in the book, in the hope that it will prompt one to read the book and make one’s own judgment about the verisimilitude of the author’s suggestions. An appropriately brief case in point is El-Badawi’s discussion of ‘greetings’ in a passage that he headlines with the phrase, “Greeting the House.” (pp. 112-113)

El-Badawi begins the discussion by recalling the fact that in ‘the Aramaic Gospel Traditions’ and in the Qurʾān the standard greeting is conveyed with the cognate terms, shlāmā and salām respectively. He then refers to the synoptic Gospel passage that reports Jesus’ reference to the Scribes’ and Pharisees’ love of “greeting (shlāmā) in the marketplace” (Mt. 23:7; Mk. 12:38; Lk. 11:43; 20:46). El-Badawi then remarks, “This somewhat negative portrayal of greetings is inherited by the Qurʾān as it advised its audience to both give greetings (salām) and shun the ignorant folk (al-jābilūn; Q 25:63; 28:55).” (p. 112) He says that there is one exception in the Gospels to what he here somewhat implausibly claims is a “negative portrayal of greetings,” and it is in Jesus’ advice to those whom he sent on a preaching expedition, “When you enter a house, greet the household.” (Mt. 10:12) “In relation to this passage,” El-Badawi goes on to say, “Q 24 legislates to Muḥammad’s early community of believers various aspects of everyday life.” (p. 113) One such instance is an invitation to dinner and in this connection, El-Badawi translates Q 24:61 as follows: “So if you enter a household (buyūṭ), then greet yourselves (sallīmū ‘alā anzūkum) – a greeting (tābiyyāt) from God, blessed and good.” (p. 113) Puzzled by the apparent advice to “greet yourselves,” El-Badawi proposes that one understand the matter “intertextually with Matthew 10:12-14,” where Jesus is reported to have advised his disciples when entering an unworthy household, “Let your greeting return to you (ṣlāmkūn ‘alaykūn nēfnē).” (Mt. 10:13) El-Badawi then concludes:

\[\text{Note that El-Badawi’s references are wrong for Mark and the first Luke citation.}\]
For in truth, the Qurʾān, conscious of the episode in Matthew, advises its audience to bypass the embarrassment of greeting an unworthy household by insisting on greeting oneself. Therefore, it is Jesus’ words in the Gospel, “let your greeting return to you (šlāmkūn ‘alaykūn nēfne)” that inspire the dogmatic re-articulation of the Qurʾān, “greet yourselves (sallīmū ‘alā anfusikum”).” (p. 113)

This small example, as brief and comparatively insignificant as it is among all the other instances, nevertheless well displays Emran El-Badawi’s method throughout The Qurʾān and the Aramaic Gospel Traditions, in which he considers many lengthier passages. He italicizes the cognate words quoted in transcription from the Gospel and Qurʾān passages in order to show that they are linked on the basis of outward textual correspondence, for in his view the cognate terms themselves bespeak a linguistic as opposed to a merely notional relationship between the passages. Because El-Badawi assumes that the ‘Aramaic Gospel Traditions’ were textually well known in word-for-word detail both to Muḥammad and to the subsequent collectors and editors of the Qurʾān, textual correspondence itself signals for him a correlation between the texts, which is then supported by a perceived thematic relationship. In this instance, El-Badawi cites what he perceives to be a “somewhat negative portrayal of greetings” (p. 112) in the Gospels and correlates it with what he again perceives to be an awkward moment in the Qurʾān’s text. But his perceptions in both instances are unusual. It is unusual to think that there is a general, negative portrayal of greetings in the Gospels; and the Qurʾān passage is usually interpreted to mean “greet one another.” This state of affairs calls attention to the highly subjective aspect of El-Badawi’s methodology; he is the one who perceives the thematic correlations between Gospel and Qurʾān, and his perceptions are very often idiosyncratic. Frequently they concern what he perceives to be sins, short-comings, or malapropisms on the Gospel side, which he then claims the Qurʾān is correcting or critiquing from an Islamic perspective by way of ‘dogmatic re-articulation.’ So it turns out that the tabulations displayed in the several charts in the book’s appendices really do, as mentioned above, provide a mirage of objectivity that in fact camouflages the very subjective character of the method of data collection actually employed in the study.
From this reviewer’s perspective, the net result of Emran El-Badawi’s methodology in *The Qurʾān and the Aramaic Gospel Traditions* is that in the passages he studies in the book it is ironically the Aramaic/Syriac text of the Christian scripture that on his reckoning actually determines the wording of the Arabic Qurʾān’s diction in that it is the Syriac Gospel text that the Qurʾān allegedly dogmatically re-articulates in Arabic. However, given the fact that with very few clear exceptions there is virtually no direct quotation from the Bible or from any other Jewish or Christian text in the Qurʾān generally, it seems unlikely that the Qurʾān was composed with such close attention to the Syriac Gospel text as the re-articulation proposed here would require, even supposing that Muḥammad and Zayd ibn Thābit actually had the requisite Syriac texts readily available and were prepared knowingly to consult them in detail. There is no evidence of such close intertextual reading at the Qurʾān’s origins save for the commonplace occurrence of cognate terms in Syriac and Arabic diction coupled with the often questionable thematic constructions that El-Badawi imposes on the text. But this is not to say that the ‘Aramaic Gospel Traditions’ are irrelevant for a historical understanding of the Qurʾān in its origins.

It has become abundantly clear from the work of numerous scholars over the past half-century and more that Jewish and Christian Aramaic texts of Late Antiquity do provide an enormous archive from which the historian can helpfully retrieve a broad knowledge of the religious thought current especially in Syriac in the first half of the seventh century and especially in the intercourse between Jewish, Christian, and nascent Islamic thinking as one finds it expressed in the Arabic Qurʾān. But the crucial point to notice is that while much of the language and lore (especially the biblical) is thus familiar, in the Qurʾān the familiar material is presented in an unfamiliar, distinctive intellectual framework all its own that determines its significance in a new discourse. The Qurʾān in fact recasts the familiar in a discourse that with respect to its predecessors is rhetorically often corrective, even polemical in its import. What is more, the Arabic Qurʾān remains textually aloof from earlier narratives; it virtually never quotes them verbally. It presumes the familiarity of their contents to its audience, it recollects them, comments on them, recalls their *dramatis personae*, and uses their story-lines for its own revelatory purposes. So the question arises, how is this different from Emran El-Badawi’s proposal of dogmatic re-articulation? And the answer is that
for him it is a matter of close textual re-articulation, even re-
structuring of the very diction of the non-Arabic language of earlier
scripture passages, whereas for this reviewer the re-casting of bibli-
cal, traditional, and doctrinal discourse, where it occurs in the Qurʾān,
is on the supra-textual, thematic, and doctrinal level. In accordance
with the Qurʾān’s own general mode of discourse it is, in its origins,
an oral and not a textual phenomenon, not a literal re-articulation,
but an allusive recall of earlier or concurrent, usually liturgical recita-
tions, proclaimed in Arabic, but retaining the tell-tale linguistic signs
of their originally Aramaic or Syriac articulation. In other words, in
this reviewer’s opinion, the oral translation into Arabic of familiar
Jewish or Christian Aramaic discourse occurred, at Jewish or Christian
hands, well prior to the Qurʾān’s subsequent oral reminiscence for its
own purposes of biblical, apocryphal, or traditional Jewish or Chris-
tian lore. There is no convincing evidence of any word for word, tex-
tual re-articulation, orally or in writing having been involved in the
Qurʾān’s recall of the sayings and doings of the pre-Qurʾānic patri-
archs and prophets.

In conclusion, the proposed ‘dogmatic re-articulation’ in the
Qurʾān of the ‘Aramaic Gospel Traditions’ as Emran El-Badawi pre-
sents it, seems to this reviewer to go too far in positing too close a
textual relationship between the Gospels and the Qurʾān, so close
that in the selected passages the Qurʾān is thought, at the moment of
its first articulation, actually to have been attending to the very words
of the Syriac Gospel text.

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Al-Ṭūfī, a Ḥanbalī jurist, theologian, and exegete, was born around 670/1271-2 in the area of Baghdād and was initially educated there. He moved to Damascus in 704/1304-5 to study with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), then to Cairo in 705/1306 to work as a teacher. He was expelled from there in 711/1311 and subsequently lived elsewhere in Egypt, went on the ḥajj in 714/1315, and died in Hebron in 716/1316. His troubles in Cairo appear to have stemmed from accusations of having Shīʿī sympathies. He was also associated with Sufism, in keeping with the scholastic and religious expectations of Cairo at the time. As a jurist he has gained fame especially in modern times for his conception of public interest (maṣlaḥa) in matters of civil transactions, a principle that is seen to act as an independent source of law despite the absence of rigorous criteria by which its applicability may be assessed.

Al-Ṭūfī’s interest in Christianity reflects Mamlūk society of his era – the post-Crusade period – highlighting both the active trade relationship with Europe and the polemical tone of the interchanges. It was a vibrant era for Muslim-Christian interaction and many of the more virulent attacks seem to have their basis primarily in social and financial aspects of the overall relationship. Al-Ṭūfī himself is often described a free thinker and his work as presented here by Lejla Demiri gets to the heart of the Muslim-Christian divide through a close examination of many theological points of potential difference. In writing his book, al-Ṭūfī worked in full knowledge of the discussions that had gone before him involving Muslim approaches to Christianity; however, his attention to the text of the Bible is unique, as is his status as the first Muslim to write both a commentary on the Qurʾān (al-Ishbārāt al-ilāhiyya ilā l-mahāḥith al-uṣūliyya) and on the Bible.

Al-Ṭūfī wrote his Bible commentary, al-Taʿlīq ʿalā l-Anājīl al-arbaʿa wa-l-taʿlīq ʿalā l-Tawrāt wa-ʿalā ghayrihā min kutub al-
anbiyāʾ, as preparation for his composition of his full refutation of Christianity and defense of Islam; that book, called *al-Intiṣārāt al-Islāmiyya fī kashf shubah al-Naṣrāniyya* was written in 707/1308. His goal in the commentary was to expose how Christian doctrines were not supported by scripture. In al-Ṭūfī’s view, misinterpretation was the main culprit in bringing about mistaken Christian understandings, but intentional forgery (changing or inserting pieces of text into the Bible) was the only thing that could explain how some portions of the Christian Bible could possibly say what they do.

Al-Ṭūfī first makes it clear that he does not consider the Christian Gospels to be the equivalent of the Qurān’s Injīl: as a result of that fact the possibility of forgery exists because the Christian text was clearly the result of human writing about Jesus and not purely the message that was transmitted via Jesus from God. The inconsistency between the four Gospels, he suggests, is the plain evidence of this. He argues in his introduction that the notion of the Trinity and the idea of God’s incarnation in Jesus are false by the evidence of both scripture and reason. Jesus’ humanity is quite apparent to al-Ṭūfī on the basis of his metaphoric understanding of certain portions of the Gospels (for example when Jesus calls God “My Father”).

The text of the Gospels that al-Ṭūfī examines was likely received via the Coptic version known as the Alexandrian (also known as the Egyptian) Vulgate; Demiri provides a convincing and well-documented argument for this (see pp. 62-70). Notably al-Ṭūfī uses an ancient chapter and verse division system in making reference to this version although the edition has been provided with the modern format and numbering in the footnotes.

Al-Ṭūfī proceeds in his examination of the Bible verse-by-verse in thematically selected segments. In his analysis of the Gospels al-Ṭūfī does provide some distinctive (although not necessarily unique) understandings in certain places. Demiri draws attention especially to matters such as his arguments about the angelic nature of Jesus (text paragraph 261) and the resurrection of Jesus (para. 152). Al-Ṭūfī also raises many other interesting topics, reflecting both Muslim and Christian understandings of various issues at the time: examples may be seen in the treatment of divorce (para. 108) in which the question is raised of how it could be that Jesus is credited with equating adultery and divorce (a clear case of an impossible text for al-Ṭūfī), and the arguments surrounding the lack of *tawātūr* (uniform and ubiquitous
transmission) for the crucifixion (para. 149 and see the editor's comments in footnote 155).

While a majority of the text (para. 4 to 326) focuses on the four Gospels, a good portion of it (up to para. 606) studies sections of the Hebrew Bible, specifically passages from the books of Isaiah, Hosea, Jonah, Habakkuk, Malachi, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and Genesis. Most of the material that al-Ṭūfī examines in those books focuses on specific issues of Christian importance and Muslim contestation related to the nature of Jesus as divine and predictions of the coming of Mūḥammad. On the first matter al-Ṭūfī pays no attention to variation in Christian dogma among various groups; Christianity is presented as a singular entity. There is limited attention to legal matters, reflecting the fact that Muslims and Christians had worked out a system of mutual acceptance on such day-to-day differences. However, the compatibility of the Bible and the Qurʾān is a major concern and that theme is particularly prominent in the comments on the Book of Genesis where most of the verses that al-Ṭūfī treats raise issues related to a very general comparison of the contents of the Bible to that of the Qurʾān and the Sunna. Worthy of note because of its frequent citation in Muslim sources is al-Ṭūfī’s analysis of the “three lies of Abraham” (para. 512) and the fact that a ḥadīth report appears to support the idea that Abraham did lie. Al-Ṭūfī suggests that the report may be speaking of “metaphorical lies” and not “real and absolute lies” and, thus, calling Sara his sister, for example, could be interpreted here as a “sin” of omission: that is Abraham simply did not say explicitly “She is my wife.” However, the invocation of taḥrif does sometimes become a necessary method for al-Ṭūfī to solve these textual conflicts, as in the case of Paran being understood at Beersheba and not Mecca in Genesis 21 (para. 515). These comparisons of the Book of Genesis and the Qurʾān do lead in Christian directions on occasion: para. 546 deals with the Christian reading of Genesis 32 and the wrestling with God as proof of the possibility of divine manifestation in many forms including that of a human. Al-Ṭūfī points out that the text does not actually say that it was God who wrestled with Jacob, so no proof may be located there.

Al-Ṭūfī’s text is presented here in both a well-edited Arabic version and an English translation on facing pages. The Arabic is based on two Istanbul manuscripts, Süleymaniye Şehid Ali Paşa 2315/4 and Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 795/2, and is lightly annotated with textual
variants. The English translation provides the references to the quoted Bible passages, the names of other books that are cited in the text (providing a good sense of al-Ṭūfī’s debt to his predecessors and contemporaries), and a few assorted notes. No attention is paid in the annotations to the Christian background of the doctrines being critiqued and their significance in the Christian context; it is presumed that the reader will understand why these matters are important to Christians (al-Ṭūfī makes the Muslim position quite explicit). The Arabic text is well presented and divided into numbered paragraphs (mirrored in the translation) that make reference easy. The translation is well done overall, although a few awkward elements do remain such as in the rendering of lā … illā literally as “not … except” (e.g., para. 431), a double negative that inhibits the easy flow of English. Overall, this a valuable edition of a fascinating text that significantly broadens our appreciation of Muslim approaches to the Bible and the Qurʾān.

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The year 2013 saw the long-overdue publication of Umar Faruq Abd-Allah Wymann-Landgraf's immensely important study on Islamic law. Mālik and Medina is based on Abd-Allah’s 1978 dissertation, “Mālik’s concept of 'amal in the light of Mālikī legal theory,” which has circulated for decades in the form of photocopies and PDF files. The work’s appearance in printed form provides an opportunity for a critical evaluation of its contribution to the field of Islamic legal studies.

Mālik and Medina is a detailed study of the legal terminology of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795) as found in his seminal book, the Muwaṭṭa', and in the later collection of his statements, the Mudawwana. Indeed, Mālik and Medina is perhaps the most detailed and comprehensive study of the legal doctrine (fiqh) of any Muslim scholar, as only the legal-theoretical writings of selected jurists (most notably, al-Shāfi‘ī in the work of Joseph Lowry and al-Āmidī in that of Bernard Weiss) have thus far received comparable treatment. In his book, Abd-Allah painstakingly identifies and analyzes the numerous fine distinctions that underpin Mālik's thought, and he consequently achieves an exceptional level of insight into the latter's work. By examining Mālik's terminology closely and systematically, Abd-Allah shows conclusively that Mālik's Muwaṭṭa' was a work of law rather than simply a collection of reports about Muḥammad and other early authorities. Further, although the Muwaṭṭa' is the earliest extant such work, it is not primitive in the sense of being unsystematic: to the contrary, Abd-Allah’s careful reconstruction reveals a sophisticated conceptual framework. In addition to its contribution on Mālikī terminology, Mālik and Medina sheds new light on early Ḥanafism and early Shāfi‘ism by analyzing other jurists' reactions to Mālik's ideas.

The revised text is enhanced by updated and exhaustive engagement with secondary literature, including welcome references to Arabic-language studies that regrettably receive little attention in Western scholarship.
The book opens with an introduction to Mālik as a Medinese scholar and to the *Muwaṭṭa*, the *Mudawwana*, and other early works that preserve Mālik’s opinions. Abd-Allah relies primarily on the manuscript research of Miklos Muranyi, providing a useful summary and persuasive interpretations of the latter’s findings. He does not engage systematically with the issue of authenticity, but he does point out internal evidence of the *Mudawwana*’s reliance on the *Muwaṭṭa* (contra Norman Calder’s skepticism regarding the works’ dating) and refers to recent studies on these texts.

Chapter 2 draws on cases of positive law in the *Muwaṭṭa* and the *Mudawwana* in order to distill Mālik’s legal-theoretical approach to the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, Sunna, consensus, custom, considered opinion (*raʾy*), analogy (*qiyās*, which Abd-Allah juxtaposes with al-Shāfiʿī’s method), discretion (*istiḥsān*, which he juxtaposes with Abū Ḥanīfa’s method), preclusion (*sadd al-dharāʾiʿ*), and considerations of the unstated good (*maṣāliḥ mursala*). Abd-Allah demonstrates in great detail that although Mālik used Qurʾānic texts and prophetic traditions extensively, these sources were not in themselves norm-generating for Mālik; rather, he always interpreted them through the lens of Medinese praxis, ‘*amal abl al-Madīna*. This praxis functions as a communal interpretive mechanism that ensures the validity of source texts – guaranteeing, for example, that a report or a Qurʾānic statement has not been abrogated and that its implications are understood correctly.

Chapters 3 and 4 observe the crucial concept of Medinese praxis from the perspectives of its detractors and its adherents, respectively. Chapter 3 analyzes critiques of Medinese praxis by Mālik’s contemporaries (Abū Yūsuf, al-Shaybānī, and early Shāfiʿīs) and by later scholars (Muʿtazilīs, Ḥanafīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Zāhirīs). Chapter 4 lays out the views of advocates of Medinese praxis, namely, Mālik himself, his contemporary al-Layth ibn Saʿd, and later Ḥanbalīs. These chapters show, first, that there was a textualist critique of Medinese praxis, put forward by early Ḥanafīs as well as Shāfiʿīs and Zāhirīs, that considered Mālik’s approach too independent of and unintelligibly related to the texts of revelation. That the Shāfiʿīs and the Zāhirīs held this view is unsurprising, but Abd-Allah’s finding that it was in fact first voiced by Ḥanafīs is significant and contrary to conventional wisdom. Second, Abd-Allah demonstrates that the non-Mālikīs who were most positively disposed towards Medinese praxis were Ḥanbalīs (particu-
larly the Ibn Taymiyya family of jurists, but not Ibn Qudāma), again contradicting the common perception of Ḥanbalīs as rigid textualists. It must be pointed out, however, that the earliest Ḥanbalī usūl texts, such as those of Abū Ya‘lā and Ibn ‘Aqīl, were not consulted for this overview of Ḥanbalī views.

The second part of the book (Chapters 5 to 10) offers a meticulous analysis of Mālik’s terminology as found in the Muwaṭṭa‘ and the Mudawwana, elucidating Mālik’s terminological strategies for referring to the Sunna, Medinese praxis, and Medinese consensus, respectively. A cursory glance at Mālik’s writing might suggest that he has much less of an individual voice than jurists writing a generation after him. But Abd-Allah hones in on the terse phrases with which Mālik introduces his positions, such as “the precept among us is” or “the agreed precept among us is,” and argues convincingly that these are carefully employed terms that signify different levels of prevalence among Medinese jurists and thus different levels of authority for the positions they introduce. These distinctions make it possible to identify a spectrum in Mālik’s terminology from universal Medinese consensus, at one end, to Mālik’s individual opinion on a matter, at the other, and a second spectrum spanning communal praxis that goes back to the prophetic age and praxis originating in more recent legal reasoning.

Abd-Allah challenges received wisdom on several counts. First, he argues that in this first work on Islamic law proper, the Muwaṭṭa‘, ḥadīth are clearly not coextensive with the law: Mālik’s legal opinions are underdetermined by ḥadīth reports, and the disagreements between Mālik and his contemporaries were overwhelmingly over differing interpretations of the same sources rather than over incompatible ḥadīth. This observation appears incommensurable with the idea that ḥadīth were simply fabricated to justify the law. Second, Abd-Allah highlights the importance of ra‘y, in the sense of extra-textual legal reasoning (including extensive use of analogy and benefit considerations), in Mālik’s thought, and he shows that, contrary to common perception, the Ḥanafīs were more focused on texts than were the Mālikīs. And third, he emphasizes Mālik’s acceptance of differences of opinion and depicts an atmosphere among early jurists that was far less fiercely polemical than generally assumed by Western scholarship. There is some ambiguity about this point, however: on the one hand, Abd-Allah cites Joseph Schacht’s description of “violent
conflict of opinions” and Fazlur Rahman’s of a “stormy formative period” (p. 19), but on the other hand, he admits that Western scholars have also recognized early jurists’ widespread acceptance of legitimate differences of opinion.

This third proposition, that the early period saw less conflict about the law than hitherto supposed, leads Abd-Allah to argue that the author of the most extensive contemporary attack on Medinese praxis, *Ikhtilāf Mālik* (“Disagreement with Mālik”), contained in the *Kitāb al-Umm* of al-Shāfiʿī, cannot be al-Shāfiʿī himself (p. 62, n. 120). He bases his dismissal of al-Shāfiʿī’s authorship on two features of the text: its hostile tone and its arguments, which, in Abd-Allah’s view, occasionally reveal a misunderstanding of Mālik’s positions that seems unlikely for al-Shāfiʿī, who was Mālik’s student. The first argument is not convincing. Al-Shāfiʿī could be an aggressive opponent, as shown by his other debates, and he did not suffer what he considered faulty arguments lightly, as shown by his exclamation to al-Shaybānī regarding an argument of Abū Ḥanīfa: “If anyone else than your teacher had drawn this analogy, what would you have told him? Wouldn’t you have said: ‘You have no business talking about law?’” (*al-Umm*, ed. ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib, 8:71). In addition, in the *Ikhtilāf*, al-Shāfiʿī’s ire is directed primarily at his Mālikī opponent and at what he sees as the opponent’s unreasonable recalcitrance, not at Mālik himself. Finally, accounts of al-Shāfiʿī’s death claim that he died from injuries inflicted by Mālik’s followers in response to his criticism of Mālik. As for the content of the arguments in the *Ikhtilāf*, numerous passages elsewhere in the *Umm* show clearly that al-Shāfiʿī grappled earnestly with the meaning of Mālik’s concept of Medinese praxis, initially defending it against its critics, then growing increasingly disillusioned, and eventually rejecting the concept entirely: in a comment added to his earlier defense of a Mālikī opinion, al-Shāfiʿī explains, “I used to hold this opinion with this justification, but I stopped doing so . . . because I found some of them [i.e., the Medinese] claiming [it as] Sunna, but then I did not find their claimed Sunna to reach back to the Prophet. Therefore, I [now] prefer analogy in this case” (*al-Umm*, 9:105). The legal-theoretical stance that underpinned Mālik’s opinions was not intuitively clear to his students, and al-Shāfiʿī and his peers were thus engaged in the same task as Abd-Allah, namely, examining the corpus of Mālik’s rulings in order to glean his overall approach.
The second area in which Abd-Allah appears to err on the side of harmony concerns the phenomenon of raʾy in early Islamic law. He displays a clear awareness of the dangers of “falling into historical conflations” (p. 9) when writing the history of terms, but he himself conflates Mālik’s use of extra-textual considerations in legal reasoning with raʾy in the sense in which the term was employed in the second Hijrī century. Abd-Allah considers the epithet given to Mālik’s Medinese teacher Rabīʿa, “Rabīʿat al-Raʾy” (“Rabīʿa the legal reasoner”), evidence of Medinese acceptance of raʾy. However, there are strong indications that the epithet was not meant as a “respectful” one, such as Ibn al-Mājishūn’s retort, “You say ‘Rabīʿa the legal reasoned;’ no, by God, I have never seen anyone keener on protecting the Sunna than he is” (al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Madīnat al-salām, ed. Maʿrūf, 9:417). A letter from the Egyptian jurist al-Layth ibn Saʿd to Mālik (which Abd-Allah cites in a different context, p. 226) also makes reference to “Rabīʿa’s divergence from what came before” and the agreement of al-Layth, Mālik, and Ibn al-Mājishūn regarding Rabīʿa’s faults.

Describing al-Layth ibn Saʿd as a proponent of Medinese praxis is also problematic. It is true that al-Layth begins his letter to Mālik by agreeing that all Muslims “are subordinate (tabʿ) to the people of Medina” (p. 221) as the place of revelation, but the principal aim of his letter is to justify the parallel authenticity and normativity of the practices established by Muḥammad’s companions subsequently in other locations throughout the Islamic empire. Al-Layth’s claim that no one follows the consensus of Medinese jurists more than he does may be simply a polite but meaningless phrase; or it may denote that he agrees with unanimous Medinese positions or, at the other extreme, that he considers such positions universally binding. Abd-Allah assumes the last interpretation, but this is speculation. In any case, al-Layth proceeds to demonstrate that Medinese scholars disagree on a large and growing number of issues, with the implication that the scope of genuine, unanimously supported Medinese praxis is in fact very limited. Therefore, al-Layth should be considered one of the earliest critics of Medinese praxis, not its proponent.

In spite of these points of critique, Mālik and Medina is an enormously important study of early Islamic law that does for the Mālikī school what has not been achieved for any of the other schools, namely, providing a systematic analysis of its foundational texts of
positive law. Schacht's study of al-Shāfiʿī's *al-Umm*, though long accepted almost without question, is woefully inadequate and skewed by Schacht's primary concern with the evolution of ḥadīth. Early Ḥanafi legal texts are almost a terra incognita in Western scholarship, demonstrated by the fact that the full text of al-Shaybānī's foundational work, *al-Aṣl*, was not published until 2012 despite being easily available in manuscript form. Similarly, the first systematic overview of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal's surviving oeuvre in the form of the various *masāʾil* works of his students (by Saud al-Sarhan) has only just been published. This does not mean that macro-historical accounts of Islamic legal history ought to be suspended until basic coverage of Grundlagenforschung has been completed; it simply underscores the still tentative bases of such large-scale histories. Early Islamic legal history remains an understudied field, and *Mālik and Medina* will hopefully serve as an exemplar of the systematic analysis of a legal work.

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In this timely and ambitious volume, the editors, John Curry and Erik S. Ohlander, have undertaken to collect and edit material dealing with one of the most historiographically fraught topics and periods in Islamic history: the history of Sufism from the so-called “Middle Period” up to the cusp of modernity. As the editors note in their introduction, while the early centuries of Sufism have been relatively well served by historians and others, and the period after 1800 has been treated extensively by historians, anthropologists, and religious studies scholars, the intervening centuries have been studied in a much more haphazard, discontinuous manner, when they have been studied at all. Pernicious paradigms of Sufi “decline” and “corruption,” particularly in light of the rise of so-called “ṭariqa Sufism,” have yet to be completely extirpated. Large gaps – chronological, thematic, and geographical – remain, with entire periods, places, and figures from the later medieval to early modern periods remaining virtual terra incognita. Yet this situation, as the editors argue, has begun to change. In addition to this volume, one calls to mind, for instance, Nile Green’s Sufism: A Global History, also published in 2012; the recent flurry of monographs on early modern Ottoman Sufism are also positive signs of change in the historiographic field. While this volume of twelve papers obviously cannot resolve the above field-wide problems, it does fill in some lacunae, offer many provocative jumping-off points for further research, and, perhaps most importantly, demonstrates awareness on the part of many scholars of the problems and potential solutions within the field.

Curry and Ohlander’s introduction to the volume frames the broad issues mentioned above, before summarizing and situating the twelve contributions that follow. These contributions have been grouped into four thematic sections, with a diversity of sub-themes and chronological and geographical locations. All seek, with varying degrees of success, to situate their specifically Sufi subjects within their wider
socio-cultural settings, drawing upon a wide variety of theoretical and analytical models.

Grouped under the rubric of “historiography” are three articles arguing for reappraisals and reuses of particular textual records. Blain H. Aurer’s article rejects the still oft-repeated trope of North Indian Sufi rejection of political power, arguing instead for a much more complicated relationship – in “real life” and in textual representation – between prominent Sufis and the holders of political power. Erik S. Ohlander looks at the relationship between textual representations of a Multanese Sufi saint and the “transregional” networks linking Mecca with the rest of the Islamic world, arguing for a sophisticated re-reading of hagiographical depictions of connections, miraculous and otherwise, with the Ḥijāz. Sean Foley contends for an expansion beyond hagiography in his discussion of the early nineteenth century Ottoman Sheikh Khālid. Arguing for a dual reading of hagiography and documentary evidence, Foley also tries to incorporate political science theory, though with somewhat underwhelming results. Moving on to the more amorphous category of “landscapes,” Ovamir Anjum’s broadly ranging article attempts to argue for the importance of Sufism as an engine of social stratification in “post-ʿAbbāsid Islam,” looking at both “canonical” Sufi writings and at critiques of Sufism by figures such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. While accurately reflecting the socially pervasive nature of later medieval Sufism, Anjum’s conclusions are more sweeping than perhaps warranted. Zeynep Yürekli takes a more focused approached, examining the relationship between architectural patronage and design, on the one hand, and hagiography on the other, in the early modern Ottoman, Ṣafavid, and Mughal empires. Finally, Afshan Bokhari presents the fascinating history of the Mughal princess and Sufi devotee Jahān Ārā Begam through an art history lens; unfortunately, her article is also probably the most uneven and problematic in the collection.

Leading the “doctrine and praxis” section, Matthew Ingalls’ excellent treatment of the development of ḥātwās concerning Sufism in Mamlūk Egypt works to undermine many assumptions about the relationships existing among Sufis, legal scholars, “high” and “popular” religion, and networks of power in late medieval Egyptian society. Rıza Yıldırım makes an admirable, if uneven, attempt to analyze the development of Qizilbash ritual in light of seemingly similar futuwwa rituals practiced in Anatolia. Moving forward chronologically,
Alberto Fabio Ambrosio introduces the work and thought of an important early seventeenth century Ottoman Sufi, Ismā‘īl Anqarawī and his relationship with reformist currents in Ottoman Islam. Ottoman topics are paramount in the final section, “negotiations,” featuring articles which deal with Sufi social situations vis-à-vis power and authority. Side Emre offers a new reading of the history of Ibrāhīm-i Gulshanī (= Gülşenî), eponym of the Egyptian Gulshaniyya țariqa, and his interactions with both the Mamluks and Ottomans. John Curry’s examination of the relationships between Murād III and three Sufi figures argues against simplistic or formulaic understandings of the dynamics generated between particular Sufis and the Ottoman court. Finally, Aslı Niyazioğlu’s article uses the presentation of Sufis’ dreams in Țăshkuprîzâda’s (= Taşköprüzade) famous biographical dictionary as a site for analyzing larger issues of the perceptions, anxieties, and relationships between non-Sufi ‘ulamā and Sufi figures.

Despite some uneven material, this volume is on the whole quite useful, especially for readers interested in the history of Sufism in Ottoman lands, and, to a lesser extent, India, with a weighted tendency towards early modernity (though with little from the eighteenth century, it should be noted). Its coverage ideally would have extended further geographically and chronologically, drawing in, for instance, North Africa and Central Asia, both of which are curiously absent. The focus on the social situating of Sufism is of course a welcome contribution, with the most successful and useful of the articles in this collection being those that show the closest attention to sociocultural situating in its fine-grained details. Thankfully, the importance of Sufism as a diverse, socially embedded phenomenon is being increasingly recognized and investigated by scholars, and not just for the formative or modern periods. This volume is one manifestation of that encouraging trend – let us hope that many more such manifestations appear in the years to come.

Peter Adamson’s Interpreting Avicenna is a collection of twelve essays, written by leading experts on the “Chief Master” of Arabic philosophy – al-Sheikh al-ra’īs. Far from being a loose collection of disjointed pieces, this volume stands out as a well-structured and comprehensive handbook on Avicenna. This in itself is a remarkable achievement, which alone would make the volume indispensable. Additionally, each and every essay is an outstanding piece of scholarship, which offers a state-of-the-art presentation of its subject as well as breaks new ground and advances our knowledge of Avicenna’s life, thought, and legacy.

The essays fall into three broad divisions: (1) Avicenna’s biography, (2) Avicenna’s œuvre (with seven articles devoted to philosophy and one to medicine), and (3) Avicenna’s reception (Islamic, Jewish, and Latin Christian). The first division is represented by only one contribution: the late David C. Reisman’s “The life and times of Avicenna: patronage and learning in medieval Islam” (chapter 1). Reisman offers a panoramic overview of Avicenna’s life and works, with emphasis on “how the directions of Avicenna’s thought ... are pushed forward by the events and relationships of his private life” (p. 20). Thus, for instance, Avicenna’s so-called “Eastern philosophy,” developed in his The Easterners and The Fair Judgment (both only partially extant), is his philosophical riposte to the Baghdād Peripatetic school (such as his arch-rival Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī), involving an independent re-evaluation of the entire Aristotelian tradition from Avicenna’s own perspective as an “Eastern” scholar from Khurāsān. Reisman also helpfully surveys the development of Avicenna’s philosophical pedagogy and his experimentation with diverse styles of writing – notably his use of “enthymemes” (arguments with deliberately omitted premises, to be recovered by the reader) in the Pointers and Reminders.

The second division of the volume opens with Dimitri Gutas’ magisterial presentation of “Avicenna’s philosophical project” (chapter 2). Gutas stresses that Avicenna was “the first philosopher ever to write
about *all philosophical knowledge* ... within a single composition as a unified whole: he developed the *summa philosophiae* (p. 32; italics in the original). A key goal of Avicenna’s philosophical project was thus to present philosophy “as a whole, to reflect both the interrelatedness and interdependence of all knowledge, and its correspondence with reality” (*ibid*). Concomitantly, Avicenna insisted on “bring[ing] philosophy up to date” (p. 33) by taking account of scientific developments from Aristotle’s time until his own, clearing misconceptions of successive generations of Peripatetic commentators, and resolving difficulties and inconsistencies within the Aristotelian system itself. This updating also involved providing philosophical (i.e., scientific) explanations for religious phenomena, such as prophecy, miracles, or veridical dreams. Avicenna accomplished this as part of his thorough revision of the Aristotelian theory of the soul—a subject dealt with extensively in Gutas’ article. As in his previous publications, Gutas stresses the “absence of mysticism in Avicenna,” by which he means that, for Avicenna, all knowledge (including prophetic knowledge) is syllogistically structured, and even when intelligibles are acquired “at once or nearly so,” the syllogistic middle terms never cease to be present. The article concludes with a valuable survey of Avicenna’s diverse styles of writing, complementing Reisman’s presentation above.¹

Six extensive contributions on Avicenna’s philosophy follow: Tony Street’s “Avicenna on the syllogism” (with a valuable “bibliographical guide to Avicenna’s logical works,” pp. 67-70); Jon McGinnis’ “Avicenna’s natural philosophy;” Dag Nikolaus Hasse’s “Avicenna’s epistemological optimism;” Deborah L. Black’s “Certitude, justification, and the principles of knowledge in Avicenna’s epistemology;” Stephen Menn’s “Avicenna’s metaphysics;” and Peter Adamson’s “From the necessary existent to God” (chapters 3-4 and 6-9; chapter 5 to be discussed below). Taken together, they provide a comprehen-

¹ All these subjects are discussed much more extensively, and with exhaustive references, in the second, completely revised and greatly enhanced edition of Dimitri Gutas’ *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works*, which has now come out (Leiden: Brill, 2014). This second edition, which is almost twice the size of the first (Leiden: Brill, 1988), also includes a complete inventory of Avicenna’s authentic works. A collected volume of Gutas’ articles on Avicenna is expected soon from Variorum. Both books will serve as the indispensable foundation for Avicennian studies in the decades to come.
sive introduction to the main themes of Avicenna’s philosophy and lead the reader – following the Aristotelian curriculum – from logic as the “tool” of philosophy, through the natural sciences (with emphasis on the soul – and what we call today epistemology), to general and special metaphysics. Collectively, they also illustrate Dimitri Gutas’ observation that Avicenna treated philosophy “as a unified whole.”

These studies are packed with valuable insights. Thus, Tony Street pinpoints the key difference between the logical sections of Avicenna’s *The Cure* and *Pointers and Reminders*. While *The Cure* is “the culmination of centuries of Peripatetic philosophy” which, by and large, follows the order of Aristotle’s presentation, the *Pointers and Reminders* is “a programmatic account ... of how best to present philosophy without reference to Aristotle;” thus while the former “looked back to the tradition from which logic had developed, [the latter] looked forward to how it might be developed” in the future (p. 66).

Jon McGinnis shows how Avicenna developed a novel definition of motion as “never being at the same point for more than an instant” (p. 74). This definition constitutes a radical departure from Aristotle’s view of motion in that it postulates motion “at an instant” – an impossibility in traditional Aristotelianism. At the same time, it offers an elegant re-interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of motion as entelechy. According to Avicenna, entelechy is to be understood not as the process of actualization of potentiality, but as an already actualized perfection (*kamāl*, “perfection,” being the translation of “entelechy” in the Arabic version of Aristotle’s *Physics*); motion’s perfection consists precisely in the fact that the moving body is never at the same point for more than an instant. Avicenna was thus able to resolve the paradox of how an *already actualized* perfection (*kamāl*) could signify the *process* of actualization of potentiality.

Dag Nikolaus Hasse’s piece offers an insightful solution to the long-standing debate regarding Avicenna’s epistemology: namely, whether it is to be understood as primarily Aristotelian / abstractionist (meaning that the human intellect abstracts universal forms from material particulars) or Neoplatonic / emanationist (the human intellect receives universal forms from the Active Intellect). According to Hasse, it is, in fact, both: “Epistemologically, the normal way to acquire universal forms [for the first time] is abstraction from particulars, but ontologically the forms come from the active intellect” (p. 115). Once
the human intellect has gone through the necessary process of abstraction for a particular form, it receives it from the Active Intellect, and henceforth can receive it again at will, without having to go through the process of abstraction again.

Deborah Black’s paper offers an intriguing analysis of Avicenna’s epistemology, focusing on proposition types to which assent (taṣdiq) can be given. Eleven proposition types – such as primaries (aw-waliyyät, i.e., self-evident truths), empiricals (mujarrabät), widely accepted propositions (mashbūrät), and opined/supposed beliefs (maẓnūnät) – are conveniently listed on p. 124, ranked in the order of reliability, and subsequently analyzed. Black argues that for Avicenna, certitude (yaqīn), which is “the highest degree of assent,” presupposes “second-order belief,” i.e., “knowing that one knows” (p. 122).

Stephen Menn’s contribution is a complex disquisition on the philosophical implications of Avicenna’s understanding of quiddity (māhiyya) as neutral with regard to existence or non-existence as well as to different types of existence (mental and extra-mental). As Menn shows, in articulating some of these implications, Avicenna polemicizes against the Arab Christian (Jacobite) Aristotelian philosopher Yahyā ibn ʿAdī (d. 974). Thus, Avicenna argues that, contrary to Ibn ʿAdī’s view, in knowing an immaterial thing the mind does not become identical to or united with that thing (thus, for instance, in knowing God the mind does not become united with God). Rather, the mind gets to know the quiddity of that thing, which in itself is neutral with regard to mental or extra-mental existence and which comes to exist in the mind (when the mind knows it) or in the extra-mental world (p. 168). Relatedly, knowledge for Avicenna is always an accident (inhering in the mind as its substrate), even if it is knowledge of quiddities which, when they come to exist extra-mentally, are substances rather than accidents (pp. 165-166).

Peter Adamson’s article examines how Avicenna argues that the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd), whose existence he has established in the “ontological proof,” has the attributes of, and is thus identical to, the (philosophically construed) God of Islam. The following attributes are considered: uniqueness, simplicity, ineffability, intellection, goodness, and will (the last one only schematically, in the conclusion). Adamson shows that for Avicenna all these attributes can be deduced from the Necessary Existent’s two traits: an “intrinsic”
trait, namely its “necessity” (understood as “guarantee of existence,” \(\text{ta’akkud al-wujūd}\)) and an “extrinsic,” relational trait, namely its being the ultimate cause for the rest of existents.

Peter E. Pormann’s contribution, “Avicenna on medical practice, epistemology, and the physiology of the inner senses” (chapter 5), is the only one dealing with medicine. Pormann demonstrates, first, that though Avicenna was clearly more interested in the theoretical aspect of medicine than in clinical practice, he nonetheless had considerable clinical experience, for in his *Canon of Medicine* he indicates repeatedly that he had tested particular drugs or remedies. Second, Pormann focuses on Avicenna’s theory of the internal senses – a significant element of his psychology, discussed both in his philosophical and in his medical works. Here the main conclusion is that “Avicenna’s medical ideas were heavily influenced by his philosophy” (p. 107), with the implication that the *Canon* does not simply rehash previous medical knowledge, but is innovative in a variety of ways. Pormann also highlights the importance of Avicenna’s medical writings for the study of both his medical and his philosophical teachings; he calls attention to the fact that these writings have been unduly neglected and urges historians of philosophy and medicine to pay more attention to them.

The third division of the volume includes three studies, dealing with Avicenna’s reception among Muslims, Jews, and Latin Christians, respectively. Robert Wisnovsky has undertaken the formidable task of charting “Avicenna’s Islamic reception” (chapter 10). His essay explains why Avicenna’s *Pointers and Reminders* – rather than his other books – became the principal object of commentaries. Table 10.1 on p. 194 lists more than thirty such commentaries written from the late 12th century on. As Wisnovsky convincingly argues, it is precisely because of its “compressed and opaque style” that this work allowed for “more interpretative freedom” and was thus more attractive to commentators (p. 199; cf. also Tony Street’s observation discussed above). The significance of this vast commentatorial tradition on the *Pointers and Reminders* – as well as of the reception of Avicenna’s *magnum opus*, *The Cure* – lies in the fact that these commentators developed an “Avicennian” philosophy (distinct from Avicenna’s own) by constantly revisiting Avicenna’s works and working out solutions for problems and inconsistencies inherent in his own system. To put it another way, Avicenna’s works offered a profoundly
influential and successful “scientific paradigm” (in Thomas Kuhn’s sense) for later generations of Muslim philosophers.

One particularly important aspect of Wisnovsky’s essay is his analysis of how such thinkers as al-Ghazālī, al-Suhrawardī, and Ibn ʿArabī – often viewed as “mystics who departed radically from Avicenna’s philosophy” – fit within the Avicennian tradition. Thus, Wisnovsky argues convincingly (p. 206) that far from being merely a critic of Avicenna, al-Ghazālī played a significant role in “integrating core elements of Avicenna’s metaphysics and psychology into Sunnī theology and prophetology as well as into Sufi spirituality, and in appropriating the basic framework of Avicenna’s syllogistic into Sunn[ī] jurisprudence.” Al-Suhrawardī’s criticism of the Avicennian view that existence is “superadded” (zāʾid) to quiddity is directed not so much against Avicenna himself, but against Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Avicennanism, while al-Suhrawardī, in a sense, goes back to (a possible interpretation of) Avicenna’s own position. Most intriguingly, while Ibn ʿArabī’s identification of God with “shared existence” collapses Avicenna’s sharp distinction between “existence with the stipulation of negation [of additions]” (God’s own existence) and “existence without the stipulation of affirmation [of additions]” (the shared existence), it is nonetheless grounded in, and only becomes intelligible against the backdrop of, Avicenna’s distinction.

Gad Freudenthal and Mauro Zonta’s “The reception of Avicenna in Jewish cultures, East and West” (chapter 11) is a compressed version of their article “Avicenna among medieval Jews,” published in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy in 2012. Both versions of their study – the detailed and the compressed – represent the first ever attempt to systematically chart Avicenna’s influence in Jewish circles both in the Middle East and in Europe. In their contribution, they discuss separately Avicenna’s influence “amongst Arabophone Jews” and

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2 This is amply documented in my own study, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Mystical Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation (London & New York: Routledge, 2012).
3 i.e., existence in which existing beings participate – the esse commune of the Latin scholastic theologians.
4 On this distinction cf. Stephen Menn’s contribution, p. 167.
“amongst Hebrew-writing Jews.” As is to be expected, Avicenna’s influence was also mediated through al-Ghazālī’s *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* and Hebrew translations of the latter. In the conclusion, Freudenthal and Zonta discuss the complex question of why Avicenna was so infrequently translated into Hebrew.

Unlike “Avicenna Judaicus,” “Avicenna Latinus” has, of course, been the subject of considerable research. Amos Bertolacci’s essay, “The reception of Avicenna in Latin medieval culture” (chapter 12), offers an extremely detailed and enlightening overview. Bertolacci shows that our knowledge of Avicenna’s influence upon Latin medieval culture is quite uneven, with some areas investigated much less carefully than others. He shows, for instance, that while the reception of Avicenna’s psychology (through the Latin translation of the psychological part of *The Cure*, the *Liber de Anima*) has been fairly well investigated, this is far from being the case with the reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics and the influence of the Latin translation of the metaphysical part of *The Cure*, the *Liber de Philosophia Prima*, especially in the crucial period before 1250.

It is unfortunate that one important aspect of Avicenna’s reception is completely neglected: the volume has no comparable study of Avicenna’s influence among Christians living within the Islamic world. It is completely silent on the significant Syriac reception of Avicenna – particularly on Bar-Hebraeus (d. 1286), whose major philosophical summa *The Cream of Wisdom* is modeled on Avicenna’s *The Cure* and who translated Avicenna’s *Pointers and Reminders* into Syriac.  

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6 The same omission is noticeable in the otherwise excellent recent volume specifically devoted to Avicenna’s reception: Dag Nikolaus Hasse and Amos Bertolacci (eds.), *The Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012).

Similarly, it does not explore Avicenna’s influence upon such Arabic-writing Christian authors as the Nestorian Ishoyab bar Malkon (d. 1246), the Copts Mu’taman ibn al-‘Assāl (d. between 1270 and 1286), al-Ṣafti ibn al-‘Assāl (d. between 1253 and 1275), and Ibn al-Rāhib (d. ca. 1290), the Syrian Catholic patriarch Ishāq ibn Jubayr (d. 1721), and the Maronite scholar Buṭrus al-Tūlāwī (d. 1745) – to name just the most important figures who cite Avicenna’s works. The subject of Avicenna’s influence among Syriac and Arabic-speaking Christians thus still awaits its researchers.

Another important dimension of Avicenna’s thought that the volume, unfortunately, fails to cover – presumably because it is not included in the traditional Aristotelian curriculum – is Avicenna’s soteriology and his views on the afterlife (maʿād), which form part of his “metaphysics on the rational soul.” Sporadic references to the afterlife are found, e.g., in Dimitri Gutas’ contribution (pp. 39 and 42), but for a fuller account the reader has to go elsewhere – Jean (Yahya) Michot’s La destinée de l’homme selon Avicenne or the relevant pages in Jon McGinnis’ monograph on Avicenna. It is striking that Michot’s

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9 CMR IV, 533-534. Al-Muṭ’taman was possibly also the author of the Copto-Arabic polemical treatise *al-Sayf al-murḥaf*, which also makes use of Avicenna – see CMR IV, 662-665.

10 CMR IV, 543.


book is not even referenced in the bibliography of the present volume.

Minor inaccuracies that need to be pointed out include mistakes in transliteration (e.g., ḥayāwāniyya instead of ḥayawāniyya on p. 104, mabdāʾ instead of mabdaʾ on p. 130, al-Isfarāʾīnī instead of al-Isfarāʾīnī on p. 198, and al-Adwiyya instead of al-Adwiya on p. 219) and in Hebrew vocalization (ḥā-bārīm instead of be-bārīm and derekh instead of derekh on p. 241), as well as some typos (Pourjavady and Schmidke instead of Pourjavady and Schmidtke on pp. 219-220; the latter mistake has even crept into the bibliography at the end of the volume, p. 291). Though al-Ghazālī’s Maqṣād al-falāsifa is based on Avicenna’s Persian work Dāneshnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī, it is somewhat misleading to describe it simply as an “Arabic translation” of the latter, without explanation or qualification (p. 69).

Despite these minor deficiencies, however, the volume is unquestionably a treasure trove of information and a truly indispensable contribution to Avicennian studies. The editor, Peter Adamson, deserves the highest praise for publishing an enlightening and comprehensive handbook on Avicenna that will remain a fundamental point of reference for generations to come.

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Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology, by Daniel Lav (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ix + 238 pp., ISBN: 978-1-107-00964-6, €60.00 / $95.00 (hb)

Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology by Daniel Lav is in one part a study of the debate in early Islam over the issue of *irjāʾ*, which came to be understood as the controversy over what constitutes belief and whether it is to be deferred to God or to humans. In another part, Radical Islam is a study of modern Salafism (its militant and non-militant manifestations).

Chapter One discusses the Murjiʿa movement in the first two centuries of Islam, separating it into two phases: the early and the classical. As Lav argues, the early phase of Murjiʿism features disharmony among the views of its adherents and what it represented aside from their agreement to defer judgment on the actions of caliphs ʿUthmān and ʿAlī to God. The classical phase, ushered by such figures as the jurist Abū Ḥanīfa and his circle, defined Murjiʿism as promoting that to be a Muslim one has to believe in God and profess the *shahāda*. Accordingly, for classical Murjiʿa acts are supplementary and do not determine whether or not one is a believer.

In Chapter Two, Lav provides a rather scant discussion of the Sunnī scholar Ibn Taymiyya and his views against the Murjiʿa that does not really contextualize Ibn Taymiyya’s interest in the *irjāʾ* debate. But more significantly, the author bypasses the period from the second century until the time of Ibn Taymiyya, and leaves the reader clueless regarding the further development and dissemination of Murjiʿism among Sunnī Muslims before and after the time of Ibn Taymiyya.

Chapter Three takes us straight to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a huge jump, and analyzes such prominent names as Rashīd Riḍā and Ḥasan al-Bannā and several leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. The chapter exhibits some strong aspects and some weak aspects. Lav confuses the reader by using the expression *salafī* to denote several of these figures without actually explaining that the term at that time was used by two movements that had nothing in common (he barely acknowledges the issue in the next chapter on page 86). There is the Salafism of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and the
Salafism of the Wahhābīs. Most of those who were called Salafīs in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century were partly inspired by the reforms of ʿAbduh, such as Riḍā and al-Bannā. In this respect, Lav’s argument that “al-Bannā himself did not see any connection between these two concepts” (p. 53), meaning definition of faith and acts, misses the mark. Al-Bannā did indeed see a direct relation between acts and the definition of faith, but he was not interested in hairsplitting argumentations that preoccupied previous theologians.

Another issue with Lav’s articulation of early modernist views on acts and belief is that every time he discusses a modernist who links the two, he directly evokes the name of Ibn Taymiyya as if the latter was the only scholar to have combined the two and anyone who came after must have been influenced by him. I do not intend to undermine the relevance of Ibn Taymiyya. But Ibn Taymiyya is only one contributor to the debate over irjāʾ, and the Sunnī tradition features countless important names who took either side of the issue, and did inspire the modern debate in one way or another.

Chapter Five is the masterpiece of the book. It features a very important examination and analysis of the debate over acts and belief within the Salafī movement. Lav argues that the encounter between the views of Quṭb and classical Wahhābism gave rise to two trends: jihādī Salafism and quietist Salafism. The former accepted the views of the militant Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Quṭb and incorporated them within the larger framework of Wahhābism (especially the notion of ḥākimiyā: namely that sovereignty and legislation belong to God not to humans); in this respect, all Muslims who do defer to human-made legislations are apostates. Quietist Salafism, on the other hand, rejected Quṭb. The main fault-line between the two camps is that quietist Salafīs insist that before calling someone a kāfir (disbeliever) there must be clear signs that the person willed disbelief in his/her heart. The jihādī Salafīs contended that any act or saying that evokes disbelief is enough proof that the person who commits it is an apostate irrespective of whether he or she meant it or understood it as such (this is in context of declaring other Muslims disbelievers, especially rulers).

Chapter Six is another excellent piece that examines the conflicts among the jihādī Salafīs especially in terms of deep disagreements over pragmatism, strategies, and inclusiveness vs. exclusiveness. His
focus on such issues presents the reader with a sophisticated understanding of the dynamics and relationships between the many militant groups that are often lumped in the media, out of ignorance, as all being of the same color and persuasion. In this respect, it is interesting to note his discussion of the groups within the jihādī Salafis who criticize al-Qā‘ida for achieving only its own destruction, or consider the Ṭālibān as outright unbelievers. Some of these jihādī Salafis emphasize doctrinal and theological conformity, whereas others focus more on a general and broad platform that allows for unity against the common external enemy.

In conclusion, *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology* is a very important book that has a serious flow. Its main contribution lies in the two chapters where Daniel Lav focuses on modern Salafis (quietists and jihādist) and masterfully unveils the complex dynamics between them and within each group. In this respect, *Radical Islam* is of tremendous importance to those who study the phenomenon of modern jihādī Salafis and its manifestation in the world of today, and Lav is to be commended for the efforts and research he put in these two long chapters.

But, in my opinion, the first half of the book should be ignored. Lav does not succeed in explaining why the modern debate over belief and unbelief is related to the debate in early Islam over the notion of *irjā‘*; and subsequently the entire discussion of *irjā‘* is too weak and pointless. The fact that modern pacifists and militants call each other *Khawārij* and *Murji‘a* has to do with a particular modern understanding of the derogatory symbolism of each term. They have very little to do with the historical groups that carry those names, and if we assume they do we are only confusing ourselves.

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Radicalism, radicalization, violence, and terrorism have increasingly drawn the attention of scholars since the events of 11 September 2001. These scholars belong to various disciplines including: theology, political science, sociology, psychology, history, and other fields that provide important insights on such issues. Yet, although these different areas of study disagree about the appropriate use of the term ‘radicalization,’ they often assign this phenomena to the non-state realm while blending it with concepts of ‘extremism’ and ‘violence’. Some of these studies not only mix together and overlap radicalization with violence, but go further and identify radicalization and extremism specifically with Islamic doctrines – as being responsible for violence in the Middle East and in European Muslim communities.

The current volume tries to challenge these assumptions by further investigations of the complex causes and motivation that guide radicalization, with special emphasis on the question of how conditions for radicalization are created. It contains twelve essays, based on the proceedings of a conference held in Cambridge in 2009, covering a wide array of topics on Islamic radicalism in Europe and the Middle East. These essays are thematic and range from theoretical constructs of radicalism and radicalization, as presented in the introduction and first chapters, to empirical Middle-Eastern country studies, including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and the Gulf region. Some of these essays refer to the ‘Arab Spring’ events that transformed the politics of the Arab world in 2011. Through these essays, this volume aims at providing further insights, as the volume editor puts it: “… into the phenomenon of radicalization in the post 11 September 2001 era and of perceptions of radicalization that have emerged since then” (p. 12).

To this end, this volume suggests further investigation of radicalism from other critical angles – that of the state and its interaction with society – a point largely ignored in prior studies. One prevailing hypothesis in this volume is that radicalization is a process consisting
of a complex interrelationship between governments and their political opponents. In so far as these governments suppress and exclude their opposition from the national political game and declare discontent voices as being illegitimate, governments become central players in the creation of radicalization. This is manifested, inter alia, when non-governmental groups seek other, clandestine pathways for the expression of their political tendencies, sometimes in a radical way.

Another important observation in the current volume is the clear conceptual distinction between ‘radicalization’, ‘extremism’, and ‘violence’. A key difference between ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’, according to the authors, lies in the degree of social interaction. That is, ‘radicalism’ is conducted through social movements driven by peaceful mass mobilization, while ‘extremism’ stems from the failure to accommodate demands made by the masses, leading to violence perpetrated by much smaller groups (based on the ‘moral’ support of the masses). These observations are clarified in the various essays dedicated to the country case studies mentioned above. The authors shed important light on processes of radicalization, while concluding that some of the radical Islamic movements are neither extremist nor violent. Moreover, radicalization is not necessarily based on religion; it can also occur due to ethnic grievances, as shown in the study of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. This author, among others, stresses the critical role of the state in the radicalization process.

The major problem throughout this volume is related to the placement of the ‘Arab Spring’ in the context of the discussion. Indeed, the editor noted in the introduction that this issue is not covered in detail due to certain considerations, but mainly because of the volume’s major purpose – to examine the motives and causes, rather than the outcomes produced. Yet, one critical question this volume asks is how these motives affect the series of events in the various Arab countries. Another weakness of this volume is the unbalanced discussion on Islamic radicalization in Europe and the Middle East. While this volume promises to provide insights in both these arenas, much more attention is paid to the latter at the expense of the former. This hampers a deep understanding of the subject by means of comparative perspectives.

Despite the aforementioned weaknesses, this book adds significant new details on the complex relationships between radicalism, radicalization, violence, and terrorism. It strengthens our definition of
‘radicalization’ and our understanding of how it relates to ‘extremism’ and ‘violence’, while providing more information on the non-religious motivation of radicalization, that had previously gotten much less attention from scholars. It can be appreciated by students of Islam, Middle-East scholars and even by the general public.

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Text and references must follow the format outlined in The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition.

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