KUMŪN, ISTIḤĀLA, AND KHAIQ
Three Concepts in Ibn Ḥazm’s Cosmology

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Abstract

The Kalām’s cosmology essentially depends on the theory of atomism which suggests that everything in the world is composed of atoms and accidents inherent in atoms, all created by God. Atomism is, however, not the only theory of nature in kalām to support creationism. An alternative theory to it is the theory of latency, kumūn, which is formulated in the two different versions, the comprehensive and the limited one, and is mostly attributed to Muʿtazilī theologian al-Naẓẓām. Nevertheless this theory is not accepted by all opponents of atomism like Ibn Ḥazm. The present article attempts to examine Ibn Ḥazm’s views on the theory of latency in particular, and on the creation in general with a comparison to al-Naẓẓām’s ideas, and also to seek Ibn Ḥazm’s cosmology in the three key concepts: latency (kumūn), transformation (istiḥāla), and creation (khailq). The article points out that although Ibn Ḥazm gives some examples in accordance with the theory of latency, it does not mean that he approves the theory attributed to al-Naẓẓām as a whole with its theoretical background.

Key Words: Ibn Ḥazm, al-Naẓẓām, theory of latency (kumūn), transformation (istiḥāla), creation (khailq)

The kalām’s cosmology essentially depends on the theory of atomism, which suggests that the world is composed of indivisible parts,
jawāḥir, and accidents inherent in atoms, aʿrāḍ. Maintaining this theory, Muslim theologians attempted both to prove the existence of God and to explain the creation of the universe. In this respect, atomism is also a kind of creation theory.\(^1\) Surely, the great majority of Muslim thinkers, especially theologians, hold that creation came from nothing. This means that the universe was brought into being by God’s command, “Be!” Yet, the question of how this act of creation took place remains. The Muslim theologians aimed to provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon via atomism. As they understand it, God brought things into being, creating the atoms and accidents, and afterwards, putting them together. Theologians observed such phenomena as the continuous occurrence of new things in the universe and constant changes in the appearance of beings, and the fact that these beings can be perceived only through the sensually observable (i.e., through accidents). Such observations led theologians to believe that accidents are continuously recreated. This fact indicates one of the main characteristics of creation theory based on atomism: \textit{continuity}. In this respect, we can say that the kalām’s creation theory based on atomism has two main propositions: creation comes from nothing, and it is continuous.

Nevertheless, atomism is not the only theory of nature in support of creationism. Some theologians reject atomism, although they are not many in number. Among them, the most prominent is the Mu‘tazili theologian al-Nazzām (d. 220-230/835-844?). Similar to other theologians, he believes in creation *ex nihilo*, but he explains it through the theory of latency (*kumūn*) instead of through atomism. In other words, while the atomist theologians establish the existence of God and the createdness of the world on the basis of atomism, al-Nazzām explains them through the theory of latency. Thus, the theory of latency may be seen as an alternative explanation to atomism.²

It should be noted, however, that even if this theory was set forth as an alternative to atomism, it is far from accepted by all who have rejected atomism. For example, the critical thinker Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) is known to be a strong opponent of atomism, and he rejects it because of its incompatibility with the natural phenomena (outward appearance of things, *ẓābir*) and with religious teachings (the literal/apparent meaning, *ẓābir*, of religious texts).³ His criticism implicates alternative explanation models because his denial of atomism does not advocate another theory; that is to say, he does not intend to propose another theory to replace atomism. This article attempts to examine Ibn Ḥazm’s views of the most important theory, i.e., the theory of latency, in contrast to atomism, and it presents his thoughts on creation. Therefore, it would be appropriate to provide a general outline of the theory of latency.

As mentioned above, the theory of latency identified with al-Nazzām could be defined as “the potential existence of some body or quality in another body” and points to the creation of beings all at one time and as a whole.⁴ Thus, the views ascribed to al-Nazzām by

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² In Islamic thought, a third conception of the world is the concept of “matter and form (*bayālah* and *şūra*)” which is especially accepted by the peripatetic philosophers in the Islamic philosophical tradition. This concept inherited from Aristotle excludes creation *ex-nihilo* as it asserts that the eternal matter is the substratum of all that exist. Consequently, it was severely repudiated by theologians.


‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037-38), who provides one of the earliest comprehensive accounts of the theory, are in accordance with the definition of that concept.

The fourteenth of his [al-Nażzām’s] infamies is his claim that God created men, beasts and other animals, all sorts of plants and minerals at one time. [Therefore] the creation of Adam did not precede that of his children, as well as the creation of mothers did not precede that of their children. He asserted that God created them all at one time; however, most of beings were in the others [i.e., some of the beings were hidden in the others], so that priority and posteriority are in appearance (ṣūbūr) of those things from their places.⁵

The information given by al-Shahrastānī largely conforms to al-Baghdādī’s account:

The eighth [of al-Nażzām’s views] is that God created all creatures (mawjūdāt), either minerals, plants and animals, or men, as they are now and at one time (daf‘at” wāḥidat”). [Therefore] the creation of Adam was not before that of his descendants. Nevertheless, God has hidden some of them in others (akmāna), so that priority and posteriority are in appearance (ṣūbūr) of those things from their places, not in their creation (ḥudūth) and coming into existence (wujūd).⁶

These nearly duplicate passages present the main points of the theory: beings were created as they are now, at one time and as a whole. These created beings are hidden in each other, and those hidden things come into view when the time is ripe. It should be noted here that extending the theory to include all beings, these accounts point to a comprehensive theory of latency.

It is questionable, however, whether the theory could be ascribed to al-Nażzām in its above-mentioned form. One of the earliest sources, al-Intiṣār of al-Khayyāṭ, uses nearly the same expressions

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with al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī on the theory. However, al-Khayyāt states that this account was based on information given by Ibn al-Rāwandī and that what has been ascribed to al-Naẓẓām is malicious slander. According to him, what al-Naẓẓām suggested was that “God created the world as a whole.” In this respect, al-Khayyāt does not agree with al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī in attributing a comprehensive theory of latency to al-Naẓẓām. The only common point in all of these accounts is that “the world was created as a whole.” In fact, the creation of the world as a whole implies that it was created at one time, as well.

However, al-Ashʿarī’s account is largely consistent with that of al-Khayyāt. Without providing a detailed description of latency, he reports that al-Naẓẓām said, “oil is hidden in an olive and ointment in a sesame and fire in a stone” and “God created beings at one time.”

The information derived from the earliest sources, al-Khayyāt and al-Ashʿarī, makes it questionable whether al-Naẓẓām held a comprehensive theory of latency as recorded in later sources, such as al-

7 “Then [Ibn al-Rāwandī] said that [al-Naẓẓām] claimed that God created men, beasts and other animals, non-animal substances (jamād) and plants all at one time (fi waqt wāḥid). [Therefore] the creation of Adam did not precede that of his children, as well as the creation of mothers did not precede that of their children. God, however, has hidden (akmana) certain things in others so that priority and posteriority are in appearance (ẓubūr) of those things from their places, not in their creation and production (kbalq wa-ikbitirā).” See Abū l-Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm ibn Muḥammad al-Khayyāt, Kitāb al-intiṣār wa-l-radd ‘alā Ibn al-Rāwandī al-mulḥid (ed. Albert Naṣrī Nādir; Beirut: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kāthūlikiyya, 1957), 44.

8 Ibid. See also Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, 498-499. The author uses the account of al-Khayyāt but without considering the distinction made by al-Khayyāt between al-Naẓẓām’s own words and that of Ibn al-Rāwandī. He ascribes all of the statements in the account to al-Naẓẓām through al-Khayyāt.

9 See also Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Hādī Abū Rida, Min shuyukh al-Muʿtaẓila Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyār al-Naẓẓām wa-ārāʾuh l-kalāmiyya al-falsafiyya (2nd ed., Cairo: Dār al-Nadīm, 1989), 141. He says that the only point that the sources agreed upon is the creation of all beings as a whole and at one time.


11 Ibid., II, 404. He adds here, however, that al-Naẓẓām said that “beings are created at every single time (anna l-jism fi kull waqt yawblaq).”
Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī. Furthermore, al-Khayyāṭ’s describing the comprehensive theory of latency as slanderous of Ibn al-Rāwandi raises doubts about the attribution of the theory to al-Naẓẓām. Although the aim of this article is not to discuss the extent to which al-Naẓẓām accepted the theory of latency, we should note here that there are not clear texts that justify the attribution of the comprehensive theory of latency to al-Naẓẓām. However, he was certainly known in Muslim circles as a harsh proponent of the theory as a whole.

Although the theory of latency was identified with the name of al-Naẓẓām, it was adopted in to varying degrees by different thinkers. According to al-Ashʿarī’s account, Ṭirār ibn ʿAmr said: “Of things some are hidden and some are not hidden. As for those which are hidden, they are oil in an olive, and ointment in a sesame and juice in a grape.” Al-Ashʿarī also reports that Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam and Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir said: “Oil is hidden (kāmin) in an olive and ointment in a sesame and fire in a stone.” He further adds, “most of people of speculation (abl al-naẓar) said that fire is hidden in a stone.” These remarks of al-Ashʿarī show that the theory was accepted to different degrees by thinkers such as Ṭirār ibn ʿAmr, who is a strict opponent

12 Abū Rida notes that in al-Jāḥiẓ’s most comprehensive account about the theory of latency, there is no quotation from al-Naẓẓām as he says “the man is hidden in a drop of sperm and the palm in a date-stone.” See Abū Rida, Min sbuyūkh al-Muʿtazila, 149.

13 This is probably because al-Naẓẓām holds the idea of creation of the world at one time and as a whole. This view on which almost all sources agreed means, even implicitly, all beings (including the specific examples mentioned by al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī) were created all together. It caused the theory (with its all dimensions) to be identified with the name of al-Naẓẓām in the later period. Consequently, the commonly known examples of the comprehensive theory of latency were attributed to the most prominent proponent of the theory, i.e., al-Naẓẓām, even if he did not accept them or did not express them directly.

14 Al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt, II, 328.

15 Ibid., II, 329.

16 Ibid., II, 328. Al-Ashʿarī mentions the Muʿtazilī theologian Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854) by name.
of the theory, and Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, who proposed a different conception of world. It is evident from the above that two different theories of latency were formulated and recognized in intellectual circles in the beginning. One of theories is the comprehensive theory of latency, which affirms the latency of all creatures and was attributed to al-Nazzām. The other is the limited theory of latency that was held by nearly all prominent thinkers of early kalām. Whereas the first theory suggests the creation of all beings at one time, the other says that some beings are composed of elements contradictory to each other. Despite this contradiction, those elements would exist in a single body.

When we analyze the examples given for the limited theory of latency, we can see that all are marked by two outstanding characteristics: first, they emerge from other things through some human act. For example, a person squeezes juice out of a grape or oil out of an olive and strikes a hard object on a stone to create a fire. Second, their presence in the substances out of which they emerge is felt even before they emerge by a human act. Thus, the presence of the juice in the grape and the oil in the olive may be felt even before it emerges. Similarly, the presence of the fire in the stone may be felt as the stone gradually warms up while being struck by iron. These examples are based on simple observations and, consequently, are almost obliga-

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17 Especially in al-Jāḥiẓ’s Kitāb al-ḥayawān, Dirār ibn ‘Amr is illustrated as a representative of aṣḥāb al-ʿarād and as the leading opponent of the theory of latency; see Abū ʿUthmān ‘Amr ibn Bahr al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-ḥayawān (ed. ‘Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn; Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1988), V, 10.
18 The distinction was made by Wolfson and seems quite accurate. See Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, 501.
20 See Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, 501. These remarks can be observed to be true in general. Especially regarding the second characteristic mentioned above, however, there is an uncertainty about the presence of oil in the olive and that of fire in a piece of wood. According to the opponents of latency, the presence of fire in a piece of wood, etc., is quite controversial. Being aware of this, Wolfson notes that the presence of fire is felt by the gradual warming of the piece of wood or stone.
tory to be approved on this empirical basis. In this regard, they should be accepted.21

This point relating to the theory of latency in kalām was echoed in Ibn Ḥazm’s approach. First of all, we should say that Ibn Ḥazm appears to accept some of the implications of the theory. Thus, he targets the implacable opponents of the theory, the Ashʿarīs, especially al-Bāqīlānī, and harshly criticizes their view that there is no heat in fire, no cold in snow, no oil in an olive, no juice in a grape and no blood in a man.22 According to Ibn Ḥazm, among the observable things around us, some are hidden, such as blood in a man, juice in a grape and oil in an olive. The evidence for this is that when the hidden things emerge from the visible objects, the residuals crumple, become smaller and lose weight because of the emergence of what was hidden. Seemingly, Ibn Ḥazm accepts the examples proposed as part of the theory of latency. What led him to accept these examples, however, is that they are obviously perceived and indubitably verified by the senses. Thus, it can be seen that when we squeeze the grape, the juices emerge, and the resulting residue is different from the grape. It would be absurd to deny this obvious fact. Ibn Ḥazm

21 cf. Josef van Ess, “Kumūn,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, V, 384. Van Ess refers here to the starting point of the theory as he says “the concept was derived from simple observations.”

22 Ibn Ḥazm’s criticism seems to be accurate because some of al-Bāqīlānī’s views could be construed in this way. These views, however, were presented in regard to the issue of ṭab (natures of things) rather than being related to latency. What al-Bāqīlānī tried to prove is that to satiate, to quench thirst, to inebriate, to heat, to chill, etc., are not the intrinsic characteristics of beings. According to him, if these were intrinsic characteristics of things due to their natures, satiation, quenched thirst and drunkenness would also occur when other substances were eaten or drunk. Likewise, there would be heat and cold when something came close to anything else because all things are similar to each other. Therefore, if an object necessarily causes an effect, a similar object should cause a similar effect. Thus, when someone eats pebbles or soil, for example, he should be satiated. Likewise, when he drinks vinegar, his thirst should be quenched because these substances are of the same kind as things that are eaten or drunk; see Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqīlānī, Kitāb al-tambid (ed. Richard J. McCarthy; Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Sharqiyya, 1957), 40. Consequently, to assert that burning and inebriety result from the heat of a fire or the strength of wine is absolute ignorance; the truth is that these are acts of God (Ibid., 43).
regards such a denial as madness and as opposition to reason and sense data. He consequently accepts the examples of latency that can be verified by the senses.

However, he considers such latency as compatible with the Qurʾān and refers to some Qurʾānic verses as evidence. One of the verses states that “We said, ‘O Fire! Be thou cool and (a means of) safety for Abraham!’” If the fire was not blazing with heat, Ibn Ḥazm suggests, God would not give such an order. Another verse says, “and from the fruit of the date-palm and the vine, ye get out wholesome drink and food.” According to Ibn Ḥazm, this verse denotes that juice is found in those fruits. Consequently, he accepts the theory of latency, to some extent, because of its consistency with the two main bases of his thought, i.e., the sense data and the apparent or literal (ẓāhir) meaning of expressions in the Qurʾān.

Nevertheless, Ibn Ḥazm does not go beyond these examples in terms of latency. Neither does he accept the controversial example of fire in a stone or iron. For him, there is such power in the flint or steel that when compressed, the air within them emerges and is trans-
formed into fire. Likewise, the moisture in all burnable materials is transformed first into fire, then into smoke and eventually into air. There is in the nature of fire, he says, the ability to draw out the flammable constituents of things and to evaporate the moisture contained therein, such that all flammable constituents and the moisture vanish, and there remains only noncombustible and nonflammable ash. In this ash, there is neither fire nor moisture to evaporate. Ibn Ḥazm supports this assertion with the example of lamp oil. Lamp oil is quintessentially flammable. Once it is ignited by fire, however, the few liquid elements in it are transformed into smoke, then the burnable constituents emerge and, ultimately, the oil’s flammability is extinguished.\\(^{26}\)

Because he does not accept this example of latency accepted even by scholars who oppose the theory (e.g., Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, Muʿammad ibn ʿAbbād, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir, and in fact, “most of people of speculation, abl al-nazar” in al-Ashʿarī’s words), it is unreasonable to expect that Ibn Ḥazm would approve of the more extreme cases of latency. He does not accept radical examples which are given to support the theory and do not limit it to the cases that are not easily perceived by the senses, but extend to every being in the world, such as the existence of a stately palm within a small date-stone and a man perfectly shaped within a paltry drop of sperm. According to Ibn Ḥazm, such ideas are in irrational opposition to sense data. Undoubtedly, a palm emerges from a date-stone and a man from a drop of sperm, but it is because God created date-stones and sperm to have this nature. God created in the date-stone the power to absorb the moisture contained in water, dung and soil. The date-stone that absorbs moisture is transformed (tuḥīl) into the sapling, leaf, blossom and fruit. Likewise, the created nature of the blood in a drop of seed (nufṣa) is transformed into flesh, blood, bones, nerves, veins, cartilage, skin, nails and hair. All of these occur by the creation of God.\\(^{27}\) That is to say, a palm proceeds from the date-stone and a man from sperm, yet this does not mean that the palm and man were already hidden in them. It simply indi-

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27 Faṣl, V, 62. See also Ibn Ḥazm, al-Uṣūl wa-l-furūʿ, II, 311. Here, he gives only the example of the date-stone and palm.
cates that God has created date-stones and sperm to be capable of transforming into a palm and a man. He constantly intervenes in this process of transformation with a new act of creation.

Based on the above, we can categorize the examples of latency into three groups: the first group consists of simple and limited examples, such as the presence of oil in an olive and juice in a grape. This kind of latency based on simple sensory observations is accepted by nearly all theologians. According to Ibn Ḥazm’s account, only the Ashʿarīs (he mentions al-Bāqillānī by name) do not approve of it. The second group includes comprehensive examples, such as a man hiding within a drop of sperm and a palm in a date-stone. This theory, which is strongly opposed by Ibn Ḥazm, is only attributed to al-Naẓṣām. It is likely not held by any Muslim theologian except for his followers, such as al-Jāḥīz. The third group of examples finds its place between the other two examples and includes the hiding of fire in firewood, stone or iron. This is the most controversial group of examples among the theologians. According to al-Ashʿarī, most of the early theologians, especially the Muʿtazilīs, accepted this type of latency. Regarding the information provided by Abū Rashīd al-Nisābūrī and Ibn Mattawayh, the Muʿtazila of Baṣra later approved of this version of the theory while the Muʿtazila of Baghdaḍ, which was led by Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, did not accept it.\(^\text{28}\) This controversy is because of the intermediary position of this type of latency between the other two types with regard to sensual verification. This type of latency can neither be directly experienced through the senses (as the first type can) nor is almost entirely deprived of the support of sensory perception (as the second type is). Thus, those who say that fire is not hidden in firewood insist that, if the fire were hidden in firewood, it would be felt when someone touched the firewood or would be seen

when the firewood were smashed. This example explains why some theologians do not accept that fire may be hidden in firewood, whereas they approve of the presence of oil in an olive. The presence of oil in an olive is clearly visible because when we squeeze an olive, oil emerges out of it. When we touch firewood or stone, however, we can not feel the fire at that moment.

As can be seen, Ibn Ḥazm accepts only the first version of the theory of latency that had already been accepted by most of the theologians, i.e., the simple cases that could be verified by the senses. There is no fire, in his opinion, in a stone or iron, and no palm in a date-stone. The fire or palm, he says, comes into existence as a consequence of a transformation that occurs in the matter (stone, iron or date-stone, for example) under specific circumstances. This assertion introduces a new concept: istihāla (transformation), which refers to a slow and gradual change in essence or qualities of an object.

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29 See, for example, Abū Rashīd, Masāʾil, 57; Ibn Mattawayh, Tadbkira, 146-147. Thus, van Ess says, this is one of three main arguments that was brought forth against the theory. See van Ess, “Kumūn,” 385.

30 It should be remembered here that we have some reservations about Wolfson’s view on the issue. As mentioned above, he regards the presence of oil in an olive and fire in a stone as similar and puts these two kinds of latency under the same category.

31 Occasionally, the term inqilāb (change, alteration) is used instead of istihāla. See, for example, al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-bayawān, V, 16; Taqī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn Ṭaymiyya, Majmuʿ fatāwâ Sheikh al-ʾīslâm ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Ibn Taymiyya (ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-ʿĀṣimī al-Najdī; Riyāḍ: Maṭābiʿ al-Riyāḍ, 1381 H.), XVII, 264.

32 See Abū l-Ḥasan Sayf al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Āmidī, al-Mubīn fi ṣbarḥ maʿānī al-fāżl al-ḥukmāʾ wa-l-mutakallimin (ed. Ḥasan Maḥmūd al-Shāfīʿi; Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1993), 100; “… wa-ammā l-istiḥāla fa-ʿibāratuʾn ‘an istibdāl al-sayyīb fi ḏbāṭīb aw šifarin min šīʿatīb lā dafʿatun ṭawāhidatun bal yasīrān yasīr’ain.” As seen from the definition, the main emphasis is on the slowness of transformation. Al-Tahānawī’s definition supports this point: “[The transformation (istiḥāla)] is a gradual transition (intiqād) from one situation to another.” See Muḥammad Aʿlā ibn ‘Alī al-Tahānawī, Kasbsbāf isṭilāḥāt al-funūn (eds. Mawlawī Muḥammad Wajīh et al.; Calcutta: The Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1862), I, 322. Al-Tabrizī gives a simpler definition: “The alteration (tagbayyur) occurred in terms of quality.” See Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr al-Ṭabrizī, al-Muqaddimāt al-khams wa-l-ʾisbrūn min Dilālat al-ḥāʾirin (ed. Muḥammad Zā-
As understood from the sources, *istiḥāla* is a term used by those who do not accept the comprehensive theory of latency to explain the transformation of bodies. The most debated example of this term is the presence of fire in a stone or in firewood. Those who rejected the idea that fire is hidden in these objects instead believed that fire’s presence is associated with air. Quoting from the words of al-Naẓẓām, al-Ḥāḍirī summarizes the theory of such men, called *aṣḥāb al-aʿrād*, as follows:

... The fire is not hidden in the firewood. How can it be, while the fire is larger than the firewood? But when one piece of wood is rubbed with another the both get considerably heated. Then, the particles of the air surrounding the pieces of wood and, in turn, the air that touches the former gets warm. When completely became heated, this air thins down and consequently flames up. Therefore the fire is transformed air (*bawāṣʿ istaḥāla*). Because of its quintessence, the air is a matter which is hot, fine, weak, capable to quickly accommodate with anything (*jayyid al-qabūl*), and easy to transform. The fire that seems larger than the wood is just the air which was transformed (*al-bawāṣʿ al-mustaḥīl*).
The opponents of latency assign the key role to the air because it is an irrefutable fact that when the wood burns, fire emerges. Given that the fire was not hidden in the wood, it must have come from the outside.\textsuperscript{37} Because the fire could not be seen before, however, it is necessary to ascribe its existence to something that was already there. This “something” is the air. It becomes heated as a result of certain circumstances (such as rubbing, etc.) and eventually is transformed into fire.

Ibn Taymiyya, who accepts the concept of \textit{istiḥāla}, has a similar approach. According to him, when two objects are joined, there exists another object between them, and the transformation occurs. In this context, the fire emerges from two things joined together (e.g., two pieces of wood, a piece of stone and iron, or two pieces of flint) as a result of the transformation of the matter (the air) between them. When we strike a stone with iron or rub one piece of wood with another (in the text, the trees of \textit{markh} and \textit{ʿafār}\textsuperscript{38}), they lose some of their component particles due to the pressure from striking or rub-

\textsuperscript{36} See al-Jāḥiẓ, \textit{Kitāb al-bayawān}, V, 15.

\textsuperscript{37} The proponents of \textit{kumūn} do not accept this. According to them, there is no fire that came from the outside and acted in wood, stone, etc.; see al-Jāḥiẓ, \textit{Kitāb al-bayawān}, V, 20.

\textsuperscript{38} The trees of \textit{markh} and \textit{ʿafār} are quite common examples used in debates on whether fire was hidden in the wood. See, for example, al-Jāḥiẓ, \textit{Kitāb al-bayawān}, V, 82. It is based on the verse Q 36:80: “The same Who produces for you out of the green tree, when behold, ye kindle therewith (your own fires)!” The commentators say that the expression “green tree (\textit{al-shajar al-akhḍar})” refers to the trees of \textit{markh} and \textit{ʿafār}. See, for example, Abū l-Qāsim Jār Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Zamakhshāri, \textit{al-Kashšāf ʿan ṣaḥābāʾi ḥawāmīd al-tanzīl wa-ʿīyān al-aqāwil fī wujūb al-taʾwil} (ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām Shāhīn; Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1995), IV, 30; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Qurtubi, \textit{al-Jāmiʿ li-ʾaḥkām al-Qurʾān} (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1967), XV, 59-60. Consequently, this verse that specifies that fire emerges from wood (together with the above-mentioned trees) is always inserted into the discussion.
bing. Then, some of these lost particles are transformed, the air between the two becomes warm and, consequently, fire emerges.\textsuperscript{39}

As mentioned above, Ibn Ḥazm utilizes the concept of istihāla to explain the examples given in the latter two categories of latency. He approves, in principle, of the presence of transformation in the world. According to him, most things in the world are transformed into each other.\textsuperscript{40} The examples in his Fāṣl, however, that he provides to prove the occurrence of transformation are quite curious. Indeed, the discussion here seems to occur in a legal context rather than a theological one. His main opponents are not theologians or philosophers who accept comprehensive latency but rather the Ḥanafis. He targets their claims that a small amount of urine or wine in the water is not transformed into water and that these are absolutely present in the water, although their amounts are too small to be perceived by the senses.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39} See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ fatāwā, XVII, 264. We should note here, however, that Ibn Taymiyya refers to a lost material. According to him, the existence of hot air itself is not enough for fire to emerge. To transform the air into fire, there must be a trigger, such as rubbing or striking. The matter that emerged as a result of rubbing (or, in other words, the decreasing material in the rubbed matter because of rubbing) heats up the air and eventually transforms it into fire. Of course, rubbing is not sufficient to cause a fire in and of itself. Both the emerging matter and the air surrounding the bodies that are rubbed together cause the fire to come into existence. See ibid., XVII, 261.

\textsuperscript{40} Fāṣl, V, 64; "... kullu ṣbāḥu fi l-ʿālam fa-aktbarūb yastaṭīṭu baʿḍubū ilā baʿḍum".

\textsuperscript{41} Ḥanafi jurists expressed their opinions about the pureness of water in their juridical books, especially in the chapters on purification (ṭabāra). They differentiated between the two kinds of things mixed in water, i.e. between the one that impairs the purity of water and denatures it and the other that does not remove its features. This is another issue for discussion; however, we can infer from these statements that they regard that anything mixed in water remains there without being transformed into it. See, for example, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Maḥmūd ibn Mawdūd al-Mawṣili, al-Ikhtiyār li-taʾlīl al-Mukbtār (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1984), I, 13-16; Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAli ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghinānī, al-Hidāya sbarbī Bidāyat al-mubtadāʾ (İstanbul: Kahraman Yayınları, 1986), I, 17-21. Therefore, the views attributed to the Ḥanafi jurists by Ibn Ḥazm correspond to what they said. However, Ibn Ḥazm tries to show that these scholars consider such water to be impure in an absolute manner; however, it is not true. According to the Ḥanafis, a drop of wine that fell into one liter of water remains there without being trans-
Ibn Ḥazm responds to this claim by pointing to our naming of objects: the objects around us are different due to the dissimilarity of their natures and qualities. Furthermore, their names and definitions differ from one another based on dissimilarity in their natures and qualities. For example, water has a nature and certain characteristics, and whatever possesses this nature and characteristic, we call “water.” If an object does not have the nature and characteristic that makes it “water,” it would not be “water,” and consequently, we would not call it “water.” Therefore, it is not possible for the water to be present in wine or honey as it is – by preserving its own definition, nature, and characteristics.\footnote{Faşl, V, 64.}

In this way, Ibn Ḥazm makes a simple inference against the Ḥanafis who insist upon the impossibility of transformation. An object is identical to what we call it; if we call it “water,” it is water. Thus, calling it water means that we confirm the absence of wine within it. If we thought that wine was present therein, then we would not call it “water.” That we call it “water” indicates that we accept that water has transformed wine into water and that it is no longer present in the water. It also indicates our approval of this transformation. If the amount of wine poured into the water were greater than the amount of water, then the wine would transform the water into wine. Wine is defined by its nature and characteristics, and if this definition corresponds entirely with an object, that object will also be defined as wine.

According to Ibn Ḥazm, the transformation of natural beings occurs in favor of the dominant objects. Therefore, he puts forth the general principle that when two things meet, the dominant one compels the other object to transform. For example, air transforms water into air (i.e., through evaporation). However, when the air transformed from the water becomes a large amount, the transformation process is reversed, and the air is transformed into water (rain). All of these examples can be understood through the senses and reason formed and makes it impure; in contrast, a drop of wine which fell into sea remains there without transforming into water as well, but it does not contaminate it.
We should notice, however, that Ibn Ḥazm does not reason here in a theological way; perhaps, he could not perceive the concept of transformation discussed in the natural philosophy of kalām. He rather addresses the concept within a legal framework. As seen in the examples of latency provided above, one object is completely transformed into another, as in the transformation of air into fire. Before the air has been transformed into fire, there was no fire but only air. Air is transformed into fire under certain circumstances, fire emerges, and the air completely disappears. In the examples of Ibn Ḥazm, two different elements exist together, and the dominant one causes the other to transform. Due to its greater quantity, water transforms the drop of wine. The examples Ibn Ḥazm provides to prove the occurrence of transformation do not conform to the commonly offered examples of latency. Despite this, however, he clearly accepts the occurrence of transformation in nature and uses it to explain what proponents of latency explain through their theory.

There is no doubt that his approval of some examples of latency (such as the presence of oil in an olive) and the rejection of others (such as the hiding of palm in a date-stone) is based on him considering observable facts. We clearly see the presence of oil in an olive; moreover, we squeeze it to remove its oil. These are irrefutable facts.

43 Ibid.
44 The other examples given by Ibn Ḥazm against the Ḥanafīs proceed in the same way. For example, the chicken eats carrion and blood, and the ram drinks wine. However, all of these (i.e., carrion, blood, wine, etc.) lost their natures and were transformed into chicken and mutton. Therefore, the Ḥanafīs accept the chicken and mutton as ḥalāl. This acceptance means that the nature of the chicken or ram transforms what they eat or drink. If chicken and rams excessively ate or drank these things, their nature would become insufficient to transform them, and these impure things would become dominant in their natures. Thus, eating them would be ḥaram. Likewise, the legume and fruits absorb impure materials from the soil, but they transform them and become ḥalāl. See ibid.

It should be noted here that such examples of transformation (istiḥāla) have not been used only by Ibn Ḥazm. Al-Khwārazmī, for example, considers the transformation of what a ram eats into mutton as an example of istiḥāla; see al-Khwārazmī, Mafātiḥ al-ʿulūm, 161.
However, the hidden presence of palm in a date-stone cannot be verified by the senses. The most we can say is that the date-stone will be transformed into a palm. Consequently, Ibn Ḥazm’s approval of some examples of latency relates more to the fact that these examples conform to data derived from observable facts rather than his acceptance the theory of latency. That he included in his system the concept of transformation, which is consistently avoided by the proponents of latency, shows that he remained distant from this theory.

Ibn Ḥazm fiercely opposes the most important premise of the theory, i.e., that two different bodies could be present in the same place at the same time (*mudākhala*).\(^4\) Every object maintains a space as large as itself. If another object is added to it, a space as large as the added object would need to exist. Therefore, it is not possible to say that two different bodies could be in the same place at the same time, unless there is a new space with the same width as the added body. Just as a single body could not be in two different places at the same time, two different bodies could not be present in the same place at the same time.\(^5\) In this way, Ibn Ḥazm rejects one of the main propositions that justifies the theory of latency.

Accordingly, Ibn Ḥazm’s acceptance of the examples of latency does not refer to the approval of such a conception of the world. Although Ibn Ḥazm and other theologians accepted these examples, they did not base a theory of the universe upon them. They accepted them because they are easily observable.

We can now proceed to examine the views of Ibn Ḥazm regarding creation and compare them with those of al-Nazzām. We mentioned above that ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī said that al-Nazzām asserted

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\(^4\) That is one of the main criticisms against the theory from both Sunnī and Mu‘tazili theologians. According to these theologians, in addition to the theory of latency’s other fallacies, it is faulty because it requires the presence of two different bodies to be in the same place at the same time.

\(^5\) *Faṣl*, V, 61. Ibn Ḥazm states that two bodies could not exist together by way of *mudākhala* but only by way of *mujāwara* (to be in two places side by side). According to him, *mudākhala* can occur between an accident and a body or between an accident and another because the accidents do not occupy space. Accordingly, the accidents, such as the color, taste, heat, cold or rest, could occur within bodies or penetrate each others. See *Faṣl*, V, 61, 86.
the creation of beings occurred at one time (\(\textit{fī waq\'īn wāḥid}\))

These statements indicate that he considered creation to be an act that occurred at one time and all at once. This belief conforms to the theory of latency.

We also mentioned, however, that in parallel with the accounts of al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī, al-Ashʿarī says that al-Naẓẓām accepted the creation of things both at one time and at all times. Thus, al-Ashʿarī’s account contains, at first glance, two paradoxical statements: the creation of beings at one time and the continuity of creation at all times. In al-Khayyāṭ, we can find a similar account that emphasizes the continuity of creation. He states that al-Naẓẓām said that the world was created as a whole. He then quotes Ibn al-Rāwandi as saying, “al-Naẓẓām believes that God creates the world and everything in it at every time and at every point without annihilating them and constantly renews the creation.” Al-Khayyāṭ does not accept, however, this report as true. He records that this opinion was ascribed to al-Naẓẓām by al-Jāḥiẓ and that no one else made such an assertion except him; moreover, followers of al-Naẓẓām insisted that he did not hold such a view.

If al-Khayyāṭ’s denial of this assertion is true, al-Naẓẓām does not, in fact, make contradictory statements.

Even if we assume that both reports provided by al-Ashʿarī are true, it is still possible to reconcile them. Thus, the creation of objects all at one time could be regarded as latency (\(\textit{kumūn}\)), whereas the continuity of creation at all times could be regarded as appearance (\(\textit{ẓuhūr}\)). According to this model, all beings were created at one time, but they emerge from their hidden places when the time is ripe in what can be understood as the continuity of creation.

Consequently, because we accept that al-Naẓẓām believed in the latency and creation of beings all at one time, it would be appropriate to construe the information regarding the continuity of creation as indicator of the second part of the theory, i.e. appearance (\(\textit{ẓuhūr}\)).

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47 See al-Khayyāṭ, \(\textit{Kitāb al-intiṣār}\), 44.

As he denied the theory of latency, Ibn Ḥazm did not consider creation to be an act that occurred at one time. To him, creation is continuous. He explains that God’s creating something means to bring it into existence out of non-existence, i.e., to generate (produce, *ijād*). Thus, as long as it continues to exist, it is created by God. To say that God is not creating/is continuing to create something that exists now means that it is existent, but God is no longer the creator of it. God constantly creates anything that exists at every time, unless He annihilated it.\(^{49}\) It seems here that Ibn Ḥazm regards the endurance of a being as its continuous creation by God.

The discussion is related, at least in the eye of Ibn Ḥazm, to debates on “creation and what is created” regarding whether creation is identical with what is created or not. Ibn Ḥazm regards the two as identical.\(^{50}\) Because the created thing is identical to the creation, the creation will continue to occur as long as the created being exists. Consequently, creation will be continuous.\(^{51}\) In Ibn Ḥazm’s remarks at the beginning of the chapter on the continuity of creation, we find a hint of his view about the issue when he says, “when we have demonstrated that the creation of anything is identical with it (*inna khalq al-shay’ huwa l-shay’ nafsu*) and that God’s creating anything will continue to occur as long as this being exists…”\(^{52}\)

Another point that led him to this idea is the literal reading of the Scripture on which his system is based. As proof, he refers to the verse “it is We Who created you and gave you shape; then We bade the angels bow down to Adam…” According to Ibn Ḥazm, this verse indicates that God created the soil and water, then Adam and his sons were nourished by what was transformed from the soil and water (*bimā istahāla ‘anhumā*). Consequently, blood came into being as a transformed product of soil and water. Finally, God transformed (*aḥāla*) this blood into semen. Ibn Ḥazm also refers to the verses “…then We developed out of it another creature (man, *khalqa akhbar*)” and “He makes you, in the wombs of your mothers, in stages, one

\(^{49}\) See *Faṣl*, V, 55.

\(^{50}\) See *Faṣl*, V, 40.

\(^{51}\) See also Duncan Black Macdonald, “Continuous re-Creation and Atomic Time in Muslim Scholastic Theology,” *Isis* 9 (1927), 338.

\(^{52}\) See *Faṣl*, V, 55.
after another, (khalqan min ba‘d khalqan) in three veils of darkness.” All of these verses show, he says, that God transforms His creatures at all times.53

As demonstrated, based on the concept of transformation (istiḥāla), Ibn Ḥazm tries to show that beings are in a continuous process of change. He interprets the transformation of beings as the continuity of creation. According to this theory, the object is recreated by God without being annihilated. That is what he calls “new creation (khalq jadīd).”54

Here, we should point to Ibn Ḥazm’s view about al-Nazẓām’s idea of creation. He notes that al-Nazẓām maintained that God created everything all at one time without annihilating it and that his view was criticized by certain unnamed theologians.55 Ibn Ḥazm regards this statement as true, but although he approved of al-Nazẓām’s opinion, Ibn Ḥazm does not necessarily think theoretically in the same way as al-Nazẓām on the issue of creation. As mentioned above, he does not agree with al-Nazẓām on latency.56

An important point to consider is the meaning of the statement, “to create something without annihilating it.” One of the possible interpretations is that it refers to creation theories in classical Islamic theology. We should briefly describe these theories.

Alousi categorizes these theories under two broad headings: i) theories of continuous creation and ii) theories of continuous recreation. According to Alousi, the principal points that differentiate the two categories are the endurance of the accidents and the acceptance of the natural laws of causality. The main representatives of the theory of continuous creation are the Muʿtazilīs, who assert the en-
duration of the accidents and accept the operation of natural laws of causality in beings. Those who support the other theory are the Ashʿarīs, who deny the endurance of accidents and natural causality.\(^{57}\)

The central question here is the endurance of accidents. Namely, can the accidents, or the visible characteristics of things, persist within a substance when they were created once? Or, are they annihilated and then re-created again? According to the Muʿtazila, the accidents endure except for those that, by their nature, cannot. This means that when an accident was created once in a substrate, it remains there. It is annihilated only when its contrary is created. According to the Ashʿariyya, as well as the Māturidiyya, the accidents do not endure. When the accident was created, it does not remain at rest more than an instant before it is annihilated. God recreates that accident, however, in the same substrate, and it continues in this manner (tajaddud al-amthāl, literally, the regeneration of the similars). Thus, the proponents of the second trend believe, in opposition to the Muʿtazilīs, that the accidents are continuously recreated by God rather than created all at once.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{57}\) For more information, see al-Alousi, *The Problem of Creation*, 278-297. When classifying these theories, the author does not consider whether the existence of atoms was accepted. Consequently, the Muʿtazilīs who accept the existence of atoms, theologians who deny it, such as al-Nazzām and Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, and a Muslim philosopher, al-Kindī, who rejected atomism and held the concept of “matter and form,” are categorized as adherents of the same theory, i.e., that of continuous creation. Al-Alousī states that “the main distinction between them being the belief of one group in the idea of the atom, and its rejection by the other.” However, he regards the Ashʿaris, who maintain a similar concept of the atom to the Muʿtazilīs, as the adherents of the theory of continuous re-creation. For a brief analysis of these theories, see Pines, *Madḥhab al-dharra*, 33-34.

\(^{58}\) As al-Alousi pointed out, the different approaches of the schools to the issue of causality partially shaped their views on the endurance of accidents. Thus, because the Ashʿarīs rejected the natural causality and accepted the absolute intervention of God, they came to the opinion that the accidents must be created by God in every instance. However, because they accept the natural causality to some extent, the Muʿtazilīs held that an accident could endure. Therefore, we can consider the endurance of accidents to be the basis for the classification of these approaches.
That is what gives us the reason why theologians held different creation theories. Because the Ashʿarīs believe that accidents are continuously annihilated and recreated, we can label their theory “the theory of continuous recreation.” Because they believe in the endurance of accidents, the Muʿtazilīs do not need to accept continuous recreation. Consequently, with respect to the existence of accidents, the world is continuously annihilated and recreated in the view of the Ashʿarīs. According to the Muʿtazilīs, the world is not annihilated, and when it once was brought into existence, it remains in existence until it is annihilated by God. 59

It could be argued that the statement ascribed to al-Nazzām by Ibn Ḥazm that “God created everything that He created all at one time without annihilating it” refers to the endurance of accidents. Of course, it is quite possible that the unnamed theologians Ibn Ḥazm mentions as being critical of al-Nazzām are the Ashʿarīs, who do not approve of the endurance of accidents. To verify this judgment, however, it should be proven that al-Nazzām accepted the endurance of accidents; however, this view is quite controversial. M. ʿA. Abū Rida says, for example, that al-Nazzām does not accept this theory of en-

59 The difference between these two approaches to the issue of creation is explained in relation to the qualities of accidents. Accordingly, that the accidents do not have endurance and that they are re-created at every time is the starting point for the idea of continuous re-creation. This idea appears to be consistent by itself. Because the accidents are constantly re-created, the creation becomes a continuous act. For another explanation, i.e., that of continuous creation, the idea of the re-creation of accidents does not exist; on the contrary, the accident remains in existence because it was once created. Consequently, at first sight, creation was over and done with, because there is nothing which is continuously re-created. Such an impression is essentially caused by looking at the issue from the perspective of the endurance of accidents. It should be remembered here, however, that the atomist view supposes the continuity of creation. Because at every time something is created in the world, and these created beings are composed of atoms and accidents. Therefore, the term continuous creation should be addressed in a more comprehensive manner. The term continuous re-creation is applied to more specific examples in the scope of continuous creation. Namely, it specifically refers to the continuous re-creation of some components of created beings, i.e., accidents. This particular emphasis distinguishes it from the more general idea of continuous creation. In this regard, the concept of continuous re-creation denotes a special approach under the concept of continuous creation.
Moreover, when he summarizes the theologians’ views on the endurance of accidents, al-Ashʿarī does not mention al-Naẓẓām by name among those who denied the endurance of accidents. Rather al-Ashʿarī places him in a distinct category. Accordingly, al-Naẓẓām accepts only one accident, *movement*, and he asserts that it does not have endurance. Therefore, the problem lies at the very core of the issue. Al-Naẓẓām does not regard as accidents much of what other theologians consider to be accidents. Thus, the explanation appears to be quite problematic because it attempts to describe a theory of the world through the notions that belong to another theory. Furthermore, the only accident whose presence was accepted by al-Naẓẓām does not have endurance. Even if this explanation were approved despite its potential inconsistencies and difficulties, this simply indicates that al-Naẓẓām thinks in a different way from the Ashʿarīs and not that he shares Ibn Ḥazm’s perspective.

Another possible explanation is that the opinion attributed to al-Naẓẓām refers directly to the theory of latency, which seems to be a more reasonable conclusion because the main thesis of the theory, i.e., the creation of beings all at one time, implies that the beings are not annihilated. Seemingly, Ibn Ḥazm considered only the portion of the theory that is compatible with his views, not the whole. Consequently, that Ibn Ḥazm regards the view of al-Naẓẓām as true does not mean that there is an absolute agreement between the two. At first sight, their views seem to be identical: the object is created without being annihilated. However, they reach the same conclusion from different starting points, i.e., from different views on creation. Al-Naẓẓām’s conclusion is based on the connotations of the theory of latency, while that of Ibn Ḥazm is based on the visible appearance of beings and on the presupposition that God continuously intervenes in the world through His power. As has been demonstrated, Ibn

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Hazm approves of the view of al-Nazzām when solely considering the similarity in conclusions reached without paying attention to its theoretical background or without comprehending it completely.

In conclusion, we can say that although Ibn Ḥazm accepted some examples provided in support of the theory of latency, he does not regard it as a theory of nature. This approval does not mean more than that he found these examples to be compatible with his methodology, which is based on the visible facts (i.e. visible appearance of beings). Accordingly, he rejects the theory of latency just as he rejects atomism. Thus, he explains the creation neither within the framework of these theories nor through their concepts. Certainly, he believes that creation is continuous, and in this respect, he concurs with many of the creation theories. This agreement, however, occurs only at the literal level and not in terms of the theoretical background.

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